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Preface and major findings:
the anatomy, the analysis and
the assessment of the ‘beast’
Fifteen into one? is the result of a collective reflection by a group of polit-
ical scientists who are all fascinated and puzzled by the evolution of the
EU system and its major features. The study is part of a two-level research
project for which the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) has given
a grant (WE 954/6–1) within the larger research programme ‘Regieren in
Europa’ (Governance in Europe) co-ordinated by Beate Kohler-Koch,
University of Mannheim. Our particular project aimed to examine if, and
to what extent, the European Union’s political system has changed since
the Maastricht Treaty came into force. The analysis has been pursued at
the ‘Brussels–Strasbourg’ level as well as at the national levels, where we
dealt with the constitutional, institutional, procedural and administrative
adaptation and reaction processes. 
Taking up earlier work by one of the editors, we follow some conven-
tional and some less tried approaches, identify some strange puzzles and
come up with some traditional and some perhaps surprising results. As a
starting point, this project took the demands of a multi-level system seri-
ously. The analysis has therefore been pursued both in the ‘Brussels–
Strasbourg’ space as well as at the level of all fifteen Member States. To
link the evolution in both arenas we decided to follow a neo-institution-
alist approach and – in this line – to take the para-constitutional and
institutional evolution of the EC/EU Treaty as the independent variable.
The central question was: in what way did the treaty amendments and
revisions affect Member States or – to formulate it more concretely – how
have groups of actors in the member states adapted their constitutional,
institutional, procedural and administrative structures to the common and
self-made challenges of the EU polity? 
In a country-by-country account the research group has described and
analysed who participates in which forms and at which stages of the EU
policy-cycle and thus how national actors interact and fit into the Union
system. We also addressed the demand for a dynamic approach and the
need to analyse the integration process over a longer period. Starting from
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the impact of the Treaty on the European Union, we discovered that we
also had to look back to the set-up and situation prevailing before the
European Union was created in Maastricht. 
Another characteristic of our approach was the use of quantitative
trends including especially a systematic comparison of legal provisions
and data about the production patterns and the output of legal acts,
provided in raw data from EC institutions. At the end we were able to
describe the long-term trends of the integration process some over nearly
half a century from the early days of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) until the end of the 1990s. The major findings of this
multi-level and multi-actor analysis point to particular features of the EU
polity with the Member States as constitutive units:
(1) From analysing the institutional and procedural evolution of the
European polity over the last fifty years we realised that the evolution,
amendment and revision of the set-up at the European level have been
considerable. Of specific relevance were five trends in the growth and
differentiation of the EU system. National actors, as masters of treaty-
building, have considerably increased the demands on their own set-ups –
especially through para-constitutional communitarisation, sectoral and
procedural differentiation, institutional and actor differentiation as well
as through the burgeoning scope and density of binding obligations in
form of the acquis communautaire. The data for the 1990s indicate that
these integration processes have not reached a stage of saturation nor even
a ‘local optimum’.
(2) Confronted with these challenges – i.e. the considerable changes
in our key variables – we wondered about the patterns of national reac-
tion. The findings of the country reports indicate clear traces of a broad
and intensive ‘Europeanisation’ of national actors in the institutions of
members states and a ‘domestication’ at the European level. As we –
in contrast to other approaches – define the ambiguous term
‘Europeanisation’ as a shift of attention, we observe that national govern-
ments, administrations, parliaments, regions, interest groups and courts
have mobilised additional resources for their multi-level game. They have
adapted their national machinery and invested time in the EU policy cycle
at both the national and the EU level. Within this persistent trend the
period since the Single European Act (SEA) (1987) has been a time when
more and more national actors discovered the importance of the EC/EU
polity for their own interests. With increasing salience in more and more
sectors national demands for ‘voice’ opportunities have grown exponen-
tially. Using key concepts such as ‘transparency’, ‘democratic deficit’ and
‘legitimacy’ as pretexts for a higher degree of participation, more and
more groups of actors have been included. These processes increase the
degree of complexity of the emerging politico-administrative system.
xiv Preface and major findings
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What thus becomes clear at the turn of the millennium is that the
European Union has been opened by national institutions and actors.
Looking from the other perspective, ‘Europeanisation’ is closely linked
with a ‘domestication’ of EU institutions, rules and behavioural settings.
‘EU-Brussels’ is no longer just an arena for diplomats but for all national
ministries (since 1999 also for defence secretaries) and an increasing range
of policy networks. This process of mutual interaction is significant; it is
not a one-way street. The allocation of competences and the patterns of
mutual participation point to a fusion of both levels. 
(3) Given this rise in salience of the EU level many might find the
vertical asymmetry between ‘Brussels’ and the national capitals surprising.
Fundamental patterns of national policy-making have not changed:
national actors have strengthened existing set-ups to mobilise their
resources for ‘access’ and ‘influence’ over an increasing range of ‘vital’
policy areas and over all phases of the policy cycle. We observe some
limited constitutional revisions, some minor institutional rearrangements
and a lot of procedural and administrative adaptations, but no structural
revolution in the Member States. Actors playing on both levels have been
ingenious in developing incremental devices without creating new major
set-ups at the national level. We could not find indicators of any change
in this ‘conservative’ attitude of major actors. Thus the rate and the degree
of para-constitutional, institutional and procedural amendments and revi-
sions of the EC/EU treaty, our independent variable, has not led to
respective changes in Member States, and this vertical asymmetry between
the two levels is part of the evolution of the EU system.
(4) The latter finding might help to explain another counterintuitive
observation – that of non-convergence among Member States. The rather
uniform patterns of national reactions with regard to the shift of aware-
ness, attention and mobilisation should thus not hide another surprising
pattern: the constitutional, institutional and administrative systems, and
their relative use, have not clided into one – ideal – model of adapting to
the Brussels policy cycle. Given the same kind of institutional and proce-
dural challenges that react on and shape the EU system, the degree
similarity among the ‘Fifteen’ is rather small. Traditional national
patterns are resistant and apparently flexible enough to induce compla-
cency about one’s own performance. Imports of apparently more
competitive set-ups or procedures are rare. Each member state pursues its
own way in the Brussels ‘space’, and a screening of ‘best practices’ is not
pursued on any systematic level.
(5) In spite of a general trend towards an increased engagement in the
EU policy cycle we find a clear horizontal asymmetry among groups of
actors in the adaptation process. Gains and losses in getting access and
influence on both levels are not equally distributed among national actors;
some are more flexible as well as more forceful, and thus more competitive
Preface and major findings xv
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than others. Using a fourfold typology of identifying adaptation patterns
on both the national and the European level, our reading of the national
reports confirms the traditional view that some actors – especially parlia-
ments and some regional administrations – are only weak adaptors
whereas others – such as the head of governments, governmental adminis-
trations and interest groups – have increased their role as strong and active
multi-level players. Though parliaments normally count among the ‘losers’
in the multi-level game some have at least established a position of strong
national adaptors. Though not all effects are directly visible, one conse-
quence is a shift in the internal national balance of powers towards
governments and administrations and thence towards the heads of govern-
ments and finance ministers. 
(6) Unlike at the beginning of our project we are now extremely
cautious about positing an optimal model or blueprint which would offer
‘best practices’ in national adaptation and thus serve as an ideal example
for ‘efficient governance’. Long-established national features make it
extremely difficult to offer any valid statements on which structures and
procedures are more or less ‘fit’ for the multi-level game. Any blueprint
for an optimal model would be both academically invalid and politically
risky. The picture we get from studying the particularities of Member
States makes it clear that imitation by straightforward import would be
subject to the law of unintended and therefore worrying consequences
unless the institutional–procedural environment had been carefully
analysed. The limited use of the experience of other Member States is
therefore a prudent decision. EU applicant countries should thus be
careful in drafting their specific institutional set-up and procedural rules.
Present members offer a broad set of variations, which indicates the
importance of national actors, but they do not necessarily serve as a good
example. Based on these reflections this study refrains from offering a
model case for the ideal member of a ‘XXL Union’ of 25 or more
members. One general conclusion, however, is evident for institutional
strategies: all existing plans which propose changes in the Treaty text
without discussing national reaction patterns will remain superficial and
may lead to damaging and even counterproductive results.
(7) As a consequence of the dynamic and comparative approach
Fifteen into one? also tries to contribute to a dynamic theory on the evolu-
tion of the (West) European states. Exploiting conventional integration-
related theories – in our case, studies of (neo-)realist, (neo-)federal/neo-
functional, governance and fusion issues – we found stimulating offers
and insights in each of them. Our findings stress, however, that nation
states are neither strengthened or ‘rescued’ in their traditional set-ups. The
evolution of the national and the European level does not follow any clear
path towards a discernible ‘finalité politique’. We are thus observing
the creation of a new kind of polity, a mixture of ‘Europeanisation’ and
xvi Preface and major findings
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‘domestication’ as described by the fusion thesis. These trends indicate a
new stage in the evolution of West European states, with the EU level as
a major component. 
The analysis of the ‘Fifteen’ and the ‘One’ could not have been carried out
without the help of the contributors. Each of them has dealt for many
years with the effects of the process of European integration in his or her
particular member state. As is necessary in a volume of this kind, special
efforts were made to standardise individual chapters. We therefore
discussed the analytical approach and preliminary results during a work-
shop at the Europa Centre, Bonn, in February 1999 and tried to scrutinise
the contributions against a common checklist. 
Special thanks should go to Simon Bulmer who linked the editors to the
publisher and who gave further helpful advice. We received constructive
comments and criticism on earlier drafts of our paper on ‘Governance in
the EU after Maastricht’ from Arthur Benz, Armin von Bogdandy,
Geoffrey Edwards, Hans-Ulrich Derlien, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Francis
Jacobs, Thomas Jäger, Christian Joerges, Beate Kohler-Koch, Dietmar
Nickel, Charles Reich, Roger Scully, Michael Shackleton, Peter
Schiffauer, Helen Wallace and Michael Zürn. We are very grateful to our
student researchers Jana Fleschenberg, Astrid Krekelberg, Martina Kroll
and Sonja Siegert, who helped us in establishing the necessary data bases
and in editing the volume. Christine Agius and Richard Whitaker helped
us to polish the English. Finally, we would like to thank Pippa Kenyon
and Nicola Viinikka from Manchester University Press for their patience
and comments. 
The relations between Member States and the European Union are an
never-ending story. The contributions were written in 2000 and may not
therefore encompass subsequent changes in national arrangements. The
editors are already planning their next edition on a Union with some
twenty countries and working within the constitutional and institutional
set-up after further steps in treaty-building. Our joint search into the
future indicates another function of this volume. We hope that it offers
useful reflections for the applicant countries on how to make their systems
‘fit’ for a successful and competitive life inside the ‘Brussels + X’
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1 Wolfgang Wessels, Andreas Maurer and Jürgen Mittag 
The European Union and Member
States: analysing two arenas over time 
Our puzzles: traditional approaches and beyond
Fifteen into one? takes up traditional approaches to political science.
Since Aristotle it has been considered useful to compare constitutional
and institutional dimensions of polities and not least to discuss ‘optimal’
models of policy-making. In view of the European Union’s multi-level and
multi-actor polity, we add to a vast literature1 by highlighting the
complex procedural and institutional set-up of nation states preparing
and implementing decisions made by the institutions of the European
Community (EC). 
Unlike volumes on the general structure and culture of European polit-
ical systems, this volume focuses on reactions and adaptations to a
challenge which is common to all – i.e. the policy-cycle of the Union. We
thus intend to explore structural commonalities and differences with a
common point of reference. Fifteen traditional systems and their varia-
tions may be better explained when the comparison is based on the fact
that they are reacting to the same challenge. In looking at the emerging
and evolving realities of the European polity we are interested in how
European institutions and Member States (re-)act and interact in a new
institutional and procedural set-up. Thus, our major puzzle is: how do
governmental and non-governmental actors in different national settings
– involving different national traditions – adapt to common challenges,
constraints and opportunities for which they are mainly themselves
responsible? 
Given the features and the dynamics of the evolution of the EU system,
we expect to find generally observable trends in the ways that national
systems meet the demands of the Union. How do actors perform when
they become objects and subjects of the same interaction structure?
Fifteen into one? aims to offer a mixture of conventional and specific
analyses and insights for different groups of readers. For scholars of inter-
national relations, European integration and comparative politics, these
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evolutions are of specific interest:2 they involve looking at both the
national level, as in comparative studies,3 and at the European level, as in
integration-related approaches.4
We thus try to identify from our comparative research some general
trends that can be drawn from our analysis of the Member States. These
expectations are based on the assumption that, in response to para-consti-
tutional changes – the SEA, the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties
– national institutions and actors will have altered their roles, rules and
interaction patterns during the period of research. Are we witnessing –
owing to the similar pressure for adaptation in each Member State – a
trend towards a common and unique model, or rather towards the rein-
forcement of existing divergences? Will national institutions converge
towards one multi-level EU system or will national variations remain? Are
the institutions resistant to change or are they subject to a trend of
‘Europeanisation’? Does a consideration of national institutions enable us
to draw some final conclusions on the future of the Member States – that
is, will the European choir sing with one voice or will there still be fifteen
distinct sounds in future?
The ‘One’: evolution into what? 
Fifteen into one? goes beyond a strictly comparative approach of academic
curiosity. It deals with the issue of how traditional institutions of the West
European nation states are shaped by becoming part of one new and differ-
ent polity. This issue is of growing relevance as frequent institutional and
procedural revisions and amendments of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) have provided the Union’s members with additional rights and obli-
gations. With respect to their history, West European states have – in the
last half of the twentieth century – created a new and particular kind of
political system, which offers opportunities and incentives for making
public policies beyond the borders of individual countries.
We follow the conventional wisdom that in studying the EU polity it is
also necessary to look at the national – constitutive – parts of the EU
system. Since the early days of studying the integration process it became
obvious that the political system of the Member States could not be
treated as a ‘black box’, which would be irrelevant for the Brussels arena.5
As a logical consequence academics and practitioners have chosen to
analyse how national governments, parliaments and interest groups react
on the national level.6
Major areas of decision-making have shifted partly or mainly from the
state arenas to the EU ‘space’ in recent years. Many key issues – of utmost
political sensitivity – have become part of the subject matter of the
European Union. Even if one discounts how the features of ‘governance’
in the emerging EU political system have been analytically appraised by
academic scholars,7 one fact has become obvious: the European integra-
4 Introduction
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tion process has had a significant impact on the characteristics of national
political systems. This is not merely because the individual Member States
have to implement Community legislation, but also – and even more
importantly – because national institutions are increasingly involved in
preparing and making binding decisions. Within the individual Member
States there is an ongoing reaction to the challenges of the evolving EU
system. National institutions have made substantial efforts to cope with
the self-made and challenging devices of the European Union. Some indi-
cators highlight the validity of the impact of the European Union for the
national political systems.
Within the Union, institutions take decisions which are binding on the
fifteen Member States and their citizens. The dynamics of recent decades
are considerable: in amending the original treaty via the SEA (1987), the
Maastricht (1993) and Nice (2001) versions of the EU Treaty, Member
States – acting as ‘masters of the treaties’8 – have enlarged the scope of
policy fields for common activities. They have added new articles which
define specific competencies and procedures (from 86 in the EEC treaty of
1957 to 254 in the EU Nice Treaty of 2001) and have revised again and
again the institutional and procedural set-up. The overall output of their
activity – taking various forms from regulations and directives towards
legislative programme decisions and non-binding recommendations – has
evolved from 1952 to 1998 towards a total of 52,799 legal acts in
December 1998. Many of these decisions apply to relatively short time
periods or are regularly replaced by new legislation.9 If we focus on the
total amount of ‘legislation in force’ – the ‘acquis communautaire’ with
which the Member States must comply and which applicant countries
have to adopt – we observe a smaller number of legal acts, but even the
acquis communautaire more than doubled from 4,566 legal acts in 1983
to 9,767 in 1998 (Figure 1.1). 
In other words, the treaties and their policy provisions have been exten-
sively exploited by the Member States acting jointly within the Council of
Ministers and with the European Commission and – to a growing extent
– together with the European Parliament (EP).10
The ‘Fifteen’: ‘Europeanisation’ as a key feature of mutual reinforcement
The Union is considered to have made a marked difference to its
constituent units. In this way, the ‘masters of the treaties’ challenge their
other role as ‘masters of their own constitution’. Although Member States
have been the architects of the emerging EU system, the challenges for
their own traditional polity were and are considerable. Not only has the
scope and intensity of EU decision-making increased, but also its
complexity. It is thus not surprising that national actors of several kinds
and levels have pursued different strategies to retain or even increase their
say – at both the European and the national or regional level. This volume
Analysing the European Union and Member States 5
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points to a considerable variety in these approaches. Through various
loops of push–pull dynamics between the European and the national
levels, the struggle for a voice11 has even increased the institutional and
procedural differentiation in the national as in the European arenas.
Consequently, we anticipate that we shall witness a further stage in the
evolution of the West European state.12
Comparative studies of the fifteen political systems of EU Member
States can thus no longer remain separate from the emerging ‘One’ – i.e.
the evolution of the Union. The exclusion of the European dimension
from research into the major trends of national systems will increasingly
lead to distorted results. 
Fifteen into one? thus discusses the ‘into’ – i.e. the actual process of
integration and what we call ‘Europeanisation’. Europeanisation of
national actors and procedures is measured first by a shift of attention and
participation.13 With regard to its processual character, ‘Europeanisation’
means ‘the incremental process of reorienting the shape of politics to the
degree that EC/EU political and economic dynamics become integral parts
of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making’.14 At
one extreme, ‘Europeanisation’ could lead to a full synchronisation of
national politics with EC/EU imperatives. National institutions would
turn into strong multi-level players using their access and influence in
one arena for improving their role in others. Actors would profit from a
mutually reinforcing virtuous circle, upgrading or at least retaining the
opportunities to have a say in ‘their’ European business. 
6 Introduction
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the European Union’s legislation in force, 1983–98
Source: Directories of Community Legislation in Force (Luxembourg, 1984–99, December
issues).
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In order to analyse these tendencies we have developed a typology
which differentiates between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ adapters at both the
national and the ‘Brussels’ level.15 Developing this approach, the chapters
on the Member States in Part II examine the governmental and non-
governmental structures of institutional adaptation. How, and to what
extent, have these actors shifted their attention to ‘Brussels’? 
Given that time is a scarce resource for political actors, the creation,
and especially the use, of institutions and procedures which provide
linkage to the EU machinery should be seen as relevant. But relevant for
what? What we cannot offer, with the modest means we have available, is
a socio-psychological analysis of the attitudes and belief systems of the
individuals involved.16 We assume that they learn more about Brussels
and their partners in Europe – an important part of some kind of commu-
nity-building,17 but we must be careful about our conclusions – in terms
both of the evaluation of the common endeavour and of the behaviour of
the actors involved. Nevertheless, the chapters on the Member States in
Part II indicate that those elites involved in the EU policy-cycle seem to
develop some kind of positive ‘orientation’18 towards European gover-
nance; they certainly invest a considerable amount of their time in dealing
with the Brussels–Strasbourg arena.
Linking two arenas
In analysing this process we focus on two research areas – the European
and the national – and compare evolutions on the European level with
those in the national setting. In this regard, several developments point to
a kind of ‘parallel’ and simultaneous evolution owing to the creation and
use of opportunity structures at the EU level. The evolution of the Council
and of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and its
related working groups went hand in hand with the creation of
‘European’ departments in more and more ministries of the Member
States. Similarly, new demands for joint problem-solving induced institu-
tional differentiation in the Commission (new Directorates General), the
Council (new Council formations) and in the Member States (new services
within existing ministries). To a certain extent direct elections to the EP
and the successive allocation of powers to Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) have generated the institutionalisation of European
Affairs Committees in the parliaments of the Member States. Early
attempts at regional and structural policies induced institutionalisation
processes at both the European and the national as well as the regional
levels. Institutional adaptations to a changed or changing environment are
reactions to demand ‘pulls’ from the Brussels arena, which are by them-
selves the results of the ‘push’ of actors from Member States. In other
words, multi-level governance creates a ‘loop’ of adaptation. 
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‘Fifteen’ and the ‘One’: a new kind of relationship?
Fifteen into one? aims to provoke a debate on what the evolution of the
state in Western Europe will look like. Will the EU bodies dilute and
replace national institutions which are the product of centuries-old evolu-
tions and revolutions? Or will the latter dominate the Union without
being seriously affected by the Brussels arena in their day-to-day activi-
ties? Thus as shapers which are not shaped by themselves, the ‘Fifteen’
would remain unaffected by a rather less important or even marginalised
‘One’. Or have the ‘masters of the treaties’ created additional and essen-
tial incentives to alter their own politico-administrative set-up in order to
strengthen their problem-solving capacity? Several actors would then have
to mobilise energy and attention in order to play a game in an arena which
offers more effective instruments for solving problems. For this purpose
they have to gain additional material knowledge, procedural skills and
political sensitivity. National actors have to enlarge their channels for
action and their style of interaction. Existing machineries will at the same
time increase their functional differentiation and their co-operation mech-
anisms. The ‘One’ would become a major force for the evolution of the
‘Fifteen’. Thus, the very process of European integration raises the even
more demanding issue of linking trends on both arenas in a multi-level
analysis.19 Fifteen into one? is thus more than a comparative study: it
raises the issue of how a linkage between several levels of government can
be established within a novel mode of governance beyond the nation state. 
Such an issue is not only of academic interest. If the constituent corner-
stones of the EU system – the ‘Fifteen’ and the ‘One’ – become more
heterogeneous, the structures, processes and networks which link the
different branches and layers of governance will become even more
complex for the policy-makers as well as for the citizenry. 
Which direction? Expectations from theories
To orient our analysis we look at a set of theory-led expectations about
the evolution, the patterns and their impact on Member States and their
structural frameworks for the EC/EU policy-cycle.20 The ‘acquis acade-
mique’ on European integration delivers an ever-increasing variety in the
concepts and terms used for identifying major characteristics of the
EC/EU. It seems that Donald Puchala’s elephant21 is apparently a beast
with more and more parts which are quite often looked upon separately.
But there seems to be a broad consensus that although the elephant is
slow-moving, he is still far from moribund. 
One can distinguish between approaches which concern the conceptu-
alisation of the EU’s organisational nature, the actual process of
integration, and specific policies, institutions and decision-making
networks. Among the most prominent concepts include those referring to
8 Introduction
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the Union as a ‘quasi-state’,22 a ‘regulatory state’,23 or a ‘supranational
federation’.24 Perhaps highest on the current political science list are the
conceptual models of multi-level,25 supranational,26 network (without
government),27 ‘polycratic’28 or multi-tiered governance.29 Other terms
identify core features, such as ‘layered intergovernmentalism’,30 ‘deliber-
ative supranationalism’31 and ‘multi-level constitutionalism’32 or
concentrate on the Union’s political and socio-economic processes follow-
ing the Treaty of Maastricht. 
This range of characterisations demonstrates the difficulties in applying
the traditional categories of territorial ‘state’ and ‘international organisa-
tion’.33 However, in spite of the manifold approaches which refer to
governance in the Union as ‘sui generis’, there is one common feature
which almost all scholars of European integration studies share: unlike
other international organisations, the EC/EU system takes binding deci-
sions which affect the way of life of its citizenry. Legal acts – regulations,
directives, decisions, etc. – and the evolution of the actors involved in the
production of commonly defined measures, are thus major characteristics
of the EC/EU construction. They can therefore be used as significant indi-
cators for the evolution of the political system34 which is permitted to
authoritatively allocate values.35 Given that we identify this feature
almost everywhere within the ruling paradigms, we can link these charac-
teristics with traditional elements of political science and in particular the
political system approach.36
Whatever the language used, political scientists and lawyers classify the
EC/EU as a system for joint decision-making in which actors from two or
more levels of governance interact in order to solve common (and
commonly identified) problems. Whereas the areas of co-operation and
integration were originally restricted to the coal and steel industry and its
related labour markets, the European Union of the third millennium
pertains to a much wider scope of potential action: nearly every field of
traditional state activity can become subject to policy-making beyond the
nation state. The intensive research on operating networks, single institu-
tions and policy fields as well as on multi-level governance has
contributed considerably to our understanding of the post-Maastricht
system. But what kind of systemic dynamics can we observe in an overall
view over the last fifty years?
(Neo-)functional and (neo-)federal expectations: downgrading and
superseding national actors
From the well-known neo-functional or neo-federal lines of argument one
could expect a linear or even exponential growth in the making of a sui
generis European polity, i.e. a rather smooth process upwards towards
some kind of a federal union. In this case, the very nature of integration
follows the stimulating definition, which describes ‘the process whereby
Analysing the European Union and Member States 9
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political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift
their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is
expected to lead to a new political community, superimposed over the
pre-existing ones.’37 The main feature of integration here is the concept of
functional, institutional and procedural spillover: a process which refers
‘to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a
situation which the original goal can be assured only by taking further
actions, which in turn create a further condition and need for more action,
and so forth’.38 Consequently, spillover gradually involves ‘more and
more people, call[s] for more and more inter-bureaucratic contact and
consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favour of later decisions,
meeting, in a pro-community direction, the new problems which grow out
of the earlier compromises’.39
Neo-functionalism would thus predict that actors tend to expand the
scope of mutual commitment and intensify their commitment to the orig-
inal sector(s).40 In the view of this approach, the revisions of the European
treaties are the legally sanctioned products of spillover processes which
provide the EU institutions with more exclusive powers for shaping
outputs which bind the Member States. The latter accept their roles as
part of a process the final outcome of which is not fixed. The ‘finalité’
is not officially declared. Neo-functional spillover or Hallstein’s
‘Sachlogik’41 within policy fields and from one policy area into another
would lead to a widening of the functional scope of EC/EU law – i.e. to
an increasing number of treaty provisions for a growing number of policy
fields. The EC/EU-related structures and procedures of Member States
would be oriented to an emerging supranational bureaucracy.42 The latter
would be expected to act as a ‘political promoter’ which formulates far-
reaching policy agendas, articulates ideals and brokers strategies for the
deepening of the integration process. The influence of national actors
would wither away.
According to federalist thinking, national actors’ struggle for access,
voice and veto powers, e.g. for an effective control of the Brussels arena,
has not been, is not and will not become, successful.43 Instead, Member
States’ institutions and actors will become increasingly marginalised and
substituted by EC/EU bodies. Such Member State institutions will be
transformed from arenas for national actors into autonomous bodies
replacing national influence. Each step of treaty (constitution)-building
would increase the role of supranational institutions and decrease the veto
powers of Member States. The behavioural pattern of the Council of
Ministers would be dominated by the use of articles which allow for
qualified majority voting (QMV). Where the treaty permits strong parlia-
mentary involvement, co-decision would replace other weaker procedures
10 Introduction
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for parliamentary participation. Those EU-related bodies which bring the
national actors together (Council, COREPER and its related working
groups) would be seen as primarily serving parochial national interests
and as a limited part of a proper federal system which alone could guar-
antee efficient, effective and legitimate European policies. Concomitantly,
the attempts of national administrations to lock into the EC/EU system of
a supranational governance evolving towards a real government are
rejected as a strategy against the real will of the European people (demos)
and the desirable path to a federal union.44 In this view the EP is a key
institution of the constitutional set-up of the (future) EU government.
Federalism assumes a legitimate supranational order in which the EP
formulates far-reaching policy agendas, articulates ideals and brokers
strategies for the deepening of the integration process. As weak adapters,
the national actors – governments, administrations and their EC/EU-
related agencies – would be downgraded to secondary actors.
(Neo-)realist assumptions: strengthening or rescuing the nation state
In contrast to this approach (neo-)realist thinking conceives the sovereign
nation state as the authoritative actor in cross-border interaction.45
Although various intrastate actors participate in the making of political
decisions, the nation state is identified as a unified defender of clearly
defined interests and preferences.46 Following neo-realist assumptions, the
Union and its institutional set-up are products of a general strategy of
national governments and their administrations to gain and to keep influ-
ence vis-à-vis other countries.47 ‘The fundamental goal of states in any
relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative
capabilities.’48 Within the framework of the Union, the principal task of
Member States is to retain their supremacy as ‘masters of the Treaties’.49
National actors defend and shape an institutional balance favouring the
Council and – to a growing extent – the European Council. The Council’s
infrastructure is then considered as an addition to national institutions
sharing the control of the Commission’s activities and thus preventing an
evolution towards an unrestrained supranational bureaucracy: ‘The influ-
ence of supranational actors is generally marginal, limited to situations
where they have strong domestic allies.’50 The style of European law-
making is characterised by conflict between Member States in which
zero-sum games predominate. Accordingly, the behavioural pattern of
actors in the Council of Ministers would be characterised by unanimous
decision-making and distributive – ‘quid-pro-quo’ – bargaining.
Strictly Realist expectations for post-‘Maastricht’ developments stress
that the 1989 ‘geopolitical revolution’ and the subsequent radical trans-
formation of the international system makes West European integration
look like a child of the Cold War period.51 From this perspective the
Maastricht Treaty was already outdated at the time of its signature.
Analysing the European Union and Member States 11
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Neo-realists, however, could interpret ‘Maastricht’ as the product of a
new ‘integrative balancing’52 between Member States. The provisions of
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) would reconstitute the ultimate
power of Member States: more veto rights for Member States, a benign
neglect of the EP and reduced influence for the European Commission. The
use of ‘Maastricht’ and its new or revised provisions – however suprana-
tional they might look – will follow an intergovernmental regime of
domination by national governments. With regard to the EP, Member
States would rather try to exclude MEPs than allow the involvement of a
new set of actors who are difficult to control. Instead, neo-realism would
expect national parliaments to provide the necessary means for democratic
scrutiny of EU business. National administrations would be regarded as
essential in maintaining the ‘institutional balance’ and overall legitimacy in
the Union. The interaction style between the two levels of a co-operative
governance would follow a model of diplomatic administration. Civil
servants – usually seconded from foreign ministries and prime ministerial
departments – would prevent any attempts among supranational actors to
gain influence. Thus national administrations remain the key protagonists,
strengthening or at least ‘rescuing the nation state’.53 The European
Commission and the EP would remain ‘weak’ European actors.
Unlike classic realism, the liberal intergovernmentalist variant of neo-
realism analyses the construction of national preference-building.
‘National interests are . . . neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerge
through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for politi-
cal influence, national and transnational coalitions form . . . new political
influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy
alternatives are recognised by governments.’54 The analysis of the config-
uration of national interests therefore includes a consideration of how
groups of actors beyond the core of governments and administrations
steer the definition or – as regards public opinion – the background of
interests and preferences: ‘Groups articulate preferences; governments
aggregate them.’55 Liberal intergovernmentalism therefore shares the
(neo-)realist assumption of the centrality of Member States’ actors within
the EC/EU and it explicitly ‘denies the historical and path dependent
quality of integration’,56 which neo-functionalism stresses as the rationale
behind the very process of ‘supranational governance’57 in the Union. In
following these assumptions, few national institutions would become
‘strong’ multi-level players, most would simply have to play the role of
strong national actors. 
Views of governance approaches: polycentric, non-hierarchical multi-
level co-ordination
In view of the major approaches within the modern (i.e. post-1989) school
of governance, the institutional and procedural changes in the EU treaties
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should be analysed as one particular element of rather minor relevance
within the complex multi-level game of the Union. The EU polity is seen as
a ‘post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent’ arrangement of authority
which supersedes the limits of the nation state.58 Assuming a non-hierar-
chical decision-making process, the EU does matter but only as one realm
of collective decision-making and implementation. In other words, ‘policy-
making in the Community is at its heart a multilateral inter-bureaucratic
negotiation marathon’.59 Given that formal and informal networks60
among different groups of actors are the decisive arenas for decision-
making, formal rules are generally seen as a less important factor. 
The ‘governance-inspired’ pendulum thesis then assumes some kind of
cyclical up and down between ‘fusion and diffusion’.61 This ‘pattern of
the pendulum varies over time and across issues, responding to little
endogenous and exogenous factors, and including shifts between dynam-
ics and static periods or arenas of co-operation’.62 With ‘Maastricht’ as a
more permanent fixture, this to-ing and fro-ing63 leads to an ‘unstable
equilibrium’64 where trends of ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘re-nationalisation’
come into close competition. In clear contrast to neo-realism and inter-
governmentalism, some contributions of multi-level governance would
conceive the EP as an active player in the game. ‘Irrespective of whether
the EP provides legitimacy of European executive decisions, it certainly
interferes with the negotiating process.’65 It can, and sometimes does,
overturn the results of negotiation in and around the Commission and the
Council. ‘Maastricht’ would not however constitute a major structural
change for the daily governance of the Union. Even if the EP is seen as
‘perhaps the largest net beneficiary of the institutional changes in the
TEU’,66 multi-level governance would not view the EP as a key player in
the EU arena. 
From the perspective of this school of thought, Member States are not
seen as unified actors. Rather, they are viewed as arenas of collective deci-
sion/preparation and implementation, thus indicating a new stage for
both administrations and for the state. European governance therefore
contributes to a ‘decrease in the unilateral steering by government, and
hence an increase in the self-governance of networks’.67 National actors
follow a plurality of different adaptation strategies and so we would
expect to see weak and strong multi-level players. In any case the monop-
oly of the state in steering this process would wane. Accordingly, we
would expect an ‘erosion’ of the traditional politico-administrative
systems of nation states and a shift of the EU towards a new ‘middle
ages’68 of overlapping complex authority structures and divided loyalty
configurations. We would then discover a ‘post-modern state’69 in a ‘post-
national constellation’.70 Eventually, national administrations might need
to rearrange their relationship with both the Union and the national core
channels for policy-making. 
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The fusion view: Europeanisation and communitarisation
The fusion theory71 goes beyond the analysis of integration at a given (set
of) time(s) and tries to offer tools for understanding the dynamics of the
EU system over time. It regards EU institutions and procedures as core
channels and instruments by which national governments and adminis-
trations, as well as other public and private actors, increasingly pool and
share public resources from several levels to attain commonly identified
goals. Institutional and procedural growth and differentiation – starting
from the ECSC – signals and reflects a growing participation of several
actors from different levels, which is sometimes overshadowed by cyclical
ups and downs in the political and public mood. However, each ‘up’ leads
to a ratchet effect by which the level of activities in the valley of day-to-
day politics will have moved to a higher plateau of a supranational
communitarisation. The major feature of this process is a transfer and a
‘fusion’ of public instruments from several state levels linked with the
respective ‘Europeanisation’ of national actors and institutions. The steps
of treaty-building are typical products of the attempt by the ‘masters of
the treaties’ to improve their capacity for effective problem-solving and,
at the same time, for retaining and even improving their national ‘voice’.
The result is a new degree of institutional and procedural complexity
which is documented in the treaties. From this view the legal output
would be expected to increase; the EP would become a real ‘co-legisla-
tor’,72 and the speed of decision-making would depend on procedural
frameworks, national and cross-national interest formation as well as on
external pressure. 
On the national level the fusion thesis suggests a significant trend
towards ‘Europeanisation’.73 EU policy-making thus triggers institutional
adaptation in the Member States and alters domestic rules and the inter-
institutional distribution of the means for effective participation in
European governance. National and regional actors are socialised into the
EU legislative process, and continue to adapt to the procedures. Thus, in
this view, institutions from both arenas would become strong multi-level
players, able and willing to pursue an ongoing positive-sum game. 
Grasping the ‘One’ and the ‘Fifteen’: on method and approach
In a historic retro-perspective, as well as in terms of shaping the future of
Europe, the subject of our research is both rather unique and yet also ‘in
the making’. We therefore face a dual methodological challenge: that of
analysing a rather unfamiliar polity which at the same time has not
remained static but is undergoing considerable change. Unless we focus on
the process, we risk missing some basic features of the dynamics of
European integration. Static analyses and evaluations might be outdated
by the time of their publication.
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The quantitative exploration of the ‘One’
Our approach is to analyse expectations of how national actors have
behaved in EU governance after ‘Maastricht’. The method applied is
deduced from our reading of historical neo-institutionalist theory.74 We
thus use a ‘macro-political’ perspective within a systematic institutional
framework that transcends policy fields and permits an analysis of the
Union’s politico-administrative system and its procedural features over
time. In this first step75 we focus on the evolution of the para-constitu-
tional and institutional set up and of the de facto use of legal and
procedural instruments at the disposal of Member States and EU institu-
tions. We look at the essential features for understanding the actual
process of EC/EU integration and co-operation as well as at the different
devices used to shape the ‘legal’ constitution of the Union. Accordingly,
we proceed to analyse the effective use of structures for joint problem-
solving by the key actors concerned. We try to give answers to the
question whether para-constitutional revisions, such as Treaty amend-
ments, matter and how they matter for the set-up and evolution of
policy-making structures. Finally, we use the results to readdress the ques-
tion of whether integration-related approaches provide evidence to
support some of the theoretical assumptions elaborated by the academic
community.
For the purpose of this volume these trends are taken as independent
variables. In Part II, we look at how national institutions and intermedi-
ary actors (re-)act to the constraints and challenges from the EC/EU level. 
Taking issues seriously: considering the fifteen ‘national appendages’ of
the moving ‘beast’ 
Our analysis focuses on the overall relevance of the EU evolution for each
national system. The central question which arises is: does, and in partic-
ular how does, the Union matter for the national systems in general? After
a brief overview of the historical path of the respective country into the
European integration process, each chapter in Part II refers to the basic
attitudes towards, and concepts of, European integration in the Member
State, and also considers parties, interest groups and public opinion,
which potentially play important parts in the formation of a European
polity. In this context, special attention is given to the development of
public opinion. Apart from (neo-)functionalist approaches – which tend
to stress only the role of elites – we must also take into account the role
of the citizenry in European affairs because ‘public opinion applies not
just to formal processes of regional integration or specifically to the devel-
opment of the European Community but applies right along the
continuum of internationalised governance’.76 What is the attitude of the
general public in the national systems towards the European Union? How
is this orientation expressed? Has the mindset changed over the years?
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The analysis leads to the question of whether there are substantial differ-
ences between individual Member States and how these background
variables might affect the politico-administrative set-up. Thus, we consid-
ered it essential to link fundamental patterns of Member States’ positions
on the European Union with the efforts of governments, parliaments,
administrations, regions and courts to adapt to European integration.
This issue is highly salient: how do Eurosceptic states fare in the multi-
level game? 
Closely linked to the issue of public opinion is the analysis of political
parties and party systems. In connecting the state with society and inter-
est groups, parties act either as intermediary structures, which express
society’s interests and needs,77 or as a ‘linkage between institutions and
constituencies within the Polity’.78 Parties represent, aggregate, articulate
and adapt conflicts, acting on the basis of social cleavages. With regard to
West European societies, these cleavages are subject to ongoing change.
Thus, another requirement is to show how far the European integration
process has affected parties and party systems. Has European integration
led to ideological changes at the national party level79 or is the traditional
set of cleavages complemented by a European cleavage – leading to a
system of anti- and pro-integrationist parties? 
Interest groups provide another link between state and society. How do
such groups react to the European integration process? How do they
formulate concepts and strategies with regard to secondary EU legisla-
tion? Are they still orientated towards the national level or do they devote
more attention to European issues? 
If parties and other intermediary actors shape the ‘background’ of
interests and preferences we also need to look at specific national priori-
ties with regard to European integration. Given the socio-economic
heterogeneity of and the geographical distance between Member States,
one could expect different governmental interests with regard to
European integration policy projects. Thus, we also look at the questions:
since ‘Maastricht’, and in comparison to the pre-Maastricht era, what are
the main policy areas of the Member States? Which European topics are
discussed in national debates? Is there any evidence to suggest that major
political events or national conflicts – such as national elections, changes
in government, etc. – produce important changes in the tone or style of EU
policy-making at the national level? 
National adaptation: structures and procedures for European policy-
making
A second – and, for us, highly salient – set of questions concerning the
Member State level relates to the national structures and decision-making
processes in relation the European Union and its institutional framework.
The fifteen chapters on the Member States in Part II explore the roles and
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behaviour of institutions in the national policy-cycle, i.e. from the
perspective of the national – and, where relevant, from the regional – capi-
tals. The focus will be on the extent and intensity of participation by
national institutions in the process of preparing, making, implementing
and controlling EC/EU-generated decisions. Our central question is: to
what extent are national institutions involved in the policy-cycle of the
European Union? We look both at the Member States and how they inter-
act with Community bodies. Special attention is given to the impact of the
(Maastricht) Treaty on the European Union. Did ‘Maastricht’ matter for
the single Member States, at least those twelve signatory states of the EU
treaty? What constitutional, institutional and procedural changes have
taken place since ‘Maastricht’? How relevant are the EC/EU oriented
procedures as well as the institutional and administrative set-ups for the
Member States and for their constituencies? What highlights – in quanti-
tative as well as in qualitative terms – can we observe with regard to what
is new or what seems to be strange in individual Member States? Has the
Maastricht Treaty had any major impacts, such as leading to the estab-
lishment of new administrative units and co-ordinating bodies? 
In this second step, opening up the ‘black box’ of the EU-related policy-
cycle involves analysing the patterns of interaction between governments,
parliaments, administrations, regional entities, constitutional courts and
other actors, while bearing in mind how allies and competitors perform in
the political space. The chapters in Part II describe who is involved at each
stage of the policy-cycle. 
We thus look into the manner in which the ‘established’ members
shaped their institutions and procedures in the light of the major consti-
tutional amendments and revisions of the (Maastricht) Treaty. As for the
Member States that joined as part of the 1995 enlargement (Austria,
Finland and Sweden), the authors analyse both the institutional–
procedural structures and the adaptation and transformation processes. 
The investigations in Part II also refer to the co-operation and interac-
tion of national bodies with the European institutions in the Brussels
sphere. We analyse how national institutions, especially governments or
administrations, deal with European affairs. In this regard, the involve-
ment of national parliaments in European affairs and the subsequent
changes affecting the procedures of national parliaments is also exam-
ined.80 How do national parliaments deal with European affairs,
particularly since ‘Maastricht’? Which methods of parliamentary partici-
pation have been used? With regard to regional actors the authors studied
which channels of information and policy co-ordination have been set up
by regional institutions. Finally, we take a look at the constitutional
complaints and judgements of national (constitutional) courts and their
interpretations. 
We want to know if and how some well-known specifics of some
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member countries survived the 1990s. Did the Danish parliament secure
its gatekeeper role? What is the updated record of the renewed SGCI,
which gained the reputation of representing an efficient, centralised
system in France? How much success have the German Länder really
achieved in the march towards Brussels and Bonn/Berlin? Which formula
of national participation in the EC/EU policy process have the Swedish or
the Austrian systems adhered to? 
The search for best practices: what lessons can be learned?
One intriguing issue frequently present in political and academic debates
is the question of the ‘best practice’ of adaptation to the EC/EU structures.
Comparing the structures and processes in the fifteen Member States, we
examine the national institutions in terms of a comparative performance
test. Based on our findings, the foremost question of Part II is how well
the individual Member States have adapted. Can we identify Member
States which look more efficient than others? Why do some states succeed
and others fail to reach their goals? Have the national institutions under-
taken serious innovations? Thus, do the common challenges of handling
the Brussels set-up lead national systems to adopt similar methods of
organising the essential constitutional and institutional dimensions of
their polity? Or do the reactions to these challenges lead to a strengthen-
ing of national approaches so that the traditional specifics of Member
States turn out to be more relevant than the similarities?
For both the next round of newcomers to the Union and for the found-
ing members we take up Aristotle’s vocation of going beyond description
and analysis towards discussing improvements. If we focus on the multi-
ple ways in which Member States have developed their systems, can we
identify an optimal model which would serve as a reference point, or do
we need to be more modest? 
This enquiry refers to the debate about whether certain actors and –
more importantly – whether certain Member States are more able than
others to attain their goals or to cope with the challenges coming from the
EU level. Is there a model of the most competitive Member State or insti-
tutional actor which might therefore serve as a point of reference for other
members and for the institutional and procedural designs of the newcom-
ers? Have institutional features such as the role of the Danish parliament,
the UK cabinet system or the strategies of the German Länder served as
models for other Member States? Remarks about the ‘unfair’ advantages
of some partners are not unknown in Community circles. The Council’s
internal debates about necessary reforms to streamline the co-ordination
among its various formats and subordinated bodies lead directly to the
question about which national model(s) of EC/EU-related policy co-ordi-
nation would fit(s) into an arena of twenty or more participants.81
Patterns of adaptation might also be identified in terms of certain basic
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models: Fifteen into one? develops a typology of different ways in which
national actors (re)act within and adapt to European integration. Will
such an adaptation be asymmetrical? Will the point of convergence be
dominated by specific structures of one Member State or a group of
Member States? 
The ‘goodness of fit’ category considers positions expressed by academ-
ics and political actors with regard to each Member State, thus permitting
each author a – necessarily subjective – analysis concerning the ‘perform-
ance’ of his or her Member State. 
Methodological risks
The methods used in this volume might be seen as conventional. Authors
from the fifteen Member States analysed ‘their’ respective country on the
basis of a semi-structured outline, which was collectively discussed and
elaborated. The approach has its merits and limitations. It helps us to
compare the structural and organisational reactions of a certain set of
important actors but has the limitations of more subjective assessments,
the latter being especially visible when authors analyse the extent to which
a system has adapted to European integration. Given the limits of time
and resources, an in-depth study of Member States’ relative competitive-
ness in different policy fields could not be pursued. However we hope that
our findings may serve as a starting point for a broader set of case
studies.82
There are further caveats. The evolutions and changes in states’
politico-administrative spheres are usually continuing, gradual and time-
consuming. Tracing back an ongoing process of interaction and mutual
adaptation between various actors always risks a timebound, backward-
looking view. Accordingly we might need a longer-term perspective to
identify the key patterns of evolution. However, using the 1960s–90s as a
basis for our observations, we take the risk of privileging certain educated
expectations about institutional trends within the emerging multi-level
and para-constitutional system. 
We realise that the EU system cannot be described and analysed simply
by looking at the institutions of the EU and their policies in a narrow
sense and from a sectoral perspective. Case studies on governance within
different policy fields and related networks provide an essential intellec-
tual input to our understanding about the evolution of multi-level and
multi-actor governance.83 We admit that the links between the ‘constitu-
tive’ elements of the Union cannot always be easily assessed. In this
respect, scrutinising the institutional adaptation of national and sub-
national actors to a ‘moving target’ beyond the boundaries of traditional
policy making – the Union in recent decades – is subject to an obvious
risk. Hence, we may observe different speeds of adaptation. We may also
need to take into account the slower reactions of some Member States at
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the national level. Member state A may remain immune to a new external
input whereas Member State B is characterised by a dynamic set of
changes in the politico-administrative system owing to European
demands. Member States C and D, at the same time, might not alter their
formal rules of EC/EU participation. However, the public discourse on
policy-making and administrative participation is characterised by an ever
growing ‘de facto internalisation’ of European issues into traditional
‘national’ spheres. Analyses of common trends of Europeanisation need to
account particularly for the roots of change. 
Institutional adjustments may not automatically lead to a direct and
swift alteration of policy processes in all areas simultaneously. There may
be fundamental hidden patterns which we are not able to not grasp
through our empirical data. 
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2 Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels
The European Union matters:
structuring self-made offers and
demands 
Self-made demands from the EU: analysing the impact of Maastricht
The evolution of European integration since 1950 has been considerable.
The European Union has gained in stature, taking on and aspiring to new
functions across the policy spectrum and challenging the conceptualisa-
tion of the evolving structure for joint problem-solving, deliberation and
decision-making.
The evolution of the Union: stages of constitution-building 
To test different theory-led expectations and their impact on the Member
States,1 in view of the Maastricht Treaty, we proceed in two steps. First,
we explore the evolution of EC/EU primary law, e.g. treaty provisions.
With regard to the institutional and procedural design ‘before’ and ‘after’
the TEU we scrutinise forms of decision-making rules within the EC/EU
from its foundation. More precisely, we look at the evolution of decision-
making rules in the Council of Ministers and the decision-making
procedures involving the Council and the EP. We thus sketch the evolu-
tion of our independent variables. As a second step, we take the legal
output of the Council of Ministers, the EP and the European Commission
as dependent variables in order to identify fundamental trends in the
‘demands’ made by political actors to use or to refrain from using the EU’s
para-constitutional resources and opportunities. 
When exploring the relationship between the European and national
levels of governance,2 we assume that one important variable is to be
found in the creation and subsequent development of EU institutions as
well as in the increasing differentiation of procedures within the policy-
cycle of the Brussels arena. In addressing the specific interaction
mechanisms between treaty reform and Member State adaptation to new
European ‘opportunity structures’,3 this chapter investigates the latter’s
fundamental nature. 
We therefore try to offer answers to four sets of questions:
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• What kind of essential features can we identify for grasping the EC/EU
on the move? How do the ‘masters of the treaties’4 shape the ‘legal’
constitution of the EU? Which indicators permit an analysis of funda-
mental trends and structural evolutions?
• How do institutional actors use self-made structures for joint problem-
solving? Do para-constitutional revisions such as treaty amendments
matter – and how do they matter – for the set-up and evolution of the
policy-making structures of the EU’s ‘living constitution’?5
• What are the EU-related challenges to national systems? 
• How can the results be explained in terms of general, integration-
related approaches? Do they support or dismiss some of the theoretical
assumptions elaborated in the academic community?6
The shape of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was designed to give a renewed contrac-
tual input into the West European multi-level and multi-actor machinery
of common problem-solving and joint decision-making between Member
States’ governments, their politico-administrative substructures and the
EU’s institutions. Five years after the entry into force of the SEA7 and the
accession of Portugal and Spain to the then European Communities, the
‘masters of the treaties’ agreed to a revision of the founding treaties as
well as to the creation of two distinct pillars for intergovernmental co-
operation in the fields of Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)8 and Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA).9 The result was a kind of ‘Russian doll’: a new
TEU integrating the three existing Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) treaties.
Encompassing EC-generated supranationalism and EU-related intergov-
ernmentalism, the Maastricht Treaty committed the Member States as
well as the European institutions to a ‘single institutional framework’
embodying a broadly defined set of aims and tasks as well as common
procedures.10
The road to Maastricht11 was marked by important, somewhat unin-
tended and unpredictable circumstances. The treaty reform was originally
aimed at a policy-based Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the
three-phased movement towards Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU).12 But the end of the Cold War and German unification pushed the
heads of state and governments towards other, though not completely
new, themes of political union: policy and institutional reform – including
CFSP, social policy and JHA – as well as a revision of rules governing the
EC/EU policy-cycle from decision preparation to decision implementation
and control. 
Treaty revisions: creations and creators
Like its predecessor and successors – the SEA of 1986, the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1997 and the Nice Treaty of 2000 – the Maastricht Treaty has
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to be interpreted as but one ‘grand bargain’ decision13 among Member
States along an uncharted path of European integration and co-operation.
In this perspective, Maastricht needs to be read as a peak within a fluid
landscape, moving with regard to time, the functional, institutional and
geographical dimensions of supranational integration and interstate
co-operation and co-ordination. Member States – governments, adminis-
trations, parliaments, parties and other ‘collective actors’14 – were and
still are important but not exclusive players of the game: their preferences
provide an input or a ‘voice’15 on the basis of experience gained while
crossing the landscape between the ‘peaks’ of IGCs.
We then conceive of treaty revisions and amendments as initial ‘offers’
to actors working within the EU institutions. Placed within this multi-
level and multi-actor framework for governance they create incentives and
disincentives to use or to refrain from using treaty articles – legal empow-
erments provide the skeleton of a ‘living constitution’.16 Institutions and
procedures provide arenas and rules for making binding decisions. One
could therefore argue that treaty-building has a significant effect on the
day-to-day output of the Union and thus on the evolution of the system in
general; we therefore consider the evolution of para-constitutional
patterns within the integration process over the Union’s whole history.
Starting from this assumption, we expect to be able to identify five periods
which are defined by historical decisions either to create, amend or re-
design the treaties: the ECSC Treaty, the Rome Treaties establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic
Community (Euratom), the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and the
Amsterdam Treaty. As a concluding point we will refer also to the reforms
of the Nice Treaty (2001).
It is our view that relations between treaty reform and treaty imple-
mentation are not uni-directional. Treaty reforms do not emerge from
nowhere as a ‘deus ex machina’, rather they represent reactions to prior
developments and trends, reflecting both the complex day-to-day machin-
ery at all relevant levels of policy-making as well as the reaction of
socio-political actors which do not or only rarely intervene during the
‘implementation’ of a given set of treaties. Quite often these contractual
treaty foundations simply formalise institutional evolutions which have
been developed either within existing treaty provisions, through inter-
institutional agreements, institutional rules of procedure and codes of
conduct, or outside of the treaties, through bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments between EU members.17 Treaty amendments also attempt to
address institutional and procedural weaknesses identified during the
implementation of previous adjustments to the ‘rules of the game’. Treaty
revisions are thus endemic parts of the process; they are not only inde-
pendent variables affecting the nature and the evolution of the system but
also become dependent variables themselves. Institutions and procedures
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– ‘formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices
that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the
Polity and economy’18 – are creations and creators at the same time. In
this regard, one specific feature of the Union should be addressed: in nego-
tiating and ratifying treaty amendments, Member States challenge their
own politico-administrative systems. The effect of these challenges varies
according to the nature of the political systems in the Member States.
The EU: a multi-level and multi-actor system . . . in process:
an institutional approach 
We assume that institutions do matter. Historical neo-institutionalist
theories19 and the path-dependency approach20 to policy preferences,
institutions and procedures, policy outcomes and policy instruments
offers a possible starting point. The institutional and procedural design of
the EC/EU is subject to new circumstances, political and institutional
changes over time – a ‘stickiness in movement along the continuum’.21
Accordingly, Member States seek not only functional, i.e. policy-based,
but also institutional solutions to shared problems on the basis of what
already exists. Critical junctures – revisions of the treaties or exogenous
developments affecting the EC/EU or a major part of it – offer Member
States and institutions the chance to adapt and re-design the existing
arrangements.22 The logic of path dependency suggests that in such an
institutionalised arrangement as the EC/EU, ‘past lines of policy [will]
condition subsequent policy by encouraging societal forces to organise
along some lines rather than others, to adapt particular identities or to
develop interests in policies that are costly to shift’.23 Institutions, rules
and procedural routines at both the national and the European levels of
governance therefore become able to ‘structure political situations and
leave their own imprint on political outcomes’.24 In other words, institu-
tional arrangements affect the range of future developments insofar as
they narrow down the areas for possible change and oblige Member States
incrementally to revise existing arrangements. 
Within these processes, national interests and preferences – as they are
the articulated products of shared beliefs – ‘act as “focal points” around
which the behaviour of actors converges’.25 This process presupposes
interest aggregation by national governments.26 They are widely perceived
as ‘unified actors’27 and remain key interlocutors for the EC/EU institu-
tions and arenas. They are important targets of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) and other functional ‘demoi’.28 They provide
essential resources for the system not only with respect to the financial
basis of the Union, but also with regard to the effective functioning of the
institutional setting. Hence, Member States second civil servants to the
Council of Ministers and the Commission, and provide important intel-
lectual and managerial resources for Council Presidencies and coercive
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resources for pushing the Council to reach agreements.29 However, as
with institutional and policy developments, national interest formation is
‘locked in’: the preference aggregators and articulators of the EC/EU
system, especially national governments, use the channels which they have
created themselves. Concomitantly, societal preference-builders – parlia-
ments, political parties, NGOs, public opinion and the mass media – also
become involved in the process. Some of them, such as parties and NGOs,
may be fully aware of these interaction mechanisms because they are
mirrored directly by similar or corresponding entities within the Brussels
and Strasbourg arenas. Others, especially public opinion, may only react
to European policy and institutional outcomes. In any case, the complex
mechanism between institutions, interests and ideas needs to be taken into
account.
As we are interested in the long-term trends of the EC/EU system and
the respective impacts on EC/EU policy-making in the Member States, we
look at the effective use of treaty provisions. For this purpose, we explore
the real ‘demand’ for different procedural ‘offers’ or opportunity struc-
tures at hand. 
We take the changes, which the architects of the treaties have included
within primary law, as independent variables. Of course, we do not expect
that the intentions of the treaty architects will be fully met. Fifteen
national, aggregated interpretations of the treaties30 produces a produc-
tive ambiguity31 which itself serves as a driving force behind subsequent
reforms of the EU’s para-constitutional setting. The ‘masters of the
treaties’ might revise the formal rules through informal arrangement (at
European Council level) or – together with the constitutive elements of
the Union’s ‘single institutional framework’ – by the adoption of inter-
institutional agreements (between the Council of Ministers, the EP and the
European Commission).32 Even if Member State governments are in full
agreement about the respective interpretations of treaty implementation,
they cannot guarantee a full and comprehensive use of new articles. The
treaty provisions do not prescribe actors’ subsequent behaviour; new
governments and new political coalitions may prefer other areas and
methods of co-operation to those used by their predecessors – thus one
might expect to see the law of unintended consequences at work. 
The evolution of the EU system
Incentives and disincentives for bringing the treaty rules into play do not
exclusively depend on procedural and institutional opportunities but
depend also on the political context of the day and the time. Preferences
of Member States and other actors matter, although they cannot be taken
as fixed. Time lags in making use of amended treaties are imposed by the
treaty provisions themselves.33 However, we argue that the usefulness of
The European Union matters 33
2444Ch2  3/12/02  2:01 pm  Page 33
new opportunities is proved either early or never. It is the period between
the conclusion of an IGC and a rather short period afterwards where
actors set precedents which set out the ‘path’34 or at least the range of
possible behaviour for implementing the treaty. We assume therefore that
during five years (November 1993–December 1998) of the application of
Maastricht, possible effects should have become apparent.
The extension of scope and actors involved: trends and patterns of
constitution-building 
As a first step, we concentrate on the development of the EC/EU’s rules
between 1951 (ECSC Treaty) and 2001 (Nice Treaty). We observe that
the total number of treaty articles dealing with specific competencies and
decision-making rules – the enumerative empowerments – in an increas-
ing amount of specific policy fields, has grown considerably from 86 (EEC
Treaty 1957) to 254 (Nice Treaty 2001). Further illustrations of this
broad scope can be seen in the expansion of the number of Commission
Directorates-General (DGs) (from nine in 1958 to twenty-four in 1999)
and of autonomous executive agencies (from two in 1975 to eleven in
1998);35 the agendas of the EP at its plenary sessions and especially the
presidency conclusions published after each session of the European
Council.36 The increasing number of sectoral forms of the Council of
Ministers (from four in 1958 to twenty-three in 1998)37 as well as the
extension of the administrative sub-structure, indicates that governmental
actors have become more and more involved in using their Brussels
networks extensively and intensively.38
As for the provisions governing the decision-making system within the
Council of Ministers, Figure 2.1 shows the absolute proportion of the
Council’s internal decision-making modes between 1952 until 1999. It
can clearly be seen that the total number of rules providing for unanimity
and QMV has considerably increased over time. If we focus on the rela-
tive rates of the treaty-based provisions in the Council (Figure 2.2), we
also notice an over-proportional growth in QMV voting up to
Amsterdam. 
The EP was not originally designed along the lines of national legisla-
tures in the EU Member States. Given its original lack of legislative
powers, Parliament’s influence on important decisions in traditional
policy areas remained limited, although MEPs engaged in trials of
strength with the Council in the context of the budgetary procedures.
Since 1979 Parliament has expanded its role as a watchdog by making
intensive use of its right to ask questions, by keeping a close eye on EU
expenditure (through the Committee on Budgetary Control) and by
setting up temporary committees of inquiry. Since 1986–87, EC Treaty
amendments have introduced important changes concerning the role and
position of the EP. On the basis of the positive experiences gained with
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the co-operation procedure after the entry into force of the SEA (1987),
the Maastricht Treaty widened the procedure’s scope and in also created
the so-called ‘co-decision procedure’. The EP obtained the right to block
a proposed legislative act without the Council having the right to outvote
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Figure 2.1 Decision-making modes in the Council of Ministers, 1952–2001,
absolute numbers
Source: Original ECSC, EEC, EC and EU Treaties (by time of their entry into force).
Figure 2.2 Decision-making modes in the Council of Ministers, 1952–2001,
per cent
Source: Original ECSC, EEC, EC and EU Treaties (by time of their entry into force).
Simple Majority Qualified Majority Special GMV Unanimity
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it at the end of the procedure. The Conciliation Committee was to be the
nucleus of the co-decision procedure. Apart from co-decision, Maastricht
extended the assent procedure to a wide range of international agreements
and other sectors of a legislative nature. As regards the implementation
phase of the EC/EU policy-cycle, Parliament was given the formal right to
set up temporary Committees of Inquiry in order to investigate malad-
ministration in the implementation of EC law. Finally, and with a view to
the early stages of European decision-making, Parliament gained the right
to request the European Commission to submit legislative proposals. 
Commentators on the Maastricht Treaty have argued that the EP ‘was
perhaps the largest net beneficiary of the institutional changes in the
TEU’39 and that the treaty ‘marks the point in the Community’s develop-
ment at which the Parliament became the first chamber of a real
legislature; and the Council is obliged to act from time to time like a
second legislative chamber rather than a ministerial directorate’.40
Understanding the slow but steady move to include the EP into the EU
system therefore necessitates a perspective which departs from orthodox
realism. On the other hand, the co-decision procedure could well be
depicted as symptomatic of the ‘general trade-off’ between the ‘problem-
solving capacity’41 of EU decision-making on the one hand and
parliamentary involvement on the other: ‘Expanding the legislative . . .
powers of the European Parliament could render European decision
processes, already too complicated and time-consuming, even more
cumbersome’.42 As for the roles provided by the treaties for the EP, the
relative dimension of its ‘exclusion’ from the EC/EU policy-making
process has considerably diminished (Figure 2.3). However, in view of the
absolute increase in treaty-based decision-making procedures (Figure 2.4),
the growth in consultation, co-operation and co-decision procedures is
balanced by a small augmentation of ‘non-participation’ in the Council’s
rule-making process. The main reasons for this development are the
dynamics of subsequent treaty reforms widening the functional scope of
European integration and co-operation into new areas. Of specific inter-
est in this regard is the combination of both the respective powers of the
Parliament and Council, which shows a remarkable increase in procedural
complexity over time. There is no typical procedure which clearly domi-
nates the political system, e.g. QMV and co-decision as the general rule. 
An ideal three-step model towards communitarisation
To explain these trends we can construct an ideal type of a three-step
evolutionary pattern by which governments create competencies and
respective procedures in policy fields (Figure 2.5). 
• Intergovernmentalisation: to achieve objectives of joint interest and to
reduce transaction costs, Member States agree to pool resources in a
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loose form which might be outside the E[E]C Treaty (e.g. European
Political Co-Operation, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System (EMS),43 the TREVI44 network providing
a collective intellectual capacity to combat international crime); or by
referring to Article 308 (ex Article 235) ECT (the treaty establishing
the European Community), which requires unanimous decision-
making in the Council of Ministers. 
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Figure 2.3 Decision-making procedures in the European Parliament/Council,
1958–2001, absolute numbers
Source: Maurer (1999), new data added, based on original EEC, EC and EU treaties.
Figure 2.4 Decision-making procedures in the European Parliament/Council,
1958–2001, per cent
Source: Maurer (1999), new data added, based on original EEC, EC and EU treaties.
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• ‘Treatyisation’ by ‘hard’ intergovernmental structures and procedures:
In a second phase governments include the new policy area(s) expressis
verbis into the treaty, perhaps with formulas limiting the roles of
EC/EU bodies or securing Member States’ veto powers (such as
unanimity in the Council), since they remain hesitant to cede too much
power to non-national actors or to risk being outvoted by majority
decisions and restrictive rule interpretations. 
• Communitarisation: in a third phase of treaty amendment, govern-
ments then commit themselves to QMV instead of unanimity, for the
sake of efficiency and effectiveness. As for the EP and the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), Member States are, in the first phase of policy-
building, rather reluctant to allocate powers to other actors. Only in
the subsequent phases of treaty amendments has the EP been granted
some powers – ideally consultation in the second phase and co-opera-
tion, co-decision or assent in the third phase of constitutional revision.
As to the ECJ, similar empowerments evolve over time. In a first phase,
judicial control is excluded, then narrowed down to some specific
policy fields and/or behavioural settings. If trust in the system and the
Court precedes compliance with its decisions, governments agree in
subsequent phases to widen and/or to strengthen its powers.
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Figure 2.5 Three steps towards communitarisation
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Over recent decades, we thus witness a strong centripetal trend towards
‘communitarisation’: a push and pull of provisions towards the EC treaties
or, within the treaties, towards supranational procedures,45 or towards
EC-like rules within the intergovernmental pillars of the Union46 – even if it
is with many derogations, such as the case of the area of ‘freedom, security
and justice’ (Title IV ECT)47 and even if, in terms of community orthodoxy,
‘dirty’ communitarisations48 and institutional anomalies49 take place.
Towards procedural ambiguities
The character of treaty provisions is reinforced by a specific legal feature:
if we take a closer look at the treaties, we can identify a trend towards
procedural ambiguity over time. Whereas the original treaties foresaw a
restricted (clear) set of rules for each policy field, subsequent treaty
amendments have led to a procedural differentiation with a variety of rule
opportunities. As a result, the treaty provisions do not dictate a clear
nomenclature of rules to be applied to specific sectors. Instead, since the
SEA, Member States and supranational institutions can, in an increasing
number of policy fields, select whether a given piece of secondary legisla-
tion – a regulation, a directive or another type of legal act – should be
decided by unanimity, simple or qualified majority voting in the Council;
according to the consultation, co-operation or (after Maastricht) the co-
decision procedure; without any participation of the EP or with or
without consultation of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC),
the Committee of the Regions (CoR) or similar institutions. In other
words, different procedural blueprints and interinstitutional codes
compete for application and raise the potential for conflict between the
actors involved. From a national perspective, this growing variation of
institutions and procedures means a mixed set of opportunity structures
for access and participation in the EC/EU policy-cycle.
Patterns of participation: the policy-cycle
The resulting nature of the Union is characterised by a continuing exten-
sion of its responsibilities and authorities, which have enlarged the total
range in which EC/EU institutions are active. In order to successfully
reconcile the management of growing responsibilities with the demands
for functional participation of the political actors involved, new institu-
tions and procedures have been established and the institutional
framework has been altered. The complexity of the Union is a result of the
huge number of its duties, legislative processes and implementation proce-
dures and, at times, the unfathomable nature of the procedures and the
roles of those actors involved. For a closer look at the complex structure
of the Union we use the policy-cycle as a scheme for observing funda-
mental patterns of the Union’s living constitution (Figure 2.6).
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Rules for decision preparation, decision-making, implementation and
control differ both across the policy fields in which they are applied, and
in terms of the institutions and bodies involved. Furthermore, Maastricht
introduced new bodies such as the CoR and the European Central Bank
(ECB). These developments – repeated in the Amsterdam Treaty by the
creation of new institutions such as the Employment Committee, CFSP,
the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit within the second pillar, and
procedures such as the closer co-operation clauses50 – are an expression
of the growth and differentiation of European integration. New institu-
tions are established not for the purpose of furthering the institutional
complexity of the Union, but because they are required to deal with the
Union’s new policy duties and tasks, to give it a single voice or interface
for dealing with third countries and organisations, or to become its
formalised feedback system towards the specific geographical or func-
tional levels of governance. New institutions do not operate in a political
vacuum but in a closely connected system and balance of power in which
the architects of the treaty have positioned them. Whenever new institu-
tions gain autonomy, they do not use it in isolation but in a framework of
established rules and centres of political power. This process of institu-
tional growth thus attains a higher degree of complexity, potentially
mirrored by new structures and processes in the Member States.
Considering institutions as ‘systems of rules’, institutionalisation is
the process by ‘which rules are created, applied, and interpreted by those
who live under them’.51 One characteristic of this institutionalisation is
– as Figure 2.6 suggests – the comprehensive and intensive participation
of national governments, parliaments and administrations in nearly all
phases of the policy-cycle, the intensity of participation varying accord-
ing to constraints which are to be found in EC/EU treaty law as well as
in the rules governing the political systems in the Member States. The
use of these bodies, as well as the tendency towards procedural differ-
entiation, has increased significantly. The extension of the scope of
trans-border co-operation has resulted in a growing number of separate
and specialised arenas for interaction and law-making. New Council
formats and related working groups have been created, new Commission
services installed, new parliamentary committees set up and new consul-
tative bodies placed within the existing ‘institutional terrain’ of the
Union.52 If the various Council voting procedures are combined with the
different forms of involvement and methods of the EP in the policy-
cycle, it is possible to identify more than thirty distinct procedures for
the process of decision-making53 (this number excludes the roles fore-
seen for the ECB, the ECOSOC, the CoR and the new Employment
Committee, as well as the non-treaty-based ‘soft law’ extensions and
mutations such as the increasing number of interinstitutional agreements
and codes of conduct). 
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Administrative involvement and interaction modes
However, the considerable and increasing role played by EC institutions
has not automatically led to the substitution of national actors. Even
‘exclusive EC competencies’ in the fields of agriculture, fisheries and trade
require meetings of the Council of Ministers or its working groups in
which national civil servants shape the exact scope of the Commission’s
authority. Thus, the growing role of de-nationalised and supranational
actors is leading to a more intensive and differentiated incorporation of
national actors in the whole EC process.54 In pursuing their strategies for
access and influence, Member States have become intensively involved in
those phases of the policy-cycle where the Commission enjoys rather
exclusive prerogatives, such as the right of initiative. As part of the
Commission’s internal procedure for using this monopoly (see phase I of
the policy-cycle), this ‘epistemic community’55 draws on some 700 expert
groups. The involvement of national civil servants is important for the
Commission in its tasks of identifying problems, collecting first-hand
information and examining options for possible legislative proposals.
Expert groups advise the Commission on the basis of the Member States’
interest or perspectives. They act as ‘early warning units’ for the
Commission. This growing network provides the Commission with
extended and timely information. Expert groups indicate a Member
State’s willingness to incorporate a given issue into their national rolling
agenda: will Member State X and its administration be able to transpose
the directive within a given time period? Will the envisaged legal act have
an effect on the administrative law of Member State Y?56
The overall proportion of civil servants with immediate access to the
EU cycle is considerable and probably even larger within smaller member
countries and those with a federal system of shared competencies between
different levels of governance (Belgium, Germany, Austria). To these
agents directly participating in the Brussels arena we must add their
colleagues who are indirectly involved in national preparation and imple-
mentation procedures. These domestic spillovers are difficult to calculate,
not least because each country has different internal methods of co-ordi-
nating EC/EU business. 
National officials work closely together on preparing Council of
Ministers’ decisions in approximately 250 working groups under the
Council and COREPER57 (see phase II of the policy-cycle). These interac-
tion patterns involve many sectors and levels of national administrative
hierarchies.58 The Council’s working groups have a significant impact
on the decision-making arena; around 90 per cent of EC legislation is
prepared at this stage.59 As for the implementation of EC regulations or
directives (see phase III of the policy-cycle), the Council has created around
420 comitology committees involving national civil servants. There are
more than ten different formulas for these committees characterised by
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different rights of national civil servants to delay or to block operational
decisions by the Commission.60 These committees fulfil rule-interpreting,
fund-approving or rule-setting functions. They therefore act both as
‘regime-takers’ and ‘regime-makers’.61 Furthermore, the Brussels-based
infrastructure is surrounded by consultative and advisory committees
made up of non-governmental and sectoral specialists who provide
expertise at both the decision-preparation and implementation phases.
Reflecting the EC/EU’s external policy activities, one can also find joint
committees, bringing together administrators from the EU institutions, the
Member States and third parties. The potential influence of committees
differs largely according to the phase of the policy-cycle and the policy
sector. 
The involvement of national civil servants in the policy-cycle is not
simply a ‘watch-dog exercise’ because for the Commission and the
national institutions, the ‘engrenage’-like62 interlocking of actors is an
important part of the joint management of the policy-cycle. If any major
element could be held responsible for the bureaucratisation63 of Brussels,
it is this network of multi-level administrative interpenetration. However,
this bureaucracy is not an accidental product of personal mismanagement
or just another example of Parkinson’s Law which assumes that expan-
sion takes place simply for the personal advantage of the civil servants
involved. This trend is an ultimately unavoidable result of the intensive
propensity of national politicians and civil servants to comprehensively
participate in the preparation, making and implementing of those EC/EU
decisions which directly affect them. 
Empirical trends of the Union: divergent patterns
Policy-making in the Council: using opportunities and output
production 
After sketching the evolution of procedural opportunities and the basic
structures of the involvement of national actors in the EC/EU policy-cycle,
we now consider the patterns of their usage in an aggregated form. How
have the actors within the institutions exploited the opportunities
provided by the original treaties and their subsequent amendments? Can
we identify any relationship between the stages of EC/EU constitution-
building and the evolution of the Union’s policy output? 
Altogether, we can list a total sum of 52,799 legal acts adopted
between 1952 and December 1998 (Figure 2.7). 
Of course, the 52,799 legal acts are not of equal rank in terms of their
legal relevance. Besides regulations, directives, decisions and recommen-
dations authorised by the Council alone, the EP and the Council or
the Commission, the Union’s data bases also include a set of political
events which are less binding (Council conclusions of a political nature,
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etc.). Figure 2.7 indicates a quasi-linear growth with regard to original
secondary legislation and other legal events from 1961 until 1987 with
some significant drops between 1964 and 1965 and between 1983 and
1984, but a constant stepwise decrease from 1987 onwards; the Council
of Ministers’ output shows a steady decline from 1986–87. Furthermore
the Maastricht provisions did not lead to an increase in output. Hence, the
legal acts which arose from the new Maastricht pillars – CFSP and JHA –
did not change the overall trend. Within the two intergovernmental
pillars, the Council issued only 287 legal acts between 1993 and
December 1998 (compared, for the same period, with 7,518 legal acts
under Agricultural and Fisheries policy). The European Commission’s
output began to grow from 1976 onwards, although the relative growth
remained stable between 1980 and 1993. With the coming into force of
the Maastricht Treaty, output decreased dramatically, thus reflecting the
net decline in Council legislation after 1986–87. 
Our interpretation of the fall in the Council’s output after 1987 is
based on a consideration of three major policy areas of the EC – that of
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Fisheries policy, external
trade policy and customs policy, which together constitute 41,886 legal
acts or 79.3 per cent of all measures produced up to December 1998.
Given their age, one can assume a saturation of these policies; in fact, the
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Figure 2.7 Legal output of Council and Commission, per year, 1952–2000
Source: Maurer 2001 based on CELEX.
Note: Sums represent every legal event as noted by CELEX. Apart from ‘real’ secondary
legislation, CELEX also refers to executive acts by either the Commission or the Council.
Note that from November 1993 onwards, Council legislation also comprises legislative
acts by the EP and the Council (co-decision procedure).
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falling levels of EC legislation are almost exclusively due to these policy
areas. The European Commission’s autonomous activities to a large
extent result from earlier Council (or since 1993, Council and EP) legisla-
tion. There is a significant gap from 1952 to 1979, which suggests that the
relatively small amount of Council legislation required fewer Commission
executive acts when compared with legislation passed from the 1980s
onwards (Table 2.1).
One of the major features of the EC’s legal output is the variation with
regard to the binding nature of legal acts. From this perspective, the
nature of the Council’s legal acts is characterised by a decrease in the most
binding measure – i.e. regulations outside the policy sectors of CAP and
trade policy after 1987. On the other hand, the SEA apparently affected
matters insofar as the number of directives per year increased between
1987 and 1993, i.e. during the final phase of the Single European
Market (SEM) programme. Since 1993, the use of directives decreased
slightly until 1996; subsequently, the number remained fairly stable.
Interestingly, one can also witness an increase in decisions from 1961 to
1982 and then again from 1986 to 1998. The first phase concerns the
Council’s regulatory decisions in the strict sense of Article 249 (ex
Article 189) ECT on the definition of the different legal instruments avail-
able within the EU system. The second phase includes another type of
decision, so-called ‘legislative decisions’ in the framework of policy
programmes (SOCRATES, Ariane, Research Framework Programmes,
etc.).64
Another issue concerning the production of binding EC/EU law needs
to be addressed. So far, we have focused at the dynamics of the Council
in the EU system. We referred to the total output of legal acts irrespective
of whether the different items were still in force or not. A large propor-
tion of these decisions are in force for relatively short time periods or are
regularly replaced by new legislation. However, during the 1990s the
acquis communautaire – the legislation in force at a given moment – more
than doubled from 4,566 legal acts in 1983 to 9,767 in 1998.65 Thus there
has been a substantial increase in overall legal activity within the Union in
recent years (Figure 2.8).66
Voting procedures in the Council
When representing their interests, positions and preferences, national
actors are faced with specific rules, of which QMV is considered the most
significant. Statistical data on the use of QMV within the Council of
Ministers have been published only since the coming into force of the
Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993, but some raw data are available
for earlier periods (Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.1 Legal output per year of Commission, Council and Parliament, 1952–98, according to policy areas
1952–86 1987–93 1994–98 Totals
% of Legal % of Legal % of Legal Legal acts: % of Legal
Policy domains as identified by CELEX Total Acts per year output Total Acts per year output Total Acts per year output total output
General financial and institutional affairs 610 17.42 2.8 476 68 2.57 693 138.6 5.51 1779 3.36
Customs policy 4347 124.2 19.97 2496 356.57 13.50 1021 204.2 8.12 7864 14.89
Agriculture 9274 264.97 42.62 8435 1205 45.63 5310 1062 42.28 23019 43.59
Fisheries 798 22.8 3.67 1325 189.28 7.16 800 160 6.36 2923 5.53
External relations 3549 101.4 16.31 2963 423.28 16.03 1568 313.6 12.48 8080 15.30
Competition 384 10.97 1.76 474 67.71 2.56 854 170.8 6.79 1712 3.24
Industry and internal market 1004 28.68 4.61 528 75.42 2.85 582 116.4 4.63 2114 4.00
Taxation 80 2.28 0.36 84 12 0.45 63 12.6 0.51 227 0.042
EPC/CFSP 0 0 0 6 0.85 0.03 161 32.2 1.28 167 0.031
(1 Nov. 1993)
Justice and Home affairs 0 0 0 1 0.14 0.005 119 23.8 0.94 120 0.022
(1 Nov. 1993)
Freedom of movement and Social Policy 397 11.34 1.82 237 33.85 1.28 143 28.6 1.13 777 1.47
Right of establishment 119 3.4 0.54 89 12.71 0.40 67 13.4 0.53 275 0.52
Transport policy 258 7.37 1.18 186 26.57 1.01 139 27.8 1.10 583 1.10
Economic and monetary affairs 130 3.71 0.59 32 4.57 0.17 56 11.2 0.44 218 0.41
Regional and structural policy 126 3.6 0.57 439 62.71 2.37 256 51.2 2.03 821 1.55
Environment, consumer, health 248 7.08 1.13 379 54.14 2.05 358 71.6 2.85 985 1.86
Energy policy 284 8.11 1.30 116 16.57 0.62 118 23.6 0.93 518 0.98
Education, science, information 119 3.4 0.54 177 25.28 0.95 206 41.2 1.64 502 0.95
Law relating to undertakings 25 0.71 0.11 35 5 0.18 39 7.8 0.31 99 0.18
People’s Europe 5 0.14 0.02 5 0.71 0.027 6 1.2 0.047 16 0.030
Sum 21757 621.62 100 18483 2640.42 100 12559 2511.8 100 52799 100



































Table 2.2 ‘Real’ use of QMV, 1985–99
Item 1985 1986 1994 1995 1996 1999
Total sum of Council legal acts 615 731 561 458 429 327
Number of cases where
‘real voting’ occurred approx. 70a approx. 100b 64c 54d 45d 31e
Percentage: number of cases 
of voting/council legal acts approx. 11.38 approx. 13.67 11.4 11.84 10.48 9.78
Notes: a Answer to Written Question No. 1121/86 by James Elles to the Council of the
EC; OJEC, No. C 306/42, 1 December 1986. b Answer to Written Question No. 2126/86
by Nicole Fontaine to the Council of the EC; OJEC, No. C 82/43, 30 March 1987.
c Answer to Written Question No. E-1263/96 by James Moorhouse to the Council of the
EU; OJEC, No. C 305/71–75, 15 October 1996, and: Answer to Written Question No.
E-858/95 by Ulla Sandbaek to the Council; OJEC, No. C 213/22, 17 August 1995.
d Commission Européenne (Secrétariat Général): Analyse des décisions adoptées à la
majorité qualifiée en 1996, Bruxelles, 14 July 1997. e Monthly Summaries of Council Acts,
January–December 1999, http://ue.eu.int/en/acts. Data for 1997 and 1998 were not
available.
Among the 561 legal acts of the Council in 1994, a total of 64 (11.4
per cent) was subject to real voting. Of the 458 legal acts adopted in 1995,
the relative share of ‘real votes’ increased slightly to 54 (11.84 per cent).
In 1996, the Council referred 45 times to having voted by QMV in a total
of 429 cases (10.48 per cent). Altogether, the rather small share of ‘real
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Figure 2.8 European legislation in force, 1983–98
Source: Directories of Community Legislation in Force (Luxembourg, 1984–99, December
issues).
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voting’ indicates the underlying ‘culture of consensus’67 within the
Council and its component members. However, the average rate of QMV
also suggests a belief among national actors that, ultimately, the use of
voting is an acceptable way out of a deadlock. In addition, the data on the
real use of QMV are based on the total volume of the Council’s legislative
activity. Accordingly, the basis also includes legal acts where the treaties
oblige the Council to act by unanimity. 
Voting risks problems in the later stages of the policy-cycle. Given that
since 1993 voting results have been published by the Council, the views of
out-voted Member States are therefore visible to interest groups from all
sides – governmental as well as non-governmental. Thus, Member States
which find themselves in a minority position may come under pressure
from domestic actors to oppose the legislation and then to block the
timely enforcement of the legal act in question. However, one should not
underestimate the impact of ‘real voting’, despite the small extent to
which it is used. Hence, the idea behind QMV is not exclusively its routine
practice but its potential power as a ‘sword of Damocles’68 that pushes
Member State actors to concede in order to reach agreement. What QMV
certainly implies therefore is the need for governments to clarify, at an
early stage of the policy-cycle, the domestic ‘common position’ between
the actors involved. QMV may thus increase the pressure on national
administrations and their EC/EU-related policy co-ordination systems. If
this argument holds, one would expect to see changes in such systems
after the SEA and/or after the Maastricht Treaty, since both revisions
induced a considerable transfer of unanimity rules into QMV opportuni-
ties. We will see in the chapters on the Member States in Part II, if and
how governments, administrations and their related agencies have reacted
to these potential challenges.
The efficiency of the Council: frequency of sessions and productivity
One way of observing behavioural patterns in the EC/EU policy-cycle is to
analyse both the frequency with which national ministers and their repre-
sentatives use the Council of Ministers and their capacity to reach
agreement within the time they spend in the relevant institutional struc-
ture. The number of Council meetings per year has grown constantly from
twenty meetings in 1967 to ninety-one in 2000. The relatively high
number of Council meetings per year is related in particular to new
Council formats rather than to higher frequencies of meetings among
existing ones (Figure 2.9). 
As we know from the well-documented agricultural sector, the
frequency of meetings in the Council of Ministers, on the one hand, and
its working groups, on the other, has grown considerably. Many civil
servants meet twice monthly on average.69 If one also includes unrecorded
informal meetings, it becomes quite clear that the intensity with which
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some civil servants deal with European affairs in their daily agenda is
remarkable. This level of activity is not only a characteristic of the mid-
1990s but has grown constantly over recent years. Has the frequency of
meetings led to greater efficiency? Certainly not. Between 1976 and 1998,
the Council’s productivity – defined as the ratio between its legal output
and its meetings per year – declined from ten legal acts per session in 1976
to three acts per session in 2000. In other words, the greater number of
Council meetings has not led to a growth in the Council’s output. The
Internal Market programme (legislative proposals of the Commission
prior to the SEA) led to a higher productivity from 1984 to 1986.
However, after the entry into force of the SEA, not only the Council’s
overall output, but also its productivity per session, fell again. 
Are we therefore witnessing the evolution of a growing ‘participation
bureaucracy’,70 whose major interest is to get involved at any expense
without considering the potentially damaging effects of its size and
complexity? Or is our observation of the Council’s productivity mainly due
to the constitution of new policy areas which, given their nature and tech-
nical specificity, cannot be dealt with by existing staff at the governments’
disposal? Instead, new policy areas require new expertise and adequate
personnel input, which thus leads to an ever-growing network of ministries
and governmental agencies. Chapters on the Member States in Part II
will thus address the question of under which circumstances national
actors – located either in the permanent representations or at their home
bases – have and will become involved in the EC/EU policy-cycle.
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Figure 2.9 Productivity of the Council of Ministers, 1966–2000: legal acts per
year against meetings per year
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The evolution of the EP’s involvement
Given that national governments and administrations have to co-operate
with the EP as an established actor, we have also looked at the evolution
of the different procedures which govern this special kind of a bicameral
relationship (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). We note that between 1987 and
December 1993, more than 30 per cent of Commission proposals which
addressed the EP fell under the co-operation procedure (Figure 2.10).
Following the Maastricht Treaty, the share of legislation falling under co-
operation declined to 13.6 per cent (1995) whereas the share under
co-decision rose to 21.8 per cent. The main reason for the substitution of
co-operation by co-decision lies in the procedural change applied to
Article 95 (ex Article 100a) ECT which was and still is the general legal
basis for harmonisation measures in the framework of the Internal
Market.71 Hence, around 66 per cent of all co-decision procedures
concluded between November 1993 and December 1998 fell under Article
95. In spite of the fact that co-decision was to apply to only 9.25 per cent
of all EC treaty provisions containing procedural specifications (see
Figures 2.3 and 2.4), nearly 25 per cent of the European Commission’s
initiatives submitted to both the Council and the Parliament up to
December 1998 fell under this procedure.72 This is not only the result of
an EP-friendly attitude but is also due to the fact that these provisions are
mainly ruled by QMV (except for cultural policy and research policy
programmes). The demand for this kind of legislation was thus much
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Figure 2.10 Parliamentary involvement in EC legislation, 1987–98: real use of
procedural empowerments
Source: Maurer (1999), based on the OIEL data base.
Percentage of Cooperation Percentage of Codecision
Percentage of Cooperation and Codecision▲
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higher than the original – treaty-based – supply would have suggested.
The Maastricht Treaty clearly led to a strengthened legislative role for the
EP regarding the internal market and the areas of environment, research
and education policy. This trend will continue under the Amsterdam
Treaty as most co-operation procedures (except for four related to EMU)
have been replaced by a simplified and shortened co-decision rule.73
Has the slow but steady inclusion of the EP affected the national
systems? The participation of Parliament in co-decision may induce new
institutional settings within those national ministries which are directly
concerned: ministries of economics and/or industry, environment,
consumer protection and health policy, telecommunications, transport,
education and youth. Alternatively – or even in parallel to the national
EP-related bodies – the permanent representations of the Member States
may reinforce their contacts with the EP by setting up special units or by
providing civil servants to as ‘points of contact’ for MEPs. It may be that
there are no formal changes owing to the ‘parliamentarisation’ of the
EC/EU but a smooth de facto inclusion of EP-related concerns within
existing ministerial or parliamentary departments. However, we may also
identify similar evolutions at the level of national parliaments. Do they
view the EP as a new or familiar but stronger ally or alien? Or do they
perceive their European colleagues as illegitimate intruders? Have they
introduced new means of digesting the growing role of the EP in EC/EU
politics, such as involving themselves in a meaningful dialogue, at the very
least with their respective national party’s MEPs?
The speed of policy-making: the learning curve of the Council and
the EP
One major indicator of the demands made of national and supranational
actors in the EC/EU policy-cycle is their performance in terms of time
needed to adopt binding legislation, i.e. the procedural efficiency of the
system. In operational terms, we concentrate on the application of the co-
decision procedure and analyse the speed of decision-making over time.
With regard to the EP’s increased powers following Maastricht, and there-
fore its contribution to the ‘output legitimacy’74 of the EU’s multi-level
governance framework, co-decision was expected to be a complex,
lengthy, cumbersome and protracted procedure.75 Indeed, the procedure
could well be depicted as symptomatic of the ‘general trade-off’ between
efficiency and the ‘problem-solving capacity’76 of EU decision-making on
the one hand and parliamentary involvement on the other. This argument
is also stressed by the fusion theory.77
However, in contrast to these predictions, co-decision does not appear
to have led to serious delays in the final adoption of EC legislation. The
average total duration of the 152 procedures concluded prior to April
1999 was 737 days. In contrast, the average length of time taken for acts
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adopted under the co-operation procedure was 734 days. In other words,
co-decision has exceeded the time length of co-operation by only three
days on average (Figure 2.11).78
How can we explain the shortening of these time spans and the fact
that the time needed for co-decision does not differ as much from co-
operation, as was expected in the aftermath of Maastricht? One explana-
tion could be that the two chambers directly involved in co-decision act
not as adversaries but as problem-solvers who are interested in de-drama-
tising political conflict. Another – less idealistic – suggestion would be
that there is an aim simply to produce some output, to attain public atten-
tion and to gain legitimacy. That is to say that either the EP or the Council
prefer the adoption of second-best solutions rather than exhausting their
negotiations and battling for long periods in order to reach a joint agree-
ment. If this argument holds we would expect a decrease in the number of
meetings of the conciliation committee in relation to the adoption of joint
legislation over time. However, the empirical reality shows an increasing
number of conciliation meetings in relation to legal acts completed
between 1994 and 2001.79 Thus, the time efficiency of co-decision is not
rooted some kind of low-level confrontation between the institutions
involved. Both the Council and the Parliament have learned to negotiate
and develop a specific type of communitarian ‘Streitkultur’.80
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Figure 2.11 Co-decision procedure, 1991–2000: time periods between
Commission proposal and final adoption of the legal act, December 2000
Source: Maurer (1999, 2001).
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We offer a different explanation for the trend towards efficiency. The
most important delays in co-decision occur owing to lengthy procedures
before the adoption of Parliament’s first reading and the Council’s
common position where the treaty provisions do not set any deadlines.
Even before the Commission’s formal proposal, the actors involved aim to
achieve substantial influence over the Commission’s proposed text. The
various groups of Member States’ civil servants and private industry meet
within a highly elaborate network of working groups where the substance
of the Commission’s drafts is fine-tuned by a wide range of civil servants
and lobbyists. MEPs meet with Council of Ministers and COREPER repre-
sentatives, Commissioners, Commission cabinet members and other
officials to indicate their potential amendments and ideas on the draft.
Moreover, MEPs are contacted to a growing extent by members of national
parliaments who aim to draw their colleagues’ attention to the potential
consequences of European legislation and to possible EP amendments.81
Once the Commission has officially published and submitted its proposal
to Parliament and the Council, informal meetings take place in which EP
rapporteurs and civil servants, COREPER members, Member State repre-
sentatives and interest groups deliberate on the draft.82 Hence the EP’s first
reading and the subsequent adoption of the Council’s common position are
subject to informal deals between the institutions on matters such as the
legal basis, the financial resources necessary or available for implementing
the act, or some its major aspects. In line with governance approaches we
identify the effects of a growing and rather effective set of networks in an
‘iron quadrangle’83 between the Commission’s services, national adminis-
trations, lobbyists and EP committees.
Theoretical and operative conclusions
Revisiting expectations: controversies surrounding an emergent system 
Through negotiating and ratifying para-constitutional treaty amend-
ments, Member States affect their own politico-administrative systems.
For that purpose we have looked back over the last fifty years in order to
identifying the relevant features of an emergent system. Some are coun-
terintuitive especially in view of historical accounts of the EC/EU’s
developments. However, the empirical results do not point in one clear
direction. We observe divergent trends, between both indicators and
policy fields. The institutional and procedural opportunities on the
European level are employed to differing degrees. The impact of these
challenges varies according to the nature of Member States’ political and
administrative systems. According to this assumption our question is: do
para-constitutional revisions matter – and how do they matter – for the
set-up and functioning of national, sub-national and non-governmental
policy-making structures? 
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Following theory-led expectations we can observe different degrees of
validity. Thus we identify some spillover processes when looking at the
para-constitutional dynamics of the Maastricht Treaty. However, they
have not operated convincingly according to the expansive logic in neo-
functional assumptions: the real use of the new treaty-based competencies
has not lived up to the prediction of a quasi-exponential (‘spillover’-
related) exploitation. For neo-federalist approaches, the EP has used its
powers rather effectively but undramatically and in a business-like way.
However, there are insufficient cross-institutional and cross-policy field
indications of a clear, linear shift towards the strengthening of a suprana-
tional state-like and purely parliamentary system. Finally, the
observations concerning efficiency point to methods of collective bargain-
ing and learning processes which could be interpreted as steps towards a
new kind of bicameral system at the EU level. 
(Neo-)realist views of a decline of the Union following the demise of
superpower bilateralism have been falsified by the revisions to the ECT,
including those at Amsterdam and particularly the measures increasing
the EP’s powers. When considering only the Council’s output, this school
of thought might claim that the overall ‘use’ of EC/EU institutions by
governments has declined. However, a closer look reveals that this
decrease is mainly caused by a ‘saturation’ in traditional EC fields such as
agriculture and trade policy and where new legislation is short-lived (e.g.
price-fixing regulations).84 Governments have even used the articles for
taking politically and – at least with regard to the third pillar – legally
binding decisions in the new pillars although the procedures are clearly
intergovernmental. The net decline in productivity could be interpreted as
reflecting an increasing difficulty in balancing interests between Member
States, but this school of thought might have difficulties in explaining the
increasing role of the EP. 
The observed macro-political patterns resemble most clearly the expec-
tations deduced from governance approaches. In the overall figures the
‘pendulum’ metaphor might be useful in capturing general impressions.
For many of the indicators we do not find a significant impact which
could be attributed to the procedural revisions and amendments of the
Maastricht Treaty. The treaty revisions of 1987 and 1993 – at least those
concerning the EC Treaty – provided for more efficient procedures, but
the exploitation of these provisions was mainly concentrated in some
policy fields. In this view, the extension of the number of policy areas in
which the Council may act by QMV has not resulted in more ‘real’ voting
in the 1990s. Although the treaty revisions provided for more parliamen-
tary procedures, the day-to-day inclusion of the EP remains an issue of
controversial debate. Therefore, governance analyses might need to take
greater account of the role of this institution. The increase in the EP’s
power, however, is linked to a rise in procedural complexity, leading to
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an erosion of the traditional cornerstones of democratic legitimacy, the
national parliaments of the Member States. European parliamentarians
are therefore becoming an active part of the highly specialised interaction
that takes places within informal non-hierarchical networks. 
As to the fusion view, the empirical record is also mixed. Overall
figures point to national governments’ decreasing interest in using EC/EU
instruments. However, we need to qualify this assessment in view of the
limits of quantitative analysis. We would draw attention to a non-linear
relationship between para-constitutional developments and the exploita-
tion of treaties. On the other hand, we identify a dynamic process of
treaty modification and change brought to the institutional and proce-
dural set-up of the Union – a regular pattern of remodelling institutions,
procedures and competencies.85 A closer look also indicates that the new
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty have been used across the board; as
an explanation we could point to the saturation in traditional fields like
agriculture policy. The increasing role of the EP fits the expectation of a
dual legitimacy of European decision-making and the execution of
sectoral authority in the name of the citizenry. The creation of the
Conference of European Affairs Committees of the national parliaments
(COSAC) in 1989 and its formal recognition by the Amsterdam Treaty,
the instalment of national parliament liaison officers within the EP build-
ings and the increasing importance of meetings between corresponding
committees of both the national parliaments and the EP indicate a trend
towards an embryonic kind of multi-level parliamentarism. 
Increasing demands: trends of growth and differentiation
What are the operative challenges to the Member States and their politico-
administrative systems? We might point to a set of trends from the
Brussels arenas which need to be analysed in terms of their potential
effects on national systems. Of particular relevance are:
• The dynamic evolution of new and refined treaty provisions leading –
in a typical pattern – to an ever-increasing set of communitarised
frameworks for policy-making: para-constitutional communitarisation
with a growing role for all Community institutions.
• The subsequent widening of the functional scope of integration:
sectoral differentiation concerning an increasing variety of policy fields
and thus involving more and more actors.
• The creation of institutions by subsequent treaty amendments: institu-
tional differentiation, which increases the range of interaction styles
among relevant actors in the policy-cycle.
• The creation and cross-institutional combination of different kinds of
procedures, which provide actors with opportunities to take binding
decisions: procedural differentiation, which increases complexity and
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the need for national actors to improve their procedural skills; with
majority rule as an acceptable method of decision-making and given
the speed of the co-decision procedure, national actors cannot adopt an
attitude of ‘wait and see’.
• The activation of networks and procedural mechanisms which allow a
growing set of interest and preference articulators outside the official
array of institutions, to participate in EC/EU policy-making: actor
differentiation, which leads to the need to take into account political
sensitivities in broader coalition games.
• The increasing scope and density of legal obligations: the doubling in
size of the acquis communautaire from the early 1980s to 1998 (see
Figure 2.6) also indicates both the rise of the para-constitutional set-up
as well as the invasion of the ‘legal space’ of Member States.
In view of these trends, does the Union require governments, parliaments
and administrations to adapt at the national level? Given the evolution of
the functional scope of EU policy-making over time, do new policy areas,
altered instruments and reformed institutions mobilise national actors and
lead to adaptation at the national level? Is the evolution of the EP viewed
as a challenge which must be dealt with, or are Member States’ systems
immune to such a group of new players?
In the following chapters we will scrutinise the roles and behaviour of
institutions at the national level, i.e. from the perspective of the national
capitals. The focus will be on the extent and intensity of participation by
national institutions in the process of preparing, making, taking, imple-
menting and controlling EC/EU-generated decisions. Given the features
and the dynamics of the EC/EU evolution, we expect to find generally
discernible trends in the ways national institutions react and adapt to the
challenges of the EC/EU. In line with the fusion approach, we look for
trends of ‘Europeanisation’ defined as shifts in the attention of national
institutions caused by the growth and differentiation of the para-consti-
tutional and institutional set up of the EC/EU. We are curious as to how
we can witness emergent or convergent patterns. 
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3 Christian Franck, Hervé Leclercq and Claire Vandevievere
Belgium: Europeanisation and
Belgian federalism
Introduction: European integration as a historical lesson of neutrality 
For about fifty years, the Belgian policy toward European integration is
the most significant demonstration Belgium has made of its commitment
to multilateralism and international co-operation in security as well as in
economic affairs. Even if Belgium had already illustrated such an orienta-
tion through its participation in multilateral trade and monetary
co-operation before the Second World War, its security policy, by
contrast, had been shaped by the compulsory neutrality imposed on
Belgium from 1830 to 1914. To escape from being involved in a new war
caused by the rivalry of its great neighbours, Belgium, had returned to
neutrality by the so-called ‘politique d’indépendance’ in 1936 – with the
well-known consequences when the turmoil of 1940 began. 
European orthodoxy and political pragmatism
It was the Belgian government in exile in London (1940–44) which initi-
ated the new course of Belgian foreign policy for the second part of the
century. Security was to be ensured through collective security and collec-
tive defence, hence the active commitment to the United Nations (UN)
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Belgium has
searched for a ‘voice’ in politico-strategic and economic diplomacy
through multilateralism and through participation in a decision-making
process which rested not on directoires by the great powers but on the
institutional rules of international organisations. Even if both the UN and
NATO have offered forums of great importance for its foreign policy, it
is European integration that has been the central focus for Belgium since
the creation of the Council of Europe and the strengthening of the Europe
of the Six in the early 1950s. Despite divisions in the Belgian political
elite between defenders of national sovereignty and supranationalists
led by Paul-Henri Spaak, it was the latter that had a greater role in
shaping Belgian European policy. The long-term aim of this policy is the
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achievement of a federal union, so Belgium has pushed for a widening of
the scope of EC competencies and a strengthening of supranationalism in
EC decision-making. Belgium has thus favoured the Commission’s
monopoly in policy initiation (that is, its role as ‘the motor’ of integra-
tion), the extension of QMV in the Council, a growing role for the EP and
full powers for the ECJ in ensuring that European law is observed.
Nevertheless, the story of Belgian diplomacy is also one of pragmatism in
its attempts to bypass obstacles on the road to the integration.
In 1972 the Belgian government supported French President
Pompidou’s attempts to give a new impetus to the European unification.
However, it was not certain that the French proposals made at the 1972
Paris Summit were an attempt to pave the way towards a federal Europe.
Having been against the proposal in the early 1960s, by December 1974,
Belgium had agreed to the direct involvement of heads of state or prime
ministers in EC affairs through the European Council. The Tindemans
Report (December 1975) was another illustration of Belgium’s pragma-
tism in looking for incremental progress at a time when substantial moves
towards a federal Europe were not forthcoming. However this pragma-
tism was also visible in Belgium’s efforts to preserve and to reinforce the
supranational elements of the EC’s institutional system whenever such
opportunities arose. For instance, the Belgian presidency pressed for
voting on agriculture issues in the first half of 1982. Furthermore, follow-
ing ‘the night of the long knives’ during the 1997 Amsterdam European
Council, Belgian Prime Minister Jean Luc Dehaene insisted there was no
point in re-weighting the votes within the Council of Ministers’ QMV
system without extending it to cover new competencies.
The priority of EMU
In the 1990s, movements towards EMU formed the strategic priority for
pushing forward European integration, but the objectives of political
unification were also constantly relevant. Belgium has remained among
those who support a common defence policy and a common defence
which would fully consolidate a political role for the European Union in
international affairs. And the final aim of federalism has not been aban-
doned even if Dehaene insisted more on federative elements of the
institutional system than on a definite federal system. This federalist atti-
tude, associated with Belgium and the Netherlands, explains their
unhappiness with the pillar structure of the TEU and their support during
the 1996–97 IGC for a progressive inclusion of the two intergovernmen-
tal pillars into the supranational pillar one. Since the Maastricht Treaty
has entered into force, membership of the Euro-Zone has been the main
priority for the Belgian government. The latter took important measures
to decrease public debt which fell from 7.2 per cent in 1993 to under 3
per cent in 1997 (in fact, 2.1 per cent). Although the overall trend was
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downward, the debt ratio of 135 per cent in 1993 was still at 123 per cent
in 1998. The European Monetary Institute (EMI) has asked that Belgium
retain a positive balance (net of debt) that could lead the country, as fore-
seen in the Treaty of Maastricht, to a debt ratio of 60 per cent by 2031.
At the time of joining the Euro-Zone, Belgium aimed to maintain a posi-
tive balance of 6 per cent for several years.1
Furthermore, an administrative service (Commissariat général à l’euro)
has been created as an instrument to prepare and adapt the banking,
financial and economic sectors to the use of the Euro. Its activities are
organised around the following themes: preparation for and adaptation to
the Euro by public administrators (non-)financial enterprises and
consumers, and communication policy. The aim of the Commissariat was
not to substitute private initiatives but to co-ordinate and provide infor-
mation and recommendations about how to follow the guidelines. It
began, for instance, with an inventory of all the measures necessary to
ensure a harmonious and efficient introduction of the Euro within
Belgium between 1999 and 2002. Each measure is explained in the form
of an up-to-date file which deals with the relevant sectors, the state of the
work, the timing and, in some cases, recommendations. Leaflets and
colloquia are also supplied. The possibility of enlargement in the year
2000 placed Belgium at a crossroads. A fear of losing its influence within
EU institutions led Belgium to defend its position and to adopt a reluctant
attitude towards following the ‘larger’ Member States who press for insti-
tutional reforms. Might Belgium take on a rigid if not conservative
approach to institutional issues? At Amsterdam, it aimed to maintain the
minimum ratio of one commissioner per Member State and was reluctant
to see a re-weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers – arguing, as
mentioned above, that this reform would prove necessary only if QMV
was significantly extended. The Belgian government, however, reacted
promptly to overcome the Amsterdam failure on institutions by propos-
ing a declaration which links the re-weighting of the voting in the Council
of Ministers, the composition of the Commission and an extension of
QMV. This initiative was also supported by France and Italy.
Political parties and public opinion: from permissive consensus to issue-
related ‘voice’
Belgian political parties, in general, are still in favour of a federal Europe
but are critical of recent developments and suggest that the Union should
be more democratic, more social and more efficient. Hence the Green
Party voted against the Treaty of Amsterdam and the federal parliament
adopted a resolution supporting the Belgian government in its proposal
for institutional reforms. In the Senate on 4 June 1998, 49 members voted
in favour of the Treaty of Amsterdam and 13 voted against. In the
Chamber of Representatives on 9 July 1998, 105 members voted in favour
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and 23 voted against. In party terms, the Social-Christians, Socialists and
Liberals voted in favour while the Green Party voted against. Also voting
negatively were ‘Volksunie’, a party that favours Flemish autonomy, and
the ‘Vlaams Blok’, the separatist and extreme-right group, both of which
favour a ‘Europe of the Peoples’.
Public opinion has naturally moved in the same way. From a general
permissive consensus, the attitude of the population has become more
critical depending on policy issues. Two major events put Europe on the
agenda: the bankruptcy of Clabecq Forges and the closing of Renault-
Vilvordre. Europe was seen at the same time as both a scapegoat and a
forum in which a social dimension should be developed. However,
beyond such circumstances as these, public opinion is not usually signifi-
cantly mobilised. The Maastricht criteria were synonymous with
restrictions but have nevertheless been accepted. However, from 1980 to
1996, those who believed that belonging to the Union was a good thing
became a minority according to Eurobarometer data (57 per cent in 1980
and 42 per cent in 1996). The majority of interest groups are in favour of
European integration though there are differences among various types of
groups and subjects.
Belgian federalism
The major institutional feature that influences Belgian European policy is
its federal structure completed after the Treaty of Maastricht. The specific
character of Belgian federalism lies in the co-existence of two different
kinds of federated entities: regions and communities. There are three
regions: the Wallonian Region, the Flemish Region and the Brussels-
Capital Region. They are territorial entities created essentially as a
response to aspirations of socio-economic autonomy. They have major
power in the fields of town and country planning, economic policy, public
industrial initiatives, infrastructure, employment, environment, energy
policy and transport. The Kingdom of Belgium also has three communi-
ties, which express cultural autonomies: the French Community, the
Flemish Community and the German Community. They have authority in
education, cultural matters, broadcast media, use of languages and poli-
cies with a personal impact (personal assistance, health, policy concerning
persons with disabilities, protection of young children, etc.). These feder-
ated entities have become increasingly involved in the EC decision-making
process, both at the preparatory stage and, since the Maastricht Treaty,
with regard to final decision-making. This is due to the change of Article
203 (ex Article 146) ECT, advocated mainly by Belgium and Germany.
The Council of Ministers is no longer formed strictly by members of the
national government but is composed of representatives of each Member
State at ‘ministerial level’, entitled to take decisions for the government of
that Member State. A member of a federated government can legally
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represent Belgium but this must be on the basis of a consensus which can
sometimes be difficult to attain. A co-operation agreement was signed on
8 March 1994 between the federal state and the regions and communities
to establish the rules for the representation of Belgium. The Flemish
Parliament passed a resolution in 1996 requesting separate votes for the
Belgian federated entities in the Council of Ministers on matters which
concern them.2 However, the federal state did not defend this proposition
during the 1996 IGC which would have divided the Belgian vote in the
Council of Ministers. The Belgian state therefore remains the only inter-
locutor although some entities would like more power. This could be
possible only within the fundamentally changed Belgian framework
brought about by Belgian federalisation. Co-operation and co-ordination
have become essential at the administrative and political levels. Federated
entities are very sensitive on specific issues such as culture, the right
of European citizens to vote in local elections, and the concept of
subsidiarity.
In its memorandum for the 1996 IGC (October 1995), the Belgian
government pointed out that subsidiarity is not only a ‘downward’ prin-
ciple – from Union to States – but also an ‘upward’ principle if action at
the Union level is appropriate. Being a federal state, the government sees
in subsidiarity a crucial principle in the relations between the Union, the
federal state and the communities and regions. The CoR and the use of
Article 203 ECT are expressions of this subsidiarity. However, according
to Belgium, subsidiarity should be applied in all Member States. A re-
negotiation of subsidiarity at the 1996 IGC was conceivable only if it did
not damage further developments in European integration or interfere in
the sharing of competencies within Member States. The federal govern-
ment’s support for the specification of subsidiarity in the Treaty of
Amsterdam was mainly an attempt to please the federated entities.
The national policy-cycle: the complexity of horizontal and vertical
co-ordination 
Actors and co-ordinating bodies
Some ministerial departments at the federal level, which are particularly
involved in European integration, have their own European co-ordination
structures. All, however, have assigned one of their staff members to act
as a ‘European co-ordinator’. Currently, the regional or community
ministries are striving to organise European co-ordination in the same
way by designating either a person or a unit to this role. In addition, there
are many interdepartmental co-ordination bodies. At present, no ministe-
rial department has been created in Belgium to deal specifically with
European issues. Rather, the existing bodies have been adapted to partic-
ipate in drawing up and implementing Community decisions. At the
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political level, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is responsible for Belgium’s
foreign policy and general European policy. He participates in the
`General Affairs’ Councils and sits together with the Prime Minister on
the European Council. At the administrative level, two ministerial depart-
ments play a key co-ordinating role: the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry for Economic Affairs. The former has two services for
European co-ordination: the P.11 and J.12 services. In the Economic
Affairs Ministry consultation takes place in an interdepartmental commit-
tee known as the Inter-Ministerial Economic Committee (IEC), which is
composed of representatives from several ministries. Above all these
administrative bodies act as federal co-ordinators; representatives of both
the communities and regions are also invited to IEC meetings whenever an
issue of concern to them has been put on the agenda. As for P.11, it holds
ad hoc ‘European Co-Ordination’ meetings, to which it invites represen-
tatives from the various ministerial cabinets and departments concerned;
occasionally a delegation from the Commission of the European
Communities attends. The composition of the group varies according to
the subjects studied. The process of co-ordination involves preparing the
Belgian position to be defended in the Community institutions – upward
co-ordination – and giving momentum to the transposition of EU law –
downward co-ordination. Upward co-ordination falls within the jurisdic-
tion of the P.11 service while downward co-ordination is dealt with by the
P.12 service. The IEC, which co-ordinates the various ministerial depart-
ments in economic matters, is chaired by the Secretary-General of the
Ministry for Economic Affairs and is composed of high-level civil servants
from departments with economic responsibilities (in the broad sense of
the word) and never includes members of the ministerial cabinets. 
In principle, the ‘European Co-Ordination’ meetings in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs deal, as a priority, with the political and institutional
aspects of the matters involved while the IEC provides a forum for co-ordi-
nation of a more technical nature. Besides those general co-ordination
groups, there are sectoral co-ordination bodies which act to overcome the
combination of ad hoc meetings, for example at the Department of
Agriculture or at the Department of Public Health and the Environment.
Like other Member States, Belgium uses its Permanent Representation to
the Communities in Brussels for all communications between the European
institutions and the Belgian administrations. The Permanent
Representation participates in the co-ordination of the preparation of
national positions in relation to Community law. Civil servants from the
Permanent Representations and in some cases other designated officials
from the ministries are present in the working parties that prepare Council
decisions and even possibly in expert groups convened by the Commission.
It takes part in negotiations in which it expresses Belgium’s standpoint. In
addition to career diplomats, the Belgian Permanent Representation also
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comprises officials seconded from the Ministries for Economic Affairs,
Communications and Infrastructure, Finance, Agriculture, Employment
and Labour, and also from the National Bank. The communities (except
the German-speaking community) and the regions have also designated
‘attachés’. They receive instructions only from the minister to whom they
are answerable but are under the authority of the Ambassador.
Procedures
The lengthy preparation of the legislative process starts, as a general rule,
with a Commission proposal. This proposal is actually the outcome of
work during which the Commission calls upon, in particular, consultants
or experts from the national administrations. For the preparation, the
Belgian experts included in a COREPER working party are specialised
officials appointed by the department which has been contacted by the
Permanent Representation. In most cases it is easy to find the competent
service. The co-ordinator will intervene only when the decision proposal
does not clearly fit into a section of existing Belgian law: he has then to
designate an official to participate in the work or, if several ministries can
claim jurisdiction in the matter, he will attend a European co-ordination
meeting in the P.11 service which will determine the department to be the
so-called ‘pilot department’.
A form of post hoc control of the position adopted by the expert is the
regular report s/he has to submit to her/his minister. In addition, coher-
ence of the Belgian position is guaranteed by the presence, within the
working party, of officials from the Permanent Representation who act as
spokespersons for Belgium. At this stage, the Representation is actually
responsible for the co-ordination but if necessary, it is assisted by the pilot
department. After COREPER, when the matter goes back to the Council
of Ministers, the experts gathered in the P.11 service then prepare the
Council meeting by charting the main lines of the position to be defended
by the minister, accompanied by a member of his cabinet, the Permanent
Representative and the Deputy Permanent Representative.
For implementation, the department or departments concerned make
plans that are communicated to the European co-ordinator or co-ordina-
tors. The J.12 service ensures that the deadlines for the transposition of
directives are observed. Given that European rules generally encompass
the responsibilities of several ministerial departments of the federal state,
the regions and the communities, co-ordination at this level is required.
The pilot departments are entrusted with an initiating role and are
charged with contacting the other ministerial departments concerned and
following the action through. These departments are chosen because of
their responsibility and those most often charged with implementing
directives are Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Social Affairs, Public Health
and Environment, and Finance.
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Regular meetings are held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to ensure
that the follow-up is supervised. At these meetings the co-ordinators of
the departments concerned evaluate the progress of the transposition or
implementation procedure. Actually, in many fields basic legislation
makes all later rules subject to consultation by some specialised council.
These councils are either bodies composed of scientific specialists (e.g. the
High Council for Hygiene in Mines), consumers and social partners (e.g.
the Public Contracts Commission) and sometimes only of social partners
(e.g. the National Labour Council), or bodies with a socio-economic
composition (e.g. the Consumers’ Council or the Central Council for the
Economy). They are not bound by any deadlines within which they must
give their opinion. As is customarily the case in Belgium, they also enjoy
a considerable amount of autonomy in organising their work. It seems
therefore that the process is ruled more by officials than by the govern-
ment. The minister representing Belgium is fully informed at the end of the
elaboration process before attending the Council of Ministers. There is
also some reluctance among those with political authority to act on
instructions from the administrative level. As a consequence officials do
not receive any instructions and a minister may change Belgium’s position
at the very end of the negotiations. When a matter causes conflict or has
a political significance, it is dealt with at the governmental level. 
Political parties are rather excluded from this game which is dominated
by officials, at least in terms of legislation of lesser importance. When it
appears that a matter has political relevance, political headquarters come
in to defend a particular position. Their involvement is however, modest
because of the technical, and the evolutionary character of European
negotiations, the lack of transparency and the priority given to national
issues. As far as transposition is concerned, one could equally make the
distinction between those measures which are of political importance and
those which are not. The former are dealt with at the political level in the
government or among political parties; the latter at the administrative
level but both cases require the government’s intervention. The prelimi-
nary draft of the law of transposition is discussed in the Belgian Council
of Ministers. The government may change its draft according to the
suggestions contained in the opinion of the Conseil d’Etat without being
bound. The draft order is submitted to the King to be signed (or the
competent minister of a federated government). As for the draft law, this
is presented to the competent legislative assemblies. Ratification, promul-
gation and publication are still required for the law to be applicable in
Belgium. Once the transposition has been completed, the Belgian
Permanent Representation is informed so that it can then notify the
Commission.
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The specifics of regional and community involvement 
Co-operation on European policy-making between the federal state,
regions and communities is facilitated by co-ordination procedures which
are formalised through legal rules and which are designed to promote
dialogue between the three levels. The ‘comité de concertation’ comprises
six national ministers – including the Prime Minister who chairs the
committee – and six ministers representing the Flemish government, the
government of the French Community, the Wallonian regional govern-
ment and the Brussels regional government. Originally set up to settle
‘conflicts of interest’, this committee is now an important meeting place
where general co-ordination problems arising from the drafting and
implementation of Belgium’s European policy can be raised and may be
solved. The ‘comité de concertation’ may set up specialised committees,
called ‘inter-ministerial conferences’, to promote consultation and co-
operation between the state, communities and regions. Consultation takes
place between the relevant members of the federal government and the
community and regional governments, not between the members of their
staff. The ‘conferences’ can however set up working groups on a perma-
nent or ad hoc basis. The Inter-Ministerial Conference on Foreign Policy
takes a prominent part in European affairs. The permanent representative
and the deputy representative are the only persons entitled to take the
floor within COREPER. When preparing meetings, they have the option
of assistance from the Belgian ‘spokesperson’ from one of the working
parties set up by the committee. It is usually the permanent representative
who designates an official from the Representation to play this role in
each working party. If appropriate, such an official can be chosen from
among the regional or community ‘attachés’.
The federal authority, the regions and the communities concluded on 8
March 1994 an agreement ‘relating to the representation of the Kingdom
of Belgium within the Council of Ministers of the European Union’. The
aim of this agreement was to organise a general co-ordination mechanism
ensuring unity in the views expressed by Belgium. ‘Co-ordination’ must
take place before each session of the Council of Ministers, whatever the
field may be. Such co-ordination is the responsibility of P.11 in the federal
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘both from a general point of view and in
respect of each point of the agenda of the European Communities
Councils meetings’. Positions are adopted by consensus but if this cannot
be reached, the case in hand is referred to the Inter-Ministerial Conference
for Foreign Policy, which also acts by consensus. If agreement still cannot
be achieved then the matter is submitted to the ‘comité de concertation’.
This co-ordination process must result in the adoption of a single position
so that Belgium can take part effectively in Community decision-making.
Without a consensus the Belgian representative has to abstain from voting
or from taking a position within the Council of Ministers.
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By virtue of Article 146 of the Treaty of Rome, as reformulated by the
Treaty of Maastricht, representation of Belgium within the Council is
possible through ‘a representative . . . at ministerial level’ from all the
competent regions and communities, ‘authorised to commit the govern-
ment’ of Belgium. Article 81 of the Special Act on Institutional Reforms
of 8 August 1980 authorises the regional or community governments ‘to
commit the State within the Council in which one of their members repre-
sents Belgium’, in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between
the federal authority, the regions and communities. The agreement signed
on 8 March 1994 reiterates the point that only one minister may hold the
Belgian seat and is authorised to commit the State by his or her vote.3 As
for Belgium’s representation, the agreement distinguishes between four
categories of Councils: 
• Councils concerning exclusively federal competencies (general affairs,
economy and finance, justice, telecommunications, consumers, devel-
opment, civil defence and fishery) in which Belgium is led by the federal
authority.
• Councils concerning chiefly federal competencies (agriculture, internal
market, public health, energy, environment, transportation and social
affairs) in which Belgium is represented by the federal authority in the
presence of an assessor representing the constituent units.
• Councils concerning chiefly regional or community competencies
(industry and research) in which Belgium is represented by one of the
constituent units, helped by a federal assessor.
• Councils concerning exclusively regional or community competencies
(culture, education, tourism, youth, housing and land planning) in
which Belgium is represented by one of the constituent units.
The ‘assessor-minister’ assists the minister representing Belgium. When
matters deliberated in the Council of Ministers do not correspond exactly
to the attribution of competencies in the Belgian system, the ‘sitting-minis-
ter’ representing the predominantly competent collectivity will be assisted
by a minister from one of the other collectivities which shares this compe-
tence in an ancillary fashion. With regard to their representation, Belgian
regions and communities have organised a half-yearly rotation system for
the assessor or sitting-ministers entitled to act on behalf of Belgium. An
annex to the agreement details a rotation system for informal Councils as
well. This process of co-ordination prior to meetings of the Council of
Ministers allows for the establishment of instructions from which the
Belgian representative cannot depart except if the evolution of the discus-
sion in the Council demands adaptation. If this is the case then decisions
have to be taken urgently without consultation and with the representa-
tive defending the general interest. As far as implementation is concerned,
the transposition of directives in Regional and Community fields – within
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the terms of Belgian law – depends solely on the communities or regions
themselves. The federal authority is not able to force the latter to fulfil
their European obligations. However, at an international level, the
Belgian state could be held liable, as in the case of environmental protec-
tion, a field in which regions often fail to act or are late or negligent.
Under Article 169 of the constitution, the federal authority can take the
place of the region or community which has not fulfilled an ‘international
or supranational obligation’, provided that beforehand the state has been
‘sentenced by an international or supranational court for not fulfilling’
this obligation. The state then has the power to implement ‘the enacting
terms of the decision’ of the court but the effect of such measures ends as
soon as the community or region concerned has complied with the enact-
ing terms of the judgement.
Parliamentary participation
The parliamentary assemblies, in particular the Federal Parliament and to
a lesser extent the regional and community councils, have striven to
increase their control over European integration. For example, since April
1985, within the Chamber of Representatives, there has been an Advisory
Committee on European Issues. In March 1990 the Senate also set up such
a committee. The two bodies have worked together in the form of the
Federal Advisory Committee on European Issues. This is composed of ten
deputies, ten senators and ten Belgian members of the EP. The main tasks
of this committee are to inform the Parliament on Community affairs and
to control the government’s action at the European level as regards prepa-
ration and implementation of Community law. The committee produces
reports and recommendations.
Some federated Councils have set up similar committees but their
members do not often meet and therefore they play only a minimal role in
parliamentary scrutiny and in the transposition of directives. Nevertheless
these initiatives accurately reflect the reactions of most national parlia-
ments in the face of what is called the “European democratic deficit”.
However, they have had only a limited influence on the Belgian adminis-
tration. Legal provisions have been adopted since the last Belgian
Constitutional reform in 1993, the year in which the Maastricht Treaty
entered into force. Article 168, §6 of the constitution states that ‘The
Chambers shall be informed of any revisions to the treaties instituting the
European Communities, or to the treaties and acts amending or supple-
menting them, as of the moment that the negotiations concerned are
opened. They shall be fully aware of the draft treaty before its signature.’
Article 16(2), of the Special Act on Institutional Reforms gives the
regional and community councils the same prerogative. Regular meetings
on the IGCs have been held in practice in the federal parliament, mainly
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This practice, however, is not
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frequent in the Regional and Community Councils, where European
affairs are not high on the agenda. For secondary law, the Special Act on
Institutional Reforms also includes a section dealing with the ‘Information
of the Chambers and the Councils on the proposals for acts with a norma-
tive character of the Commission of the European Communities’. Article
92 provides that: ‘as soon as they are sent to the Council of the European
Communities, the proposals for regulations or directives and, if necessary,
other acts with a normative character of the Commission of the European
Communities are communicated to the federal legislative chambers and to
the regional or community councils, depending on the subject matter.’
Attempts to exercise some control over these proposals have been very
sporadic in the councils but there is actually a procedure in the federal
parliament. Indeed the Federal Advisory Committee on European Issues
regularly receives a list of the European Commission’s proposals. 
Each political group chooses one proposal that should be dealt with as a
priority. The subject has to refer to a federal competence and to be relevant
for the Committee. After the redaction of a technical sheet on each selected
proposal, the Committee has different possibilities related to the relevance
of the matter: the procedure can be brought to an end or a report on the
subject can be elaborated by collecting information and organising hear-
ings – this can lead to a resolution by the Advisory Committee. Another
possibility is that a permanent committee of the Chamber or of the Senate
would want to study the matter, which hardly ever takes place because this
kind of committee is usually overloaded. In any case the technical sheets
collected in a parliamentary document are a source of information for all
the deputies who can use them for classical scrutiny.
Any deputy indeed can formulate (written or) oral questions in the
commissions or in the plenary session on European matters. Although
only the Chamber of Representatives has the political control (the Senate
no longer has this), such questions rarely endanger the government’s posi-
tion. The latter informs and listens to the parliament and takes good note
of comments made but is not compelled to take account of them in
forming a negotiating stance. The efforts of deputies to exert control
during the early stages of decision-making result from a realisation that
such deputies have lost any control over the implementation of EU law.
The latter is usually carried out through governmental orders and legal
acts which leave very little room for important changes. Only a few
matters such as the right to vote at municipal elections are subjected to
important debates that cause some difficulties to the government. But
again, the precise terms of the directive in question have to be respected.4
Participation of other actors
As regions and communities are direct institutional actors involved in
European policy through co-operation, co-ordination and representation,
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they have been included in the general organisational set-up. With regard
to political parties, there is an evolution towards a reduced consensus on
European affairs (see the Introduction). Governments are coalitional and
one could argue that tensions arise more as a result of conflicts of interest
between portfolios than between political tendencies. For instance, within
the framework of Agenda 2000, differences have arisen between the
Social-Christian Prime Minister – who favours maintaining the EU budget
at 1.27 per cent of EU GNP), the Socialist Minister for Foreign Affairs –
who supports CAP reforms – and the Social-Christian Minister for
Agriculture – who, by contrast, wishes to defend the agricultural sector.
Turning to the role of lobbyists, who relay public opinion and interests,
one could make the distinction between socio-economic interests – such as
workers and employers, agricultural organisations, services and profes-
sional groups and political–cultural interests – such as human rights,
ecology and consumers’ rights. The level of lobbying for these particular
interests depends on the resources that lobbyists have available at the
European level, and on the potential benefits that such lobbying can
bring. 
National survey data show that interest groups’ communications
networks are limited.5 Such organisations mainly look for contacts with
actors that have only a limited influence on the European decision-making
process such as the EP, the media, national political parties and federal or
regional deputies. Even then, contacts are not that frequent (although a
comparative study would be useful). On the contrary, actors such as the
European Commission, the Permanent Representation or the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, are neglected. The media, however, can be a good means
of pressurising or ‘waking-up’ the government. However, socio-economic
groups with a direct European interest seem to find their way more easily
to the Commission and many such organisations are members of interest
groups that act at the European level. This is an advantage when interests
coincide, but this is not always the case.
The majority of these organisations are in favour of an increase in the
EU’s competencies. Practical reasons such as efficiency explain this atti-
tude. However, this is not the case with the CAP, where many interest
groups see the amount of money spent on this particular interest as
exaggerated. By contrast, EMU is accepted, particularly among socio-
economic interests who recognise its economic advantages. While social
policy is seen as a necessary complement to EMU (except among employ-
ers and business interests) this is viewed as a defence reflex to preserve
social benefits rather than in terms of a European ideal of solidarity. EMU
and social policy are in that respect two major topics among the Belgian
population. This is not to say that there is a major social mobilisation in
Belgium around the Union. Indeed the debates on the Amsterdam Treaty,
for instance, might be seen as particularly shallow.
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The control of EC law: the Belgian legal order and the supremacy of
EC law
The milestone decision of the Belgian Cour de Cassation on this point is
that taken in the case of Le Ski on 27 May 1971. In this case, the Cour de
Cassation gave up the former adage of ‘Lex posterior derogat legi priori’
in favour of the Supremacy of EC law over Belgian legal acts. The reason-
ing of the Cour was the following: 
In the event of a conflict between a norm of domestic law and a norm of
international law which produces direct effects in the domestic legal system,
the rule established by a treaty shall prevail. The Primacy of the treaty
results from the very nature of international law. The reason is that the
treaties which have created Community law have instituted a new legal
system in whose favour the member-states have restricted the exercise of
their sovereign powers in the areas determined by those treaties.6
Thus, by recognising the ceding of sovereignty, the Cour de Cassation
proclaimed a fortiori the supremacy of both the primary EC treaties and
secondary EC legislation. The terms of the judgement are obviously
borrowed from the leading ECJ case of Costa v. ENEL (1964), except in
the reference to the limitation of the exercise of sovereign powers, where
Costa v. ENEL invoked a definitive limitation of sovereign rights. But the
Cour de Cassation did not address the question of whether EC law should
prevail over Belgian Constitutional provisions. As regards the Conseil
d’Etat, whose role is to assess the constitutionality of administrative acts,
in the Orfinger7 case it clearly held that the supremacy of EC law was
based on Article 34 of the Constitution and implied that provisions of the
European treaties should prevail over Belgian constitutional law. This
statement is rather unsatisfactory, for the simple reason that Article 34 of
the Constitution can be modified under certain procedures to the extent
that the supremacy of EC law can be challenged in the future.
Concerning the Cour d’Arbitrage, whose role is to monitor the consti-
tutionality of legislative acts, it has up to now argued that the
Constitution should prevail over conventional provisions of international
law. But the current case law concerns only classical international treaties,
and not those which deal with a supranational structure such as the
European Community. In a report (10–13 May 1993), the Cour
d’Arbitrage addressed the question of conflict between Belgian constitu-
tional provisions and Community law, and held that this problem could
not be solved without referring to Article 25 of the Constitution (new
Article 34) which provides that the exercise of the powers of national
institutions can be delegated by a treaty to institutions bound by public
international law. This assertion opens the door to the possible recogni-
tion by the Cour d’Arbitrage of the supremacy of EC law over the Belgian
Constitution.
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The Belgian legal order: direct applicability and direct effect
In its report on Belgium, Hervé Bribosia made a very good summary: 
The point of view of the Belgian legal order is in accordance with that of
the EC: national courts admit the supreme jurisdiction of the ECJ – by
virtue of Article 177 – to rule on the direct effect of EC law in the domes-
tic legal order . . . The decision of the Conseil d’Etat in the case of
Corveleyn in 1968 deserves to be mentioned as it precedes by a few years
the ECJ’s decision in the Van Duyn Case (1974) asserting the principle of
the direct applicability of directives . . . Indeed, the Conseil d’Etat annulled
a ministerial order of deportation that violated the 1964 directive, which,
at the time, had not been transposed . . . Since then, the Belgian courts
have with a few exceptions, supported the direct application of directives,
at least in their vertical dimension, in accordance with the ECJ’s decision
in Marshall.8
Appeals to the ECJ 
There is one pending case based on Article 227(ex Article 170) ECT that
should be judged in 1999; there are no cases under Article 232(ex
Article 175) ECT but, since 1993, ninety-nine cases have been intro-
duced or are pending before the ECJ under Article 234(ex Article 177)
ECT. Article 227(ex Article 170) is very rarely used by the Member
States for political reasons, which is understandable; they prefer to call
upon the Commission to pursue a Member State for non-compliance
with community obligations under Article 226(ex Article 169) ECT. In
spite of this, Belgium introduced an Article 227(ex Article 170) ECT
action before the ECJ against Spain concerning the importation of Rioja
wine. The facts of this case can be summarised as follows: Belgian
importers would like to import Rioja in bulk. But a Spanish decree, in
order to guarantee the appellation of origin, obliges bottling within the
region concerned, and thus forbids the importation of Rioja in bulk.
Moreover, importers have contested this legislation on the grounds that
it infringes the principle of the free movement of goods. The ECJ has
already decided in favour of Delhaize in a former case under Article
234(ex Article 177) ECT but, in practice, the Spanish authorities have
not back-pedalled. It is now up to the ECJ to confirm its interpretation
of Community law, despite the fact that Spain, with the clemency of the
Austrian presidency, has attempted to bypass the ECJ by trying to
convince the Council of Ministers to adopt a resolution stating that the
production of wine must include bottling within the region of produc-
tion. As regards Article 234(ex Article 177) ECT, the ninety-nine cases
that are or have been brought before the ECJ since 1993, can be classi-
fied as in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Cases that are being or have been brought before the ECJ,
1993–98
Area (in alphabetical order) No. Area (ordered by importance) No.
Agriculture 5 Social welfare 22
Brussels convention 1 Free movement of goods 14
Competition law 4 Fiscal affairs 9
Consumers 1 Supremacy of EC law 1
Co-operation agreement 1 Freedom of establishment 8
Environment 2 Free movement of workers 7
Fiscal affairs 9 Free movement of services 6
Free movement of goods 14 Agriculture 5
Free movement of persons 1 Sex discrimination 5
Free movement of services 6 Competition law 4
Free movement of workers 7 Social policy 4
Freedom of establishment 8 Environment 2
Free trade agreements 1 Intellectual property 2
Intellectual property 2 Transport 2
Protocol on privilege and immunity 1 Brussels convention 1
Public health 1 Consumers 1
Sex discrimination 5 Co-operation agreement 1
Social welfare 22 Free movement of persons 1
Social policy 4 Free trade agreements 1
State aid 1 Protocol on privilege and immunity 1
Supremacy of EC law 1 Public health 1
Transport 2 State aid 1
It is interesting to note that the more sensitive areas are mainly social
policy, fiscal affairs and working environment issues (which involve
mutual recognition of professional qualifications, degrees and working
conditions). The importance of social policy is not a coincidence. It high-
lights the social consequences of economic globalisation with its plethora
of mergers, restructuring and ‘delocalisation’ of undertakings. In Office
National de l’Emploi v. Heidemarie Naruschawicus,9 for instance, the
ECJ was questioned on the interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 77/187
regarding the maintenance of workers’ rights following the transfer of
undertakings.10 In this case, the ECJ held that the rights of workers deriv-
ing from their contractual relationships were transferred to the transferee.
Both the globalisation of the international economy and the requirements
of the Euro have led the Member States to attempt to cut down their social
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expenditure one way or another, and in the meantime to increase their
incomes in order to ensure a balanced budget. This attitude is illustrated
in many cases dealing with pensions (twelve cases), indemnities for
disability (six cases), doles (three cases). Those cases often take the shape
of a conflict of law applicable to the facts at stake or a conflict of inter-
pretation of a regulation or directive. The importance of fiscal affairs is
mainly owing to the directives on VAT harmonisation; the problems
raised often refer to the interpretation of a specific provision that has an
important implication for the undertakings concerned. Because of the
importance of the economic consequences for these actors, it is not
surprising that they have a very good knowledge of Community law them-
selves or, through their advisers, of well-known law firms specialising in
these matters. With regard to the working environment, a distinction has
to be drawn between the problems linked to freedom of establishment and
free movement of services and those linked to the free movement of
workers. The former problems can be divided into two categories: first,
those concerning the mutual recognition of qualifications and conditions
of access to professions – affecting doctors, veterennaries, architects, lorry
drivers – and secondly, those relating to the legal standing of migrant
workers.
With regard to the latter problems (those concerning the free move-
ment of workers), particular importance must be attached to the ‘Bosman
Case’ in which it was confirmed that EC law in general and the free
movement of workers in particular, applies even to sporting activities
and should prevail over sporting regulations whenever those regulations
are contrary to EC law. But, once again, there were important financial
interests at stake which justified Mr Bosman’s determination to continue
his legal struggle to the end, and his decision to employ the services of
legal experts. Otherwise, it is often surprising to see how few Belgian
citizens and even lawyers, are aware of EC law: although citizens have
heard about EC law, it remains the domain of specialists and a legal
‘elite’. 
Conclusions: the Europeanisation of a small declining federal state
Given its political landscape, Belgium is well trained in the process of
compromise. Belgium often plays a conciliatory role between the diver-
gent, even antagonistic, positions of Member States. Being a small
country, however, Belgium rarely takes the initiative for new Community
rules. Rather, it tends to follow others and for much of the time considers
the Commission as an ally. However Belgium holds some winning cards
such as the stability of its prime ministerial office, its ministers who know
their dossiers and their European partners very well, the presence of some
strong personalities and the alliance with other small countries, in partic-
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ular the Benelux nations. One could argue that Benelux co-operation was
not at its best during the last round of the Amsterdam negotiations.
However, it did not prevent the prime minister from blocking institutional
reforms because of his dissatisfaction with regard to the extension of
majority voting.
As a federal state with important competencies devolved to its
constituent units, Belgium has created elaborate procedures to achieve a
delicate balance between the existence of federated authorities and the
need to preserve its unity as a single Member State within the Union. The
main aspect of achieving this balance is the co-ordination and the co-oper-
ation between the federal authorities, the regions and the communities.
They participate in the elaboration of Community policies thanks to co-
ordination within Belgian’s political and administrative system and
representation at the European level, not only in the consultative CoR but
especially in the Council of Ministers. This is owing to the fact that the
last constitutional reforms in Belgium favoured greater visibility of the
regions and the communities at the international and European level. By
‘visibility’ we mean presence and competencies. This respect for the feder-
ated entities’ autonomy causes some problems of efficiency but growing
claims for autonomy have been satisfied.
This political reality sometimes preoccupies the other Members States
that recognise one single political entity: the Kingdom of Belgium. When
signing the Amsterdam Treaty on 2 October 1997, Belgium had to reas-
sure its partners by stating that it was in all cases the Kingdom as such
which was bound in respect of its entire territory by the Treaty and would
bear full liability for compliance with the obligations entered into the
Treaty. A temporary substitution procedure is a partial solution to allow
the state to implement Community law when regions or communities are
delaying this process.
Belgium’s credibility as a pro-European is also harmed by its reputation
of being tardy where implementation of Community law is concerned.
Belgium has striven and is still trying to ameliorate the situation, but the
results remain unsatisfactory. The comparatively poor position of
Belgium can be explained to some extent by a number of factors: the
federal system, the poor performance of some administrations owing to
shortage of staff, lack of pressure and motivation, the strict separation
between officials in charge of preparing Community law and those
responsible for its implementation, the absence of a European culture
among many officials and the obligatory consultation of many specialised
consultative councils.
The levels of ‘Europeanisation’ within the Belgian administration
The first difficulty in determining the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ is the
danger of generalisation. One could indeed identify at least two types of
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officials: full-time officials working on European matters and part-time
officials. Diplomats and officials from the Permanent Representation are
an elite that have fully integrated themselves into European policy-
making. (Delegates from communities and regions are still in a learning
process.) At the other extreme, there are national officials that are very
occasionally in touch with European matters – when, for instance, trans-
posing a directive without having had anything to do with the negotiation
process. Personal factors and the frequency of European matters dealt
with by officials influences the degree of European culture. In the negoti-
ation process, the presence of a member of the Permanent Representation
or a national official in working parties is due to practical necessity,
depending in particular on the technicality of the matter. Audio-visual
issues, for instance, are so technical that national experts dominate the
relevant working party.
Apart from this distinction, three factors particular to Belgium could be
identified in determining the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ – that is the
closeness of the Belgian administration to European institutions and
culture: geographical proximity, ideology and Belgian federalisation. The
proximity of Belgian and European institutions facilitates the involvement
of national officials in the European policy-cycle. The Belgian Permanent
Representation has thus a comparatively smaller staff than other
Permanent Representations but there are proportionally more Belgian
officials. Proximity also means that such officials keep in close contact
with their ministries.
The ideological factor influences matters in two ways. Survey data
show that the full-time Belgian Euro-officials are considered to be the
most supranationalist.11 This explains not only their constructive behav-
iour and their willingness to reach agreement at the European level, but
also their confidence in the European Commission. This confidence leads
Belgian officials to have less involvement in the Commission’s networks,
in contrast to their British counterparts. In addition, as a small state,
Belgium cannot afford to have officials in every body but does not prevent
them from maintaining specific contacts.
Belgian federalisation also plays an ambivalent role. It has meant that
some national officials have become community or regional ones but also
that many new officials have been employed. As a whole, it has led to
more people being involved in European matters who want to assert their
authority. Sometimes, for example, one can see within the Permanent
Representation an objective alliance between community and regional
officials aiming to assert themselves ahead of experienced federal officials.
Federalisation also means that new political entities are keen to preserve
the autonomy they have recently acquired. Officials can thus be unwilling
to play the European game. With regard to the Amsterdam Treaty, for
instance, Flanders was absolutely against majority voting on cultural
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matters and the French-speaking Community succeeded in having a proto-
col inserted on the financing of public broadcasting.
Federalisation has also brought with it new officials who are inexperi-
enced in European affairs and structures. The learning process is
sometimes difficult and can cause reticence. The lack of staff is also an
important obstacle. The German-speaking Community in particular does
not yet have any delegate at the Permanent Representation and never
attends COREPER meetings. The Brussels-Capital administration does
not yet have any official specifically in charge of European affairs, rather
each official attempts to deal with the European aspects of her/his own
competencies, but this is rarely a matter of priority.
Beyond the ‘Europeanisation’ of the administration, it is also signifi-
cant to underline the extent to which European and Belgian policies
increasingly interact. From 1992 to 1996, when the budget deficit had
finally fallen to reach the target of 3 per cent of GDP, compliance with
Maastricht’s economic convergence criteria was the dominant determi-
nant of government policy (since 1992) led by Prime Minister Dehaene.
Another more recent illustration of this ever closer interaction has been
provided by the linkage between the Belgian plan for employment
prepared in early 1998 according to the guidelines of the special employ-
ment summit of November 1997 held in Luxembourg and the
interprofessional agreement of November 1998. By incorporating
employers and trade unions in the drafting of the Belgian document deliv-
ered in April for presentation in the Cardiff European Council (June
1998), the government has helped bring about a new social dialogue
between these two groups. This opened the way to the November 1998
interprofessional agreement for 1999–2000 and created a new impetus for
professional training, flexibility and the reduction of labour costs – linked
to the creation of jobs. According to Dehaene, no interprofessional agree-
ment in Belgium would have been possible without the European
framework and process.12
Another example of the influence of European affairs in domestic poli-
tics is the acceptance of the Amsterdam Treaty by the Brussels COCOM
gathering together the two linguistic wings of the Brussels regional assem-
bly. A majority in each linguistic group is required on cultural issues. The
Brussels Regional Executive, supported by a large majority of the 65
French-speaking representatives, was lacking one vote in the Flemish
group. However, two representatives of the opposition Flemish Liberal
Party chose to side with the executive, thereby ensuring that support for
the Amsterdam Treaty was forthcoming from both linguistic groups. 
While the ‘Europeanisation’ of politics and policies is increasing, a final
question may be raised concerning the parallels between Belgian federalism
and European federalisation. Such parallels have recurrently been drawn
by the Belgian authorities, namely by Kings Baudouin and Albert II.13
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While this ‘official’ approach might be seen as an attempt to legitimise the
Belgian federal experiment as part of the broader European experience,
one may also suggest that the two processes are actually moving in oppo-
site directions, the first representing a case of ‘centrifugal’ federalism while
the second illustrates a ‘centripetal’ or associative federalism.
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4 Finn Laursen
Denmark: in pursuit of influence
and legitimacy 
Introduction: a reluctant but serious player
Attitudes to European integration in Denmark are very complex. A major-
ity of the Danish people support economic integration in Europe as long
as it does not affect Danish autonomy too much. Denmark joined the EEC
in 1973 after a referendum in October 1972 where 63.4 per cent of the
Danish people supported membership. The SEA was ratified after 56.2
per cent of the Danish people supported it in a referendum on 27 February
1986. But the Maastricht Treaty was first voted down by a narrow major-
ity of 50.7 per cent on 2 June 1992. By the time it was accepted in a
second referendum on 18 May 1993 by 56.7 per cent of the electorate,
Denmark had secured four exemptions or reservations at the Edinburgh
summit in December 1992.1 One of these dealt with EMU, where
Denmark decided not to take part in the third phase.
The three other reservations dealt with citizenship of the Union, JHA
co-operation and defence policy. Denmark would not join the Western
European Union (WEU) and would take part only in intergovernmental
JHA co-operation. The four areas were those where a deepening of inte-
gration was taking the process closer to the traditional symbols of the
nation state: citizenship, money and defence. The hesitancy of the Danish
public should be contrasted with an economic and political elite that is
much more pro-integration. In 1972, 141 members of the Danish parlia-
ment voted in favour of membership, against 34 ‘no’ votes. In 1992 and
1993 there were quite large majorities in the Parliament as well. The only
exception from the rule was January 1986, when the opposition denied
the Conservative-Liberal government a majority in favour of the SEA.
However, after a referendum a substantial majority did vote for the
Treaty. On 12 May 1992, the Folketing authorised ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty with 130 votes in favour, with only 25 voting against
(23 members were absent and a Faroese member abstained). This meant
support from the Conservative-Liberal minority government at the time,
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as well as the leading opposition parties, the Social Democrats, the Social-
Liberals, the Centre-Democrats and parts of the Christian People’s Party.
Only the right-wing Progress Party and the left-wing Socialist People’s
Party did not support the Treaty. Still, a small majority of the people
rejected it on 2 June 1992. 
After the four Edinburgh exemptions prior to the second referendum,
154 members voted for ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as supple-
mented by the reservations. The Treaty was now supported by the new
government coalition of the Social Democrats, the Social-Liberals, the
Centre-Democrats and the Christian People’s Party as well as the Liberals
and Conservatives, which had in the meantime moved into opposition. An
important difference compared with 1992 was the support from the
Socialist People’s Party, which had been actively involved in finding the
so-called ‘national compromise’, which became the basis for the
Edinburgh exemptions (three MPs from the People’s Socialists voted
against the Treaty in 1993). The Progress Party remained opposed, but the
total of ‘no’ votes was only sixteen (also including one Social-Liberal MP).
The shift in attitude of the Socialist People’s Party in 1993 to the
Maastricht Treaty had been a traumatic event for the Party. In the elec-
tions to the EP in June 1994, its percentage of votes fell to 8.6 from 9.1
per cent in 1989. The People’s Movement against the Union claimed 10.3
per cent, and the slightly more pragmatic EU opponents in the new June
Movement received 15.2 per cent of the votes, taking the total anti-EU
vote to 25.5 per cent, up from the 18.9 percent the People’s Movement got
in 1989.2 The Danish electorate had sent a signal to the politicians. At the
elections to the Folketing in September 1994 a new radical left-wing party
the Red–Green Alliance or the Unity List, entered the Parliament, creating
extra pressure within the Socialist People’s Party (Table 4.1).
The next election to the Folketing took place on 11 March 1998, just
prior to the referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. In the new Folketing,
the following parties opposed the Amsterdam Treaty: the Socialist
People’s Party, the Danish People’s Party, the Unity List (Red–Green
Alliance) and the Progress Party. The Socialist People’s Party, however,
was split on the issue. The Danish People’s Party was a splinter group
from the Progress Party. The Amsterdam Treaty was accepted by 92 votes
after the third reading in the Parliament (Social Democrats, Liberals,
Conservatives, Centre-Democrats, Social-Liberals and Christian People’s
Party) against 22 votes (Socialist People’s Party, Danish People’s Party,
the Unity List, the Progress Party and one Conservative MP, Frank
Dahlgaard). Four members of the Socialist People’s Party later indicated
that they would have voted for the Treaty, had they been present.3
The referendum result on 28 May 1998 was a ‘yes’ vote of 55.1 per
cent.4 The hesitancy of the Danish public has in many ways made
Denmark a ‘minimalist’ state regarding European integration. Danish EU
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policy is domestically driven. Pro-integration parties fear retribution at
the polls if they become too pro-European. Whereas Denmark’s original
reasons for joining the EEC were based on the interests of Danish agri-
culture and industry, there is now an increasing range of issues where
Denmark actively seeks European solutions, for instance, the environ-
ment, consumer protection, social policy and employment. Since the
beginning of 1993, Denmark has had Social Democratic-led governments
which have actively sought to give the EU a more ‘progressive’ face in the
hope of making the two-level game between the domestic constituents and
the European partners easier. This has also included support for increased
transparency in EU decision-making and support for subsidiarity – or
‘nearness’, as it is usually translated in Danish.
The basic attitudes of the established political parties have not
changed fundamentally in recent years. The Liberal Party and the
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Table 4.1 Parliamentary representation of Danish parties and groups, 1998
Seats won in the election Folketing election, EP election, Folketing election,
and % of total votes in 11 March 1998 9 June 1994 21 September 1994
Denmark Seats % of Seats % of Seats % of
vote vote vote
Social Democrats 63 36.0 3 15.8 62 34.6
Liberal Party 42 24.0 4 19.0 42 23.3
Conservative Party 16 8.9 3 17.7 27 15.0
Socialist People’s Party 13 7.5 1 8.6 13 7.3
Danish People’s Party 13 7.4 NP –
Centre-Democrats 8 4.3 0 0.9 5 2.8
Social-Liberal Party 7 3.9 1 8.5 8 4.6
Red–Green Alliance 5 2.7 NP 6 3.1
Christian People’s Party 4 2.5 0 1.1 0 1.9
Progress Party 4 2.4 0 2.9 11 6.4
June Movement NP 2 15.2 NP
People’s Movement against NP 2 10.3 NP
the EC Union
Greenlanda 2 2
Faroe Islandsa 2 2
Total number of seats 179 16 179
Notes: NP: did not participate.
aGreenland and the Faroe Islands have home rule and are not members of the European
Union.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Political Parties in Denmark’ www.um.dk/english/
danmark/ om_danmark/partier/, and ‘The Referendum in Denmark on 28 May 1998 on
the Ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty’ www.um.dk/english/udenrigspolitik/europa/
vurderinguk/.
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smaller Centre-Democrats remain the strongest pro-integration parties.
The Social Democrats and Social-Liberals are in favour of integration,
but have minority factions that are sceptical. These two parties remain
committed to the four Edinburgh exemptions, for the moment at least,
although leaders of both parties have recently mentioned the possibility
of a referendum about the EMU reservation early in the twenty-first
century. The integration of the Schengen acquis into the Union by the
Amsterdam Treaty is also creating pressures on the JHA exemption, and
the new British attitude to a common European defence policy has
placed pressure on the Danish policy on European defence.
The Conservative Party is also pro-integration, but less so than the
Liberal Party. It is the smaller parties on both the left and the right that
have tried to exploit the public’s scepticism by advocating anti-integra-
tion policies. These smaller parties have sometimes been very successful
in setting the agenda of the Danish EU debate. As we have seen, Social
Democratic-led governments since 1993 have tried to give the Union a
more ‘progressive’ face. A good indication of this were the proposals
made by Denmark during the 1996–97 IGC. There were seven listed,
dealing with employment, environment, openness, consumer protection,
fraud, subsidiarity and national parliaments.5 After the negotiation
finished in Amsterdam in June 1997, the Danish government went
further by stressing the Danish recommendations in the Treaty and
emphasising the Treaty’s preparations for Eastern European enlarge-
ment. It was expected that this could help ‘sell’ the Treaty to the Danish
public.
When the Folketing opened in October 1997, the prime minister said
of the Maastricht referenda: ‘We have learned, and we have listened.
The Danes do not mind being a part of Europe. Europe may also be a
part of Denmark, but only a part. For the government, therefore, it was
decisive to reach a result in Amsterdam, where the Danish people can
recognise the values that society in Denmark is built on. We succeeded,
we succeeded.’6 He went on to give three reasons why the Danes should
vote ‘yes’ for the Treaty: the Amsterdam Treaty was the basis for widen-
ing the Union to include the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs), a precondition for a peaceful Europe; the Amsterdam Treaty
was better than the Maastricht Treaty in respect to the Danish central
values (mærkesager); and in terms of democracy, human rights, better
co-operation regarding the environment and employment. The four
Danish exemptions were intact and secure. He went on to explain
that the Union was an association, but not an association where we
should co-operate about everything: ‘We should co-operate about the
necessary.’7
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The national policy-cycle: complexity at work 
It is recognised that EU legislation increasingly penetrates Danish society.
The government has responded with elaborate co-ordination mechanisms
between the different ministries and agencies, as well as private interests
affected by EU legislation and decisions. Further, the Parliament has tried
to keep a relatively tight control of the EU policies of successive govern-
ments. Both the governmental/administrative and parliamentary
mechanisms changed somewhat after Maastricht, partly in response to the
request for more transparency and partly in response to the expanded
agenda and increased majority voting in the Union. Yet the changes have
not been major.
The general outline of the flow of EU decision-making in Denmark is
given in Figure 4.1. Proposals from the Commission first go through
thirty-one Special Committees with civil servants from the ministries
affected by the proposal.8 At this preparatory stage, interested organisa-
tions are usually heard; often they are directly represented on the Special
Committees themselves. 
The next stage is the high-level EC Committee of Heads of Department
from the ministries most affected by EU matters. This Committee is
chaired by the Head of Department from the ‘Northern’ division of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many questions are usually settled before this
stage, and if there are still problems they often have to be resolved at the
political level. This happens through the government’s own Foreign Policy
Committee chaired by the Foreign Minister.
Since 1994, the Parliament has had a powerful committee role in
dealing with EU matters, in the form of the European Affairs Committee
(Europaudvalget). It comes at the end of the process, which is true in the
sense that the government seeks a mandate just prior to the final negotia-
tions in the Council. However, the European Affairs Committee is
informed about new Commission proposals earlier, and earlier delibera-
tions in the Committee or discussions in political circles can have affected
the government’s position by the time it seeks a mandate. 
The role of government: towards prime ministerial government 
It is difficult to separate the role of the government from the role of the
administration. The stage at which the responsible minister gets involved
varies from case to case. Formally the Danish position is established
at cabinet level in the Foreign Policy Committee (Regeringens
Udenrigspolitiske Udvalg), which normally meets on Thursdays. It
consists of 12 ministers: the Foreign Minister (chairman), the Prime
Minister, and the Ministers of Economy, Finance, Justice, Environment
and Energy, Labour, Taxation, Transport, Health, Research, and Food,
Agriculture and Fisheries. Other ministers can take part as required.9 This
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committee was formed by merging the government’s Common Market
Committee and Foreign and Security Political Committee. It deals with
the issues of all three pillars of the Union, dividing them into Part I (EC
matters) and Part II (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
JHA matters).10 The group of ministers taking part is smaller for Part II
than Part I matters: the Foreign Minister (chairman), Prime Minister and
Ministers of Economy, Environment and Energy, Development Aid,
Interior, Health and Defence. The Minister of Justice takes part in delib-
erations concerning JHA. 
The positions established by the government’s Foreign Policy
Committee are presented to the Folketing’s European Affairs Committee
on the Friday the week before the Council meets to discuss the issue in
question. If accepted by the European Affairs Committee, the position will
constitute the negotiation mandate for the government in the Council of
Ministers.
Part II issues related to CFSP also go to the Parliament’s Foreign
Affairs Committee, and issues related to JHA co-operation go to the Legal
Affairs Committee. At the administrative level these issues are co-ordi-
nated through the Foreign and Security Political Committee of officials
(Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske embedsmandsudvalg), not the EC
Committee which deals only with pillar one issues. Thus, there are no
Special Committees dealing with second and third pillar issues as such.
The government emphasises that this is intergovernmental co-operation.
For these issues of ‘high politics’, decision-making is more centralised.
The Minister of Defence also participates in Part II co-ordination.
The Government’s Foreign Policy Committee mainly concentrates on
three types of case. The first concerns concrete cases of great political
importance for Denmark, including specific Danish initiatives. Second, it
discusses cases for the next Council meeting in Brussels. Discussion is
usually limited to cases of a more principled nature or cases where the EC
Committee did not reach an agreed position. Finally, bigger issues or
cross-cutting topics form part of the Foreign Policy Committee’s role. The
aim of the discussion can be to formulate either a general Danish attitude
or general political guidelines.11 Generally, change at the level of central
government can be detected in the increased role of the prime minister.
This is due to a number of factors, such as increased summitry in the
Union, and the Prime Minister’s wish to control matters that are politi-
cally sensitive and can affect the survival of the government. However, the
Foreign Ministry remains the most important co-ordinating body.
In the case of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations a special mechanism
was established. All interested ministries were represented in the ‘EC
Committee in special session’ (EF-udvalget i særlig samling) at the level of
head of office (kontorchef) and chaired by the Head of the Northern divi-
sion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Above this was the Summit
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Committee (Topmødeudvalget) in which all interested ministries were
represented by the Head of Department (departementschef). The interest-
ing thing was that this committee was chaired by the Head of Department
from the Prime Minister’s Office, which meant a somewhat weakened
position for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About half the ministers took
part in the government’s own Summit Committee (Regeringens
topmødeudvalg).12 All in all this meant a broader involvement compared
with the 1991 IGC. The purpose was to capture as many of the domestic
implications as possible and avoid the problems of Maastricht Treaty rati-
fication. Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s personal interest might
also help explain the greater involvement by the Prime Minister and his
Office.13
The government’s interest in this is clear. It wants to control the polit-
ically sensitive aspects of the decision-making process. Since even
technical details, such as which food additives are allowed or prohibited,
can become political issues, getting input from experts and affected inter-
ests is important. The administrative system of co-ordination, which will
be described in greater detail later, has been set up to include these rele-
vant inputs. At the same time, the system is fairly centralised through the
Foreign Ministry to ensure that Denmark gets as much influence in
Brussels as possible. So there are both consensus and efficiency consider-
ations behind the organisational set-up.
The role of parliament: towards transparency 
Since the very beginning of Danish membership of the EC in 1973 the
Folketing has exercised more control over European policy than any other
national parliament in the EC/EU.14 A Market Relations Committee
(markedsudvalg) was established in 1972. From the spring of 1973 a
system developed which in reality included the issuing of binding
mandates to ministers negotiating within the Council of Ministers. The
original name of the committee corresponded to the original concept of
integration in Denmark. Integration was seen as a relatively limited
economic matter. As mentioned earlier, in 1994 the committee changed its
name to the European Affairs Committee (Europaudvalget) which, espe-
cially after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, seems more
appropriate. After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty the
government has continued to seek a mandate for important matters falling
under the EU’s first pillar. For CFSP matters the government informs the
European Affairs Committee, but the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs
Committee is also told about these matters. Similarly, JHA matters are
dealt with both by the European Affairs Committee and the Legal Affairs
Committee of the Parliament. Whenever a mandate for negotiation is
needed, however, it has to be given by the European Affairs Committee.15
The European Affairs Committee has extensive access to EC docu-
Denmark 99
2444Ch4  3/12/02  2:02 pm  Page 99
ments. Documents that touch on the security of other Member States can
be read in the office of the Chairman of the Committee. For this reason
members have to accept an obligation of secrecy. The government has the
obligation to keep members informed about current proposals for EC
legislation; the Committee can request a written orientation from the
government about the negotiation situation related to any issue and it can
request a meeting with the competent minister at any time.16 The
European Affairs Committee has seventeen members chosen proportion-
ally among the parties represented in the Folketing. Politically the
Committee thus mirrors the Chamber. The Committee normally meets on
Fridays; ministers will appear before the Committee and present their
proposals verbally. ‘If there is no majority against the mandate, the
Government negotiates on this basis.’17 Since 1973 the practice has devel-
oped that the chairperson counts the votes of the parties represented by
the members of the European Affairs Committee. It takes 90 votes or
more against to refuse a mandate for negotiation – i.e. more than half of
the 179 members of the Folketing.
Usually between two and four ministers attend a meeting, each going
through 10–20 points, including proposals on the agenda of the Council
meetings in Brussels for the following week. Ministers are accompanied
by civil servants. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Ministry
have civil servants permanently present.18 Apart from presenting the
negotiation positions the government also informs the European Affairs
Committee about proposals under consideration. It is usually only during
the last part of the legislative process in the Union that the government
presents a negotiation position. By starting the discussion earlier in the
European Affairs Committee the government can try to be sure that it
knows the feelings and attitudes of the parliamentarians. By the time
a negotiation position is put forward it is accepted in more than 90 per
cent of the cases, more so under majority governments than minority
governments.19
However, as outlined in an information brochure produced by the
Secretariat of the European Affairs Committee, ‘it does not happen infre-
quently that the Government changes its original mandate for negotiation
during the talks with the Committee – or at least adapts it to meet the
points of view which are likely to attract a majority in the Committee’.20
The same text goes on to say that ‘the Danish civil servants who take part
in the negotiations at an early stage – often before the Commission
submits its proposal – take into consideration the fact that the
Government shall at a given hour have the result approved by the politi-
cal forum constituted by the European Affairs Committee’.21 In other
words, anticipated reactions are important in the policy-making process.
Civil servants have developed a keen feeling for the interests of their polit-
ical superiors.
100 Member States and the European Union
2444Ch4  3/12/02  2:02 pm  Page 100
It should be mentioned that the European Affairs Committee receives
deputations, as do other standing committees of the Folketing. This gives
interest organisations an additional point of access to the policy-making
system. The ‘no’ vote in the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty
in June 1992 led to a discussion about transparency in the Union. This
discussion also affected the Danish system to some extent. In March 1993
it was decided to have a press briefing after each meeting of the
Committee. At this briefing the Chairman of the Committee informs the
press about the cases where the government has had its negotiation posi-
tion accepted, and normally also gives the main lines of that position.
Information is also given about the cases where there is a majority against
the government position. The briefing also includes information about the
position taken by the political parties whose representatives can partici-
pate in the press meeting and explain their positions. In cases where there
is a decision about secrecy the Chairman will simply state that the govern-
ment has received a negotiation mandate but that it is confidential until a
final decision has been made. When a final decision is made, the stances
adopted by the different parties to the negotiation mandate are made
public.22
Meetings of the European Affairs Committee until 1999 took place
behind closed doors. Shorthand minutes have been taken since 1984, but
they go only to the Chairman and one representative of each party repre-
sented. The lack of openness of the meetings of the Europe Committee has
been regularly criticised, especially by the Socialist People’s Party.
Another type of criticism has come from the other side of the political
spectrum, with the Progress Party saying that the Committee is the only
parliamentary control on hundreds of changes in Danish law, which
cannot even be changed later by the Folketing.
The Danish system has not answered the question whether EU policy is
foreign or domestic policy. A particular issue that rises from this tension
is the question of which role the specialised standing committees (fagud-
valg) of the Folketing should play. These committees will usually have
more technical expertise that the more ‘generalist’ European Affairs
Committee. A first response to this problem was sharing of information.
A practice was started whereby the agenda of the European Affairs
Committee was sent to the chairpersons on the other standing commit-
tees. In the case of the Environment and Regional Planning Committee a
practice of systematically asking for an opinion on proposals for environ-
mental legislation developed in the 1980s during the years of a ‘green’
majority of Social Democrats, Social Liberals and People’s Socialists
under the Conservative-Liberal government of Poul Schlüter.23
In March 1993 it was also decided to draw in these specialised commit-
tees to a greater extent.24 A report from the European Affairs Committee
of 20 May 1994 continued this trend and sought further association of
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specialised committees in the process of considering EU legislative
matters.25 A system of parallel information was put in place for new
Commission proposals affecting the level of protection in Denmark in the
areas of health, environment, labour market and consumer policy.
According to the 1994 arrangement, elementary notes were sent concur-
rently to the European Affairs Committee and to one or several relevant
specialised committees as soon as possible after the Commission had put
forward a new proposal. Similarly information from the Foreign Ministry
later in the process, including the topical notes usually sent at least a week
before the meeting of the European Affairs Committee prior to the decid-
ing Council meeting, would be forwarded to relevant specialised
committees.
This system was evaluated two years later and some further changes
were introduced by a report from the European Affairs Committee of 27
September 1996.26 The 1996 arrangement decided between the govern-
ment and the European Affairs Committee extended the parallel
information system to all new proposals for directives. Basic notes (grund-
notater) are prepared for all new directives as well as Green and White
Papers. Basic notes should be ready at least ten weeks after the
Commission proposal reaches the Council. A topical note (samlenotat) is
still due a week before the meeting of the European Affairs Committee,
giving the minister a mandate. Basic notes and topical notes are all
factual. They do not reveal the government’s stand, which is revealed only
orally at the meeting giving the government a mandate.
The general public now has access to 95 per cent of the notes received
by the European Affairs Committee. The European Affairs Committee
also decided to introduce public hearings in 1996. Hearings and subse-
quent readings can be conducted in co-operation with the specialised
committee in question.27 Concerning implementation, the 1996 report
mentioned the problem that most implementation in Denmark takes
place through administrative decrees (bekendtgørelser), i.e. not legisla-
tion. This is possible because basic legislation empowers the government
to do so. The European Affairs Committee has been kept informed
about implementation through short notes. There was now also a need
to send these notes to the specialised committees, and the government
agreed to do this. 
The main purpose of the 1996 reform thus was to get information as
early as possible and get it to the specialised committees. It was not a
radical reform. Indeed the report had minority views which indicated
some problems that still exist. The Socialist People’s Party suggested that
all Commission proposals should immediately be dealt with by relevant
specialised committees. The Unity List and the Danish People’s Party went
further and suggested that the Folketing should have a full public first
reading of EU legislative acts in the Chamber. Specialised committees
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should be drawn in formally and the meetings of the European Affairs
Committee should be open. 
The Unity List also criticised the arrangement concerning implementa-
tion whereby the specialised committees are informed only after
implementation has taken place. For directives where the government had
required a negotiation mandate from the European Affairs Committee, it
should be possible for a political party to demand that implementation be
dealt with by Parliament. Of 127 directives during the period 1994–95,
only twenty-seven resulted in laws adopted by the parliament. No less
than 141 administrative acts were issued to implement these directives.
Two other changes have taken place more recently. One concerns
World Trade Organisation (WTO) matters and other Schengen matters.
According to a report of 14 March 1997, the government will provide the
European Affairs Committee with half-yearly reports on developments
inside the WTO, especially developments that affect the level of protection
in Denmark on health, environment, labour market and consumer policy.
The government will also provide continuous information about the
WTO’s work when important decisions of a political character are
prepared. The European Affairs Committee will be informed if the
Commission needs a negotiation mandate for WTO negotiations. The
same procedures as for normal EU cases will be followed.28 Denmark’s
decision to accede to the Schengen Convention was confirmed by the
Folketing on 10 June 1997. On 27 November 1997 the Minister of Justice
suggested a procedure for informing the European Affairs Committee and
Legal Affairs Committee prior to meetings in the Schengen Executive
Committee. The procedure agreed with the Parliament includes first of all
a commitment to send a note concerning the points that are expected to
be dealt with, as far as possible a week before the meeting of the European
Affairs Committee which takes place the week before the meeting in the
Schengen Executive Committee. At the meetings in the Legal Affairs
Committee (usually Thursday) and European Affairs Committee (usually
Friday) the Minister of Interior and/or Justice will make oral accounts of
the essential cases according to the same procedures as for EU matters.
After the meeting in the Executive Committee the government will send a
written account of the meeting to the two committees.29 This procedure
for Schengen matters is comparable to the procedure already adopted for
pillar three JHA co-operation after the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty. Prior to Denmark’s accession to Schengen being fully ratified by
the other parties to the Convention, however, the government was not
seeking a negotiation mandate, since Denmark was only an observer.
Before getting to the Parliament JHA cases have gone through the
Preparatory Committee concerning Legal and Police Co-operation of
civil servants (Forberedelsesudvalget vedr. Rets- og politisamarbejde),
the Foreign and Security Committee of civil servants (Udenrigs- og
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Sikkerhedpolitisk Udvalg) and the government’s Foreign Policy
Committee (II) (Udenrigspolitisk Udvalg). 30
The role of the administration
Relevant ministries are represented in the Special Committees where most
of the preparation of legislation takes place. The number of Special
Committees has increased over time. It started with eighteen in 1972; by
1977 there were twenty-five and by 1982 twenty-seven,31 and in 1994
there were thirty.32 As mentioned earlier, there are currently thirty-one.
Obviously this increasing number of Special Committees testifies to the
increasing functional scope of European integration. This increase in
scope has been part of the process since Denmark joined in 1973. New
issues, such as environment, energy and research, gradually became part
of the agenda, sometimes through the use of Article 235 of the Treaty of
Rome. The SEA and the 1992 Internal Market programme boosted the
process. This is particularly the case for the latter, with its vast legislative
programme and ‘the new method’ of establishing European standards
involving private standards organisations such as CEN, CENELEC and
ETSI. This has affected the Danish system and led to an increased involve-
ment of private interests. This has blurred the distinction between the
state and society especially at the level of the Special Committees, where
private organisations are heard or take part in meetings (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Ranking of Ministry involvement in Special Committees 
No. of No. of
permanent permanent
Ministry memberships Ministry memberships
Foreign Affairs 31 Labour 10
Finance 22 Research and Information
Technology 9
Business and Industry 12 Health 8
Justice 17 Prime Minister Office 7
Economy 16 Housing and Urban 6
Food, Agriculture and Affairs
Fisheries 16 Social Affairs 6
Taxation 13 Education 5
Transport 11 Culture 4
Environment and Energy 10 Interior 4
Source: Computed from ‘Specialudvalg under EF-Udvalg (prior. 1 January 1999)’, kindly
provided by the Foreign Ministry.
The officials of the Special Committees also take part in Commission
expert committees while Commission proposals are being prepared. Once
the proposals arrive in the Specialised Committees they are usually
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already known and will be considered by partly the same officials. This
has meant a blurring of the distinction between the Danish state and the
EU system as such. 
The Special Committees play a central role in establishing the Danish
positions. Only when there is disagreement in a Special Committee will
the higher-level EC EU Committee and the government’s Foreign Policy
Committee become actively involved.33 The Special Committees have
developed into real negotiating bodies where private and public interests
are normatively merged.34 For instance, the Danish Employer’s
Association (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) and the Danish Confederation
of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Danmark) are both currently
represented, or at least normally invited to meetings of Special
Committees dealing with Labour Market and Social Conditions,
Establishment of Services, Transport Questions, Industry and Regional
Political Co-operation, Education, Technical Trade Barriers for Industrial
Goods and Information Technology and Telecommunication.35
The EC Committee, on the other hand, never became a very important
committee. Real disagreements can be solved only at the government
level. So the EC Committee has become a formal link that expedites cases
and distributes information; over time, its influence has probably
decreased. One suggestion is that the participants in the co-ordination
system have developed a kind of ‘EC culture’ that includes a good sense
of what can be achieved in Brussels.36 The EC Committee never became
the high-ranking committee that it was intended to be.37
Højbjerg and Marcher (1995) have suggested that the Danish co-ordina-
tion system has gone through three phases: formal institutionalisation
(1970–73); a period where more sectors became involved (1974–85); and a
period where it became more independent or autonomous (1986–95). This
raises the question of whether the post-Maastricht period will become a
fourth phase. Based partly on work by Grønnegaard and Christensen,38
they suggest that the specialised ministries (ressortministerier) and the
Special Committees will gain increased importance and that the role of
the Foreign Ministry will decrease. The knowledge required to establish the
Danish negotiation positions exists at the lower sectoral level in the co-
ordination system. However, overall co-ordination through the Foreign
Ministry, the government’s Foreign Policy Committee and the Parliament’s
European Affairs Committee will continue to be necessary to ensure coher-
ent positions and to enhance influence in Brussels.
The role of regions
Denmark is divided into fourteen counties (amter) and 275 municipalities
(kommuner). These lower levels of government are not major actors in the
policy-making process, but they implement and administer much of the
ensuing legislation. They are especially responsible for health, social
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policy and environmental policy. Since some of these areas have been
further developed as EU policies since the Maastricht Treaty entered into
force, they are, of course, affected. Municipalities and counties have
established their own associations and they lobby both the government in
Copenhagen and the Commission in Brussels. Indeed, the largest cities
have their own lobbyists in Brussels.39
In 1994 the Association of Local Authorities (Kommunernes
Landsforening) took part in three Special Committees, namely those
concerning Labour Market and Social Conditions, Environment, and
Health, and it was usually invited to the Special Committee on Education.
The Association of County Councils (Amtsrådsforeningen) was an ad hoc
member of the Special Committee for Labour Market and Social
Conditions, a member of the special committees on Transport and
Environment and was usually invited to the Special Committee on
Education. There was also a joint communal EC/EU Secretariat (Det
Fælleskommunale EF-Sekretariat) which was an ad hoc member of the
Special Committee on Industrial and Regional Political Co-Operation.40
This secretariat, however, was dissolved in 1994.41 At the beginning of
1999 the Association of Local Authorities took part in meetings of the
following Special Committees: Food and Agriculture, Labour Market and
Social Conditions, Establishment of Services (as ad hoc member),
Transport Questions (normally invited), Industrial and Regional Political
Co-Operation, Research, Education (normally invited), IT and
Telecommunications. The Association of County Councils also took part
in most of these, plus the Special Committee on Health.42
The establishment of the EU CoR has also given a more formal avenue
of influence for these lower regional Danish levels. Denmark has nine
representatives in the CoR. Four are nominated by the Association of
Local Authorities, four by the Association of County Councils and one by
the Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities.43 Among the issues
traditionally dealt with by municipalities the following are directly
affected by EC legislation: environment, public procurement, social and
labour market policy, and regional policy. The following areas are said to
be under indirect influence: education, trans-European networks (trans-
port, telecommunications and energy), culture, and information
technology.44
In conclusion, the sub-national level is increasingly involved in EU
policy-making in Denmark at the level of Special Committees and through
representation in the CoR. Yet they have not become major players. In the
spring of 1988 the Association of County Councils produced a proposal
for debate.45 The paper suggested participation by Association experts
already in relevant Commission expert groups. The Danish Special
Committees were said to be dominated by business interests and hearings
usually took place late in the process, thus limiting the possibility of
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influence. A closer direct co-operation with the government was also
suggested; however, the paper is said to have been met by total silence.46
Conflicts between EC law and national law
Whereas the Parliament is supreme in Danish politics, the Danish courts
have tried to stay away from politics. When the Danish Supreme Court
decided to look into a complaint about the Maastricht Treaty it was there-
fore a surprise for many. The Court delivered its judgement on 6 April
1998, dismissing the case. Neither the additional powers that have been
delegated to the Council in pursuance of Article 308 (ex Article 235) ECT,
nor the law-making activities of the ECJ can be regarded as incompatible
with the demand for specification in Section 20(1) of the Danish
Constitution.47 The Danish Constitution allows the transfer of powers to
international organisations ‘to such an extent as shall be provided by
statute’. The appellants had pleaded that this condition had not been met.
The Court went far in deferring to politics – it must be considered to be
assumed in the Constitution that no transfer of powers can take place to
such an extent that Denmark can no longer be considered an independent
state. The determination of the limits to this must rely almost exclusively
on considerations of a political nature.48
Afterwards the prime minister stated that he was ‘satisfied that the
matter [had] been closed with a clear and unanimous decision’.49 In terms
of implementing EU directives Denmark is doing quite well. Of 1,378
directives applicable at the end of 1997 Denmark had implemented 1,337,
i.e. 97 per cent. Only Sweden had a slightly better record, and the EU
average at the time was approximately 94 per cent. Denmark had imple-
mented 100 per cent of the directives dealing with customs,
pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, textiles, rights of residence, recogni-
tion of qualifications, financial services, company law, intellectual and
industrial property, public procurement, direct taxation, indirect taxa-
tion, consumer protection and product safety, competition, and
environment. Denmark’s lowest score was for telecommunications, with
nine out of fifteen directives implemented, i.e., 60 per cent, despite the EU
average being only 70 per cent. The date for the creation of a liberalised
and harmonised European telecommunications market, indeed, was 1
January 1998.50
If we look at infringement cases between 1993 to 1997, Denmark also
does well. Although there were a number of Article 226 (ex Article 169)
letters sent to Denmark, most cases were solved quickly. Only few
reasoned opinions followed, and there were no referrals to the ECJ (see
Table 4.3). Only Sweden and Finland came through the same period
without referrals to the ECJ. 
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Table 4.3 Danish infringements, 1993–97
Article 226 letters Reasoned opinions Referrals to Court
1993 66 3 0
1994 57 14 0
1995 42 1 0
1996 22 0 0
1997 63 1 0
Total 250 19 0
Source: ‘Fifteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law –
1997’, COM (1998) 317 Final, OJEC, C 250, 10 August 1998.
Overall trends: the impact of the Maastricht Treaty
The most direct effect of the Maastricht Treaty was an increased empha-
sis on policies that could make the whole integration process more
legitimate in Denmark. Thus there was more emphasis on environment,
consumer protection, social policy, employment, and openness (‘near-
ness’). Institutionally the two new pillars required some adaptations,
involving also the Foreign Affairs and Legal Affairs Committees of the
Parliament, respectively, in CFSP and JHA matters. Similarly, there has
been an effort to involve the functional specialised committees in the
parliament earlier and to a greater extent in first pillar legislation. The
government and the political parties all talk about making decision-
making more open and democratic, but in practice this has turned out
not to be so easy so long as there is a concept of ‘national interests’ to be
defended in Brussels. The ‘diplomatic’ approach to intergovernmental
negotiations calls for some secrecy.
However, many day-to-day decisions are made at the level of Special
Committees that involve representatives from interest organisations, thus
blurring the distinction between the state and the civil society. At the same
time the experts in the Special Committees are also involved in the
Commission expert committees when proposals are prepared and in
working groups under the Council when the final decisions are prepared.
This has blurred the division between the Danish and EU institutions. A
multi-tiered system that crosses national borders has emerged. Danish
officials have become enmeshed in wider transnational networks. One
should expect some learning and actor socialisation in these networks.
Yet the government’s political prerogatives remain strong. Table 4.2
(p. 104) gives a more detailed account of the institutions involved, but it
does not include everything: it basically covers pillar one cases, and it also
leaves out the EP on the EU side.
108 Member States and the European Union
2444Ch4  3/12/02  2:02 pm  Page 108
Perspectives for the future
We should expect the tension between central co-ordination and input of
expertise at the more decentralised level to continue in the future.
Perceptions of legislative failure should lead to more involvement of the
Special Committees on the administrative side and specialised standing
committees in the Parliament. Furthermore, the question of legitimacy in
the integration process will remain central for Danish politicians. More
openness will be sought in the EP. To the extent that the ‘democratic
deficit’ cannot be resolved at the Danish level, perceptions of the role of
the EP may change and become more positive. Indeed, on these points, we
recently have seen further efforts and changes.
In November 1998 the European Affairs Committee put forward a
draft report concerning greater openness in Danish EU decision-making.51
The main proposals were to increase further the involvement of the
specialised committees (fagudvalg) of the Folketing at an early stage, to
open some meetings of the European Affairs Committee to the public, and
to invite Danish MEPs to some meetings of the Committee. According to
press reports, the prime minister decided after the Supreme Court case
about the Maastricht Treaty to make decision-making more democratic.
Some EU legislation concerning food additives, where the otherwise envi-
ronmental and consumer-friendly EP did not ask for high levels of
protection, had also inspired the proposals. Getting the Parliament’s
expertise involved early and creating a stronger link to the EP was seen as
a way to improve EU legislation. Further, it was argued that a public
debate on important proposals should take place. The government would
be asked to present such proposals to open meetings of the European
Affairs Committee soon after they were made by the Commission.52
The Amsterdam Treaty also influenced thinking in Copenhagen with
respect to the role of the Danish MEPs. The increased use of the co-deci-
sion procedure implies that the role of the EP will increase. The
government therefore began regular meetings with the Danish MEPs in
the summer of 1998. The proposal from the European Affairs Committee
gave MEPs access to open meetings of the committee in the future with a
right to speak; these open meetings, however, would not take decisions.
Decisions, including mandates for negotiations to the government, would
still be taken in closed meetings.
According to the proposal, the basic notes regarding Commission
proposals should be ready two months (rather than ten weeks) after the
Commission proposal is received.
On 19 February the European Affairs Committee issued its report on
greater openness in the Danish EU decision-making process;53 the govern-
ment had agreed to the parts that affected its involvement. The general
lines of the draft proposal from November 1998 were confirmed; since
1 March 1999, when the report entered into force, it has become possible
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to have open meetings in the European Affairs Committee including the
presence of Danish MEPs. MEPs can also send proposals to the other
standing committees of the Folketing, and efforts to involve these
specialised parliamentary committees early in the process have been rein-
forced. Basic notes from the government must be sent to the EP at the
latest two months after the proposal from the Commission has been
received by the Council. Therefore, in many ways the Amsterdam Treaty
has reinforced trends from the Maastricht Treaty – and, with some cogni-
tive lag, led to increased contacts with MEPs. The integration of the
Schengen acquis and the movement of some JHA matters to the first pillar
under the Amsterdam Treaty, where Denmark still has an exemption from
taking part in supranational co-operation, threatens to place pressure on
the Danish system, but no institutional adaptation has yet taken place.
The impact of EMU and accession of new Member States
EMU has been widely discussed in Denmark in connection with the start
of the third phase and the introduction of the Euro. It seems that public
opinion is becoming more favourable towards Danish participation. The
political debate has mainly been about the timing of the referendum. The
government seems to regret the marginalised position it is in with respect
to the ECB and the making of European monetary policy, but the debate
does not seem to have indicated any implications for Danish institutions
at present.
Enlargement has also been discussed in Denmark, in particular the
accession of the Baltic states, where the government has tried hard to get
Latvia and Lithuania into the group of front runners together with
Estonia. Three of the existing Special Committees deal with Central and
Eastern European Countries – committees on Enlargement, Co-
Ordination Concerning Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe,
and the Ad Hoc Special Committee concerning the White Paper on the
Participation of Central and Eastern European Countries in the Internal
Market.
Conclusion: struggling with the not-so-permissive consensus
Denmark has established a complex policy co-ordination system that
usually allows it to speak with one voice in Brussels. It has also established
a system with more democratic political control than exists in most other
EU countries. Seen in connection with the continued scepticism among the
Danish electorate about further integration, this has occasionally made
Denmark a difficult partner. The other side of the story, however, is that
Denmark has been good at implementing EU legislation. The early
involvement of the interest organisations and administrative agencies that
will implement legislation has made this part of the process a success
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story. Where the Danish system still fails, it can be argued, is its lack of
success in communicating the rationale of the continued process of inte-
gration in Europe to its citizens in a convincing way. Trying to give the
EU a more ‘progressive’ face has become part of the government’s strat-
egy to create more legitimacy for the process. Yet the government has not
yet dared to make a direct attack on the Danish exemptions from the
Maastricht Treaty. These increasingly shackle the government. It can thus
be concluded that the Danish political leadership is still struggling with a
not-so-permissive consensus among the Danish public when it comes to
European integration.54 Or, put differently, the quest for legitimacy
remains somewhat illusory.55
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5 Andreas Maurer1
Germany: fragmented structures in a
complex system
Introduction: preferences of a tamed power2
Germany’s political class is marked by a positive and constructive attitude
towards European integration. The main objective of European policy
was and still is to achieve effective and democratic European co-operation
and integration.3 All governments and the vast majority of political
parties contrive their general European policy agenda around the funda-
mental aim of far-reaching integration towards some kind of political
union. Although the diplomatic class does not follow any kind of altruis-
tic or ‘naive’ European policy geared to achieve a European federation,
the majority of political actors are reluctant to explicitly play a leading
role within the evolving European Union. That is not to say that they are
immune from searching ways to influence the European agenda. But
German initiatives regarding ‘great bargain’ decisions (IGCs, CAP
reforms, decisions on the Union’s financial resources)4 are generally pre-
arranged jointly with other Member State governments. Until 1989, this
‘leadership avoidance reflex’5 was a typical feature of Germany acting
under the paradigm of a ‘semi-sovereign’ state.6 ‘Deutschlands Interessen
liegen in Europa’ (Germany’s interests lie in Europe) – this paradigm
reflects the political elites’ view of Germany’s potential leadership in
Europe, the mediation of its power within the EC and its institutional
arrangements.7 With its large industrial sector and dependence on foreign
trade, Germany is largely linked to the Common Market. Establishing
close economic links within the EC is therefore politically advantageous
as it demonstrates the FRG’s commitment to economic and political
integration.8
Time is another country: the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and
German re-unification
The end of the Cold War decisively changed the fundamental parameters
for the European Union and its Member States. Given the objective
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changes for Germany – its size and population, its ‘geo-political central-
ity’ between West and East Europe and its economic power – one could
have suggested that the re-unified Republic would act as a dominant
leader in the Union.9 However, as the Maastricht and the more recent
Amsterdam IGC process of 1996–97 revealed,10 Germany did not aspire
to use its potential to engage in unilateral power politics. Despite domes-
tic concerns especially on EMU, neither the federal government nor the
parliamentary opposition parties attempted to exploit Germany’s poten-
tial against its traditional role of an important but ‘tamed power’.11 The
political class is associated with the ‘traditional’ set of priorities in EU
politics: achieving and consolidating EMU and political union in institu-
tional as well as in substantive terms, i.e. economic policy co-ordination
at the EC level and a coherent and effective CFSP; the continuation of
Franco-German co-operation; and a strengthening of the military capaci-
ties of the Union through the integration of the WEU into the EU ambit.12
The basic perception of European integration remains unchanged, partic-
ularly with regard to the role of the EC institutions. The German political
elite continues to aim at the phased creation of a legally independent,
state-like political entity with some kind of a structured multi-levelled –
‘two-chamber’ system whose members shall – on the basis of equal rights
and obligations – co-operate through the adoption of binding law. The
Social-Democrat/Green government does not depart from this conception
of European integration. On the contrary, compared with the Kohl era,
the coalition additionally focuses on social and employment policy, and
the formalisation of citizen rights within the corpus of the EU Treaty.13
Until 1991–92 public opinion in Germany appeared to conform to the
so-called ‘permissive consensus’.14 However, during the 1991–92 IGC,
public opinion became somewhat more critical15 – a development in line
with the broader trend towards ‘Euroscepticism’ which can be observed in
all member-states.16 The negotiations on EMU and the critique of this
process articulated by the Bundesbank (during the IGC process), the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Social Union (CSU) (during the
ratification process) and a wide range of academics (during ratification
and after the Maastricht decision of the Constitutional Court) affected the
way in which the ‘finalité politique’ of European integration was
presented. Hence, Chancellor Kohl repeatedly made clear that German
European policy had changed since 1990 by admitting that his previous
calls for establishing a ‘United States of Europe’ were a mistake and that
he implicitly no longer supported this idea.17 Although a favourable atti-
tude towards European integration remains, the political parties are
gradually adopting more controversial positions with regard to the
method of integration and the competencies to be conferred on the
European institutions in specific policy areas, especially on those which
are also debated at the national level. Hence, one can identify some kind
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of ‘Europeanised’ party cleavages which have developed along the path of
European treaty reforms in the areas of social and employment policy,
equal opportunities policy, environment policy and home and judicial co-
operation. 18
This change in tone reflects a more pragmatic and less ‘idealistic’
approach towards European integration. German political players try to
increase their influence on the implementation and the execution of policy
fields and programmes, especially with regard to their financial implica-
tions.19 Given the political environment of the Union after Maastricht
(Agenda 2000, reform of the Union’s own resources), the economic reces-
sion of 1992–93, high and persistent unemployment rates and the
extensive transfers to the Eastern Länder, cost-benefit analysis becomes
more important and – with view to the interaction between government
and the citizenry – also more relevant for German EC/EU policy-making
(Figure 5.1).20
The national policy-cycle: multi-level complexity and segmentation 
Our study of the participation of German institutions in EC/EU decision-
making concentrates on the country’s political system and institutional
design. In that respect the following question has to be addressed: if the
relationship between the FRG and the Union can be described as a
‘complex interdependence’,21 is this exclusively due to the history of
Germany and the institutions involved or did the path of European inte-
gration as well as the institutional set-up of the Union also contribute to
this interdependence? Moreover, do changes in the basic perceptions of
European integration impact on the relationship between Germany and
the Union? 
The interinstitutional set-up of German EU policy-making features a
hierarchy of policy-making powers and functions according to the insti-
tutions involved as well as to the different phases of the EC/EU
policy-making cycle. Evidently there are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of
participation in EC/EU decision-making.22 How has this setting evolved
over time? 
Germany is a federal state. Owing to this constitutionalised structure
collective players intervene at different levels in the political process. The
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) attributes specific competencies and functions to
these levels. The vertical division of powers between the federal level and
that of the ‘federated states’ – the Länder – leads to a complex system of
‘political interwovenness’ or ‘interconnectedness’ (Politikverflechtung).23
Basically, there is no single decision-making centre but different levels
interact in the decision-making process and compete for access and partic-
ipation. In addition to this vertical distribution of ‘openings’, there is
a horizontal division of influence between the different ministries and
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institutions on each level. Three constitutional rules govern this frame-
work of joint decision-making. The first is the principle of ministerial
responsibility (‘Ressortprinzip’), according to which ministries at the
federal level are independent and competing actors. Unlike the situation
in France or the United Kingdom, this principle hinders the different
branches of the German government in their attempts to develop coherent
approaches to EC policy-making.24 Secondly, the framework of joint deci-
sion-making is influenced by the chancellor principle (‘Kanzlerprinzip’),
which empowers the Chancellor to guide the government and to define
the ministerial portfolios, and which can be mobilised when serious chal-
lenges and interministerial bottlenecks occur. However, the Chancellor is
not entitled finally to decide on matters where ministers battle for differ-
ent views or positions. Hence the collective government principle
(‘Kabinettsprinzip’) ensures that open conflicts between ministries are
decided by the whole cabinet of the federal government. 
Interest groups are involved only in the preparatory and implementa-
tion phases of the EU’s policy-cycle. Playing a decisive role during the
decision-making phase is the exception rather than the rule. Finally the
German political parties have very limited institutionalised functions in
the policy-cycle. 
The federal bureaucracy
Germany’s EU administrators have a poor reputation. A growing litera-
ture focusing on the efficiency of Germany’s European policy-making has
detected structural handicaps and ‘failures’ owing to the institutional
design. The conventional wisdom25 identifies a comparatively low degree
of effectiveness and competitiveness. Compared to its French and British
counterparts, the performance of the German interadministrative process
suffers from horizontal and vertical fragmentation,26 old-fashioned and
cumbersome procedures, ‘negative co-ordination’,27 ‘institutional plural-
ism’,28 and ‘institutional cannibalism’.29 Hence, the powers conferred to
the different levels of policy-making are not co-ordinated by a central
agency responsible for formulating a coherent European policy. These
features highlight a lack of clear strategy and of rapid position taking-
leading which can leave the German delegation in a minority position in
the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, this politico-administrative
system features flexible working and co-ordination structures. One of the
persistent advantages of the German political system is the decentralised
and departmentalised scheme of administrative interaction. Decision-
making is filtered from the lowest level towards the highest administrative
and political levels.30 In a manner which resembles the hidden logic
behind the decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers, the bureau-
cracy tries to solve conflicts at the earliest and lowest level possible. 
The federal government is composed of the Chancellor, ministers,
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ministers of state and the ministerial bureaucracy which are directly
involved in the EU’s Council of Ministers, its subordinate working mech-
anisms, but also in the Commission’s comitology committees. The
Chancellor claims a certain ‘domaine résérvé’ within the European
Council. He disposes of a so-called ‘guidance competence’ (‘Richt-
linienkompetenz’),31 which can be defined as a capability to set the
strategic guidelines of the federal government in general, to resolve inter-
ministerial disputes (decisions of the Chancellor in this regard are binding
for ministers), and to determine the final governmental approach on a
given issue.32 The guidance competence on European affairs was only
rarely used until the formalisation of the European Council in 1974.
However, since then German Chancellors have made use of this power on
several occasions (EMS, Schengen co-operation, IGCs, enlargement). The
European Council’s tendency towards ‘de facto intrusion’ into the compe-
tencies of the Council of Ministers under the EC Treaty has reinforced the
Chancellor’s potential to influence the broad but decisive outlines of EU
policy-making. 
On the other hand, the ministers of the cabinet and the ministerial
bureaucracy are highly involved in the preparatory drafting of EC legisla-
tion within the working groups of the Council of Ministers and the
European Commission as well as within COREPER. The principle of
ministerial responsibility would suggest that all ministers are equal in the
face of the Union. However, some are more equal than others. This is due
to the evolution of EC/EU policy fields, but also results from the histori-
cal evolution of the ministries in the FRG. With the exception of the
Ministry for Defence, every German ministry contains at least one special
division for European Affairs (Table 5.1). 
The information provided by Table 5.1 has to be understood as a snap-
shot taken from the ongoing ‘EC/EU reality show’ of scope enlargement
and institutional as well as procedural differentiation.33 In comparing the
2001 picture with the institutional design of the German federal govern-
ment in earlier periods of European integration (our reference period here
is 1982–88),34 we can see that EC/EU membership has had a considerable
impact upon the institutional and procedural aspects of German politics
and policies. Moreover, by taking the overall number of national admin-
istrative units which deal more or less exclusively with European affairs
as an indicator for the dynamic ‘Europeanisation’ of Member States,35 we
can assume that some ministries seem to be more closely involved in
EC/EU policy-making than others. Owing to the original ECSC and EEC
treaties with their concentration on a few – economic – policy areas, only
the Ministry for Economics had established a European affairs division. In
the absence of a foreign minister until 1955,36 the Federal Ministry for
Economics took on the lead-role in the day-to-day policy management for
the ECSC.37 These original arrangements established the Ministry of
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Table 5.1 The Chancellory, the Ministries and their European Affairs Units,
March 2001
Chancellory Department 2 Group 21 Division 211
Department 4 (Foreign Affairs) Divisions 411 and 412
Group 41
(Economic Affairs)
Ministries EU related EU-related EU-related divisions
Departments directorates
Foreign Affairs Department E 2 Directorates 4 Divisions each and Task Force
Provides chairman of Political (1995–97) on the IGC and (since 1997)
the Committee of Department on Enlargement. 
State Secretaries for (CFSP–COREU) In July 1998, the Political Affairs
European affairs department’s Divisions dealing with EU
Member States shifted towards the
E Department.
Since October 1998 the E Department also
provides for the Secretariat of the Committee
of State Secretaries on EC Affairs.
Interior Department V – Working group V I 4 (EC law), Division
Department P V I 5 (EP election law), Division V II 4
(Police) (German Internal Affairs Unit to the
Department A Permanent Representative), Division P6
(Asylum and (Police co-operation), Division A6 (EC-
Foreign Nationals) Harmonisation of Treatment of Foreign
Nationals)
Justice Department E 2 Directorates 6 Divisions each
Finance Department E 3 Directorates 16 Divisions directly linked to Department
Provides deputy chairman on European + Task Force EMU E since October 1998 representation of the
of the committee of state Policy + Task Force on FRG towards the ECJ
secretaries on European Enlargement
affairs since 10/1998
Economics Department V 1 Directorate on 5 Divisions directly related to the
Provided deputy chairman on Foreign European Policy Directorate on E policy + 2  Divisions
of the Committee of State Trade and substantially related to the 
Secretaries on European Policy Directorate on E policy.
European affairs (former E
until October 1998 department)
Agriculture Department 6 2 Directorates 13 Divisions and Project Group 33 (BSE)
Labour and Social Affairs Department VII 1 Directorate 5 Divisions
Family Affairs, – – Divisions for European and International
Senior Citizens, Women and Family Affairs, Politics for
Women and Youth Senior Citizens, and Youth Policy
Health – 1 Directorate
Transport – – 1 Division (EU, OECD, Council of Europe,
ECE and OSCE)
Environment – – 1 Division (EU, Council of Europe, OSCE,
Bilateral Co-Operation with EC Member
States)
Education, Science – Directorate 12 5 Divisions dealing with EC affairs
and Technology Directorate 31 1 Division on Higher Education and
Directorate 42 EC affairs
1 Division on European Science co-operation
Economic Co-operation Department 4 Directorate 40 2 Divisions
Regional Planning, – – Division on Harmonisation of
Building and Urban technical norms and Working
Development Group on European Co-Operation
Sources: Organisation plans of the Federal ministries and the Federal Chancellery
(December 1997–March 1999) and Auswärtiges Amt/Bundesministerium der Finanzen;
Verfahren der Koordination der innerstaatlichen Willensbildung in der Europapolitik
(Berlin, 1 December 2000).
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Economics in a strong position on matters of functional – economic inte-
gration, although there was no formal agreement on the division of labour
with the Chancellor’s Office. The entry into force of the Rome Treaties
pushed the Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs into an agreement
on European policy responsibilities, reached in 1958.38 The Ministries for
Agriculture, Finance and Foreign Affairs created European departments
and directorates during the 1960s. In 1993 – after the entry into force of
the Maastricht Treaty – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a sepa-
rate European Affairs division. In addition, the Ministries of Justice and
of the Interior provide legal expertise to the so-called ‘Four Musketeers’.
The involvement of other ministries became relevant only within the
context of the SEA and – with regard to the creation of divisions dealing
with substantial aspects of co-operation in the JHA field – with the entry
into force of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Reflecting one of the main characteristics of the EC/EU integration
process over time – the incremental enlargement of the substantive scope
of policy-making and the institutional as well as procedural growth –
German ministerial involvement in European Affairs can be characterised
as a process of horizontal differentiation and segmentation. This process
becomes perceptible in comparing the division of the workload among the
national ministries during EC/EU presidencies. Table 5.2 indicates that
the number of working group meetings involving federal ministries
outside the club of the ‘Four Musketeers’ has considerably increased over
time. Neither the Ministry for Foreign Affairs nor the Ministry of
Economics nor – since October 1998 the Ministry of Finance – has a
monopoly in giving Germany a ‘voice’ in the Brussels arena. 
These figures not only mirror the policy preferences of the European
Commission and the Council of Ministers at a given time,39 but also indi-
cate a shift in the competencies of the ministries within the German
government. Interestingly, a comparison between the Presidency’s draft
plans of August 1998 (Kohl government) and of December 1998
(Schröder government) demonstrates the shift in the relative importance
of the Ministry of Finance at the expense of the Ministry of Economics to
only a very limited extent. The organisational changes of the new govern-
ment (reallocation of European affairs co-ordination competencies
between the Ministries of Economics, Finance and Foreign Affairs) did
not spill over into their activity with regard to the Council’s working
groups. My conclusion would be that ups and downs in the activity of
some ministries are mainly rooted in the rolling policy agenda of the
Commission and the Council and are not exclusively a result of the policy
preferences of the German government. The role occupied by the Ministry
for Labour in 1999 confirms this argument, since the Presidency foresaw
only one working group dealing with social affairs. Thus, the policy prior-
ities of the Schröder government with regard to employment policy in
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general (Luxembourg process) and the European Employment Pact
(Cologne process) are not reflected in a strengthened role for the relevant
ministry. On the contrary, the Pact was, together with the whole policy
agenda on employment, one of the areas which Chancellor Schröder
reserved for the Chancellery. 
Near to the problem – far from the centre: the co-ordination of policy-
making
The roles and functions of the different levels within the federal govern-
ment vary according to the phases of the EC policy-cycle. During the
preparation phase, the bulk of activities are carried out by the heads of
department, who are involved in long-term policy planning and co-ordi-
nation, and by the heads of division, who focus on the technical details of
EC/EU legislation. In this phase, ministers of state and parliamentary state
secretaries trade political issues whereas in general, the ministers them-
selves do not intervene. As far as the decision-taking phase is concerned,
it is up to the relevant minister to decide on a given issue. However, each
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Table 5.2 Division of labour among presidents and representatives of the FRG
in the working groups of the Council of Ministers during German presidencies,
1988–99
Ministry 1988 1994 1999
PRE SGD PRE SGD PRE SGD
Foreign Affairs 2 1 22 22 30 25
Economics 29 48 23 49 38 46
Agriculture 18 23 42 51 63 64
Finance 13 30 2 30 19 48
Justice 24 25 20 22 33 31
Interior 3 3 18 21 33 33
Labour 3 4 4 5 1 1
Transport 4 4 3 8 1 6
Youth, Family, Health 3 13 23 28 35 28
Education, Science, Technology 1 2 4 6 2 0
Environment 2 3 2 6 8 8
Economic Co-Operation 0 5 0 4 1 1
Regional Planning 2 4 1 2 1 2
Permanent Representation 91 26 96 30 84 49
Others 2 3 4 13 2 1
Sum 197 194 264 297 351 343
Sources: For 1988 and 1994: Rometsch and Wessels (1996); for 1999: Draft minutes of
the European Delegates’ meeting of 15 December 1998, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn (18
December 1998).
Notes: PRE = Presidency of the Council. SGD = Speaker of the German delegation in the
Council.
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ministry’s representative from the working groups in Council of Ministers
has the task of closing as many dossiers as possible before transferring
them to the rather political COREPER and to the Council of Ministers’
level.40
Horizontal policy co-ordination overarching the different policy fields
plays an important role in EC/EU affairs. The principle of ministerial
responsibility can account for the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
does not play a preponderant role in EC affairs. However, as far as partic-
ipation in CFSP is concerned, it is the Foreign Ministry’s European Affairs
Division which together with the Political Division that shapes Germany’s
position. Moreover, one of the two Parliamentary State Secretaries of the
Foreign Affairs Ministry acts as the Chairman of the Committee of State
Secretaries on European Affairs and as the main interlocutor in dealings
with the Cabinet of the federal government. For historical reasons – the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established only in 1955, after the
Ministry of Economics41 – and because of the fact that the main focus of
European integration until 1993 was economic rather than political, the
Foreign Minister, when acting as a co-ordinator, has always been assisted
by the Minister of Economics. Until the end of the Kohl government, it
was the latter ministry which was mainly responsible for representing the
FRG at the ECJ as well as for the distribution of EC/EU documents to the
other actors involved in the German European policy process. Of greater
importance to the co-ordination of German European policy-making is
the fact that the European Department in the Ministry of Economics
chaired the inter-ministerial committees on EC affairs, formulated and
transmitted the negotiation instructions to the diplomats in the Permanent
Representation of Germany in Brussels, and finally, disposed of the
Secretariat of the Committee of State Secretaries on European Affairs. 
How did the evolution of the EC/EU influence the powers and respon-
sibilities of these two ministries? The Ministry of Economics developed its
role as the central interface between Brussels and Bonn from the time of
the founding European Treaties through to the SEA. The Ministry for
Agriculture established its ‘own’ contacts with the relevant players on the
national and European levels. In this phase, the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs was mainly responsible for macro-political issues such as institu-
tional reform, European Political Co-Operation etc. There was thus a
sector-specific partnership between the two ministries. This changed when
the Maastricht Treaty entered German politics. The new policy agenda of
the Union included many issues which were not exclusively related to the
traditional role of the Ministry for Economics. Consequently, the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other ministries restructured their admin-
istrations according to their new tasks in the field of European
policy-making. As a result, the trend of ‘sectorised policy making’42 in
German European affairs considerably increased. 
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The ongoing dynamics of segmentation, institutional pluralism and the
potential for conflict between the governmental actors dealing with
EC/EU affairs suggest that co-ordination mechanisms and institutions
across the different phases of the Brussels policy-cycle are highly impor-
tant. Seen from a French or a British perspective the lack of a central
agency which regularly co-ordinates the German European policy may be
interpreted as one of the most considerable weaknesses in the political
system. Even prior to the first fundamental reform of the EEC,
Regelsberger and Wessels described the German co-ordination mecha-
nisms as indicators of ‘negative co-ordination’: each ministerial actor tries
to protect his or her sphere of competence instead of choosing an empa-
thetic approach aimed at adopting coherent German policy preferences
across the different EC/EU policy fields.43 However, one should not jump
to conclusions and assume a chaotic regime in European affairs.
The co-ordination of EC/EU policy-making in the Federal Republic is
ensured at different levels of government by a set of institutions in the
broad meaning of the term,44 that is, formalised conferences, committees
and informal but regular contacts on the administrative level. In the
absence of a central interface between Brussels and Bonn/Berlin, channels
of information, instruction and communication have been established at
each level of the administration. Commission drafts of proposals for new
or amended EC legislation are transmitted from the Permanent
Representation to the Ministry of Economics and, since October 1998, to
the Ministry of Finance.45 The proposals are then advanced to the lead-
department (‘federführende Ressort’). The re-transmission of proposals
and amendments as well as the instructions for German delegations to the
Council of Ministers and its subsequent bodies is therefore the outcome
of a complex co-ordination mechanism. 
The most political institution is the Cabinet Committee on European
Affairs, established in January 1973.46 Until the Schröder government
came into office, the Cabinet Committee had met only twice – at its inau-
gural session and at the beginning of Helmut Kohl’s Chancellorship.
Given that since January 1973 the Cabinet of the federal government
discussed EU business (under the topics of ‘European Questions’ and
‘International Affairs’) on a weekly basis, the Cabinet Committee became
a rather artificial instrument. As a consequence, Chancellor Schröder and
his government abolished it.47 In the absence of a formalised and efficient
co-ordination structure at the ministerial level, the bulk of the political co-
ordination is carried out by the Inter-ministerial Committee of State
Secretaries on European Affairs. This committee was set up in 1963 in
order to deal with controversies in relation to European affairs.48 Meeting
approximately on a bi-monthly basis, it brings together the State
Ministers and State Secretaries of the ‘Four Musketeers’ in European
affairs as well as the State Minister dealing with European Affairs in the
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Chancellery and the Permanent Representative of the FRG in Brussels.
Other ministries participate in the meetings when the chair (Foreign
Affairs) considers it as appropriate. Although the structure of this
committee is rather flexible, becoming a permanent member is of political
importance.49 In October 1998 the secretariat shifted from the Ministry
of Economics to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, underlining the latter’s
strengthened role in co-ordinating German EC/EU policy.50 The commit-
tee’s main task is to settle controversial questions and to prepare dossiers
of a political and strategic nature with regard to the Council of Ministers’
meetings. Decisions of the committee are taken by common accord and
are politically binding for the ministries;51 it does not adopt a pro-active
policy approach on the basis of the Council of Ministers’ agenda.52
Besides co-ordinating the internal agenda of European policy-making,
determining the German representatives in Brussels is another area of
complexity and incoherence. The German Permanent Representation
cannot act on its own account. Instead, the Bonn/Berlin-based institu-
tional pluralism and segmentation in European affairs is mirrored in the
Permanent Representation in Brussels. Ministries send their civil servants
to the Permanent Representation (in 1998 the two core ministries occu-
pied 57 per cent of the posts).53 The total number of civil servants
working in the Permanent Representation indicates an intensive involve-
ment of the German ministerial administration (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Evolution of German personnel in the Permanent Representation in
comparison to the number of days spent in the Council and its preparatory
bodies, 1958–2000
Policy area 1958 1960 1969 1975 1988 1995 1998 2000
Germany’s Permanent 5 19 28 39 42 59 87 107
Representation staff
Council meetings 21 44 69 76.5 117.5 98 94 91
Council Meetings/Permanent 4.2 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.8 1.7 1.1 1.08
Representation staff
COREPER meetings 39 97 129 118 104 112 116 130
COREPER Meeting/Permanent 7.8 5.1 4.6 3.02 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.2
Representation staff
Working group meetings 302 505 1412.5 2079.5 2000.5 2364.5 3140 3537
Meetings/Permanent 60.4 26.6 50.4 53.3 47.6 40.1 36.1 33.05
Representation staff
Source: Web site of the Council; 43rd Review of the Council’s Work (Brussels, 1995);
European Commission: General Report of Activities of the EU 1998 (Brussels/ Luxembourg,
2001).
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With a view to instructing the Permanent Representation of the
German position in Brussels, the Ministry of Finance – until October 1998
the Ministry of Economics – co-ordinates the meetings in relation to
COREPER I, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for
the management of the Bonn/Berlin-based work in relation to COREPER
II.54 In order to give instructions to COREPER I and its subsequent
working units, every ministry has a European Delegate (‘Europa-
Beauftragter’). They meet on virtually a monthly basis; since October
1998 the location and the chairmanship have been transferred from the
Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Below this level,
there are regular contacts between the heads of division (‘Ressortleiter’) in
order to settle disputes between the ministries concerned on issues related
to the Council’s working group meetings. The so-called ‘Tuesday
Committee’, which meets on a weekly basis, focuses on the technical
aspects of a given issue. The co-ordination of the European Delegates and
the Tuesday Committee, and the informal contacts between civil servants,
are aimed at settling disputes of a technical rather than political nature.
As regards timing, these bodies focus on the working groups of the
Council of Ministers and COREPER I. As far as the meetings of the
European Delegates are concerned, the deputy permanent representative
for COREPER I is always involved. The relative autonomy of the actors
indicates the problem of achieving coherent policy approaches; although
the Europe Delegates and the Tuesday Committee give each ministry an
opportunity to discuss its position on the COREPER agenda, it remains
up to each responsible ministerial administration to formulate the instruc-
tions for the working group level. 
Although the different co-ordination mechanisms have not been offi-
cially established by law, they have a long tradition and have influenced
the structure of the federal government’s decision-making process to a
considerable extent. Ministerial self-interest prevails but given the
Chancellor’s ‘Sword of Damocles’, i.e. the ‘guidance competence’, the
competition between the ministries does not lead to anarchy. Autonomy
and segmentation are counterbalanced by the possibility that the
Chancellery may intervene in order to dispel conflict. Nevertheless, as the
working group level is the ‘most vital’55 of all the Council’s component
parts56 and given that between 7057 and 90 per cent58 of the Council’s
agenda is dealt with at this level,59 the fact that there is apparently no
effective co-ordination mechanism between the relevant ministerial bodies
indicates clearly the problem for European policy-making in the FRG. 
The parliamentary dimension 
Unlike in the United Kingdom and France, the overall mentality of
members in the German two-chamber parliament – Bundestag and
Bundesrat – is characterised by co-operation and less by partisan
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structures and conflict between loyalty and discipline. Co-operation
between government and parliament leads to what is classically identified
as the German ‘working parliament’ (Arbeitsparlament), in which the
opposition tries to influence the government’s decisions by a wide range
of technical–concrete rather than political–general instruments.60 This
‘working parliament’ function has considerable implications for the
organisation of parliamentary activities. For instance, decision-making
shifts from the plenary towards the huge range of committees, sub-
committees and various working groups within the parliament, all of
which are subject oriented. Decision-making has also moved towards
parliamentary groups (organised according to subject and cutting across
committee spheres), working parties (also cutting across committees) and
coalition groups (which themselves are established according to subjects
and committee duties). This process of shifting the parliamentary legisla-
tive and control functions towards a multitude of sub-structures leads to
an ‘atomisation’61 of the Bundestag, with serious implications for the
handling of European affairs. Given that the committee structure of the
German Bundestag follows the differentiation of the executive branch,
one can suggest that the co-ordination mechanisms at the federal govern-
ment level amplify the process of atomisation at the parliamentary level.
Originally, the Bundestag disposed of very limited scrutiny powers; the
federal government had to inform the two parliamentary chambers before
any decision that would become binding law in Germany. These general
rules were never applied effectively for three reasons: first the ‘Article 2
[of the EEC ratification act] procedure’ focused on informing parliament
about European affairs but did not foresee a right of consultation.
Consequently the parliament could not affect the federal government’s
stance in the Council of Ministers. Secondly both houses were informed
about relevant EC documents only at a rather late stage. About 65 per
cent of EC documents debated on the Bundestag’s floor between 1980 and
1986 were already in force at the time of debate.62 Consequently, scruti-
nising the government in EC affairs was limited to some kind of ‘ex post’
control and did not provide parliamentarians with an effective involve-
ment in EC policy-making. Thirdly, the Bundestag had shown little
interest in scrutinising European affairs. Instead, the overall majority of
its members supported the EP’s claims for more powers and considered
the Bundestag as a temporary substitute for the EP in the treatment of EC
documents.63 Furthermore the first fully-fledged and regular parliamen-
tary institution for dealing exclusively with EC affairs – the so-called EC
Committee (EG-Ausschuß, set up in 1991) – faced almost the same struc-
tural problems as its predecessors,64 since it was not empowered to give
the Bundestag a central voice vis-à-vis the government. Owing to the
reluctance of other committees (especially Economics and Foreign Affairs)
to share their powers with another body, the EC Committee was only
128 Member States and the European Union
2444Ch5  3/12/02  2:02 pm  Page 128
rarely nominated as committee-in-charge (‘federführender Ausschuß’).65
A major change in these mechanisms took place with the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty. The amended Article 23 of the Basic Law calls ‘the
federal Government [to] inform the Bundestag and the Bundesrat
comprehensively and as quickly as possible’. Moreover, it obliges the
government for the first time since 1957 to ‘take account of the opinion
of the Bundestag in the negotiations’ (of the Council and its subsequent
operative structures). In other words, Article 23 opens the door for some
kind of a ‘parliamentary scrutiny reserve mechanism’ similar to that
which operates in Denmark and the United Kingdom. But the need to take
the Bundestag’s view ‘into account’ is ambiguous and could mean
anything between accepting the institution’s view, incorporating elements
of it or ignoring it altogether with an explanation as to why the govern-
ment has decided to take a different course of action. Thus, the
amendment to the Basic Law had to be combined with several reforms
which sought to adapt the relevant institutions to the new situation. First,
the government and the Bundestag agreed on a so-called ‘co-operation
law’. Secondly, both houses of the German Parliament amended Article
45 of the Basic Law to provide a constitutional basis for setting up a
Committee on European Union Affairs (CEUA) in the Bundestag. The
latter amended its Rules of Procedure in order to define the operational
framework for the CEUA as well as the rules for the movement of docu-
ments between the different bodies of the house. 
Given these shortcomings of the 1992 constitutional reform, it took the
Bundestag two years to officially establish the CEUA on 14 December
1994. With fifty full members (thirty-nine members of the Bundestag and
eleven German Members of the European Parliament), it is one of the
largest committees in the House.66 The prominent role of the committee
is also underlined by the fact that – deviating from the general principle
according to which committees shall only prepare decisions of the plenary
– the CEUA can be empowered to exercise the Bundestag’s rights in rela-
tion to the federal government or address its recommendations directly to
the government unless another committee opposes. The CEUA acts as a
specialist ‘clearing house’ of parliament. The government has no influence
either over the selection of topics for deliberation in the committees or on
the way in which the committees organise their work. If the EU
Committee is designated as the committee-in-charge, it may submit a draft
resolution to the Bundestag.67 It is responsible for the receipt of all EU
documents from the government and for filtering them into the other
specialist committees. At first glance this innovation may suggest a major
step towards a unified parliamentary position vis-à-vis the government. In
this regard it was argued that, until 1992, the government ‘operated as a
unified actor vis-à-vis the Bundestag which was divided along departmen-
tal lines. Each departmental standing committee could only communicate
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its views with, and obtain information from, “its” department.
Integrating departmental considerations into a broader European policy
was difficult.’ Now, since the establishment of the CEUA, the argument
was that the Bundestag had a body which ‘– like the federal government,
the Chancellor’s Office and the Foreign Office – is able to deal with
German policy comprehensively’.68 Of course, comparing the CEUA’s
powers with its predecessors from a government perspective, one could
presume that the committee is identified as ‘the’ central hub between the
Bundestag and the government. However, given our findings on the char-
acteristics and operation of the federal government in European affairs,
one might have serious doubts concerning the view of the government as
a ‘unified actor’, since the organisational segmentation and sectorisation
of European politics in Germany was reinforced in the post-Maastricht
period. 
The implications of parliamentary scrutiny differ in every parliament of
the Union. Following the Co-Operation Law of 12 March 1993, the
German government is obliged to give the Bundestag full information on
all EU documents in advance of the preparation for meetings of the
Council of Ministers.69 Unlike in most of the other parliaments of the
Union, this rule applies to all three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty.
Moreover, once the Bundestag has adopted a position on an EU docu-
ment, the government has to base its position in the Council of Ministers
on the Bundestag’s decision. The Bundestag may ask the government to
postpone the adoption of a common position in the Council of Ministers.
In this case, the government is required to table a ‘parliamentary scrutiny
reserve’ in the Council. In addition to this general rule, the Bundestag’s
Act of Ratification of the TEU obliged the government to consult the
parliament prior to any decision by the Council of Ministers with regard
to entry into the third phase of EMU.70
The EU Committee has succeeded in broadening the instrumental scope
of its scrutiny mechanisms. During the 13th legislative term, it held eighty-
four meetings and considered 903 of 2,955 EU documents forwarded to
the Bundestag (30.6 per cent). In 174 cases the committee acted as commit-
tee-in-charge. This function was not limited to the deliberation of EP
documents but extended to some of the most important items of the
Union’s rolling agenda – the EU Committee took up the lead for the IGC
leading to the Amsterdam Treaty and for its ratification, for Agenda 2000,
employment policy, the enlargement of the Union as well as for other insti-
tutional changes (the European Investment Bank (EIB), establishment of
EU agencies, etc.). Even on monetary integration where it acted only as a
joint-deliberative committee (‘mitberatender Ausschuß’), it contributed
significantly to the Bundestag’s decision of 23 April 1998 on the approval
of Germany’s entry into the third stage of EMU. The committee chose the
option of directly addressing the German government on three occasions:
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on the proposal for a Council regulation on combating fraud, on the
creation of an agency for the surveillance of racism and xenophobia and –
together with the Committee on the Rules of Procedure – on the resolution
of the XVth meeting of COSAC.71 This last case is particularly illustrative
since the vast majority of the Bundestag strongly opposed any upgrading of
COSAC in order to control the Council of Ministers collectively. The roots
of this critical posture vis-à-vis more formalised arrangements for inter-
parliamentary scrutiny are to be found in both the positive attitude of
German parliamentarians vis-à-vis the EP and in the fear that COSAC or
similar institutions may aggravate the complex structure of European deci-
sion-making at the ‘Brussels’ and at the ‘Bonn/Berlin’ level.
The Bundestag arranged a rather timely management of the scrutiny
process. Unlike its predecessors, the EU Committee became politically
recognised by its ‘competing committees’ as a useful instrument for
holding the government to account. Although the segmented structure of
parliamentary activities still dominates the operation of the Bundestag in
EU affairs, the EU Committee and its activities have helped to provide a
broader range of the Bundestag’s members with an understanding of the
long-term and horizontal issues in European affairs. The activities of the
EU Committee spilled over into other committees insofar as the latter
began to invent new mechanisms of scrutiny only after the EU Committee
started to work. For example, while the Committee of the Interior did not
participate actively in supervising the government’s stance in the imple-
mentation of the Schengen agreement,72 it did oblige the government to
report on each meeting of the relevant EU Council of Ministers’ groups
including the K4 Committee.73 This change of approach occurred after
the Bundestag’s EU Committee had submitted, for the first time in the
Bundestag’s history, a ‘parliamentary scrutiny reserve’ on the signature of
the Europol Convention. 
The federal state: European policy-making down to earth
As federal states, the sixteen Länder have the quality of ‘autonomous
statehood’ (‘Eigenstaatlichkeit’). Two factors define the prominent char-
acter of the Länder as entities with an autonomous statehood: first, they
possess their own competencies and are thus able to structure politics and
policies autonomously within their territory. Secondly, they participate in
the legislative and administrative process of the federation and thus play
an important role in the decision-making system of the ‘whole state’
(Gesamtstaat). However, the ‘process of European integration has posed
a persistent challenge to the legal status of the Länder and their political
quality as constituent states, and therefore also to the fundamental federal
structure of the Federal Republic’.74 Thus, whereas federal statehood is
still guaranteed as a central and irrevocable structural principle of the
Basic Law, the question has repeatedly been posed as to how far the
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balance between federation and Länder may shift without undermining
the essence of federal statehood. 
Whereas the Act of Ratification of the Treaty of Rome was combined
with an obligation of the federal government to inform the Bundesrat only
on legislative proposals issued by the European Commission, the estab-
lishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) resulted in
the ‘Länder participation procedure’.75 The federal government declared
itself prepared to follow the Länder views strictly if their competencies
were affected by a draft legislative act of the EEC. During the negotiations
on the Rome Treaties, the Länder and the federal government also agreed
on the institution of a ‘Länder-Observer’ (Länderbeobachter), who is
located in Bonn/Berlin as well as in Brussels, to provide information to the
Bundesrat and the Länder.76 The Länder-Observer is entitled to partici-
pate at each meeting of the Council of Ministers and to report on the
latter’s proceedings to the Länder and the Bundesrat.77 However, owing
to its rather modest administrative support – until 1998 there were only
two full-time and one part-time civil servants working in its Bonn/Berlin
and Brussels offices78 – the Länder-Observer did not become a key posi-
tion in the decision-making process between Brussels and the Länder
governments. 
Considering the complex structure that characterises European policy-
making at the ‘Brussels’ and the ‘Bonn/Berlin’ levels, it came as no surprise
that the primary strategic response of the Länder to the SEA was the
establishment of some kind of co-ordination mechanism with regard to
the federal state level as well as to the wider arena of policy-making in
Brussels. Apart from the different participation procedures in EC/EU
affairs, the Länder developed various activities to entrench their rights
and to generate an independent capacity in the making of European law
and politics. 
The Länder established a dense network between Bonn and their
respective capitals in order to manage the growing input from the
Brussels arena. The most important developments occurred at the minis-
terial level. During the 1980s the first European policy divisions were
created in those ministries which were indirectly affected by EC regula-
tions or directives; this evolution followed the growing scope and
differentiation of EC competencies. Both the SEA and the Maastricht
Treaty induced a new momentum in this development insofar as every
ministry nominated its own desk officers for European affairs
(‘Europareferent’). In August 1998 the ‘Ministry’ (Senator) for the
Interior of Bremen was the only Länder ministry without a European
policy desk officer.79 The main activities of such officers are centred
around the distribution among ministers of the European documentation
which enters their ministry from either the Bundesrat’s administration or
the liaison offices of the Länder in Brussels. As regards the co-operation
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between the ministries (interministerial co-ordination), the European
Affairs desk officers meet on an irregular basis in order to settle disputes
and to prepare the draft positions of their Land government at the upper
decision-making levels. 
To co-ordinate European policy-making between the federal state and
the Länder more efficiently, every Land government nominated its own
European Affairs Commissioner (Europabeauftragter) or European
Affairs Delegate (Europabevollmächtigter), occupying a post either as a
minister or as a state-secretary. Such delegates act as a ‘bridge’ between
their Land and the other levels of European policy-making by represent-
ing their Land in the ‘Europe-Chamber’ of the Bundesrat (a special
institution for the co-ordination of the Bundesrat’s European policy) and
vis-à-vis the federal government. For this reason, most of these posts have
been located at the Representation of the Länder at the federal state level
in Bonn/Berlin.
As a response to the growing amount of EC legislation after the entry
into force of the SEA, the Länder opened information or liaison offices in
Brussels between 1985 and 1987; initially criticised by the federal govern-
ment as instruments of an ‘auxiliary’ or ‘competitive foreign policy’
(‘Nebenaußenpolitik’),80 they quickly became a useful tool for the Länder
to secure and pass on information from the European Commission and
the German Permanent Representation during the decision-preparation
phase. The liaison offices have also proved useful as a tool for advancing
the specific interests of each individual Land vis-à-vis the European
Commission, especially with regard to the management of the ERDF and
to the settlement of disputes on state aid and the granting of subsidies
with the European Commission’s DG for Competition. Compared with
the Länder-Observer, the Länder offices have far more administrative
staff. In autumn 1997, there were 141 civil servants working in the offices
of which 90 belonged to the higher service.81 Finally, the creation of the
CoR also prompted the offices to assist their Länder representatives in the
preparation of the committee’s meetings.82
Based on the Act of Ratification of the SEA, the federal government
and the Länder agreed on a co-operation agreement which gradually
extended Länder rights of participation in terms of the extent to which
their powers and interests were affected by proposed EC legislation. The
agreement also officially allowed the participation of Länder representa-
tives in the working groups of the Council of Ministers and the European
Commission. Building on these procedures at the Maastricht IGC, the
Länder went a step further and successfully sought entrance into the core
of the Council of Ministers as equal partners with the other Member
States. With the amendment of Article 203 (ex Article 146) ECT and the
revision of Article 23 of the German Basic Law, the Länder and the
Bundesrat achieved new and important instruments for a more effective
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and direct interest mediation in the Union. In fact, the new provisions of
the Basic Law opened the door of the Council of Ministers to the Länder
insofar as it allowed for the appointment of a Länder minister (or another
representative of equal rank) to represent the Federal Republic in the
Council in cases where the exclusive competencies of the Länder were
involved.
In clear contrast to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat adapted its institu-
tional structure and instruments at a rather early stage of the European
integration process. The European Union Affairs Committee – EUAC
(Ausschuß für Fragen der Europäischen Union) – was established on 1
November 1993, though its general tasks and structure date back to 20
December 1957 when the Bundesrat created the first parliamentary
Committee for European Issues in the then EEC. Unlike in the Bundestag,
the members of the committee can be replaced by civil servants.83 The
EUAC normally holds a meeting every three weeks to prepare the deci-
sions of the Bundesrat; if a decision must be made on an EU document
before the next Bundesrat plenary session is scheduled then the so-called
‘European or EU Chamber’ (Europa- or EU-Kammer) will be convened. If
operating, the chamber replaces and acts on behalf of the Bundesrat’s
plenary. As a general rule, the EUAC is always nominated as committee-
in-charge. It consequently exercises much more power in setting the
Bundesrat’s EC/EU agenda than its counterpart in the Bundestag. As
regards the scope of scrutiny, the federal government adopts a broad
interpretation of the concept of ‘EU proposals’ to be forwarded to the
Bundesrat. The latter receives virtually all documents concerning the
European Council and the Council of Ministers.84 Within the framework
of the third pillar (JHA) where the Länder have considerable legislative,
executive and operative powers, not only the proposals and documents of
the Council of Ministers, but also unofficial papers drawn up by other
Member States are transmitted to the Bundesrat.85
The obligations of the government vis-à-vis the Bundesrat are graded
depending on the matter and the competencies of the Länder. Where EC
or EU legislative proposals fall within the sole jurisdiction of the
Federation but where the interests of the Länder are also affected, the
federal government is required to take account of the opinion of the
Bundesrat when adopting its negotiating position. Where a proposal is
concerned essentially with the competencies of the Länder and their
administrations, the federal government is obliged to respect the views of
the Bundesrat. Concerning EC legislative proposals based on Article 308
(ex Article 235) ECT, the government must come to an agreement
(Einvernehmen) with the Bundesrat in instances where the latter’s
approval is required by domestic law. Consequently the government
cannot vote in favour of a proposal before the Bundesrat has given the
green light. Where exclusive competencies of the Länder are involved, the
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FRG is represented in the Council of Ministers by a minister of the Länder
nominated by the Bundesrat. Finally, Article 23 of the Basic Law rules
that laws transferring sovereign powers always require the consent of
both houses of parliament. More importantly and especially with regard
to EU action under the third pillar, Article 23 states that for ‘the estab-
lishment of the EU as well as amendments to its statutory foundations and
comparable regulations which amend or supplement the content of this
Basic Law or make such amendments or supplements possible’ a two-
thirds majority is needed in both houses.
What has been the experience with these innovations so far? As far as
the participation of Länder civil servants in the Council of Ministers’ and
the Commission’s working groups is concerned, Weber-Panariello
reported that in April 1994 250 Länder civil servants were nominated for
the Brussels-based working groups.86 This number steadily grew from 354
in 199587 to 450 in 1996. Since then, Knodt notes that the internal work-
load of the Länder has lead to a reduction in the number of Länder
representatives.88 Hence, for the 1999 presidency, the Länder appointed
officials for 314 working groups, of which 189 are attached to the
Commission and its comitology network, and the remaining 125 to the
Council of Ministers’ working groups. Accordingly, the Länder are
present in 38 per cent of the Council’s working groups. As regards the
implementation of the Co-operation Law of 1993,89 it seems to have func-
tioned quite efficiently. During the 13th electoral term of the German
Bundestag (1994–98), the Bundesrat considered 746 EU documents of
which 124 were subject to resolutions covering qualified participation
rights of the Bundesrat.90 The latter asked the federal government to take
its view into account in the case of sixty-three EU proposals. In twenty-
three of these documents, the Bundesrat also called for the conduct of
negotiations to be transferred to a representative of the Länder.
Interestingly, the federal government accepted a decision of the Bundesrat
in 1995 which called for the transfer of responsibility for negotiations in
connection with all discussions surrounding ‘audio-visual media’,
although no specific EU proposal was under consideration by the
Bundesrat at the time. The wording of the Basic Law and its list of compe-
tencies would suggest a clear-cut distinction between ‘federal government-
related’ and ‘Länder-related’ policy areas. However, apart from media
policy where the federal government always transferred to the Bundesrat
the responsibility for negotiations in the Council of Ministers, we cannot
identify any other areas where a general rule is applicable. Hence, the
transfer of negotiation powers remains a matter of dispute on a case-by-
case basis. On the other hand, it should be noted that of the twenty-six
decisions where the federal government initially doubted the Bundesrat’s
view of the applicability of §5–2 and §6–2 of the Co-operation Law, in
most of these cases it proved possible to reach agreement either through
Germany 135
2444Ch5  3/12/02  2:02 pm  Page 135
mutual compromise or by offering the Länder joint membership of the
German delegation to the Council of Ministers. With regard to EU legisla-
tive acts based on Article 306 (ex Article 235) ECT, the Bundesrat issued
twenty-two resolutions. One could have suggested that the Bundesrat
would adopt a rather restrictive view on the application of this article,
since it always appears to extend the EC’s scope of activity without
amending the Treaty. In fact, in the vast majority of its ‘235-resolutions’,
the Bundesrat agreed on the federal government’s line to adopt the legisla-
tive act under consideration. Conflict between the Bundesrat and the
federal government generally occurred on the application of Article 23(1)
of the Basic Law, i.e. on the transfer of sovereign powers. However, in
three of the four cases from 1994 to 1998 the dispute mainly focused on
the question of whether a simple or a two-thirds’ majority was necessary
to approve the ratification laws. Since the Bundesrat agreed on all of these
laws by unanimity, the matter was always solved without involving a legal
dispute. 
Complying with European law: the challenge of bananas
The observed trends of institutional differentiation, specialisation and
segmentation spill over into the implementation area. Institutional prolif-
eration from the preparation, making and implementation of decisions
stems from the fact that the decisive actors involved are the same in the
three phases of the EC/EU policy-cycle. A civil servant responsible for the
preparation and negotiation of a draft legislative act is also likely to draft
the implementation measure (‘Referentenentwurf’). These actors tend to
be oriented towards the first two stages of European decision-making and
are less sensitive to what comes after a given decision91: Civil servants
would rather act in political than judicial frameworks. However, as the
majority of them have studied law, they are aware that a potential dispute
between Germany and the Union can be settled in the Courts.
Accordingly, their orientation is focused on the early stages of the policy-
cycle where they try to avoid conflicts which might later occur owing to
their own failure.
More than 90 per cent of all EC measures requiring further transposi-
tion into national law fall within the competence of the federal State.92 In
these cases, implementation measures are adopted by a law of the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat. In most of these cases, the legislator first
creates the legal basis for implementing measures through a special law on
the policy field concerned. Only after this law has entered into force can
special regulations be passed in order to fulfil the substantive terms of the
directive concerned. This process may involve considerable time lags,
especially when the Bundestag and the Bundesrat – when there are specific
Länder concerns – have to settle their dispute in the conciliation commit-
tee between the two chambers. As the EU moved beyond the peak of the
136 Member States and the European Union
2444Ch5  3/12/02  2:02 pm  Page 136
‘internal market programme’ legislation,93 one could also assume that the
implementation problem became less serious than it had been in previous
periods.94 Obviously, it makes a difference whether the actors concerned
have to transpose 123 directives (as in 1992) or seventy-one (in 1995).
Moreover, given that the Länder are more deeply involved in decision-
making on EC directives and recommendations than any other regional
entity in the Union, one could also assume a gradual evolution towards a
better implementation record in those areas where the Länder have to
transpose EC directives. 
Table 5.4 Implementation record for Germany, 1991–2000
Year EU average Germany: Germany: Germany: Judgements Article 234 Article 234
implementation Article 226 ECT Reasoned Cases against ECT: ECT: EU 12
record % Letters of Opinions referred to Germany Germany
Formal Notice the Court
1991 68.13 60 13 1 5 50 186
1992 82.27 97 18 5 6 62 162
1993 85.00 120 35 4 3 57 204
1994 88.59 90 66 5 7 44 203
1995 89.88 92 25 10 0 51 243
1996 93.45 62 37 8 0 66 243
1997 93.53 116 35 19 0 46 191
1998 96.71 88 46 5 6 49 240
1999 95.70 84 30 9 9 49 190
2000 93.81 92 40 11 12 47 184
Sources: European Commission, Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law (1992–2001).
The information provided by Table 5.4 seems to confirm this line of
argument. Germany’s implementation rate steadily grew from 68 per cent
in 1991 towards nearly 97 per cent in 1998.95 However, implementing a
directive – notifying the Commission that the legal transposition of a piece
of EC legislation has been completed – does not automatically mean
adequate execution. Furthermore, it does not prevent the national courts
from clarifying whether and how far national case law has to be cleared
according to EC law: problems with EC compliance arise in Germany
where any law can be reviewed against the Constitution. German case law
has gradually accepted the ECJ’s theory of direct effect, the supremacy of
EC law and therefore the capacity of a norm of Community law to be
applied in domestic court proceedings and to overrule inconsistent norms
of national law in these events.96 However, the Constitutional Court
regards itself as having the right to review EC law against the fundamen-
tal rights laid down in the Basic Law.97 In this regard, the Constitutional
Court’s Maastricht judgement had a considerable impact, since it stressed
the court’s intention to review the respect, by EU institutions, of the limits
to their powers, and that this examination may also apply to individual
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EC acts. Hence, the ongoing litigation on the compatibility of parts of the
EC Banana Regulation98 with the Basic Law seems to indicate an attempt
by German courts to challenge the supremacy of EC law. It remains to be
seen if the Constitutional Court will decide against the general principles
of the Union which serve as one of most important tools for establishing
mutual trust between the Member States. 
Conclusion: failing successfully? 
In sum, both the constitutional patterns and the evolution of Germany’s
institutions dealing with European policy indicate an increasingly
complex system which is characterised by an ongoing trend towards insti-
tutional and political pluralism. This process goes hand in hand with a
segmentation of policy-making. Each ministry – both at the federal and
the Länder level – shapes European dossiers in its own way and on its own
account. The multi-level and multi-actor system clearly testifies a lack of
long-term-based policy approaches and strategic policy planning, projec-
tion and policy-making. The broader involvement of the federal
parliamentary chambers in EC/EU decision-making reflects the funda-
mental patterns of the governmental level (elements of segmentation and
fragmentation) without ‘parliamentarising’ German EU politics in a way
comparable to the Danish Folketing’s approach (see Chapter 4 in this
volume). In contrasting some of these characteristics, we can also observe
a recovery of the ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’99 marked by a high strategic plan-
ning input from the Chancellery in European affairs. Especially during the
IGCs, the power of the Chancellor to determine policy guidelines prevails
over the principle of ministerial responsibility. Hence, the moves towards
EMU and Political Union at Maastricht as well as the initiatives on flexi-
bility and the partial communitarisation of the third pillar at Amsterdam
were strongly influenced by the Chancellor, acting closely with the French
President. 
Major institutional and constitutional decisions significantly mobilise
the German political system. In this regard, the last two IGCs were also
stirred up by the German Länder which successfully asked for a firm
recognition of the subsidiarity principle in the EC Treaty, the creation of
the CoR and for direct participation of representatives of the Bundesrat in
the Council of Ministers when it deals with matters concerning exclusive
Länder competencies in Germany. 
Apart from these developments which have amplified the complexity of
the German EU policy structure, party politics and coalition dynamics
have exacerbated the European policy-making style since the introduction
of the Maastricht Treaty. In this regard, the trend towards ‘institutional
pluralism’ in particular can also be explained by the fact that coalition
governments do not adopt a coherent approach in day-to-day policy-
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making during their term of office. Instead, they aim to define the broad
guidelines for the envisaged legislative term. But during this period, minis-
ters have to balance the objectives of their political party on the one hand
and the need to find compromise positions with their coalition partners
on the other. Thus in the daily life of EC law-making, a minister may
sometimes prefer to adopt a policy approach which corresponds to his or
her party position and which may differ from that of the coalition partner
and vice-versa. The patterns of decentralisation and segmentation may
lead scholars to characterise the German system as unsuitable and as one
of the main causes of the relatively weak German stance in the daily life
of the Union.100 Some therefore propose the creation of a Ministry for
European Affairs or the assignment of a minister or state minister from
within the Chancellery to deal specifically with European matters. The
puzzle of German incongruity in the EU system begins, however, when
looking at the outcome of German EC/EU policy-making. In spite of all
the apparent competitive disadvantages, German politicians and civil
servants show a comparatively high success rate in defining the funda-
mentals of the Union in most treaty amendments and revisions. Not only
the principles of a social market economy and monetary stability but also
subsidiarity, the ‘parliamentarisation’ and the ‘regio-institutionalisation’
of the EU’s institutional–procedural system have been ‘exported’ into the
Union.
Any attempt to concentrate European policy planning and policy-
making within the federal government and/or between the government
and its interlocutors (parliament, Länder, etc.) would interfere with the
basic feature of the German politico-institutional system, namely its
federal and decentralised structure, in institutional as well as in party
political terms. Moreover, given the flourishing of network-building in
European affairs across Brussels and Bonn/Berlin, it is far from clear that
a central policy-planning and co-ordination agency would automatically
lead to more consistent European strategies. Hence, one of the astonish-
ing facts of the development of the Brussels-based and the German
problem-solving arenas is the growing movement towards decentralised
policy making at both levels of governance. 
German EU politics face persistent patterns of interdependence – polit-
ically as well as economically. The institutional penetration of the German
political system by European integration is considerably high. In
exchange, the EU’s institutional structure and mechanisms correspond to
a considerable extent to the German arrangements. Bulmer defined this
process as an emerging congruency between the Union and Germany –
congruence with regard to the constitutional macro-structures, the
normative rules which shape the decision-making processes (package-
dealing, decentralised decision-making, coalition-building), the long-term
policy programme (segmented, sectorised and sometimes even fragmented
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policy processes) and the substantive level (high-ranking policies and
policy contexts at the two governance levels),101 patterns of congruency
developed over time. Germany’s institutions have adapted to the multi-
hierarchical and multi-centred structure in a rather effective way: they
have not merely reacted to European integration as one of its ‘subjects’,
rather they were and still are an important component of this structure.
Perspectives for the future: the shortcomings of centrality 
What would be the consequences of creating a French-like central co-ordi-
nating structure within the German system? The new body wherever it
was located (Chancellery, Foreign Ministry or in a separate ministry)
would be torn in two directions. One would be the improvement of
mutual information and of horizontal co-operation without any ambi-
tions of shaping a single German position and a coherent strategy. Hence,
as in all collective organisations, internal communication could always be
improved, but the competition among the actors of the German adminis-
tration would set clear limits, at least in most policy areas. Moreover,
there is no obvious, clear national interest which overarches sector-
specific policy ambitions. Furthermore, the very process of European
integration indicates that preference-building is not simply a matter of
unilateral power politics, but is in itself a substantial part of the cyclical
processes concerning politics and policies which move beyond the logic of
the nation state.
The alternative role of a central body would be that of achieving a
stronger vertical co-ordination backed by the highest political authority –
the Chancellery. Such an approach would open a new way of dealing with
EU affairs. However, given the deep-rooted features of the German
administration, it is likely that such a step would lead to interbureaucratic
fights – between and within ministries – which would spill over into the
political realm of coalition governments. The battles would presumably
reduce the mobilisation of civil servants and their day-to-day effectiveness
in dealing with the Union’s rolling agenda. Competition in political and
administrative terms would become endemic, and with substantial
authority, the Minister for European Affairs could become a ‘threat’ to
the key ministries. Consequently, the specific legitimising power of the
Chancellor would be needed in everyday life, according to her/his own
will, and not only on major bargaining occasions. Besides the issue of
internal competition for access to the Union, any conceivable permanent
hierarchy could not be more successful given the complexity of the EU
system. Whatever the abstract charm of organisational simplicity, such a
solution may simply not fit in the complex system that has evolved to steer
European integration.
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6 Teija Tiilikainen
Finland: smooth adaptation to
European values and institutions
Introduction: EU membership as the beginning of a new political era
Finland joined the European Union together with Austria and Sweden at
the beginning of 1995. At first glance, Finnish membership might appear as
a rapid change of political orientation, given the inflexible policy of
neutrality the country conducted until the early 1990s. In spite of the
brevity of national adaptation and consideration, the decision to follow
Sweden and submit an application for EU membership was based upon an
overwhelming political consensus. All the major political elites, including
party and interest organisations, the leadership, key actors in the private
sector and the media were in favour of Finnish membership. In the referen-
dum for EU membership in October 1994, the elites were supported by 57
per cent of the people which supported membership. One characteristic of
the Finnish EU policy thus seems to be that it relies upon a firm and stable
popular support. A division of the country, however, took place in the
referendum and it is a division that has given expression to the limits of the
governmental policy ever since. Membership in the Union was opposed by
farmers and the rural population because it was seriously believed to risk
their source of livelihood. The Farmers’ Union was the most significant
unitary force opposing Finnish membership in the campaign preceding the
referendum. Its political importance has, however, been reduced by the
reluctance of the agrarian Centre Party to join the opposition. The Centre
Party leaders seem to have assumed that such a policy would block the
party’s road to government and, furthermore, the party will be increasingly
dependent upon urban voters in the near future.
During the first years of membership the Finnish government adopted
an enthusiastic and unreserved line of policy towards the Union. In the
core issues of the Union’s political future, Finland showed a high degree
of flexibility and a preparedness to join the ‘deepeners’ of the Union
rather than its Nordic neighbours conducting a more reserved policy.1
Despite the generally positive attitude towards the Union, this position
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cannot be understood without paying attention to a particular factor
affecting Finnish political thinking. After the Cold War era, and the diffi-
cult position of Finland between the two superpowers, the Finnish
decision to join the Union should be seen very much in the light of secu-
rity policy. It was seen as a decision to join the Western unity that had
been beyond Finland’s reach during the five long decades of the Cold War.
This attitude did not limit itself to political elites but has been shown by
opinion polls. Security remains an important factor behind the positive
stand adopted.
The main constitutional amendments
The Finnish EU membership is perceived as a new positive challenge in the
Finnish political system and seems to be strongly accepted by a majority
of its actors. The membership has been put into effect by keeping the
constitutional changes to a minimum. The act of joining the Union was
not at a general level – for instance in the form of a transfer of powers,
written into the Finnish Constitution. EU membership did result in a
number of constitutional amendments, mainly concerning the division of
powers between the different political organs. These amendments had
largely been put into effect in connection with Finnish European
Economic Area (EEA) membership in 1992. The main reason for the
constitutional amendments can be found in the extensive powers that the
president has in foreign policy. According to Section 33 of the Finnish
Constitution Act (Form of Government Act): ‘the relations of Finland
with foreign powers shall be decided by the President, but treaties with
foreign powers must be approved by the Parliament insofar as they
contain provisions which pertain to legislation or which according to the
Constitution otherwise require the consent of the Parliament’. In connec-
tion with the EEA membership, a specific Section (33a) was added to the
main Section in order to balance the powers of the President and the
Council of State in EEA matters, and to prevent the powers that by defi-
nition belonged to the sphere of domestic policy from being transferred to
the president.2 The ‘Council of State’ is the term used in Finland when the
legal–institutional framework of the government is referred to. In certain
contexts the term ‘Council of State’ even involves the president. The
importance of the amendment increased when Finland joined the Union.
The other amendment made to the constitution related to the EEA
membership, and gaining more importance as Finland joined the Union,
purported to confirm the parliament’s participation in the national prepa-
ration of EU issues as well as its right to the necessary information. There
have also been some institutional changes. The Grand Committee, whose
role was to check the legislative process, has now been given a new task
as a committee of EU affairs. The prime minister was given the obligation
to inform the parliamentary committees of issues that would be handled
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in the European Council and the Council of State was given the obligation
to forward to the parliament propositions to those legal acts. Approval
rests with the parliament.
Separate from these EU amendments, there has been a comprehensive
modification of the Finnish Constitution, which will result in a new
Constitution which entered into force in the year 2000.3 The amendments
made in this new Constitution to the sections related to the Union do
not directly originate in membership itself but are rather a reflection of
the political aspirations to curtail presidential powers. In the new
Constitution, the Council of State is for the first time placed on par with
the president regarding foreign policy matters, making it a key actor in EU
policy.4 The Council of State leads the preparations of all EU issues, even
those of the CFSP, and is responsible for keeping the parliament informed.
Despite the majority of the eight new chapters of the Constitution being
related to EU issues (under the title of ‘International Relations’), there is
a specific section governing the transfer of sovereignty, which is not
included. The general articles of the new Constitution, however, reflect
the change that has taken place in Finland’s international commitments by
mentioning international co-operation and giving peace, human rights
and the development of society as its objectives.
The political priorities of membership
The Finnish membership in the Union was negotiated by a government led
by the agrarian Centre Party and farming and farmers’ unions and inter-
est groups. Consequently, this group came to dominate the official agenda
when Finland entered the Union. In May 1995, a new government was
built on the results of the parliamentary elections which had been won by
the Social Democrats. The new ‘Rainbow Government’ consisted of repre-
sentatives of all the major parties with the exception of the Centre Party.
The government that sat thorough the entire legislative period became
famous for its pro-European policy. Unemployment was the key issue that
dominated the domestic EU agenda and this issue was emphasised at the
IGC.5 The Finnish government consequently promoted a firmer EU posi-
tion in the fight against unemployment. In the IGC, the government
emphasised other policy areas with a clear connection to Nordic values
such as openness and transparency in EU decision-making, the environ-
ment, equality between the sexes, and social policy. Institutional
questions have been adopted with a more cautious attitude, however. In
addition to these general political goals, the Finnish government has taken
pains to launch a political programme called ‘The Northern Dimension’
in the Union. The essence of the programme was defined as emphasising
the positive interdependence of the Union, Russia and the Baltic Sea
region. The emphasis of the programme is on sectors such as energy
networks, trade and environmental protection. 
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The parliamentary elections of March 1999 gave a clear vote of confi-
dence to the ‘Rainbow Government’ which, consequently, continued the
old party political composition into a new electoral period. There was a
reluctance to make far-reaching amendments to the government. The new
government also had major challenges to face in its EU policy. Finland’s
first presidency of the Union commenced in July 1999 and the agenda was
expected to be filled with topics from EU enlargement and the implemen-
tation of the Amsterdam Treaty to the preparation of a common defence
and institutional reform.
The national policy-cycle: towards a new decentralisation of decision-
making
The starting point for the national division of labour in EU matters is
the division of powers between the President and the Council of State
(Figure 6.1). This is reflective of the entire political system. The clarifi-
cation of this relationship has taken place in favour of the Council of
State, implying a reinforcement of the role of the prime minister as the
leading actor of Finnish EU policy. As the leader of the general foreign
policy the president, however, leads the Finnish CFSP participation.
Under the new Constitution, this role will take place in co-operation
with the Council of State. The leadership of Finnish foreign policy in
general will take place in co-operation with the Council of State, as far
as the Constitution is concerned. In the Finnish case the main responsi-
bility for the control of EU issues and the preparation of the Finnish
position belongs to the competent ministries.6 The relevant ministry
examines an issue as far as its political, economic and legal aspects are
concerned and formulates the Finnish position. The ministries are
assisted by a system of sections that refer to different types of working
groups with specific areas and issues to cover. These consist of both
government officials and representatives of interest organisations.
According to a 1998 Finnish study, the key position of ministries and
their officials mirrors the practical exercise of powers and influence in
the domestic EU process.7 Interministerial contacts and negotiations
seem to be another important channel as far as influence on EU issues
is concerned. In addition to the increasing number of international tasks
in the ministries, Finnish EU membership has led to the establishment of
new co-ordinating bodies in the government. At the lower level there is
the Committee for EU Affairs in which the ministries as well as the pres-
ident’s office, the Bank of Finland and the Chancellor of Justice are
represented. The Committee deals with issues in which agreement has
not been reached in the sections and with issues that demand more
wide-ranging decisions. If there is a difference of opinion regarding the
Finnish position in the Committee of EU Affairs the matter can be
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brought to the leading co-ordinating organ, that is, to the Cabinet
European Union Committee dealing with general EU issues of great
importance. The Cabinet Committee is led by the prime minister and all
the government parties are represented in it. Owing to the division of
powers between the Council of State and the president, the issues related
to the CFSP are discussed in another Cabinet Committe – in the Cabinet
Committee of Foreign and Security Policy that is led by the president. 
There was even a new administrative unit established in 1994 to
administrate the co-ordinating activities and to function as an adminis-
trative secretariat for the two committees. This unit, the EU Secretariat, is
located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as the co-ordinating activ-
ities in general are firmly connected with the Prime Minister’s Office
efforts have been taken to move the EU Secretariat there.8 A small unit of
EU affairs was established in the Prime Minister’s Office in 1996. Its main
task is to co-ordinate preparations connected with the Finnish EU
Presidency. The official Finnish contact to Brussels, the Permanent
Representation of Finland in the Union, is the organ that takes the official
Finnish position to the EU political machinery. It represents Finland in all
EU institutions and supplies information on the activities of the Union to
the Finnish administration. It is a large representation with a staff consist-
ing of eighty officials representing different ministries and other
governmental bodies. The role of the Permanent Representation has been
considered mainly administrative and intermediary and its impact on the
substance of the Finnish policy is secondary.9
At the level of the Finnish central administration, membership in the
Union has implied a remarkable challenge to the traditional position of
the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the key unit in the administra-
tion of international relations. Its role used to be emphasised by the
presidential leadership of Finnish foreign policy and by the direct link that
used to be established between the Foreign Ministry and the president in
the conduct of foreign affairs. At the beginning of Finnish EU member-
ship, the Foreign Ministry had a good grip on its old position owing to the
co-ordinating functions it was given in the national EU process. Now, this
position is becoming increasingly challenged as it seems to be gradually
moving towards the prime minister and his office.
In general, differences in decision-making procedures at the EU level
are not taken into account in any systematic way in the national political
machinery. The division of EU matters into first and second pillar issues,
however, is reflected in the preparation and decision-making in the
government as well as in the parliament. In the parliament, the Grand
Committee prepares all the other EU issues with the exception of second
pillar issues, which are handled in the Foreign Affairs Committee.
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The parliament as an active actor in the national EU process
In the Finnish case the parliament can be treated as an active participant
in the formulation of Finnish EU policy. Its role is based upon the consti-
tutional amendments connected with Finnish EU membership and is
carried out mainly in the form of committee activity. The role of the
parliament was one of the major concerns related to the Finnish political
system immediately before membership – a fact which still mirrors
a certain awareness of the organisation concerning its own position. The
system of parliamentary participation that was created in the Finnish
EU system is similar to the Danish case with the exception that Finland’s
system is less centralised to one parliamentary committee. In the Finnish
case almost all parliamentary committees are involved in the handling of
EU issues.
The constitutional base for the Parliament’s participation in EU issues
can be found in Section 33 of the Finnish Constitution Act (Form of
Government Act), according to which ‘the relations of Finland with
foreign powers shall be decided by the President, but treaties with foreign
powers must be approved by the Parliament insofar as they contain provi-
sions which pertain to legislation or which according to the Constitution
otherwise require the consent of the Parliament’. When Finland joined the
EEA system, a new sub-section (33a) was added to the main paragraph
according to which ‘The Parliament shall participate in the approval of
those decisions taken by international organs which according to the
Constitution require the consent of the Parliament in the manner stipu-
lated by the Parliament Act. The Finnish Parliament shall, consequently,
participate in the approval of those decisions taken in the EU which,
according to an established interpretation of the constitution, would
belong to its sphere of competences.’ Provisions concerning the details are
included in the Parliamentary Act (Section 54). The government must
forward to the Speaker any proposals within the EU organs which the
government has notice of and which belong to the parliament’s compe-
tence. These matters are called ‘U matters’, referring to the obligatory
character of the parliamentary approval. Most ‘U matters’ consist of
Commission proposals for Council regulations or directives. Other cate-
gories are proposals for agreements between the European Community
and third parties and a group of miscellaneous texts including, for
instance, the draft budget prepared by the Commission.10
The Speaker shall submit such a matter to the Grand Committee and to
any competent specialised committee for analysis and opinion. This takes
place in the form of a communication, which also includes a tentative
position of the government. The matter is usually handled first in a
specialised committee, which gives its opinion to the Grand Committee.
On this basis, the Grand Committee then expresses the view of the Finnish
parliament.11
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The position taken by the Grand Committee must be seen to imply a
strong political commitment to the government which, in an overwhelm-
ing majority of cases, has not deviated from it. It must, however, be taken
into account that the government’s proposals, when submitted to the
parliament, have the support of a parliamentary majority. In this case, the
position of the parliament completes rather than modifies them.12
According to another paragraph (e) in Section 54 of the Parliament Act,
the Grand Committee shall receive information and documentation from
the government on any EU matter the Grand Committee requests, or the
government itself deems necessary. There is still a particular obligation
concerning information dealing with meetings of the European Council
and meetings taking the form of an IGC purporting to amend the consti-
tutive treaties of the Union. Concerning these meetings, their agenda,
discussions and outcome, it is the prime minister that is obliged to inform
the Grand Committee.
The constitutional obligation to inform the Grand Committee implies
in practice that the Committee is given information about every Council
meeting before and after the meeting. The Committee has a hearing with
the competent ministers every Friday, the task being to hear ministers’
statements regarding the issues to be decided at the forthcoming week’s
meetings of the Council. After these meetings, the Grand Committee is
provided with a report of them and their results. As was already
mentioned, the Grand Committee may even request information on the
matters being prepared within the Union or the government may provide
information of this kind on its own initiative. These matters are referred
to as ‘E matters’ in which parliamentary approval is not obligatory. The
‘E matters’ have proved to be a useful instrument in relations between the
government and the parliament, reflected among other things in their
increasing number. As far as their substance is concerned, the ‘E matters’
are usually related to the pre-initiative phase of Community legislative
procedure or to issues of large political importance in the Union.
The parliamentary activity in EU matters takes the normal forms of
questions, interpellations, notices and reports. The number of EU-related
notices and interpellations, resulting in a vote concerning the confidence
of the government has, however, not been very remarkable. Until June
1999, only two interpellations had been made relating to EU matters and
one EU-related notice (dealing with the Finnish participation in the Euro
area) given by the government. A report given by the government to the
parliament has become a common instrument when the government has
been willing to leave its position on a larger EU matter to be discussed by
the parliament. A report was given on the Finnish position in the 1996
IGC on EMU and on Finland and the future of Europe. Contacts between
the national parliament and the EP seem to be quite modestly institution-
alised in the Finnish case. The parliament is represented in COSAC by a
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delegation nominated by the Grand Committee. The parliament has also
employed a special representative in Brussels. He is accredited through the
Finnish mission in Brussels although his office is situated in the EP.13 The
secretariats of the Grand Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and
the special representative together form the Secretariat for EU affairs of
the Finnish parliament. The Secretariat is charged with co-ordinating the
relationship between the parliament and the EU organs. Relations
between national members of the EP and the national parliament could
provide an effective link between these two organisations, but in the
Finnish case, several problems have been noted in this linkage. The
Parliament’s relations with the Finnish MEPs are almost entirely carried
out through parties and their parliamentary groups, implying that the
MEPs do not have any established contacts to parliamentary commit-
tees.14 Even at the party level, contacts to their own representatives in the
EP seem to be mostly arbitrary. In small parties co-operation between
party organs and MEPs appears to be more systematic than in larger
parties that do not seem to be so dependent upon this channel of infor-
mation and impact.
Other actors: interest groups and regions 
In the course of the early years of Finnish EU membership, a majority of
social and political actors outside the parliamentary system began to
engage, in one way or another, in EU decision-making. Their channels of
influence went, however, more often directly to Brussels than to the
national system of EU decision-making. Actors from the economic sector
adapted themselves most smoothly to the European system owing to their
existing contacts and networks. For the time being, many new actors are
establishing their positions at the European level. The largest Finnish
interest organisations are members of their European umbrella organisa-
tions and a great number of actors, from cities and provinces to citizen
associations, have established their offices in Brussels. Many actors have
even co-ordinated their representation at the European level.
Of the largest Finnish interest organisations, the Confederation of
Finnish Industry and Employers, which represents about 5,600 companies
in the field of manufacturing, construction, transport and other service
sectors related to industry, is a member of the Union of Industrialists of
the European Community (UNICE) and is also represented in ECOSOC.
The three largest trade unions in Finland, The Central Organisation of
Finnish Trade Unions, The Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees
and The Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals in Finland
are all members of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and
have established a common lobby in Brussels in order to promote the
interests of Finnish wage-earners. The organisation representing the third
main interest sector of the Finnish society, The Central Union of
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Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners, is a member of the Committee
of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Community
(COPA). It is even one of the three Finnish organisations represented in
the ‘Various Interests Group’ (III) of ECOSOC.15 In the political field
membership in the Union seems to have brought about a certain division
between ‘EU elites’ and others. A great majority of the active members of
the Finnish political parties, for instance, neither engage themselves in EU
matters nor have any possibility of following the information flow coming
from EU institutions. In spite of the fact that the international connections
of the Finnish parties are constantly increasing, most parties have joined
their umbrella parties or party federations at the European level.16 Their
international offices, or staff engaged in international activities, are still
very modest. The parties’ representations in the Finnish parliament have
the best access to EU information – a situation which is largely based
upon the practice of dividing the parliamentary preparation of EU issues
between different specialised committees. Owing to its key position as far
as contacts with the government are concerned, the Grand Committee has
become somewhat of a parliamentary elite reflecting itself in its member
structure.17 The Finnish regions were not very well prepared to promote
their own interests in the Union. One reason for this was that the division
of Finland into administrative regions and provinces did not follow the
more natural division of the country into cultural or economic regions.
Membership in the Union has, therefore, emphasised other regional
communities than those brought about by the state. Finland participates
in the Union’s regional policy in the form of nineteen regional councils
that are not identical with state provinces. These regional councils func-
tion as promoters of regional interests with respect to the Union and are
responsible for the implementation of its regional programmes. 
At the lower regional level there is still another interest organisation
representing the Finnish cities and municipalities. The Association of
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities functions as their interest and
service organisation in relations with the Union and provides the secre-
tariat for the Finnish delegation in the CoR. The regional dimension is one
of those sectors of Finnish political life that is going through vast changes
in part owing to Finnish EU membership. Regional actors are gradually
liberating themselves from the strongly centralised state system and are
becoming increasingly independent actors with their own interests and
identities. 
Finally, the role of the Finnish media needs to be briefly discussed as an
actor in Finnish EU politics. In general, the Finnish media has adopted a
clearly positive attitude towards the project of European integration.18
The most important daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, has been the
most explicit with its attitude by declaring openly a positive stand
towards the issue. This importance of this attitude is further emphasised
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when one takes into account the enormous educating and socialising
task which the media had during the early years of Finnish membership.
The media was responsible for providing ordinary people, usually
unversed in the forms and details of integration, with a level of back-
ground knowledge in EU affairs. This function reflected itself in a series
of textbook-style articles or programmes related to various aspects of the
EU system.
Control of EU decisions
Within the Finnish judicial system (which lacks a Constitutional Court),
it is the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament of Finland that has
the main responsibility for constitutional control over legal acts. In this
connection, another legislative peculiarity concerning the Constitution
must be noted, namely the possibility for a law to deviate from the
Constitution without any explicit amendments being required.19 Laws
that deviate from the Constitution must, however, be predetermined
through the same process as explicit amendments to the Constitution. The
possibility to make deviations from the constitution without amending its
text increases the flexibility of the Finnish constitution vis-à-vis interna-
tional obligations in particular. It has also made the constitutional control
connected with participation in European integration much easier. During
the early years of Finnish membership the main task of the Constitutional
Committee in this respect (that is, the evaluation of the compatibility of
the different EU norms and treaties with the Finnish Constitution) was of
a mostly technical character. Another important task which it adopted,
and which evoked more political controversy, was linked with the division
of political powers in Finland and to the implications of participation in
European integration.
In the task of controlling the application of EU legislation, the Finnish
Courts have not frequently requested a preliminary ruling to be given
from the ECJ. By the end of 1998 the number of rulings requested under
Article 234 (ex Article 177) was eleven. Of these, two had been requested
by the Supreme Administrative Court and nine by other courts and
tribunals.20 The first case, in which a ruling was requested, dealt with the
compatibility with Community law of the Finnish energy tax system.
According to the claimant, the large Finnish energy company
Outokumpu, the tax imposed on imported electricity must be treated as a
discriminating tax prohibited by Article 90 (ex Article 95) ECT.21
By the end of 1997 Finland had appeared neither as a claimant nor as
a defendant in the ECJ. The number of control procedures based upon
Article 226 (ex Article 169) EC that the Commission had launched against
Finland has increased year by year, as has the number of reasoned opin-
ions given by the Commission.22 In April 1998 the Commission for the
first time decided to bring Finland to the ECJ in a case linked with Natura
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2000, according to the Commission Finland having not delivered a
complete list of areas to join the Natura 2000 network.
Conclusion: facing challenges owing to Europeanisation
In the Finnish case it is not yet possible to make a long-term assessment
of how the process towards the Union has developed and what the role of
the Maastricht Treaty was in this development. It is natural that irrespec-
tive of the indicators used, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the political system
and the administration should show a more or less linear growth since
Finland became a Member State.
During the first years of membership the proper political and adminis-
trative machinery was created in Finland for the national handling and
co-ordination of EU issues. The key political concerns of this process were
to safeguard the role of the parliament in EU decision-making and to
guarantee the effective co-ordination of the actors participating in the
preparation and decision-making of EU issues at the national level. The
‘Europeanisation’ of the Finnish political system has reinforced the polit-
ical pressures towards a change in the division of powers at the highest
political level. The prime minister, as the leader of Finnish EU policy, was
given a new role in Finnish foreign policy on a par with the president.
The ‘Europeanisation’ of administration and the huge increase in its
international tasks is reflected in an increase of staff and the establishment
of new administrative organs. This process has, somewhat surprisingly,
been far more modest as far as other social and political actors are
concerned. Interest organisations, in general, have not maintained their
former positions in the political and legislative process during the EU era;
even political parties still have a lot of work to do in the development of
their European representations and networks. Even if the referendum held
in Finland 1994 on EU membership clearly divided the Finns into two
groups, the division did not constitute a permanent new dividing line in
Finnish politics. A clear consensus prevails among the parties and other
political elites about the advantages of integration. The political
campaigns preceding the parliamentary elections of March 1999 indicated
that the political preparedness to deal with European themes was still in
its infancy. In the second parliamentary elections after Finland joined the
Union, national themes were still prevalent.
Perspectives for the future
The Finnish road to the ever-deepening union appears to be open – at least
it is not burdened with too many domestic obstacles. The general politi-
cal opinion in Finland is positive towards the deepening of European
integration. It is openly admitted that the national adjustment to integra-
tion has demanded a lot of sacrifices, for instance, in terms of reductions
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made in the welfare state system or in supports given to Finnish farmers.
However, it is usually admitted that it remains questionable to what
extent these changes are a pure result of EU membership and to what
extent they would have had to be effected irrespective of it. Finland’s
membership in the Union is an expression of the country’s new political
orientation, distancing itself from its Cold War heritage. This provides the
framework in which its future political preparedness must be assessed.
The political debates around EMU and the 1996 IGC reveal the key
elements of the Finnish preparedness for integration. From the beginning
of its period in office, the Social Democrat-led Finnish government
adopted a positive attitude towards the idea of Finland joining the EMU
in the first round. From this stage until the summer of 1997, a majority of
Finns were against this idea.23 In spite of this critical opinion among the
Finnish people culminating in heavy criticism among the supporters of
particular political parties like the Centre Party, the Greens and the Left
Wing Alliance, not one of the political parties was prepared to adopt a
policy line that would have stood out against the government’s position.24
The EMU case reflected quite clearly the general political atmosphere in
Finland vis-à-vis European integration. There are political controversies
about details but no political will to question the general positive policy
adopted towards the Union in general, and the deepening of it in particu-
lar. As the political debate around the 1996 IGC revealed, the Finns seem
to be less prepared to go ahead with institutional changes in the Union
than with other forms of deepening. The government’s emphasis was
clearly on the citizen issue; Finland supported the Union more strongly in
issues such as the fight against unemployment and the promotion of
equality between the sexes.25 The openness and transparency of the Union
was another important topic that was given much attention during the
IGC. These were, in general, concerns that did not evoke much domestic
political controversy. The main party in the opposition, the Centre Party,
which takes a more reserved attitude towards integration, criticised the
government for its unconditional commitment to the deepening of inte-
gration, yet this criticism was mainly directed at other issues than the
citizen dimension.
Another issue where the government has taken a very positive stand,
and also one of its key concerns in the IGC, relates to the development of
the CFSP. In the IGC the Finnish government was in favour of increasing
majority decisions in the CFSP and of the conferral of legal subjectivity to
the Union. The Finnish–Swedish initiative concerning the reinforcement
of the Union’s capacity for crisis management was one of the highlights of
the domestic debate. The domestic opposition becomes more clear-cut
when it comes to second pillar questions. The issue that is most at stake
is the future of Finnish military non-alignment. The Centre Party and the
Greens have adopted a policy according to which decisions related to
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national security should be kept on a much more national basis than the
government is willing to do.
The most critical question of Finnish EU policy in the IGC, and also
afterwards, seems to be connected with the institutional amendments to
the Union. In its position in the IGC, the government supported an insti-
tutional status quo – being thus unwilling to change either the present
division of powers between the institutions nor the structure and decision-
making procedures in them. It appears evident that irrespective of the
Finnish preparedness to deepen integration, the maintenance of a clear
level of intergovernmentalism in the EU’s decision-making still forms one
of the key Finnish goals. Clear amendments, for instance, in the position
of the EP or in the direction of strengthening the second pillar, would be
likely to raise heavy opposition throughout the Finnish political field.
Notes
1 The Finnish policy was from the beginning of its EU membership firmly
oriented towards taking the country to the third phase of the EMU among
the first tranche of countries. This took place while Sweden and Denmark
stayed outside. In the issue of EU enlargement, Finland supported the
Commission’s position according to which negotiations should begin with
six applicants while Sweden and Denmark raised a counter-proposition
about starting negotiations with all of the applicants.
2 According to the new Sub-section 33§a ‘The Parliament shall participate in
the approval of those decisions taken by international organs which accord-
ing to the Constitution require the consent of the Parliament in the manner
stipulated by the Parliament Act. The Council of State shall decide on the
approval and implementation of the decisions covered by Subsection 1 if the
decision does not require the Parliament’s approval and does not because of
its substance necessitate than an order is issued.’
3 The purpose of this process has been to unite the present four separate consti-
tutional acts into one unitary Constitution, the text of which will be
modernised. There was, however, some other political intent connected with
the modification process, part of which was to cut down presidential powers.
4 The new Section 93, replacing the old Section 33, states that: ‘Finnish foreign
policy is led by the President in co-operation with the Council of State.’
5 See e.g. Finland’s point of departure and objectives in the Union’s 1996 IGC.
A Report given to the Parliament by the Council of State, 27 February 1996.
6 See Risto Lampinen, Petri Uusikylä and Olli Rehn (eds), EU-asioiden valmis-
telu Suomessa (Helsinki: Eduskunnan kanslian julkaisu 7/1998), p. 26.
7 Ibid. pp. 118–119.
8 The goal of transferring the EU Secretariat to the Prime Minister’s Office was
even written into the programme of the government that entered into office
in April 1999. The change was put into effect immediately after the Finnish
EU Presidency in 2000.
9 See Lampinen et al., 1998, op. cit., p. 119.
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10 See Niilo Jääskinen and Tiina Kivisaari, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of European
Union Affairs in Finland’, in: Matti Wiberg (ed.), Trying to Make Democracy
Work. The Nordic Parliaments and the European Union (Stockholm: The
Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and Gidlunds Förlag, 1997), pp.
35–36. 
11 Ibid., p. 34.
12 See Lampinen et al., 1998, op. cit., p. 125.
13 See Jääskinen and Kivisaari, 1997, op. cit., p. 46.
14 See Mari Linnapuomi, ‘Täällä Strasbourg, kuuleeko Helsinki? Suomalaiset
europarlamentaarikot eurooppalaisen ja kansallisen tason yhteensovittajina’,
in: Tuomo Martikainen and Kyösti Pekonen (eds), Eurovaalit Suomessa
1996 (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science, Acta
Politica, No. 10), pp. 247–257.
15 The other two being The Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland and The
Federation of Finnish Enterprises.
16 The Finnish Social Democrat Party joined the Party of European Socialists in
1992; The (Conservative) National Coalition Party joined the European
People’s Party in 1995; The (Agrarian) Centre Party and The Swedish
People’s Party joined The European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party in
1995, The Green League joined the European Federation of Green Parties in
1993 and the Left Wing Alliance joined the New European Left Forum in
1991.
17 The Grand Committee includes the chairperson, or the vice-chairperson, of
several specialised committees.
18 The positive attitude of Finnish journalists towards European integration has
been confirmed in an academic dissertation (Tuomo Mörä, ‘EU-journalismin
anatomia. Media-sisältöjä muokanneet tekijät ennen kansanäänestystä
1994’, Helsingin yliopisto, Viestinnän laitoksen julkaisuja 1A/2/1999).
19 Finland has had four separate constitutions which were unified into the new
Finnish Constitution in the constitutional amendment entering into force in
March, 2000. 
20 See Statistics of the ECJ, http://curia.eu.int/en/stat.
21 Issues related to the ECJ and the control processes launched by the
Commission against Finland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Department,
the ECJ Unit, 1995–30 June 1998.
22 The number of control procedures increased from five in 1996 to eighteen in
1997. The number of reasoned opinions was eight in 1997.
23 In 1996, only 23 per cent of the Finns were in favour of a Finnish partici-
pation in EMU whereas 45 per cent were against this policy. A fifty–
fifty situation between the two opinions was achieved in the summer
1997 (the opinion polls were conducted by Eurooppalainen Suomi
www.eurooppalainensuomi.fi).
24 The Green Party did not take a stand on the EMU question at the party level,
leaving the decision to its individual members. The Centre Party and the Left
Wing Alliance demanded a referendum on the issue, but took a positive stand
at the party level.
25 See Finland’s points of departure and objectives at the 1996 IGC; Report to
the Parliament by the Council of State, 27 February 1996.
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7 Nikos Frangakis and Antonios D. Papayannides
Greece: a never-ending story of mutual
attraction and estrangement
Introduction: European and Greek identity: an ambivalent relationship
and a gateway to modernity
When dealing with Greek attitudes towards the process of European inte-
gration, one should still bear in mind that in the 1970s and part of the
1980s, Euroscepticism – or even plain anti-European feelings – reigned in
a large segment of both the elites and public opinion at large. Communists
and radical Socialists depicted European integration as a subjugation
mechanism mainly serving US interests – ‘the EEC and NATO are the
same barracks’, to translate freely a slogan of that times. Given that after
the fall of the Colonels’ regime in the mid-1970s, there was important
anti-American sentiment in Greece, Europe was consequently tainted by
the same negative feelings. Moreover, power in the European
Communities was perceived as residing in an excluding ‘directorate’ that
was to be impervious to the needs of a small country like Greece.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Conservative/Nea Dimocratia
party of Costas Karamanlis, which had the initiative for Greek accession,
openly considered integration into the Community as proof that Greece
‘belongs to the West’. It was only when the ruling Socialist/PASOK party
progressively adopted a pro-European stance – after initiating a much-
discussed renegotiation of Greek accession – that the present situation of
almost Euroenthusiasm surfaced in Greece. At the end of the 1990s, the
Union was seen in Greece1 as a gateway to modernity, as a source of
financial assistance (mainly for infrastructure-building) and as a stabilis-
ing force in foreign policy.2
Today, only the ‘orthodox’ Communist Party is openly anti-Union,
while a hard-line splinter of the Socialists (DIKKI) also has clearly nega-
tive reflexes. Yet these parties are small (in parliamentary terms, the two
accumulate seventeen seats out of a total of 300). There is some uneasi-
ness towards European integration from the Orthodox Church, mainly
for reasons of cultural/national identity; the Church traditionally has had
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a subdued political role, but it has begun to adopt a more aggressive
stance. Fluctuating Euroscepticism can also be located in dissenting
factions of the ruling PASOK party. Under the present leadership of
Costas Simitis, the party has a resolutely pro-European official position.
Still, the dual shock from the Ocalan affair (the Kurdish leader who had
earlier sought asylum in Italy, then was offered sanctuary in Greece, was
granted refuge to the Greek embassy in Kenya only to be abducted by
Turkish security forces when leaving the embassy) and from the far more
important Kosovo crisis (where Greece sided quite reluctantly with
NATO, while public opinion was vehemently opposed to NATO/Western
intervention against Serbia) has brought to the surface the deeper question
whether ‘Greece belongs to the West’. The Union was seen in this context
as absent and ineffectual in crisis, especially in matters important to
Greece.
Among economic elites one finds clear pro-EU reflexes.3 Intellectual/
political elites are less reliable in their European attachment, notwith-
standing the fact that it was among academics that much of the early
support for European integration was mustered in the early years of
Euroscepticism. Foreign policy considerations and the social impact of the
protracted stabilisation policies needed to open the way to Euro partici-
pation are the main sources of elite scepticism. The press and electronic
media provide mainly pro-European coverage. Greek participation in the
third stage of EMU in 2001 was generally touted as the paramount policy
objective.
Constitutional changes and political adaptations to accommodate the
EU legal system
The ratification of the Treaty of Accession of Greece to the (then)
European Communities was based on Article 28 §3 of the Greek
Constitution passed by a vote of simple majority in Parliament. There was
debate over ratification, with arguments that a three-fifths majority or
even a constitutional referendum was needed to operate the transfer of
sovereignty that accession entailed. This debate was sidetracked when in
1981 PASOK gained government and was keen not to jeopardise Greek
accession. Future calls for referendum ratification of the SEA, the
Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty were ignored at minimal
political cost.4
In the first phases of Greek participation, there was some scepticism
concerning the eventuality of a federal structure of Europe and support
for a more intergovernmental approach to European integration. There
was a preference for unanimous voting and/or veto power for a wide
range of matters considered of importance to national interests.
Nonetheless, since the end of the 1980s, public support for federal-type
unification grew. During the negotiation and ratification of the
Greece 167
2444Ch7  3/12/02  2:03 pm  Page 167
Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties, both the government and the
opposition were in favour of increased majority voting, of wider powers
to the Commission and a more central role for the EP.5 Paradoxically this
stance has not succeeded in terms of foreign policy issues. EU relations
with FYROM/Macedonia or with Turkey have hardened Greek support
for the veto mechanism and/or unanimity voting in sensitive issues.
European matters did not play a key (nor even an important) role in the
successive parliamentary elections (1981, 1985 or the triple elections of
1989–90). By the time of the 1993 and the 1996 elections an overall
consensus towards Europe had been achieved among the largest parties,
so any discussion of European matters at election time is now perfunctory.
It could be said that even the European elections of 1984, 1989 and 1994
had scant ‘European’ interest and served mainly as an arena for contest-
ing national issues and rivalries. 
Central policy issues and the EU dimension: reflexes and memories carry
long shadows
Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, the Greek political system has had to
deal with the twin problems of foreign policy and economic stabilisation.
Foreign policy issues have been associated with the post-Cold War recast-
ing of Balkan relationships – ominously enough, also of some redrawing
of borders – and with the residual enmity with neighbouring Turkey
which culminated in the Imia islets incident of early 1996 and remains
entangled with the long-simmering Cyprus issue. The belated stabilisation
of the economy, as well as efforts to meet convergence criteria that would
keep Greek eligible for Euro accession gained importance in public
consciousness. The government would like to wish foreign policy issues
away, but to the public opinion ‘national issues’ (as they are characteris-
tically termed) remain a major concern. Steering the Greek economy
towards the Union has been a major political gamble for the Simitis
government; the fact that foreign policy issues often involve the Union in
what is considered a ‘Balkan mess’ causes further complications, distract-
ing public opinion from Euro objectives.
Having to face acute national phobias and a lack of direction, the
government and a large segment of the press explained at great length that
the only foreign policy challenge that really mattered for Greece was
participation in the third stage of EMU. Once Greece is fully immersed in
European integration, the threats and insecurities of the Balkans and the
East Mediterranean were expected to dissipate.6 The far more important
disruption brought about by the Kosovo crisis deepened the drift between
Greek public opinion and European priorities; while official policy found
itself at odds with popular feeling, an identity crisis ensued, influencing
the image of Europe in public opinion.
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The national policy-cycle: from a closed-circuit business to an open
system
Greece is and remains a centralised state, with the government assuming
the focal role and parliament used as a means to legitimate choices already
made (Figure 7.1). Local or regional government has had little or no
worthwhile participation in EC matters. Recent institutional changes in
Greece may alter the balance, but until now such tiers of government
intervene only in the implementation of (EU-financed) infrastructure-
building. This activity is delegated (at EU insistence) by central
government to operational mechanisms with local and regional participa-
tion along with EU control. 
The real ‘beneficiaries’ of change brought about in Greek decision-
making processes by EU participation are administrative bodies involved
in EC/EU affairs. The accession negotiations made little use of the compe-
tence of Greek administration. Adaptation of the Greek legal order to the
‘acquis communautaire’ and the transposition of secondary EU legislation
usually took place by decree. This occurs under a blanket authorisation
voted along with primary law ratification and in the most simplified way
(rubber-stamping the translated EU texts, at times with odd results). The
assertion that administrations have earned powers and influence may
seem odd. However, with the Greek political system’s inability to study
and deal with technical matters, either of an EU or internal nature, and
the parliament’s role of a domesticated follower of the government, the
administration has seen its effective function devalued Throughout the
administration, ‘pockets of competence’ have been formed and have
learned in practice to interact with Brussels. It is through them that the
whole system has contact with EU mechanisms.
Ever since the accession of Greece to the then European Community,
there has been constant talk of establishing a Ministry for EC/EU affairs,
but such projects have never come to fruition. Co-ordinating authority
has been shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for
National Economy (previously the Co-Ordination Ministry), depending
mainly on the personality of ministers. Some co-ordination has at times
been exercised at prime minister level. The most enduring form of co-
ordination has been the operation of interministerial committees. These
meetings have been infrequent at the ministerial level; instead they have
worked at the Secretary-General and/or Ministers’ assistant level.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for National
Economy traditionally have Alternate Ministers or Under-Secretaries in
charge of European Affairs. Ministries with important European connec-
tions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Labour and
Social Services, have in their organisational set-up Secretariats-General
for European Affairs. Most other Ministries have European Affairs
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Directorates, often reporting directly to the Minister or to the Minister’s
Office. In cases less involved with Brussels, European Affairs are dealt
with in the context of International Relations Directorates. Participation
in daily Brussels negotiating routines is through expert missions and by
the attendance of officials detached at the Permanent Representation.
Now numbering some eighty people, the Permanent Representation has a
core of some fifteen diplomats and detached officials of Ministries. There
have been times where co-ordination has been exercised by the Permanent
Representation, to the annoyance of specialised ministries which have
occasionally reacted by a form of passive resistance. An example concerns
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has had the upper hand in co-ordi-
nating EU policy.
Relations with the EP are conducted sporadically and in no specially
organised way, with the exception of foreign policy issues, for which a
sort of permanent briefing is usually in place at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The Greek Parliament’s monitoring of European affairs is
conducted mainly through the Parliamentary Committee on European
Affairs in a rather rudimentary and unsystematic manner. Greek MEPs
are loosely associated with domestic parliamentary activities relating to
the EP’s competences. The Speaker of Greek Parliament has also created
his own mini ‘diplomatic’ service. In recent years close operational links
have been developed at both the Central Bank Governors’ and the
Monetary Committee level, along with increasing priority given by the
government to EMU third-phase participation.7
EU decision-making as a ‘black box’
The decision-making procedures of the Union are considered by the
administration rather in the form of a ‘black box’; the emphasis is on
forming Greek negotiating positions, securing government approval and
adhering to them. Differentiation between the three pillars, as can be
found in practice, flows from the ‘closed circuit’ approach to foreign
affairs (and security) matters and internal security/justice issues. CFSP
matters are considered ‘high politics’ and the ‘domaine réserve’ of a closed
circle of diplomats and advisors of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. An
important priority is to ensure that no positions are taken that may lead
to public or media criticism. Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Public
Order and Justice co-operate – somewhat uneasily – on internal security
matters. However, there exists an ‘inward-looking’ tradition which
prefers adherence to positions rather than negotiation. The more central
role of the EP in first pillar EU matters is gradually increasing. MEPs are
briefed more often, but contacts with them are mainly through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Permanent Representation. Its non-
systematic nature, however, means that the potential of influencing
decisions has not been fully utilised. National MEPs tend to be consulted
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and it has only been in vital foreign affairs issues that there has been any
systematic links to other European MPs.8
The perfunctory function of parliamentary scrutiny
The Greek Parliament has been frustrated by its decreased role in
European policy-making and national law-making. Following the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty, a Standing Committee for European
Affairs was formed, to which a general report on European issues and
government activities has to be submitted annually. Ministers are
expected to brief this Committee and be available for specific parliamen-
tary questions and hearings. After some initial enthusiasm, the level of
effective scrutiny through the Committee for European Affairs has been
rather low and government officials have been reluctant to appear before
it. Hearings have grown to be somewhat of a formality. More important,
high-visibility issues involving European affairs are dealt with in the
normal parliamentary procedure but, again, effective scrutiny is absent.
Debates over European affairs are usually exchanges of established party
polemics. The government treats the parliament’s demands for more
information and involvement in European Affairs in a rather detached
way.9 Senior ministers rarely appear to defend or explain position at
plenary sessions. EU affairs are usually dealt with long after their news-
worthiness has evaporated and debate is usually derailed by general party
bickering. Prime Minister’s question time rarely touches on EU matters,
and when doing so, it does it in a perfunctory way. The opposition also
uses this arena to criticise the government and rarely raise questions of
essence.
The EU as an awakening mechanism for reluctant Greek actors
Local government has been trying to gain direct access to parts of
European decision-making mechanisms. Infrastructure financing and
environment are the main fields of such contacts, but research
programmes, Social Fund actions or cultural programmes have also
proved of growing interest to local authorities. Their efforts to move from
rubber-stamping to a more responsible involvement have not so far
proved very successful, however. Regions in Greece have yet to obtain an
effective political role, so in fact it is first-level local authorities who have
been active in EU matters, depending mainly on local politicians’ degree
of awareness and outward-looking reflexes.
Political parties and the media – who have a tradition of heavily politi-
cised/partisan coverage – have used European affairs as an instrument for
political battle; positions used to be more clear-cut and polemical in the
1980s than is now the case. It is interesting to note that ‘Europe’ or
‘Brussels’ is often considered by opposition parties or the press as a way
to obstruct or influence government decisions. It is even more interesting
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to see how little the intricacies – or indeed the basics – of EU decision-
making are understood. Commission proposals or EP reports are quite
often referred to as ‘Brussels decisions’.10 PASOK’s shift from Euro-nega-
tivism to Euro-enthusiasm has hardly made party debate over ‘Europe’
more technical in nature. The same goes for the main opposition party,
Nea Dimocratia, notwithstanding the fact that it portrays itself as
the party that brought about accession to the Union. Likewise, the
Eurocommunists have taken a less analytical approach to European
affairs.
This reflex of using ‘Brussels’ as an appeals mechanism was character-
istic of interest groups and single economic actors in the first decade of
Greek membership. Successive Greek governments and the administration
did quite a lot of foot-dragging in adapting to Community rules: the
Union was regarded more a ‘complaints-receiving apparatus’. More
recently, interest groups have been establishing more permanent links
with EU institutions. For instance, the Industrialists’ Association, the
Chamber for Commerce and Industry, the Banks’ Association and the
General Confederation of Workers established more or less active Brussels
offices, and they also integrated Brussels positions and priorities into their
way of dealing with policy issues. Both industry and the unions have been
increasingly using Europe not only as a lobbying field but also as a source
for ideology formation. The whole political discourse about competitive-
ness, social consensus-building and participation, and the ‘modernisation’
objective – which has become official ideology – all have been heavily
influenced by interaction with Europe and European institutions. When
the overall assessment of Greece’s participation in the Union is made, this
aspect may appear as the most important one for introducing change in
Greek political life.
Specific businesses, especially those active in high-technology fields or
having undertaken modernisation efforts with the support of EU funding
or through R&D in association with EU programmes, have shown an
increasing willingness to establish their own links with Brussels and/or to
involve themselves in EU-sponsored networks. What began in the 1980s
as an interesting but limited phenomenon has grown to quite appreciable
proportions, working as a mechanism for modernisation. A similar chain
of influence has been working in academia; beginning with science and
technology programmes, wider academic circles have been in contact with
Brussels. Networks have been sponsored or influenced by the Union; this
has provided them not only with financial means, but also with research
links and market outlets. At an introspective time for the Greek higher
education system, this has proved exceptionally important, reciprocated
by increasing involvement of academics in EU-related policy-making.
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The gradual introduction of Community law in the Greek legal system:
the foundations for acceptance of Community law
Community law had a successful and rather rapid introduction in the
Greek legal system. Greek courts, from an early stage in EC membership,
deferred to Community law in conflicting cases.11 Many factors
contributed to this. It was the tradition for Greek lawyers to obtain post-
graduate training abroad, particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Such training is reflected in the reasoning of court decisions but also in the
tendency of lawyers to have recourse to Community law as a supplemen-
tary means of redress. The legal argument may not have always been very
deep, but the use of Community rules is increasingly present. Community
law has been mainly used in areas such as equal pay for men and women
and the application of Regulation 1408/71, as well as the consequences of
Commission agricultural policy decisions (mainly decisions on olive oil,
tomato paste and tobacco subsidies). Subsequently, the inventive use of
company law directives has been instrumental for testing the legality of a
series of de facto nationalisation decisions concerning ‘problem undertak-
ings’. The rules on free establishment have helped to focus on contentious
issues like the right to private higher education and the acquisition of
property in borderline areas or free radio and television services or the
opening of public administration to foreign nationals.12
The courts get to know Community law: a gradual learning process
Even before accession, the Greek Supreme Administrative Court
(Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) largely accepted the mainstream principles of
Community law.13 Soon after accession, the Special Supreme Court
adopted the procedure for the election of Greek MEPs to the European
Parliament (Ruling 10/1982). Thus, Community competence is readily
accepted. When the Greek Supreme Administrative Court had to deal with
an equal pay matter, the help of Article 141 (ex Article 119) of the EEC
Treaty was invoked by members of the Court to supplement arguments of
municipal law.14 Soon thereafter, with its decision on the Banana Case,
the Greek Supreme Administrative Court began to make direct use of
primary Community law, e.g. the Act of Accession.15 The case was
referred to the Full Court by a ruling of the Fourth Chamber; it was heard
twice in Full Court to allow for the argument to be complete. In a case
where the self-executing character of a Commission decision was
discussed, the Greek Supreme Administrative Court referred to the ECJ16
for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 (ex Article 177). The ECJ
replied with the decision of 28 October 1987,17 following which the
Greek Supreme Administrative Court ruled finally on the matter.18 From
then on, both preliminary rulings under Article 234 and application of
Community law have been unimpeded in administrative courts.
The civil courts have been somewhat slower in gaining a sure footing
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in the application of Community law. There were hesitations about
accepting Community law and of adequate argumentation. When cases of
equal pay, or of extradition were heard at the Supreme Civil Court,19 the
relevant provisions were examined almost as curiosity items. However,
Community law is gradually becoming more familiar. 
Both the direct effect and the primacy of Community law has been
accepted in the Greek legal order with little resistance from the Courts,
although the Greek administration is far less enthusiastic in adopting it.
The ‘dialogue’ between the Greek Supreme Administrative Court and the
ECJ in the case of the de facto nationalisation of the Bank for Central
Greece shows the limits of a collaboration between judges that has been
generally satisfactory.20
At the end of the day the comment of Dimitris Evrigenis, one of the
most important figures in giving effective content to Greek accession,
proved prophetic: ‘Good application of EEC rules by the courts means
that we do not hear much about them.’
Positions on institutional change: soft landing or hard decisions? 
The 1996–97 IGC debate did not generate real interest in Greece, either
in public opinion or in the political system. That debate, such as there
was, was about concepts like the democratic deficit of European institu-
tions, majority voting, evolution towards federal forms and so forth,
which at no time managed to secure any operational content in the minds
of those engaged in the debate and were used rather as code-words to
prove involvement.
What was more important was the discussion about guarantees that
European decision-making would not be detrimental to (perceived) vital
national interests. The latter are understood quite widely and have been
present to the minds, even of those who have been enthusiastic support-
ers of QMV and a shift of power to the EP and the Commission. Greece
has also been anxious that EU powers might intrude further in the field of
foreign policy and, increasingly, defence. It has not been made clear how
this extension of EU powers to such sensitive areas could be combined
with full respect for veto rights. 
Finally, there were also hopes of incorporating into the Treaties some
provision for safeguarding the borders of Member States. This point
briefly brought the IGC negotiations to the forefront of Greek public
opinion, but then it was left to its own devices when it was clear that it
would not reach a result deemed satisfactory by a deeply insecure
public.21
The Greek position on EU enlargement
Let us take as a first example the Greek position on enlargement. Viewed
from an EU standpoint, enlargement is an opening of the Union to the
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countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The fundamental position
of Greece has been favourable to enlargement for the unstated (yet easily
perceived, when discussed with policy-makers) reason that enlargement
would bring about a dilution of the centralising model of integration.
Greece is concerned about the EU moulding itself around a Western or
Northern European core. The official Greek position is favourable to a
wider integration model for the Union, even with federal overtones, but
the expectation is that integration might be more diluted rather than
result in a highly structured model. 
There is also an intermediate goal for Greece in the enlargement
process: how to favour (and be seen to favour) its Balkan neighbours for
effective participation and include the Balkan/Southeastern Europe in the
Union architecture. Thus, while accepting de facto the ‘regatta’ approach
to enlargement, Greece is a proponent both of an early conclusion of
enlargement and the widest possible first wave of new entrants.22 After
the Kosovo crisis, Greece has been advocating the inclusion of Balkan
countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania in the enlargement process as
part of the stabilisation of the region.
All such motivations towards enlargement retreat once the main
concern of Greece comes to the fore: the accession negotiations with
Cyprus, and the European future of Turkey, in the background. Greek–
Turkish relations can in no way be considered a matter of routine. For
Greece, the crisis with its neighbour across the Aegean is the matter of
vital national interest. Greece’s opportunity to put across its views to its
European partners or the international community has usually been in the
context of conflagration. However, the policy of improving Greek–
Turkish relations as a precondition of closer Union–Turkey ties has been
a tactical option, similar to the use of the Cyprus candidacy for accession
to obtain some mobility on the Cyprus issue. These tactical moves proved
successful at times during the 1990s, but they have been edging towards
an impasse. The end result of such efforts has seen Greece view enlarge-
ment mainly, if not exclusively, as a chessboard where it can carry on its
own game. Greece has increasingly stated that it will block enlargement
unless Cyprus’ accession is left to proceed unhindered. 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden have voiced
concerns about Cyprus joining the Union. This, along with the suggestion
that accession negotiations with Cyprus be suspended pending a resolu-
tion of the issue, has only recently been given serious attention in Greek
public policy. The expectation is that Greece’s attitude towards Turkish
and Cypriot accession will be biased. 
Agenda 2000: an old game played on a new field
The negotiations over Agenda 2000 offer another example of how
Greece views participation in the Union. While Agenda 2000 was a way
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of simultaneously approaching the impact of enlargement, the own-
resources challenge, CAP reform and the future of the Structural Funds,
the Greek negotiating efforts have concentrated solely on the level of
funds that were to be granted for its furthering structural adjustment.
Greek public opinion has altered over the years, from a position of divi-
sion to enthusiasm. Linked to this is an acute public awareness of the
benefits of membership, which includes EU agricultural and Structural
Funds. The political system has traditionally used this argument so as to
‘easily’ win support for European policies. The more articulate notion of
interest by participation has gained ground only in the last two or three
years, replacing previous notions of a purely financial gain from Europe. 
As Agenda 2000 negotiations developed, the Greek position followed
the Foreign Affairs Ministry recommendation and refrained from actively
participating in the own-resources debate; it focused rather on the spend-
ing side, but again opted for a low-profile approach. Following the
Spanish leadership on safeguarding Structural Funds financing, Greece
put forward the position that any reduction in the 2000–06 package was
inconceivable, being the lowest-income region in the Union, despite its
wish to be part of the third phase of EMU. At the Berlin Summit, Greece
obtained an increase of some 16 per cent (21.75 billion Euros as
compared to 18.75 billion Euros). This compares with a 7.46 per cent
increase for the whole of the Union. At the same time, the renationalisa-
tion of the CAP, which would cost Greece some 200 billion drachma per
year, was avoided and Mediterranean-specific products were spared
radical reform. Despite Greece’s ability to secure a good deal in terms of
EU funding, the CAP appears as a separate issue from enlargement or
wider budget reforms. 
The crux of institutional discussion: is a veto-less future imaginable?
Where decision-making in the Union and the institutional set-up for the
twenty-first century is concerned, the Greek position suffers from a case
of split personality. Having abandoned its earlier Euro-negativism, Greece
has, since the late 1980s, adopted a position favourable to flexible
decision-making in the Union, with QMV, increased EP powers and
Commission initiative and executive authority. At the same time, Greece
has been a proponent of a more active and coherent CFSP, with an active
defence element. The centrepiece of Greece’s negotiating position in the
earlier stages of the Amsterdam Treaty was a CFSP able to allow for the
common protection of external borders. Adherence to European institu-
tional ‘orthodoxy’ and a pro-European integration approach became a
fundamental part of both the opposition and PASOK’s political profile.23
However, Greece’s stance in terms of foreign policy has revealed a
different attitude. EU relations with Turkey, the S-300 issue in Cyprus,
the (forgotten but not totally defused) Macedonian issue, and flare-ups
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over former Yugoslavia, are recurring examples. Although situations such
as the initial Kosovo impasse and the Albanian crisis offered the opportu-
nity for Greece to have a role and use its Balkan experience and advice,
Greece’s actions have reduced any potential influence it might have had. 
Matters of everyday politics have created a deeply rooted mentality
whereby the political system and the foreign policy apparatus resort to a
blocking and/or veto stance. The ease with which the major pronounce-
ment has been made that Greece will block the whole enlargement process
unless Cyprus is allowed to proceed to accession is the most clear-cut
example. NATO’s military intervention in the Kosovo crisis and Greece’s
isolationist stance has renewed the push for unanimity in CFSP matters. 
Conclusion: creeping ‘Europeanisation’ – adjusting to difficult policies
The Greek Permanent Representation staff has fluctuated between eighty
and 120 persons, of which fewer than twenty are diplomats and the rest
are seconded from ministries other than Foreign Affairs. The reason for
such a level of Permanent Representation staff is due to the time needed
for civil servants to fly in from Greece in order to sit on EU Committees
and Working Parties (and to the ‘demand’ for Brussels postings for money
and/or career and/or prestige reasons), more than to any increasing recog-
nition of the role of the Union in Greek administrative mechanisms.
Conversely, civil servants sent to Brussels for Committee and working
group business, as well as those seconded to the Brussels’ institutions,
tend to be fewer than would otherwise be the case. Generally speaking,
‘Europeanised’ segments of the Greek administration grew rapidly during
the first decade of effective membership. This occurred at a time of
Euroscepticism on the part of Greek officials; the civil service kept its
distance European matters. In the following period and until recently,
there has been a de facto segmentation of the civil service, limiting the
number of officials to/of European Affairs. 
If a process of ‘Europeanisation’ has occurred within the Greek admin-
istration, it is because the EU dimension is increasingly taken into account
in legislative and administrative work, almost as a routine matter. Even in
areas where the EU dimension was not at first evident, such as environ-
mental matters, infrastructure or local government, the civil service has
been integrating EU criteria and priorities into its modus operandi.
There exists an ongoing conflict between the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and National Economy on the one hand (sensitive to EU rules) and
Ministries on the other (where national interests persist). This has been
noticeably the case in third pillar issues, where the Interior Ministry and
Public Order Ministry have been reluctant to follow the latest EU trends.
It is also true of the Ministries for Industry, for Public Works, Urbanism
and the Environment, and for Education.
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The convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty for the third
phase of EMU influenced macroeconomic policy-making in Greece,
affecting the decision-making mechanisms of economic policy. Foreign
policy was also influenced by the Europeanisation process, particularly by
the decisions made at Maastricht and Amsterdam. However, the reasons
behind Greece’s call for a more active CFSP after the Amsterdam Treaty
was due more to a ‘new European orientation’ than to the idea that
Greece should project a more European image. Greece advocates a CFSP
that protects the external borders of EU Member States, and an inte-
grated, credible defence. In Greece, decision-making mechanisms as such
have not been so influenced by EU treaty developments, apart from a
willing ‘surrender’ of rule-making responsibilities to Brussels. It is doubt-
ful whether the Kosovo crisis will still affect the balance achieved in
Greece, both at public opinion and elite level, over the Union’s foreign
policy dimension.
What of the question of the ‘fitness’ of Greece as a partner in the
European common venture in view of the foreseeable evolution of the EU
system? Were one to define ‘fitness’ as the capacity of Member States to
adapt to the situation evolving in the wider EU setting by a selective and
quite gradual change that caused minimal disruption to their internal
equilibria and also, as the capacity to pursue an agenda of its own while
not being cut off from the main pack, then Greece appears quite ‘fit’.
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8 Felipe Basabe Lloréns
Spain: the emergence of a new major
actor in the European arena
Introduction: the EU as a major step and catalyst in Spain’s ‘return to
Europe’
Spain’s accession to the EC in 19861 was the result of a long political
process and the fulfilment of a historical aspiration for Spanish society.
For most internal and external observers, Spain’s entry into the
Community constituted the final step of the transition process to democ-
racy.2 Accession to the Community was supported at that time almost
unanimously by all political parties and the different societal actors.3 Such
a broad social and political consensus is to be found at the basis of most
of the features of the Spanish administrative structure and participation
model in the EC/EU decision-making process. Such broad support for the
process of European integration has, however, experienced a relative
decline in recent years owing to political conflicts on issues such as fish-
eries, industrial reconversion, reform of olive oil tariffs, and CMO.4 Also,
the rise of interest groups – still on a minor scale – and dissenting opinion
within some national political parties5 has created a climate more critical
towards further developments in European integration. However, the
perception by the general public and political elites still confirms a very
positive attitude and integrationist approach to European issues. EC
budgetary reform and the future enlargement to the CEE candidate coun-
tries will be a crucial test for such a consensus.6
Spain’s membership of the Union has had a direct impact on the consol-
idation of the democratic functioning of its political system, the
acceleration of economic development and the modernisation of public
administration structures and procedures. The enactment of certain inter-
nal policies – particularly environment, regional development, consumer
protection and immigration policies – has clearly taken place in a synchro-
nised way and as a consequence of the national implementation of the
respective Community policies.
Another direct consequence of Spain’s accession to the Union has been
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the dynamisation of its civil society. This has led to the creation of inter-
est groups, professional associations and co-ordination structures at
national, regional and local level in all economic and activity sectors.7
Spain’s role in the international arena has also been considerably
enhanced, partly owing to its accession to the Union.8 Its traditional
connections with Latin America and the Islamic world have not
decreased, but have altered, mainly because of Spain’s economic develop-
ment and its compliance with EC legislation and the Common
Commercial Policy (CCP). Spain’s gradual incorporation in the Union has
followed parallel trends and patterns to the internal process of territorial
redistribution of power and reorganisation of its administrative structure
and decision-making procedures. This has facilitated adaptation to the
EC/EU decision-making process. In its years of membership, Spain has
also contributed to the process of European integration with important
initiatives and proposals9 and has played an active role. 
The fact that the Spanish political elites, long before the actual negoti-
ations for accession began,10 and the general public – despite its lack of
in-depth knowledge of the actual functioning and repercussions of EC
membership) – shared the same aspirations has clearly facilitated both the
adaptation of internal structures and the adoption of unpopular decisions.
The EC/EU dimension has been present as an important element of all
Spanish major national processes and challenges: economic transforma-
tion, social change and regional conflicts.
Political priorities with regard to EU policy-making
Spain’s political priorities with regard to EU policy-making have evolved
from the first years of membership to the present. The internal process of
modernising the administrative and productive structures and enhancing
the regionally balanced economic development was the focus of attention
prior to the adoption of the TEU. Spain traditionally adopted a very inte-
grationist negotiating stance and tried to cope with the requirements
imposed during the long transitional period leading to its full participa-
tion in all Community policies.11 Obviously, all matters related to the
definition of a regional development policy at the European level, as well
as the subsequent management of the Structural Funds, concentrated
Spain’s political priorities. Agricultural and fisheries issues were also
highly ranked – no doubt owing to the significant and painful restructur-
ing processes undergone by certain Spanish agricultural sectors – within
the general preoccupation for Spain’s full accession to the SEM.
Spain’s political EU agenda has expanded and diversified, for a number
of reasons. The TEU was adopted and implemented. In 1991 and 1993,
the transitional period for a wide range of economic sectors also came to
an end. Finally, the adjustment of the Spanish administration to the
usages and practices of the EC/EU decision-making process can also
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account for the new direction adopted. Agriculture and fisheries12 have
continued to be one of the highest-ranking areas. Regional development
policy,13 particularly the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, and
social and economic cohesion, also come into this area. At the same time,
the whole process leading to the creation of EMU concentrated Spanish
political attention, especially after President Aznar came to power. Spain’s
entry into the third stage of EMU was the focal point of his electoral
programme and the fundamental motivation for his parliamentary
alliance with the nationalist parties.14 Former President González had
justified the extension of his government’s term in office and his refusal to
call for new general elections on the basis of the need for political stabil-
ity to assume the Presidency of the Council of the EU in 1995.
Another aspect which has immediately attracted Spain’s political inter-
est is co-operation in the JHA field, especially those issues related to
immigration, external border control and police co-operation against
terrorism and drug trafficking.15 The Ministries of Home Affairs and
Justice, traditionally resistant to international co-operation, have devel-
oped a new dynamic approach to these issues and even held leading
positions and presented initiatives on a European scale in this field.
Spain’s activity within the CFSP has been less relevant, concentrating its
efforts on relationships with the Mediterranean countries and Latin
America.
Finally, Spain played an important role in both the 1990–91 and
1996–9716 IGCs, where it showed its interest in institutional issues –
owing to its peculiar position within the EC/EU institutional structure –
and those related to the deepening of European citizenship and the fight
against unemployment. Spain has always defended the principle of
subsidiarity17 as a means to improve Community action. It played a major
role in the 1999 negotiations for EC budgetary reform as a leader of the
so called ‘cohesion countries’ as well as the enlargement negotiations with
the CEE candidate countries. Spain has in fact evolved from adapting its
internal structures and interests to the EC/EU decision-making process to
strengthening its negotiating positions with a view to a wider and stronger
defence of its national interests.
Constitutional, institutional and procedural changes 
The ratification and implementation of the TEU resulted in a significant
number of changes of a constitutional, institutional and procedural nature
within the Spanish politico-administrative system.18 However, most of
these changes should be directly ascribed not only to the enactment of the
Treaty of Maastricht, but also to the natural evolution and adaptation of
the Spanish public administration to the requirements of the EC/EU deci-
sion-making process. In fact, smooth adaptation to the new Community
institutional procedures has traditionally characterised the Spanish
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Government.19 The ratification process of the TEU20 was accompanied by
the first reform of the Spanish constitutional text of 1978.21 Article 95 of
the Spanish Constitution – not used until now – entitles the Constitutional
Court (Tribunal Constitutional) to be consulted on the need for reform of
the constitutional text prior to the ratification of international treaties,
including provisions contrary to the Constitution. This a priori constitu-
tional control was demanded by the government, which limited its request
to the study of the provisions related to European citizenship, namely the
active and passive electoral rights of EC citizens. The opinion of the
Constitutional Court22 was preceded by the preceptive – and in this case
contradictory – opinion of the advisory State Council23 (Consejo de
Estado) and ruled that exclusively Article 13.2 of the Spanish
Constitution had to be reformed in order to allow for the inclusion of the
passive electoral rights for foreigners in Spain. Such limited constitutional
reform was criticised by the legal profession,24 on the grounds that either
it should have been wider, including aspects related to EMU and the trans-
fer of competences in the fields of the second and third pillar, or it could
have been avoided with a broader judicial interpretation of Article 13.2.
Both the reform of the Constitution and the ratification of the Treaty
of Maastricht were supported by the practical unanimity of all political
parties represented in the parliament. Such was also the case for the rati-
fication process of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was finally approved
on 16 December 1998, again with the favourable votes of most congress
deputies and senators.25
Most of the changes brought by the Treaty of Maastricht refer to the
consolidation and widening of the scope of competences of certain inter-
ministerial co-ordinating bodies, the extension of the participation in
EC/EU affairs to the practical totality of ministries, and the reinforcement
of the defining role of the Ministry of Economy and Finance as a co-ordi-
nating actor in determining the Spanish official position. The Spanish
Permanent Representation to the Union has also been strengthened by the
increase in its high-ranking officials and the improvement of the co-ordi-
nation structures with the national ministries via the Secretariat of State
for Foreign Policy and the European Union (SEPEUE, Secretaría de Estado
de Política Exterior y para la Unión Europea). Such has also been the case
of the Joint Committee for the European Union, the most relevant parlia-
mentary body dealing with EC/EU affairs by means of the extension of its
powers.
Certain national policies – particularly regional development, police
co-operation, immigration, development co-operation and the environ-
ment – have received a considerable impetus, partly owing to activities
developed at European level. The implementation of the Treaty of
Maastricht was accompanied by an increase of regional activism at the
European level. Most Autonomous Communities are already represented
Spain 187
2444Ch8  3/12/02  2:03 pm  Page 187
in Brussels and have created administrative units for the management of
EC/EU affairs.26 Local and municipal authorities still play a minor role
in EC/EU affairs, however, and have no global institutional framework to
represent their interests at European level.
The political change from the socialist government under Felipe
González to the current conservative one under José María Aznar has not
been so relevant for the Spanish management of EC/EU affairs, compared
to the internal innovations and new political variables brought by the
presence of the nationalist/regionalist political parties on the national
political arena after 1993 onwards (Figure 8.1).27
The national policy-cycle: the slow march towards a decentralised and
efficient administrative system
Government and public administration
There is no specific ministry within the Spanish government which verti-
cally co-ordinates and manages all EC/EU matters.28 The Cabinet of the
President of the Government includes a Department of International and
European Affairs with a pure advisory and documentary role. Although
nearly all the ministries have areas or units – in most cases, Directorates-
General dealing exclusively with European affairs – by far the greatest
number in the central government have traditionally been located within
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores).
This ministry formulates Spain’s negotiating position in relation to the
Union. By holding meetings with other ministries, it also seeks to ensure
that no single ministry defends its own interests rather than the interests
of the country as a whole. The department within the MAE dealing exclu-
sively with European Affairs is currently the Secretariat of State for
Foreign Policy and the European Union.29 The Secretary of State is
assisted by a General Secretary to whom the different directors-general are
responsible. Unusually for a government department, there is an extra tier
between the Secretariat of State and the Directorates-General, thus reflect-
ing the importance of this area of government. The General Secretary’s
private office of expert advisers (Gabinete del Secretario General) is in
direct line from the General Secretary.30
The organisation of SEPEUE was significantly modified at the end of
1998 following the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam.31 From 1999
onwards, three Directorates-General (among the seven existing within the
SEPEUE) deal with EU affairs. The Directorates-General for Political
Affairs and the United Nations (Dirección General de Asuntos Políticos y
para las NN.UU.), prepares the meetings of the Political Committee and
CFSP issues of the General Affairs Council of the EU. The Directorate-
General for Co-Ordination of EU General and Technical Affairs
(Dirección General de Coordinación de Asuntos Generales y Técnicos de
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la Unión Europea), has responsibility for financial, budgetary, economic,
commercial and customs issues. Finally, the Directorate-General for Co-
Ordination of the Internal Market and other Community Policies
(Dirección General de Coordinación del Mercado Interior y otras Políticas
Comunitarias), administers agriculture, fisheries, industrial, energetic,
transport, telecommunications, environmental, social, education,
cultural, health and consumer protection affairs.32 The new independent
Directorate-General for Foreign Policy in Europe (Dirección General de
Política Exterior para Europa) is mainly concerned with the relationships
with the CEE countries. The new structure tries to rationalise the admin-
istrative levels and internal dependencies, creating synergies within the
new departments.
After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and
Finance (MEH, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda) is the one that has
most involvement in EU Affairs. One of its main tasks is to prepare the
draft state budget bill which includes the financial flows from Spain to
the Union and vice-versa. This ministry is the general co-ordinating
agency for all EU Structural Funds and initiatives. It administers receipts
from several of these funds.33
The major EU-linked activity of the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales) is the administration of
the European Social Fund, managed by the European Social Fund
Administration Unit (Unidad Administrativa del Fondo Social Europeo),
located within the Directorate-General for Employment (Dirección
general de Empleo).34 The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
(Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación), through various
departments and autonomous administrative bodies, is responsible for the
administration of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance
Fund (EAGGF).35 The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture
(Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y Cultura) plays a major role, some-
times in collaboration with other government departments, in the
promotion of education, training and exchange links with other EU
Member States, as well as a co-ordinating role with reference to the
Regional Ministries for Education (Consejerías de Educación).36 The
Ministry of Industry and Energy (Ministerio de Industria y Energía) is
responsible for administering EU support for R&D.37 Finally, the recently
created Ministry for Environment (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente)
manages the LIFE programme and co-ordinates the selection, evaluation
and monitoring of environmental projects to be funded by the Cohesion
Fund.38 The complex management of EC environmental policy has
without any doubt been one of the major reasons for the transformation
and grouping of several administrative departments, mostly within the
former Ministry of Public Works, into the new Ministry for Environment.
Institutional participation of the Spanish government in the second and
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third pillars of the Union varies considerably in each case. While no signif-
icant administrative changes were necessary to provide for the Spanish
representation in CFSP, a major reorganisation within the then Ministry
of Home and Judicial Affairs – currently two separate ministries – was
undertaken with relation to Spain’s participation in the third pillar.
The autonomous post of the Special Ambassador to CFSP (Embajador
en misión especial para la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común), who
attended the meetings of the Political Committee, has now been
suppressed and its department ascribed to the Under-Directorate General
for CFSP (Subdirección general de Política Exterior y de Seguridad
Común) within the Directorate-General for Political Affairs and United
Nations.
The Home Ministry created special units to deal separately with
Schengen affairs and co-operation in the JHA field. Special units were also
created for the National Police (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) and the
autonomous Civil Guards (Guardia Civil), as well as the Ministry of
Justice within the Directorate-General for International Legal Co-
Operation (Dirección general de Cooperación Jurídica Internacional).
They also transformed their internal procedures and specialised their
units. For instance, the new Unit for International Co-Ordination and Co-
operation (Unidad de Coordinación y Cooperación Internacional) now
complies with the different requirements and obligations set within the EU
third pillar. Special Counsellors were also appointed at the Permanent
Representation of Spain to the Union.39
The parliament (Cortes)
The Spanish national parliament (Cortes) has an indirect presence in the
EC decision-making process.40 Parliamentary scrutiny in EC/EU affairs in
Spain has never been strong in practice, owing to the reduced institutional
role of the parliament vis-à-vis the management of certain policy areas by
the government. Post-Maastricht developments have confirmed this situ-
ation, except for specific issues of great relevance for the general public,
which had its origin in EC decisions (for example, the reform of certain
CMOs within CAP, fisheries, and the re-conversion of the coal and ship-
building industries). The main parliamentary activity in relation to EC/EU
matters has been government control, while legislative activity has been
secondary. Parliamentary control mechanisms operate on the legislative
process to incorporate EC rules into Spanish statutes,41 through the
control of Spanish government representatives in EC institutions and by
the implementation of EC decisions by the public authorities for which the
Spanish government is responsible. The broad positive consensus among
the major political parties towards the process of European integration
also underlies the limited participation and activity of the parliament in
this field.42 The parliament’s role, apart from its symbolic connotations,
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is basically reactive and limited to the reception of information given by
the government or other administrative bodies. Such information is gener-
ally granted after the definition of the Spanish official positions by the
government.
The constitutional provisions concerning the involvement of the
Spanish national parliament in European affairs are rather scarce because
of the preponderance of the executive in the management of international
and EC/EU affairs. The main role of the parliament concerns the ratifica-
tion of international treaties.43 The negotiations leading to the adoption
and signature of an international treaty are exclusively led by the central
government without any prior mandate from the national parliament.
From a legislative perspective, the Spanish parliament limits itself to
debating and approving, always at the initiative of the government, the
regulatory measures needed to adapt internal law to European provisions.
It is remarkable that an annual parliamentary debate on EC/EU affairs has
never been established,44 though the general aspects of European integra-
tion, in the early years after accession, and more specific policy oriented
issues at present, have always been among the issues dealt with in wider
political debates. There is, however, an important number of oral and
written questions, as well as interpellations and motions subsequent to
interpellation, presented to the government, in both the plenary sessions
and in some of the sectoral committees of both chambers.45 Informative
sessions are thus the most important parliamentary control activity in
EC/EU affairs, on the basis of the information given by the executive,
whether on its own initiative or on that of the chambers. The plenary
session of the Congress of Deputies holds a meeting after every summit of
the European Council in order to be informed by the president of the
government about the result of the negotiations.46 The president also
reports to the Congress and responds to the questions posed by the parlia-
mentary leaders on such issues. Such interaction generally helps to create
the necessary consensus with a view to the production of agreements on
resolutions and recommendations aiming at guiding the Spanish negotiat-
ing positions in Brussels.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Policy and the European Union also
appears bi-monthly before certain bodies of both chambers – the Joint
Committee for the European Union and the Senate’s Budget Committee –
in order to answer questions by deputies and senators on EC/EU-related
issues. Most of the sectoral Committees of the Congress47 actually control
the application and enforcement of EC legislation in their respective
fields. The main parliamentary organ dealing with EC/EU affairs is the
Joint Committee Congress/Senate for the European Union (Comisión
Mixta para la Unión Europea),48 the successor to the Joint Committee for
the European Communities.49 It is composed of an equal number of
Congress deputies and senators50 and reflects the relative strength of the
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political groups within the two chambers. The number of representatives
is variable, agreed upon by the Cortes, in order to guarantee the presence
of all parliamentary groups. The function of presidency over the commit-
tee is normally delegated by the President of the Congress or the First
Vice-President of the Chamber.51
This non-legislative committee is the only parliamentary body which
has direct and regular links with the EP and hence it plays a vital role in
ensuring that the Cortes are kept informed of activities and developments
in the European institutions. It has not generally been considered as an
important parliamentary committee, in perpetual competition with other
committees, especially that of foreign affairs. While the government has
always used it as its main means of communication with the parliament,
the opposition does not tend to consider it as its main device for govern-
ment supervision.52 The committee holds regular meetings,53 some for
general information and others on specific issues. Oral questions posed by
the committee tend to be of a sectoral nature. With the exception of some
appearances of administrative officers at their own request, and of the
regular, institutionalised appearance of the Secretary of State for Foreign
Policy and the European Union, every appearance takes place on request
from the opposition groups. The committee has located its field of action
between ex post and ex ante control of the executive action within the
Council of the European Union.54
The senate has not been especially involved in EC/EU affairs except for
questions and interpellations addressed to the government on EC issues
affecting the Autonomous Communities, such as those related to the
Structural Funds or the CoR. After the ratification of the TEU, the senate
took the decision to set up a special committee to report on regional
participation in Europe. However, it is before the senate’s Budget
Committee where the Secretary of State for Foreign Policy and the
European Union regularly reports on a bi-monthly basis.
The Spanish Autonomous Communities and other sub-national actors
The Spanish Autonomous Communities implement Community policies
within their own areas of competence according to the constitutional
distribution of powers. The adaptation of regional legislation already in
force prior to Spain’s accession affected only Catalonia and the Basque
Country. In a similar way to the situation on a national scale, regional
governments remain the main actors for decision-making and manage-
ment of EC/EU-related affairs. Nevertheless, regional parliaments,
traditionally excluded from the management and control of these areas,
have started recently to expand their activities in this field. Apart from
debating the general or sectoral impact of the process of European inte-
gration for the respective Autonomous Community, regional parliaments
regularly adopt resolutions or recommendations addressed to the regional
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government with a view to influencing both its internal policy and the
relationship with the central government and administration.
Most regional parliaments have set up permanent parliamentary
committees of a non-legislative nature in order to monitor developments
in EU affairs.55 These parliamentary committees are based on the model
of the Joint Committee for the European Union. The regional minister co-
ordinating the EC/EU affairs56 reports on a regular basis to the committee
and responds to the questions and interpellations posed by its members.
These committees have in certain cases established formal relations with
the CoR or with similar committees in regional parliaments of other
Member States.57 In 1994, three regional parliaments58 for the first time
adopted regional laws establishing procedures to participate in and
control the management of the Structural Funds by the regional govern-
ments in its different stages – project selection, programming, financial
execution. This is a further step with regard to the control mechanisms set
up by the national Cortes.59
Each of the seventeen Autonomous Communities has created a depart-
ment which deals exclusively with EC/EU affairs. These departments,
which vary considerably in size and administrative relevance – as does
their title and management status – are situated within one of the regional
ministries (Consejerías) and tend to be located in the regional capital. The
regional ministry concerned varies from one community to another,
though it is usually a Directorate-General or service reporting to the
regional Minister of the Presidency.60 The organisation of the regional
administrations for EC/EU affairs is directly related to the management of
the Structural Funds.61 The exception is the more complex cases of the
Basque Country62 and Catalonia. Most of the regional governments63
have opened a Representation Office in Brussels with the main aim of
keeping up to date with the latest EU developments, particularly those
affecting the regions. However, there is a strong difference in the legal
form, status and level of autonomy from the regional government. These
regional offices – as well as the external activities, but not foreign rela-
tions, of the Autonomous Communities64 – have been granted firm legal
support by Decision 165/1994 of the Constitutional Court. The
Representation Offices have started to create loose co-operation and co-
ordination structures among themselves in terms of their relationship with
the CoR, the EP or the Commission, always under the supervision of the
Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union.
Hierarchies, levels and channels of co-ordination with regard to EU
policy-making
Co-ordination of policy between the central government ministries is
organised by the Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and the European
Union. Apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other ministries with
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horizontal competences65 have also started to play a co-ordinating role in
terms of the Spanish participation in the EC/EU decision-making process,
owing to the relative loss of comparative political weight experienced by
the MAE. The Interministerial Conference for the European Union
(Conferencia Interministerial para la Unión Europea)66 is presided over by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Policy and the European Union and
includes representatives (Under-Secretaries, or Subsecretarios) of every
ministry, as well as the Deputy Director of the Cabinet of the President of
the Government. Its vice-presidents are the Secretary of the Delegated
Committee for Economic Affairs and the General Secretary for Foreign
Policy and the European Union. It meets on a fortnightly basis and is used
to resolve disagreements between ministries, though it essentially co-ordi-
nates economic affairs and provides information.67 The political relevance
of the Interministerial Conference arises from the monopoly of unified
external action exerted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the event that no final agreement can be reached with regard to
economic issues, the matter can be submitted to the Governmental
Delegated Committee for Economic Affairs (Comisión Delegada para
Asuntos Económicos), which groups the economic oriented ministries
under the co-ordination of highest-rank officials of the Ministry of
Economy and Finance. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary
of State for the European Union attend this committee when it deals with
EC/EU affairs, and so in most cases. In case of further conflict between
ministries, negotiating positions in Brussels are settled through informal
contacts among the Permanent Representatives, officials of SEPEUE and
of the ministries involved. The Ministry for the Public Administrations co-
ordinates the Governmental Delegated Committee for Autonomic
(regional) Policy (Comisión Delegada para Política Autonómica), which
from 1996 has increasingly intervened in the definition and co-ordination
of the Spanish EC/EU policy with the Autonomous Communities. Finally,
there is a Monitoring and Co-ordinating Committee for affairs related to
the ECJ (Comisión de Seguimiento y Coordinación de Asuntos relaciona-
dos con el TJCE), composed of representatives of the Cabinet of the
President, SEPEUE, and the Ministries of Justice, Economy and others
specifically involved. This committee studies all proceedings brought
against or by Spain before the ECJ.
The implementation of Community policies by the lower levels of the
Spanish public administration has received growing awareness and
specialisation with the general aims of improving the implementation
structures, intra-governmental co-ordination and co-operation with
regional administrations. Community pressures and suggestions have thus
had a consistent impact on Spanish administration and its internal proce-
dures.68 This general trend should not hide the growing difficulty of
implementing Community decisions in Spain owing to the transfer of
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competences to the Autonomous Communities, the disruption of formal
traditional co-operation schemes between public administrations and the
compelling need to meet higher standards.69
As regards regional participation in the EC/EU decision-making
process,70 several steps have been taken in recent years, mainly owing to
the parliamentary support received by the socialist and conservative
governments from the Catalonian (currently also Basque and Canarian)
nationalist parties. The initial structure of information transfer never
satisfied Catalonia and the Basque Country, which always wanted their
own representatives to have more autonomy with respect to the
Permanent Representation. Regions and central government institution-
alised regional participation in Community affairs by means of the
Conference on Community Affairs (Conferencia para Asuntos relaciona-
dos con las Comunidades Europeas), set up at ministry level, which will
be assisted by a permanent working group, the Committee of Co-ordina-
tors on Community Affairs (Comisión de Coordinadores para Asuntos
Comunitarios). At the same time, the conference initiates and monitors
regional participation in each Community policy through the specific
Sectorial Conferences Government–Regions already existing.71 The
Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy of the Autonomous Communities
(Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas)
co-ordinates, among the general economic interests of the regions, those
relating to the EC (relations with the ECOFIN, Structural Funds).
Despite the establishment of the conference, the regions continue to
develop bilateral contacts with SEPEUE, which acts as their real partner
for the defence of regional interests. Agreements and relations between
the regions and SEPEUE have grown considerably. The Autonomous
Communities have insisted on the need to include regional representa-
tives in the Commission’s advisory committees and the possibility that a
regional minister could represent Spain in the Council meetings when
regional competences are concerned.72 Co-ordination between the major
EU institutions and the regional departments dealing with EC affairs is
arranged by SEPEUE. In 1997 a new delegate for the autonomous
communities Affairs was appointed within the Spanish Permanent
Representation to the European Union, whose aim is to co-ordinate the
relationships between the regional offices in Brussels, the transmission
of information to them and the definition and defence of the regional
interests by the Spanish delegations in the EC/EU decision-making
process. Spanish regional representatives within the CoR have so far
played an important and active role. Some Spanish regions are part of
transnational co-operation agreements with their partners from other
Member States.73
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Interaction between the national and Brussels levels
Spain has traditionally adopted an integrationist approach in relation to
its negotiating positions within the EC/EU decision-making process. The
Spanish government has traditionally kept good contacts with the
European Commission and the EP. Such an integrationist approach has
not stopped Spain from securing its national interests, especially in the
institutional field, however; much of this is related to Spain’s position
between the ‘large’ and ‘small’ Member States. Spain has supported the
Commission’s points of view on most procedural issues. Nevertheless, it
has also traditionally rejected (for example, at the 1996–97 IGC) the
extension of majority voting to certain sensitive areas, such as the
Structural Funds and the Environment. The co-ordinating role of the
Spanish Permanent Representation, closely connected with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, is crucial, both for the different national government
departments and for the regional Representation Offices. Apart from
informal contacts within political parties and parliamentary bodies, there
has been no special effort by the Spanish institutions to establish closer
links with the EP. However, the EP has had a growing public relevance
and its profile in the media has been considerably enhanced in recent years
following the debates on certain ‘hot’ issues, such as olive oil, CMO
reform, budgetary reform, and the Commission’s vote of no-confidence.
The parliamentary Joint Committee for the European Union also
participates in the meetings of COSAC and bilateral meetings with dele-
gations or bodies from the EP or other national parliaments of the Union.
The President of the Congress/delegation of the Joint Committee for the
European Union regularly attend meetings between the President of the
EP and the representatives of the national parliaments. This occurs at the
invitation of the current Presidency. The purpose of the meeting is to
review the network of relations among parliaments and to suggest ways
in which links can be improved. Spanish deputies and senators do not
generally have other permanent channels of communication with the EU
institutions apart from the Secretariat of State for the European Union,
their respective political parties and personal contacts with MEPs.
The Spanish Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the implementation and
control of EC legislation
The Spanish Constitutional Court has not dealt in a large number of cases
directly concerning EC law. Most of the legal doctrine speaks of its ‘lack
of interest’ or even ‘reluctance to interpret’ the Community legal order.74
The Spanish Constitutional Court, a major organ of the Spanish institu-
tional structure, has paradoxically developed its jurisprudence on the
interpretation and application of EC law. This is carried out within the
framework of its frequent interventions in constitutional disputes relating
to the impact of Community acts on the internal division of powers
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between the central government and the Autonomous Communities.75
The Spanish Constitutional Court has always defended its incompetence
to decide on the compatibility between national law and EC law on the
grounds of the non-constitutional rank of such legal conflict.76 This
implies that the Constitutional Court refuses to control the application of
Community law, except for the protection of fundamental rights.
Decision 28/1991 attributed the controversial term ‘conflict of infra-
constitutional norms’ to such legal controversies, which was abandoned
in Decision 180/1993 and reinstored in Decision 45/1996, much to the
regret of the Spanish legal profession.77 The jurisprudence of the Spanish
Constitutional Court in the period 1993–98 (apart from the famous
Decision 165/1994 concerning the Office of the Basque Government in
Brussels78) has not varied with regard to its control of the application of
EC law.79
On the other hand, in the field of fundamental rights, the Spanish
Constitutional Court has accepted that the EC legal order might comple-
ment the scope of certain constitutional provisions in this field, by means
of the extension of its application to non-nationals80 or the interpretation
to be given to sex discrimination.81 However, the Constitutional Court
has refused to accept, unlike its German and Austrian counterparts, that
the arbitrary denial by a judge to initiate a preliminary ruling procedure
before the ECJ might constitute a violation of the constitutional funda-
mental right to a fair trial.82 The Constitutional Court itself has refused,
though not categorically, to initiate preliminary ruling procedures before
the ECJ. Finally, regarding disputes between the central government and
the Autonomous Communities, the constitutional court has frequently
been obliged to solve problems arising when both levels of government
claim exclusive competence to enforce Community directives on shared
matters according to the constitution and the respective Statutes of
Autonomy (Estatutos de Autonomía). The Constitutional Court has
insisted throughout this period in its traditional doctrine that the acces-
sion of Spain to the Union has not meant any reassignment of internal
powers to the benefit of the central government. The Autonomous
Communities remain responsible for the effective enforcement of such
legislation, while the central government does so only for the negotiation
of such agreements at supranational level and for the global guarantee of
their fulfilment. 
The Spanish courts vis-à-vis the implementation and control of EC
legislation
The impact of EC law on Spanish society has been of great significance in
the vast majority of economic sectors. Most of the Spanish legislation origi-
nally enacted to regulate for the first time several aspects of economic
activity (e.g. competition law, insurance law, company law, environmental
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law, and consumer protection) directly derives from EC legislation. The
adaptation of Spanish courts to Community law has been slow – as well as
its use and allegiance by lawyers and prosecutors – but progressive with
regard to both its interpretation and application. It could be stated that the
situation in 1999 regarding the application of EC law by the Spanish courts
was of full familiarisation and general acceptance of their role within the
Community legal order.83
The number of preliminary ruling procedures initiated by Spanish
courts has steadily increased to a current total number of ca. 50 proce-
dures. Between 1986 and 1993 an extremely low number of preliminary
rulings were initiated. This was especially the case until 1989,84 mostly
owing to the unawareness or misuse of the procedure by national judges.
Since 1993, the trend has risen.85 Some of these procedures are accumu-
lated or withdrawn at a later stage of the process before the ECJ. The
General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) and
the main Lawyers’ Associations systematically offered until 1996 specific
courses and seminars addressed to magistrates, judges and lawyers on the
application of EC law. In fact, some of the preliminary rulings initiated by
Spanish judges have given course to crucial decisions of the jurisprudence
of the ECJ (i.e. Marleasing, Michelletti, FOGASA, Bordessa). Not only
the ordinary judges, but also the Supreme Court86 and, especially, the
High Courts of the Autonomous Communities (Tribunales Superiores de
Justicia) have initiated such procedures. That has also been the case of
two non-jurisdictional organs such as the Competition Defence Body
(Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia) and the Central Economic–
Administrative Court (Tribunal Económico–Administrativo Central). The
fact that most of such procedures arise from regional courts is a good sign
of their dynamism and compliance with EC law, despite their recent
creation.87 Most Spanish courts having initiated a preliminary ruling
procedure before the ECJ have later fully complied with the Court’s deci-
sion within the further internal legal procedure.88
The Autonomous Communities have not been granted the right by the
central government to directly defend their interests before the ECJ.
Finally, certain organs recently created within the Spanish public admin-
istration of semi-jurisdictional nature89 have started to co-operate
fruitfully with the European Commission concerning the application of
EC law.
Overall trends: the impact of the TEU on the political and administra-
tive system
It could be stated that the level of ‘Europeanisation’ of the Spanish politico-
administrative system has followed a progressive linear trend to its present
position. The number of permanent civil servants in Brussels increased on a
regular basis until the period of the last socialist government (1993–96),
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mostly due to administrative needs and restructuring caused by scope
differentiation; their number has scarcely varied in recent years. On the
other hand, the number of civil servants sent to Brussels from the national
government departments has continued to increase, though not on a
permanent basis. The effect of the implementation of the national plans for
the restructuring of public administration and the ongoing transfer of
competences to the Autonomous Communities has to be taken into
account when comparing global figures. The level of ‘Europeanisation’ of
the Spanish administrative varies significantly from the national to the
regional and local levels. Nevertheless, the situation has in general terms
stabilised, with the exception of certain Autonomous Communities with a
lower attribution of competences. The EC/EU dimension is currently
present into all departments of the different political levels. Continuity and
deepening of the ongoing trends are the key issues concerning the assign-
ment of the administration and coordination of EC/EU affairs to the
various public bodies and institutions.
Both the Spanish Permanent Representation to the EU and SEPEUE
have expanded their functioning structures to the maximum levels.
Internal redistribution of competences merely reflects the increasing
specialisation and professionalisation of their services and departments.
The intermediate levels of the national administration within ministries or
autonomous bodies are by far the least ‘Europeanised’; their modernisa-
tion and reform is closely linked to the permanent process of internal
redistribution of powers with the regional levels and the creation of new
co-ordinating bodies. In any case, the global reform of the Spanish public
administration is the last chapter, continuously postponed,90 to be accom-
plished to create the full modernisation of the Spanish political system.
The management and administration of EC/EU affairs has increasingly
become a major battlefield in the internal power disputes between admin-
istrative departments. This occurs between ministries especially with
regard to the management of the Structural Funds and EC programmes
and initiatives. However, it also occurs within the ministries themselves.
At the same time, the need for co-ordination structures frequently trans-
forms the EC/EU dimension in a common and neutral basis for interaction
between different departments. This is particularly relevant in ministries
with competences of a purely vertical nature, for example JHA and Public
Health, which traditionally delegated all internationally related affairs to
a single internal department.
On the other hand, both the definition and financing procedures of
certain EC policies have caused internal rearrangements within the
Spanish politico-administrative system, resulting that former strictly tech-
nical departments have now acquired a new political dimension. The EU
institutions have also contributed to this polarisation of competences by
requiring a single partner on the national level in terms of the negotiation
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and implementation processes. The European Commission has constantly
encouraged the national level of the Spanish public administration to
incorporate the regional administrative levels in the EC/EU decision-
making process, since the Autonomous Communities will increasingly
become responsible for the implementation of EC legislation.
Finally, it can be stated that no major changes at the administrative
level can be observed when comparing the situation under the socialist
governments and the current conservative one. The exception is the global
trend towards the re-nationalisation of certain EC/EU policies and their
management, derived both from the less integrationist approach shown by
the Partido Popular and President Aznar towards the process of European
integration and the general situation in other EU Member States. The rela-
tive decline of the co-ordinating and policy-defining role of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs could also explain the recent subtle trend towards more
independent approaches to EC/EU affairs on the part of certain ministries,
such as Agriculture, Economy and Finance, and Public Works.
Conclusions: from adaptive newcomer to controversial mainstreamer
General assessment on the ‘post-Maastricht’ changes in the Spanish
political system
The Spanish politico-administrative system has been widely affected by the
Treaty of Maastricht, but not in a disruptive way. On the contrary, the
adoption and implementation of the TEU have simply contributed to the
reinforcement, deepening and acceleration of reform processes already
under way.91 Furthermore, the most relevant changes in the management
of EC/EU affairs by the Spanish administration do not directly derive from
the implementation of the Treaty itself, but either from external comple-
mentary aspects or as a direct result of long-time prior developments. The
implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht in Spain has run parallel to
two simultaneous political processes. The first is the acceleration of the
redistribution of powers between the national and the regional level
(1993–99).92 The second concerns the setting up of new departments and
administrative bodies to deal with sectoral policies not previously managed
at the corresponding level.93 In general terms, it could be stated that the
Treaty of Maastricht has clearly reinforced the role of the executive, at
both national and regional level, in the EC/EU decision-making process.
Only relative changes have occurred to enhance the role of the parliamen-
tary bodies or that of the Autonomous Communities in their relationships
with the central authorities concerning the protection of their interests.
Thus, it can be agreed that the European integration process has had a
negative impact on both the horizontal and vertical division of powers.
Most units or bodies related to EC/EU affairs have changed their respective
denominations. In some cases, new legislative acts or decrees adopted in
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1994 or 199694 have reinforced or redefined their rights and competences
(e.g. SEPEUE, Joint Committee for the European Union, and the
Interministerial Conference for the European Union).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has retained its major co-ordinating
role for all matters related to the Union, while the Ministry of Economy
and Finance has considerably increased its policy scope, principally owing
to management of the Structural Funds and the importance of the budg-
etary and financial provisions of EC/EU policies. The new policies
introduced at European level by the TEU have generalised the EC dimen-
sion – hence the creation of specialised units – in all Ministries and their
participation in the various co-ordinating bodies. A general trend towards
further specialisation in certain units and incorporation of EC-related
issues to the activities of the vast majority of administrative departments
can readily be acknowledged. The implementation of the subsidiarity
principle has not had any major direct impact on Spanish participation in
the EC/EU decision-making process.
The definition of Spain’s access to the third stage of EMU as a major
all-embracing political objective by Aznar’s government brought an over-
whelming presence of EC/EU-related considerations into the national
political debate and the administrative activity of most departments after
1997. The enactment of intergovernmental co-operation in the JHA field
within the TEU also enhanced Spain’s international police and judicial co-
operation and opened a new policy area of great relevance and dynamism
for Spain’s national interests, such as immigration, and the fight against
terrorism and drug trafficking. Not so much can be said of CFSP; the
expectations raised by the new EU Mediterranean policy after the
Barcelona Conference have not led to major results. The reinforcement of
Spanish–Latin American relationships since 1990 were influenced not so
much by Spain’s membership of the Union, but by other factors, both
political and economic.95
While the Spanish administrative level has not changed excessively in
institutional terms96 – despite the general acceptance that the impact of
European integration has implied growing public management competi-
tiveness – clear changes can be acknowledged at the political level. The
public role, political relevance and selection of ministers and their teams
of collaborators already takes into account the EC/EU dimension of their
competences.97 A clear distinction has been drawn within the Spanish
representatives in Brussels between the technical level, where total conti-
nuity has presided over the change from the socialist to the conservative
government, and the political level. President Aznar followed in the steps
of his predecessors in most aspects of European policy. The management
style has been different, focusing on team approaches and specific
advances rather than overall strategies, and Spain’s bilateral relationships
with other members states of the Union – especially Portugal, France, and
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to a lesser extent, Italy and the United Kingdom – have considerably
improved. Bilateral annual meetings have become increasingly institu-
tionalised with Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Morocco.
European integration has clearly produced more benefits than losses
for Spain in terms of financial resources and political influence.98 EC
membership has also had a consistent impact on most Spanish public
administrations whose procedures and structures have undergone a far-
reaching process of adaptation to conform to Community standards.
During the period after the adoption of the TEU (1993–99), previous
politico-administrative trends and processes were reinforced or deepened,
though not always as a direct result of the process of European integra-
tion itself. It could be said that the level of Spain’s national participation
has become more significant, especially on the political level and less so
on the administrative one, yet without becoming too dominant. The
number of meetings with national participation as well as the number of
national civil servants posted to Brussels has begun to stagnate at the high
level already achieved. The legislative output clearly differs from one
policy field to another, though this might still be the result of the relatively
recent enforcement of the Treaty of Maastricht and the features of the
decision-making processes assigned to each of these policy fields.
However, the changes and evolution experienced by the Spanish politico-
administrative system concerning the process of European integration,
and its participation in the EC/EU decision-making process imply long-
term structural growth and policy differentiation. This is particularly the
case at the administrative level. This long-term trend has sometimes been
overshadowed by cyclical ups and downs,99 which mostly happen at the
political level, owing to external or indirect variables. In any case, the
interaction of public instruments from several state levels linked with the
respective ‘Europeanisation’ of national actors and institutions can easily
be seen at its full extent in the Spanish case, particularly since 1995. The
struggle for participation of national representatives and institutions takes
place both horizontally (government, parliament and ministries) and
vertically (government and the Autonomous Communities) on the Spanish
national level and on the European one.
Both Spanish national and regional actors are increasingly taking part
in the EC/EU legislative process and have experienced an extensive
process of adaptation of their internal procedures. The increased rights
for participation and co-decision have been used intensively by such
actors. However, the internal Spanish political situation also clearly inter-
feres with these processes, accelerating or slowing them down: the
preference for certain instruments or decision procedures does not exclu-
sively depend on the rhythm of the process of European integration itself.
Finally, the increasing role of public opinion – though still not very rele-
vant in the Spanish case – should also be taken into account.
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The major pending issues and weaknesses of Spanish participation in
the EC/EU decision-making process are the definition of a new effective
model for the participation of the Autonomous Communities in all stages
of the process. This still depends on the relative political strength of the
nationalist/regionalist parties and their political alliances with the nation-
wide political forces. The improvement of the functioning of the
co-ordinating bodies is also vital. The policy process still appears highly
fragmented and insufficiently co-ordinated, both horizontally and verti-
cally.
Perspectives for the future: the 1996–97 IGC and other EU negotiation
processes
Spain played a relevant and high-profile role in most phases of the
1996–97 IGC.100 Its priorities with regard to the revision of the
Maastricht Treaty were made public in Autumn 1996, some months after
the accession of the Partido Popular (PP) to power, and were mostly the
result of general consensus among the major political parties.101
Continuity presided both over the content of the proposals and the nomi-
nation of the non-political members of the negotiating team.102 The main
Spanish proposals,103 apart from the maintenance of the clear separation
between the IGC negotiations and the EMU process, were: support for the
incorporation of a new Title on Employment; the creation of an area of
freedom, security and justice, together with the reinforcement of the role
of Europol and judicial co-operation on a European scale. However, there
are still many controversial issues for the Spanish general public and the
media. The prohibition of the analysis of political asylum requests by EU
nationals104 and the reinforcement of the CoR serve as examples. Yet
there remain more: the simplification of the co-decision procedure; the
establishment of an effective common security and defence policy by
means of the prospective integration of the WEU within the EU; the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) before the ECJ; equal-
ity between men and women; the encouragement and co-ordination of
voluntary organisations; and the creation of a permanent statute for the
ultra-peripheral and island regions (i.e. the Canary Islands). Although
Spain did not provide any written proposal on the weighting of votes in
the Council or the number of members of the Commission, it did block
these institutional issues owing to national interests.105
Finally, Spain firmly rejected certain proposals by other Member States
which would have affected its national interests, especially those of a
wider notion of the principle of flexibility and the re-drafting of the condi-
tions of application of the principle of subsidiarity. On the other hand,
Spain defended the extension of majority voting exclusively to certain
individual areas, with a total rejection of such extension in the cases of
management of the Structural Funds, social protection and management
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of water resources. Spain has also played or started to play a high-profile
role in the negotiation processes concerning EC budgetary reform and the
accession of new Member States, owing to the fact that it is currently the
only large Member State with a conservative political party in power.106
Spain has felt obliged to lead the position and interests of the so-called
‘cohesion countries’ in relation to the proposals of the northern countries
for budgetary reform.
Prime Minister Aznar achieved a major internal political success with
the entry of Spain into the third phase of EMU.107 The successful perform-
ance of Aznar’s economic policies and the relative lack of internal social
tensions (apart from the new scenario created by the complex Basque
peace process), has strengthened his position. The new role to be played
within the European conservative political parties and among their
leaders, and the experience accumulated in the European and interna-
tional arenas since 1997 are also the foundations of Aznar’s solid internal
negotiating position. The co-ordinating role of the ‘cohesion countries’
has been strongly reinforced by means of close contact with the
Portuguese and Greek governments.
At first glance, Spain is one of the Member States to have its national
interests most negatively affected by the results of the EC budgetary
reform. The management and effectiveness of the Structural Funds in the
Spanish economy started to have its full effect only in recent years. Co-
ordination, both vertical and horizontal, among the different
administrative levels with regard to EU affairs still needs reinforcing and
global improvement. Spain therefore seeks to extend as long as possible
its present status as a net recipient state in financial terms, in order to
further reduce the economic gap among its regions and in comparison
with other Member States. The re-nationalisation of the traditionally inte-
grationist Spanish policy towards the process of European integration
seems inevitable, at least in the short term, given the current European
political scenario. Spain’s concerns regarding the enlargement of the
Union towards Central and Eastern Europe are mostly motivated by the
potential financial and institutional repercussions.108 Contacts at the
highest political level between the Spanish government and governments
of some of the candidate countries, such as Poland and the Czech
Republic, confirm this impression. The access of Spanish economic actors
to such new markets will be reduced and unlikely to develop further.
Historical and cultural links with such countries are also not very close.
Spain could be in the position to condition the enlargement on the main-
tenance of a certain status quo within the present institutional and
financial set-up of the Union.
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the Organic Law of Authorisation LO 10/85, 2 August 1985, was published
in the Spanish Official Journal (BOE), 8 August 1985.
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Raimundo Bassols, España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE
(1957–85) (Madrid: Ed. Política Exterior, 1995).
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mously granted their authorisation for the ratification of the Accession
Treaty on 26 June 1985.
4 See El País, Special Issue 228, ‘Europeos’, 2 July 1995; and ‘Encuesta de
opinión sobre los españoles en la Unión Europea’, 21 June 1996, pp. 26 ff.
5 Particularly, the left-wing coalition Izquierda Unida (IU) and some of the
nationalist/regionalist political parties, and, to a lesser extent, individual
members of the right-wing Partido Popular (PP). See VV.AA., La izquierda y
Europa. Una aproximación crítica al Tratado de Maastricht (Madrid:
Izquierda Unida/Los Libros de la Catarata, 1992). 
6 Spain has adopted very definite national negotiating positions, especially
with regard to the maintenance of the Structural and Cohesion Funds.
7 See Carmen Garcia, ‘Les groupes d’intérêt espagnols et la Communauté
Européenne’, in: Dusan Sidjanski and Ulrich Ayberk (eds), L’Europe du Sud
dans la Communauté Européenne (Paris: PUF, 1990), pp. 115, 150; Mariano
Baena del Alcázar, ‘Groupes de pression et Administration en Espagne’, in:
Annuaire Européen d’Administration Publique, 1992, p. 137; and Emiliano
Alonso Pelegrín, El Lobby en la Unión Europea. Manual sobre el buen uso
de Bruselas (Madrid: Ediciones ESIC, 1994).
8 See Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and John Story. Las relaciones exte-
riores de la España democrática (Madrid: Alianza, 1996).
9 Among others, the inclusion of the European citizenship provisions within
the TEU or some of the key concepts of the co-operation in the JHA fields.
See VV.AA., España y el Tratado de la Unión Europea (Madrid: COLEX,
1994), pp. 7–55; Comité Organizador de la Presidencia Española del
Consejo de la Unión Europea, Prioridades de la Presidencia española del
Consejo de la Unión Europea (Madrid: BOE, 1995); and VV.AA., España y
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Política Exterior, 1998), pp. 35–58.
10 See M. Ramírez Jiménez, Europa en la conciencia española y otros estudios
(Madrid: Trotta, 1996).
11 The length of such transitional periods, depending on the different policy
areas and even product markets, ranged from five to seventeen years, being
in some cases later reduced or renegotiated.
12 Especially the fisheries issues after the conflicts with Canada (1993) and
Morocco (1995, 1999), and the enlargement negotiations with Norway.
13 The pursuit of a special status for the Canary Islands and its tax regime is to
be explained in terms of the political support granted to Aznar’s government
by the Canarian nationalist parties.
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14 Namely, the Catalonian centre-right coalition Convergencia i Uniò (CiU), the
Basque Conservative party Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and the
Canarian centre coalition Coalición Canaria (CC).
15 See VV.AA., El tercer pilar de la Unión Europea. La cooperación en asuntos
de justicia e interior (Madrid: Publicaciones del Ministerio del Interior,
1997), pp. 9–22; and VV.AA., 1998, op. cit., pp. 61–108.
16 See Rafael Arias Salgado, ‘La política europea de España y la Conferencia
Intergubernamental de 1996’, in: Política Exterior, No. 47/1995, pp. 38–46.
17 See Angel Boixareu Carrera, ‘Aspectos generales y principios básicos de la
Unión. Subsidiariedad y suficiencia de medios’, in: VV.AA., 1994, op. cit.,
pp. 55–86.
18 See Araceli Mangas Martín, ‘Le droit constitutionnel national et l’intégration
européenne: Espagne’, in: Jürgen Schwarze (ed.), XVII FIDE Kongress
(Berlin, October 1996) – Ergebnisse und Perspektiven (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1997), pp. 206–230.
19 Spain’s entry into the Union coincided with the negotiation and enforcement
of the SEA, hence the immediate implementation of its institutional and
procedural changes.
20 It was accomplished by means of Organic Law 10/1992 of 28 December
1992, published in the Spanish Official Journal (BOE), No. 312, 29
December 1992.
21 See Pablo Pérez Tremps, Constitución española y Comunidad Europea,
Cuadernos de Estudios Europeos 11 (Madrid: Civitas, 1994).
22 Declaración del Tribunal Constitucional, 21 July 1992, on the possible
incompatibility between Article 8B TEU and Article 13.2 of the Spanish
Constitution, Boletín de Legislación Extranjera, 147–148, pp. 89–97.
23 Dictamen de la Comisión Permanente del Consejo de Estado, 9 April 1992,
on the constitutional implications of the possible ratification of the TEU, in:
Boletín de Legislación Extranjera, 149–150, pp. 81–88.
24 See among others Araceli Mangas Martín, ‘La Declaración del Tribunal
Constitucional sobre el artículo 13.2 de la Constitución (derecho de sufragio
pasivo de los extranjeros). Una reforma constitucional innecesaria o insufi-
ciente’, in: Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, No. 2/1992, p. 38;
and Francisco Rubio Llorente, ‘La Constitution espagnole et le Traité de
Maastricht’, in: Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel, No. 12/1992, pp.
351–361.
25 By means of Organic Law LO 9/1998, 16 December 1998, published in the
Spanish Official Journal (BOE), 17 December 1998. Several amendments to
the text of the Organic Law were proposed and later rejected by the Basque
Nationalist Party with regard to further involvement of the Autonomous
Communities in the decision-making process related to EC affairs. The rati-
fication law includes an additional provision accepting the automatic
jurisdictional competence of the ECJ concerning preliminary rulings in the
field of judicial and police co-operation in criminal matters.
26 What initially was merely reduced to the implementation of specific
Community policies (agriculture and fisheries) and the management of the
Structural Funds can nowadays be already ascertained as the definition of full
‘European policies’ at the regional level. The participation and representation
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of regional interests within the national EC/EU decision-making process was
considerably enhanced – though still far from the demands and expectations
of the Autonomous Communities – after Maastricht by means of the setting
up of various State–Regions co-ordinating bodies and the appointment of a
Counsellor for Autonomic (‘Regional’) Affairs within the Spanish Permanent
Representation to the European Union.
27 All socialist and conservative governments from the 1993 general elections
onwards relied upon the parliamentary support of the Catalonian nationalist
coalition CiU.
28 For an updated overview of the Spanish politico-administrative system, see
Michael T. Newton and Peter J. Donaghy, Institutions of Modern Spain: A
Political and Economic Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
29 SEPEUE was in fact established in February 1981, long before negotiations
for accession had been concluded, under the denomination of the Secretariat
of State for the Relationships with the European Communities (Secretaría de
Estado para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas, SERCE). This
key institution for the Spanish EC/EU decision-making process was after
1986 called the Secretariat of State for the European Communities
(Secretaría de Estado para las Comunidades Europeas, SECE) and after 1993
the Secretariat of State for the European Union (Secretaría de Estado para la
Unión Europea, SEUE). 
30 That was also the case with the State Legal Service for the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (Servicio Jurídico del Estado ante el Tribunal de
Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas).
31 It used to include two Directorates-General – the Directorate-General for
Technical Co-ordination in European Affairs (Dirección general de
Coordinación Técnica Comunitaria), dealing with internal policy, including
more technical and economic matters, and the Directorate-General for EU
Legal and Institutional Affairs (Dirección general de Coordinación Jurídca e
Institucional Comunitaria), concerned with external, more political affairs,
including the interpretation of EU legislation.
32 This latter also comprises a new Under-Directorate for Legal Affairs
(Subdirección de Asuntos Jurídicos), which globally supervises the legal
aspects of the whole Spanish EC/EU decision-making process, as well as
acting before the ECJ on behalf of the Spanish government.
33 By far the most important of the latter for Spain is the ERDF, dealt with by
the Sub-Directorate General for Management and Administration
(Subdirección general de Gestión y Administración), a division of the
Directorate-General for Planning (Dirección general de Planificación). In
turn this Directorate-General is responsible to the General Secretariat for
Planning and Budgets (Secretaría general de Planificación y Presupuestos).
Some EC initiatives such as RECHAR, STRIDE, ENVIREG and PRISMA are
directly handled by the MEH.
34 This Ministry also collaborates with the National Institute for Employment
(Instituto Nacional de Empleo, INEM) and the Ministry of Education,
Science and Culture through the Fund for the Promotion of Employment
(Fondo para la Promoción del Empleo) for the management and promotion
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of certain EU schemes and initiatives in this field (e.g. EUROTECNET). It
also collaborates with three Institutes from the former Ministry – currently
Secretariat of State – of Social Affairs (Secretaría de Estado de Asuntos
Sociales): the Institute for Young People’s Affairs (Instituto de la Juventud,
INJUVE), the Institute for Women’s Affairs (Instituto de la Mujer) and the
Institute for Social Services (Instituto de Servicios Sociales, INSERSO).
35 The Guidance Section of the Fund is managed by the National Institute for
Agrarian Reform and Development (Instituto Nacional de Reforma y
Desarrollo Agrario, IRYDA), which is also responsible for administering bids
and payments of the LEADER initiative. The Guarantee Section of the
EAGGF is administered by the Fund for the Organisation and Regulation of
Agricultural Products and Prices (Fondo de Ordenación y Regulación de
Productos y Precios Agrarios, FORPPA), though actual payments under this
scheme come from the National Service for Agricultural Products (Servicio
Nacional de Productos Agrarios, SENPA). Both FORPPA and SENPA are
autonomous commercial bodies. The IFOP is independently administered by
the Fund for the Regulation and Market Organisation of Fish and Marine
Products (Fondo de Regulación y Organización del Mercado de Productos de
la Pesca y Cultivos Marinos, FROM).
36 The Department for the Organisation and Establishment of Professional
Training (Area de Ordenación e Implantación de la Formación Profesional),
formerly in charge of EUROTECNET, and the Secretariat of State for
Universities and Research (Secretaría de Estado de Universidades e
Investigación), formerly in charge of COMETT and other initiatives, are at
present jointly responsible for the LEONARDO programme; the Sub-
Directorate General for International Co-operation (Subdirección general de
Cooperación Internacional), formerly in charge of LINGUA and TEMPUS,
together with the Secretariat-General of the Universities Council (Secretaría
general del Consejo de Universidades) are responsible for the SOCRATES
programme.
37 Mainly through the Centre for Industrial Technological Development
(Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnológico Industrial), though all activities in
this field are co-ordinated by the Interministerial Committee for Science and
Technology (Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología, CICYT),
which also acts as a monitoring agent for Spanish involvement in the
programmes.
38 These activities were previously managed by the Directorate-General for
Environmental Policy within the former Ministry of Public Works, Transport
and Environment.
39 Spain has tabled numerous proposals in this field and led the debate for the
communitarisation of certain areas within the former third pillar. Some polit-
ical parties and civil associations working in the fields of immigration and
asylum have expressed their reluctance about some of the measures and deci-
sion-making procedures of the EU third pillar.
40 See Manuel Cienfuegos Mateo, ‘El control de las Cortes Generales sobre el
Gobierno en asuntos relativos a las Comunidades Europeas durante la
década 1986–1995’, in: Revista de las Cortes Generales, No. 38/1996, pp.
47–99.
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41 Until the Reform Law of 1994 it was not the case with administrative
decrees.
42 Only certain Congress deputies of the left-wing coalition Izquierda Unida
and of some of the Basque, Catalonian and Canarian nationalist parties have
actually developed dissenting strategies on EC affairs within the parliamen-
tary bodies. See Beatriz Alvarez-Miranda Navarro, ‘Integración europea y
sistemas de partidos en el Sur de Europa: despolarización y convergencia’, in:
Revista de Estudios Políticos, No. 3/1994, pp. 143–167.
43 According to Articles 93, 94 and 96.2 of the Spanish Constitution, and,
among them, those relating to the transfer of competences to supranational
organisations. Different voting majorities are required depending on the
specific types of international treaties. See Pérez Tremps, 1994, op. cit., pp.
121 ff.
44 As is the case of the so-called ‘State of the Nation’ or ‘State of the
Autonomous Communities’ annual parliamentary debates.
45 It should be underlined that at least one-third of these questions still pose
general or institutional problems.
46 This practice was institutionalised after the meeting of the European Council
held at the end of the first Spanish Presidency of the Council (1989).
47 Such as the Committee on Agriculture and Fisheries, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Industry or the Committee on Public
Works.
48 See Manuel Cienfuegos Mateo, ‘La Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea.
Análisis y balance de una década de actividad en el seguimiento de los
asuntos comunitarios’, in: Gaceta Jurídica de la CE, D-27, 1997, pp. 7–69.
49 This latter was created by the law of 27 December 1985. Its name, and, to
some extent its functions, were changed by the law of 19 May 1994 follow-
ing Spain’s parliamentary ratification of the TEU.
50 That was not the case before, with a larger number of congress members.
51 Relevant politicians have assumed in practice the co-ordinating role of the
committee in recent legislatures: Isabel Tocino, currently Minister for
Environment; Pedro Solbes, former Minister of Economy and Finance and
current member of the European Commission. 
52 However, it has been, in recent years, an atypical and rather relevant commit-
tee of growing importance, because its action encompasses the totality of
government policies. Among the rights granted to the committee by the law
of 1994 are the following: to receive, via the government, legislation propos-
als emanating from the EP in sufficient time to be properly informed or to
examine such proposals; to request a full debate on such proposals if it
should consider them necessary; to request the appearance of a government
member before the committee to inform it on the outcome of bills approved
by the Council of the European Union; to be informed by the government
about the general lines of its European policy; to draft reports on matters
relating to the European Union; and to establish co-operative links with their
counterparts in the parliaments of other Member States of the Union.
53 There is an average number of 40–50 sessions per legislature, thus more than
one meeting per month.
54 The opposition has repeatedly demanded that the committee become a body
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of advice prior to government adoption of decisions within the Union. The
government in turn has always maintained that the speed required by the
EC/EU decision-making process makes it impossible to seek parliamentary
support or authorisation for each decision. According to a proposal of reso-
lution presented in November 1993 by the opposition PP, the Joint
Committee for the European Union was closely involved in the preparation
of the 1996–97 IGC; a major consequence of such involvement was the
Committee Resolution of 21 December 1995 which contained guidelines
agreed by all parliamentary groups on the Spanish position for the IGC nego-
tiations.
55 Such as the Comisión para el seguimiento de la Unión Europea y de
Actuaciones Exteriores in Catalonia, the Comisión Permanente para Asuntos
Europeos in Madrid or Asturias.
56 Normally the regional Minister for the Presidency or of Economy and
Finance.
57 The first meeting of regional Parliaments of Member States of the European
Union was held in 1998 in Oviedo (Asturias) – a final result of which was the
so-called ‘Declaration of Oviedo’ – and created a permanent follow-up
Committee initially presided by Ovidio Sánchez Díaz, former President of the
regional Parliament of Asturias (Junta General del Principado).
58 Those of Cantabria, Madrid and Aragón. See VV.AA., Incidencia del
Tratado de la Unión Europea sobre la Comunidad de Madrid (Madrid:
Publicaciones de la CAM, 1993).
59 See David Ordoñez Solís, Fondos estructurales europeos. Régimen jurídico y
gestión administrativa (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1997).
60 In some of the larger regions, like Andalusia or Catalonia, these departments
have even established some offices at provincial level.
61 While the ERDF regional office is normally located within the Directorate-
General for Planning of the regional Ministry of Economy and Finance or is
even administered by the specific Directorate-General for Community
Affairs, the EAGGF regional office is usually to be found in the appropriate
Directorate-General of the regional Ministry of Agriculture; the European
Social Fund (ESF) office is most commonly located in either the regional
Employment Agency or in the regional Ministry of Labour.
62 See VV.AA., Euskadi en la Unión Europea (Bilbao: Publicaciones de la
Fundación Sabino Arana, 1994).
63 With the current – but not for too long – exceptions of La Rioja and Castile-
La Mancha.
64 Jorge Pueyo Losa and Maria Teresa Ponte Iglesias, La actividad exterior y
comunitaria de Galicia: La experiencia de otras Comunidades Autónomas
(Santiago: Fundación Alfredo Brañas, 1997).
65 Such has been the case in recent years in the Ministry of Economy and
Finance and the Ministry for the Public Administrations.
66 Formerly Interministerial Conference for Community Affairs (Conferencia
Interministerial para Asuntos Comunitarios).
67 The fact that the officials of SEPEUE are recruited within the different
ministries facilitates the co-ordinating role of the Interministerial
Conference.
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68 See David Ordoñez Solís, ‘La ejecución del Derecho Comunitario Europeo en
España’, in: Cuadernos de Estudios Europeos, 10 (Madrid: Civitas, 1994).
69 See Susana Galera Rodrigo, La aplicación administrativa del derecho comu-
nitario en España (Madrid: Civitas, 1998).
70 See among others VV.AA., Comunidades Autónomas y Comunidad Europea.
Relaciones jurídico-institucionales (Valladolid: Publicaciones Cortes de
Castilla y León, 1991); VV.AA., La participación de las Comunidades
Autónomas en los asuntos comunitarios europeos (Madrid: Publicaciones del
Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas, 1995); Alan Arias Martín,
Comunidades Autónomas y elaboración del Derecho Comunitario Europeo
(Oñati: IVAP, 1998).
71 The functions of the conference were revised by means of the 1990, 1994 and
1996 agreements between the central government and the regions.
72 While the first request is already in force vis-à-vis the functioning of around
fifty-five Commission’s advisory committees, the second is still far from
being agreed and is subject to lengthy negotiations between the government
and the regions.
73 Such as the Four Motors for Europe or the European Conference of Capital
Regions.
74 See, among others, José Julián Izquierdo Peris, ‘El Tribuunal Constitucional
como órgano de garantía del Derecho comunitario en España’, in: Gaceta
Jurídica de la CE, Bol-87, 1993, pp. 15–29; Javier Roldán Barbero and Luis
Miguel Hinojosa Martínez, ‘La aplicación del derecho Comunitario en
España (1996)’, in: Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 1, 1998, pp.
5–49; and Santiago Martínez Lage, ‘El Tribunal Constitucional y las cues-
tiones prejudiciales comunitarias’, in: Gaceta Jurídica de la CE, Bol-117,
1996, pp. 1–3.
75 In fact, the first cases indirectly related to EC legislation date only from
1988 and 1989 and solve some of the disputes initiated by the autonomous
communities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The major
decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court with regard to the interpre-
tation and application of EC law were nevertheless taken in 1991 and
1993.
76 In a somewhat similar way to the French Conseil Constitutionnel. The possi-
ble contradiction between national and EC norms cannot be interpreted as a
case of non-compliance with a constitutional provision and therefore should
be analysed as a mere conflict of non-constitutional laws to be solved by the
ordinary judge.
77 See Mangas Martín, 1992, op. cit., p. 209.
78 One of the most high-profile decisions (Decision 165/1994) of recent years
was taken in 1994 by the Spanish Constitutional Court, which enabled the
Basque government to open a delegation in Brussels with an official charac-
ter, thus depending directly from the Regional Ministry of Presidency
(Consejería de Presidencia), for the management of the external aspects
related to the EC decision-making process within its statutory competences.
79 The Constitutional Court insisted in 1996 on its previous idea that the EC
legal order was not part of the ‘constitutional corpus’ and therefore not fully
subject to its jurisdictional competence. One of its Magistrates, Professor
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González Campos, reacted to such an interpretation given in Decisions




83 See Muriel Le Barbier- Le Bris, Le juge espagnol face au droit communautaire
(Rennes: Apogée, 1998).
84 Diego Javier Liñán Nogueras and Javier Roldán Barbero, ‘La aplicación judi-
cial del derecho comunitario en España (1986–1989)’, in: Revista de
Instituciones Europeas, No. 3/1989, p. 885.
85 Diego Javier Liñán Nogueras and Alejandro Valle Gálvez, ‘Crónica sobre la
aplicación judicial del derecho comunitario en España (1 de julio de 1989–31
de diciembre de 1990)’, in: Revista de Instituciones Europeas, 3, 1991, pp.
989 ff; Diego Javier Liñán Nogueras and Manuel López Escudero, ‘Crónica
sobre la aplicación judicial del Derecho Comunitario en España (años 1991
y 1992)’, in: Revista de Instituciones Europeas, No. 1/1994, pp. 221; Diego
Javier Liñán Nogueras and Javier Roldán Barbero, ‘The Judicial Application
of Community Law in Spain’, in: Common Market Law Review, No. 6/1993,
pp. 1135 ff and Diego Javier Liñán Nogueras and Margarita A. Robles
Carrillo, ‘La aplicación judicial del derecho Comunitario en España (años
1993, 1994 y 1995)’, in: Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, No.
1/1997, p. 127.
86 Though in very rare cases by its Third Senate and even expressing serious
doubts about its effective competence to do so.
87 Major controversies with regard to the incorrect application of EC law by
Spanish courts have been paradoxically caused, apart from the reasonable
cases of individual lower judges, by the Supreme Court, owing to its reluc-
tance to fully accept the conditions of application of the principles of
supremacy and direct effect of EC law.
88 The public relevance of the ECJ for the Spanish general public – which has
never been too high despite the Spanish nationality of its President – has
increased considerably in recent years owing to certain major decisions
affecting Spanish interests, such as the fisheries conflict with the United
Kingdom and, particularly, the so called ‘Strawberries’ decision which
condemned France for attacks against Spanish lorries carrying agricultural
products.
89 Such as the Competition Defence Body, the Commission for the Regulation
of the Electric Market (Comisión Reguladora del Mercado Eléctrico) and the
National Commission for the Stock Exchange Markets (Comisión Nacional
del Mercado de Valores).
90 And that seems to be also the fate of the legislative proposals for a new
‘Estatuto de la Función Pública’, because of the lack of political consensus
and the preservation of corporatist interests.
91 See Francesco Morata, ‘Spain: Modernization through Integration’, in:
Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration.
Small States and the European Union (London: Longman, 1998), pp.
100–115.
92 Mostly owing to the loss of the absolute majority in the national parliament
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by the PSOE and the PP and their political dependence on the parliamentary
support of the centre-right nationalist parties (PNV, CiU, CC).
93 For example, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Environment, Secretariat
of State for Sport, Secretariat of State for Development Co-operation,
Secretariat of State for Migrations and Secretariat of State for Tourism.
94 At the time of the formation of the respective new governments and the
signature of political agreements among several political parties.
95 A considerable expansion and penetration of Spanish firms within Latin
American markets took place after 1996. See the article ‘The New
Conquistadores’ in: Financial Times, 2 July 1999, p. 21.
96 Apart from the redefinition of functions within the departments of SEPEUE
or the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union.
97 It is to be noted that Spain’s leading politicians in the field of international
affairs have all been professionally directly related to the process of European
integration.
98 See Amparo Almarcha Barbado (ed.), Spain and EC Membership Evaluated
(London: Pinter, 1993).
99 This was particularly relevant in the first months of Aznar’s term in office
and within the IGC negotiations leading to the adoption of the Amsterdam
Treaty.
100 The document ‘Bases para una reflexión’ prepared by the Spanish govern-
ment and made public during its 1995 Presidency of the Council, together
with the initiatives undertaken by Carlos Westendorp as Chair of the
Reflection Group, helped to define the agenda and general framework for the
development of the negotiations.
101 As contained in the Resolution of the Joint Committee for the European
Union, 21 December 1995 (BOCG, Serie A, No. 82, 29 December 1995).
102 Internal debate arose only with regard to the so called ‘asylum protocol’.
103 Spain presented twenty-nine official written proposals, three of them jointly
with other Member States. Ten of them were finally incorporated into the
new text of the Treaty, adopted with minor changes. The other nine propos-
als were tabled during the last stage of the negotiations without having been
officially codified.
104 These three proposals were to be understood within the framework of the
fight against the Basque terrorist group ETA in its international dimension.
105 The enforcement period for the Ioannina compromise was therefore extended
and Spain accepted the insertion of a political Declaration stating that its
particular case would be taken into account at the moment of further insti-
tutional reform owing to future enlargements of the Union.
106 Aznar’s leadership within the European People’s Party has been strongly rein-
forced in recent months.
107 This was one of the major points of the electoral programme of the PP on
which Aznar placed most of his political energies at one time. Such a result
has been accompanied by good economic results regarding inflation rates,
employment growth, public deficit and interest rates.
108 See Carmela Martín, España en la nueva Europa (Madrid: Alianza, 1997).
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9 Andrea Szukala
France: the European transformation
of the French model
Introduction: ‘Maastricht’ as a major challenge
Since Maastricht the politicisation of European ‘high politics’ promises to
be a very hazardous political venture in France. A newspaper headline
such as this from 1991: ‘Government and MPs concerned about French
indifference to European integration’,1 would be inconceivable today. It is
not exaggerated to presume that Maastricht stands for a fundamental
shift in how the French political system copes with the internal challenges
of ‘Europeanisation’. 
Many political scientists still like to switch to French studies today,
because the case of France serves as an excellent ideal type.2 Indeed,
France is often cited as an example when it comes to clashes of ‘state-
centric’ national political systems with the pluralistic multi-level system
that is the European Union. The characteristics of the ‘French model’ are:
the centrality of the state in mediation procedures; specific forms of inter-
est representation and a privileged place for the central state level to
enforce and implement policies.3 The conclusions of such analyses of
systemic ‘clashes’ are persistently the same: owing to internal centralisa-
tion and the government-dominated procedures in ‘external’ relations,
socio-economic actors in state-centric systems are said to be less qualified
to do business in multi-level networks. Therefore policy-making perform-
ance at the implementation stage tends to suffer while policy deficits are
subsequently higher. Even if the classification of France as a state-centric
or state-corporatist model is still valuable, these categories should blind
us to the major political and institutional changes the system has already
achieved since 1985. It is undoubtedly true that the French polity suffered
and still suffers from enormous system stress, but our perception is that
today these systemic tensions have ceased to play a more important role
in France than they do in other European countries. Actually – and
perhaps in contrast to other systems – the state level always plays a major
role in ensuring a degree of smoothness and intensity in adaptation
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processes. Since the central state is still constantly seeking to interpose
itself in mediation processes, it acts as a kind of gatekeeper for multi-level
integration in numerous domains. Its readiness to accept the permeability
of political processes is a core variable for the explanation of the break-
ing up of the ‘sovereignty shells’ that so many French politicians furiously
defended after the famous attacks from Schäuble and Lamers in autumn
1994.4
The events of recent years have been characterised by a great variety of
responses to very different phenomena such as the integration boost of the
SEM, the Maastricht Treaty and a changing European and international
environment.5 One should not pretend to be able to establish causal links
from those interlocked processes to specific systemic answers. But a tenta-
tive strategy may be, while enumerating and describing the structural
changes the French polity underwent between 1992 and 1999, to take into
consideration the positions on which no change took place at all, and to
search for missing factors. The core hypothesis of this chapter is that
many of the revisions and adaptations the ‘model’ endured during the
1990s were a function of governmental preferences. These preferences
include: restructuring the domestic debate after Maastricht, the preserva-
tion of the core assets of French ‘statism’ (strong public services,
preservation of a certain state role in economic politics) and the imple-
mentation of domestic reforms that are partly aimed at strengthening
France’s position towards its European partners. The relative weakening
of France’s ‘natural’ European leadership after 1989 made it increasingly
necessary – even for Europe’s ‘strongest’ state – to be able to mobilise
domestic political and socio-economic interests to defend its role as a
significant player. The analysis parts from the observation that after a
period of disorientation and piecemeal reform during the 1980s, when a
new European regulatory culture led to dysfunctions and a weakening of
the French administrative state and its relations with business,6 state
actors re-entered the game in the mid-1990s to try to fashion the
‘Europeanised’ French state in their own style. 
Fundamentals and institutional specifics of policy-making after
Maastricht
Five main developments mark the further progress of ‘Europeanisation’
and the new institutional arrangements since 1992. After the painful expe-
rience of referendums, French public opinion, when compared with other
European countries, now has a better accommodation with Europe.
However, political parties – notably on the right wing – are still haunted
by the split between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes in September 1992. At the
governmental level, the two heads of the executive are trying out a new
internal balance in European policy-making; ‘semi-presidentialism’ is less
and less a valuable model for classifying the French system of government.
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At the same time the special relationship between the executive and the
parliament, which is typical of the Fifth Republic’s ‘rationalised parlia-
mentarism’, seems to have undergone a fundamental change. However the
attempts to preserve a kind of bureaucratic centralisation in Paris–
Brussels interactions (from the ‘state’ to the ‘Union’) have become more
explicit. Since administrative actors are still desperately seeking to cover
and to supervise the whole range of European activities, actors such as the
prime minister are progressively implicated, and a ‘normalisation’ of
government and politicisation has emerged. This is not without conse-
quences for the strategies of those involved in interest intermediation,
which have traditionally been characterised by a strong tendency towards
pressure politics through elite interaction with the European level. The
continuous and important impact of the central level as a gatekeeper for
Franco-European interactions is above all true for the regional level,
which is still strongly supervised and confined by state actors, especially
when distributional issues are at stake. 
Risking the debate: public opinion and parties under stress
The impact of the ‘Maastricht’ conflict on public opinion and on party
political cleavages was still perceivable during the 1995 presidential elec-
tion and the third cohabitation (since May 1997). The entire process from
the Maastricht referendum in 1992 and its 48 per cent ‘no’ votes, up to
the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty and its ratification in March
1999, represents more or less a development from refusal and a strong
downward trend at the beginning of the 1990s, to accommodation with
the inevitable. Nevertheless this process is not at all linear. More so than
other Member States French public opinion suffers from a kind of ‘over-
load’ with regard to the European dimension so that from time to time,
conflictual issues tend to provoke eruptive system shocks which may
alienate a generally positive tendency.
The parties’ first reaction after the Maastricht referendum consisted of
a desperate attempt to pacify the political game and to focus on internal
issues. Whereas the left wing was fully absorbed by the end of
Mitterrandism and the reconstitution of the Socialist Party after the loss
of power in 1993, the governing right-wing coalition had to find a consen-
sus on a candidate for presidential elections and to implement EMU. This
turned out to be a difficult political project. The deficit-spending Balladur
politics prior to the 1995 presidential elections had led to a stagnation of
the French economy in the run-up to the third stage of EMU and there-
fore France risked not meeting the criteria at all. From this perspective,
spring 1994 marked an outstanding low in French ‘European’ opinion
with only 39 per cent of the population thinking that integration was
beneficial to France.7 This late ‘post-Maastricht blues’ coincided with a
dramatic increase in France’s public deficit (6 per cent), a downswing in
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a dramatic unemployment rate (12.5
per cent). These circumstances were not least due to the hard-line interest
rate policy of the German Bundesbank. Indeed, since the crash of the EMS
in 1993, France saw itself as being forced into the kind of machinations
that culminated in the conclusion of the unpopular ‘Stability Pact’ in
1997. The important controversial debate on the social costs of monetary
integration began at that time.8 This forcefully split parties, separating the
‘integrationnistes’ from so-called ‘souverainistes’, namely national repub-
licans and social Gaullists, who built a coalition against a so-called
neo-liberal ‘pensée unique’. In the 1995 presidential election, concerns
about the preservation of a high level of social protection ranked second
among the voters’ preferences.9
After the election of Jacques Chirac in 1995, the newly installed Juppé
government (1995–97) finally had to take a painful U-turn by launching
rigorous budgetary cuts.10 This abrupt policy change in the middle of
1995 made the costs of the introduction of the Euro particularly manifest
in the eyes of French citizens.11 Since then the French inclination towards
the Union has again dropped to only 46 per cent of persons stating that it
was ‘a good thing for France’ in autumn 1996.12 Anticipating further
implementation conflicts and uncertainties for the conservative govern-
mental coalition, Chirac switched towards an even more critical distance
with EMU and decided at the beginning of 1997 to bring about a prema-
ture dissolution of the National Assembly to preserve ‘his’ majority from
a defeat in 1998. Even if the electoral campaign converged on the ‘Europe
Sociale’ issue shared by all important parties involved,13 the governmen-
tal coalition was ultimately broken up by its traditional internal rivalries,
a successful Front National (14.9 per cent in 1997 national election’s first
round) and a quite forceful European cleavage. The 1994 European elec-
tions had already made it quite obvious that owing to the Maastricht
conflict the fragmentation of the French right would persist.14 The bitter
quarrels after the loss of power in 1997 as well as after the regional elec-
tions in 1998, viewed in the context of the European elections in 1999,
show that today the French right is severely disoriented and unable to deal
coherently with European challenges. A solely voter oriented perspective
permits the preservation of some kind of common bottom line, namely
with regard to the important rural interests who are concerned about
changes to the status quo in the Union’s CAP. But when it came to a
parliamentary vote on another core issue, the passage to the third stage of
EMU,15 Gaullists appeared once again unable to maintain a sufficient
level of partisan cohesion adequate to the problem at stake. Obeying their
party leader Séguin, parliamentarians of the neo-Gaullist Rassemblement
pour la République (RPR) risked categorically refusing French passage to
the third stage, had not President Chirac’s intervention prevented the
worst.
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Yet the actual Socialist Party (PS) – having come through a period of
painful reconciliation with the so-called ‘Mitterrandie’ – can still be seen
as largely pro-integrationist. But even if key members of the Jospin
government have solid European convictions (e.g. Elisabeth Gigou,
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Martine Aubry) and while the rest of the left-
wing ‘souverainistes’ have had to retire to political clubs,16 Socialist
governmental policy differs from the ‘old’ approach. Whereas
Mitterrand’s European policy was characterised by functionalism
combined with a great deal of voluntarism and symbolism,17 the new
approach appears to be more pragmatic in terms of interest formulation,
in contrast with other European governments. The core preferences of the
government have been made explicit since June 1997. France’s main
concern is still a rapid achievement of EMU conditional on four factors:
an ‘economic government’ as a counterweight to the ECB; the inclusion of
southern EU members in EMU; the establishment of obstacles to a Euro-
overrating (i.e. preventing ‘monetary dumping’ with regard to the dollar
and the yen); and employment and economic growth criteria to counter-
balance the Stability Pact’s severe monetary and budgetary standards.18
With regard to European constitutive policies, France’s adhesion to the
Amsterdam acquis is not at all unconditional either: the ratification law
consists of two articles, which describe the treaty’s institutional provisions
as inept and which make further EU Treaty reform an obligatory premise
for enlargement.19 A new European rhetoric is gaining ground which does
not underline France’s European challenges (as in the Mitterrand years),
but which emphasises the growing importance of a genuine French
contribution to the European project.
This current pragmatism is combined with a proactive governmental
policy on French public opinion. As the ‘age of symbols is over’,20 there is
a continuous attempt to explain France’s European interests and advan-
tages to the – since 1997 – less and less Eurosceptic public. The 1998
campaign on the introduction of the Euro was largely supported by the
national media and above all, was furthered by Finance Minister Strauss-
Kahn, who continuously underlined the fact that it was the Euro-Zone
that protected France from the most severe effects of the Asian crisis (the
Euro as a ‘bouclier monétaire’). As a result, French public opinion was
among the most Euro-enthusiastic in the second half of 1998: 69 per cent
of persons stated that the introduction of the Euro was a ‘very good’ or a
‘good’ thing, compared to 56 per cent in Germany, 66 per cent in Spain,
67 per cent in Italy and 49 per cent in the United Kingdom.21
The organisational cohesion of French parties is feeble compared to
that of parties in other systems. If there are sub-units for European affairs,
they do not have a relevant impact on day-to-day policy-making. Still, the
capacity of high-ranking political personalities to bring about shifts in
French public opinion cannot be underestimated. As shown above, the
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developments from 1992 to 1999 are not marked only by economic
conjuncture, but also by the different degrees of governmental accommo-
dation with the European venture. The stabilisation and normalisation
which has been discernible since the re-accession to power of a party that
is more accustomed and therefore ‘fitter’ to deal with those challenges, is
similarly observable in the context of institutional adaptations and the
evolution of the system of government. In this perspective the ups and
downs of public opinion after ‘Maastricht’ also characterise a period of
governmental policy-learning. In France it appears to be increasingly diffi-
cult to search for gains in national support for government – e.g. in the
parliamentary arena – at the expense of the European level.22 Notably in
a centralised system, where governmental actors at European and national
levels are most obviously the same, this strategy risks producing addi-
tional negative outcomes at the national level. Therefore in France, where
– in the eyes of the citizen – European issues today are a major part of the
national political game,23 shifting blame to the European level is an
increasingly difficult strategy. 
The two heads: a new relationship between president and prime minister
The core element of French European policy-making was seen as the
strong proclivity to an executive-dominated style when it came to politi-
cal intercourse with the ‘exterior’. The anxiety to preserve a homogenous
image of one national interest and one sovereignty towards the outside
stood at the centre of a quite Rousseaunian concept of interest represen-
tation. That is why the paradoxical French sharing of powers between the
prime minister and the president always attracted many foreign policy
analysts. But today more and more students of French foreign policy tend
to recognise that the political and academic perception of the president’s
role in European politics is not free from simplification.24 Indeed the
reality of genuine European policy-making in the 1990s was not as
strongly affected by ‘cohabitation’ as some may have stipulated. In ‘high
politics’ a very firm sense of solidarity regarding the preservation of
France’s rank and influence among its European partners helped to
surmount the potential cleavages between the prime minister and presi-
dent in almost any situation.25 Owing to the changing character of
day-to-day European politics, the president’s policy-making functions are
constantly diminishing; in power-political terms the Chirac presidency is
a failure.26
The relative weakness of the president is accentuated by his minor role
in economic policy. The importance of EMU as the major European
venture of the 1990s generated a more and more significant role for the
prime minister and the cabinet, and a pre-eminent role for the ministers of
Finance and the Economy. Therefore the changing patterns of executive
European policy-making are not solely a result of the actual president’s
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weaknesses, rather they elucidate the long-term consequences of the
Maastricht integration boost, and a decline of presidential power in
general. This development is implied in the institutional logic of the Vth
Republic, that – under certain political circumstances – imposes a partial
limitation of presidentialism.27
The Elysée’s information tools have turned out to be too antiquated to
cope with the complexities of modern governance: the presidential ‘abso-
lutisme inefficace’28 is built on a system of counsellors centralised at the
general secretariat of the presidency. Since 1985 the President has had at
his disposal a small European unit that prepares bilateral meetings,
European summits and Franco-German meetings. But in the end, the
Elysée’s General Secretary, who depends almost entirely on the second-
ment of civil servants from ministerial departments, cannot provide the
organisational resources to fulfil the autonomous management and co-
ordination tasks that would allow a president to govern this area of
policy. From the first to the third periods of cohabitation, the president’s
isolation from the General Secretary of Government (Secrétariat Général
du Gouvernement, SGG), the interface for ministerial co-ordination,
made him more and more unsuited to intervene in day-to-day politics,
even if traditionally his close connection with the head of the General
Secretary for Inter-ministerial Co-ordination (Secrétariat Général du
Comité Interministériel, SGCI) gave him a certain oversight of ministerial
activities at the European level. Today – apart from the grand bargains
such as treaty reforms, in foreign/defence policy and in his power to ‘go
public’ (as does President Chirac when farmers’ interests are at stake) –
the French president is more or less a ‘lame duck’ in European politics.
The 1995 reform, one of the major constitutional modifications following
Maastricht,29 may be understood as a reaction to this curtailment. The
extension of the presidential referendum according to Article 11 of the
French Constitution to any bill ‘which deals with reforms relating to the
economic and social policy of the nation and to the public services
contributing thereto’ is also an attempt to recover power in EMU-related
domains.30 Consequently, as a reciprocal gesture, the actual government
– still assuming cohabitation until 2002 – seems to rely on a silent parlia-
mentarisation of the Vth Republic to legitimate its increasing claim for
executive power.31
Changes in executive–legislative relations: a revaluation of parliament
The European integration process has always had a reputation for creat-
ing a ‘democratic deficit’ in terms of a de-parliamentarisation of
policy-making. Still, in 1996 a French analyst published an article enti-
tled: ‘The European Union: An Opportunity for the French Parliament to
Recover Powers?’32 Was France to be the only country where integration
leads to power gains at the legislative level? It is evident that the basic
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pattern of the Vth Republic’s ‘parliamentarisme rationnalisé’ is not very
conducive to the effective exercise of the functions of control, legislation
and interest aggregation. Legislative functions are delegated competen-
cies, the parliament has no organisational autonomy and the government
disposes of a set of strong instruments to overrule a disobedient assembly
(e.g. ‘Vote bloqué’, ‘Question de confiance’). 
Yet the first functional organ to monitor French European policy-
making at the parliamentary level – the Delegation for European Affairs –
was created by the Senate in 1973. A similar body was created by the
National Assembly in 1979, just after the first direct elections to the EP.
As the number of permanent committees is constitutionally fixed (Article
43(2) of the French Constitution) and as the existing committees had
made little use of the expertise provided by the new ‘Délégations pour les
Affaires des Communautés Européennes’ (18 members per chamber),
their performance had been more or less a failure. They had no relevant
competencies and were permanently overlooked by governments, which
felt absolutely unshackled in their diplomatic practice of ‘foreign’ policy-
making in Brussels. 
Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s parliamentarians began to feel
a certain pressure from below: the SEM and later EMU caused socio-
economic upheavals that the constituency oriented French parliamen-
tarians could no longer ignore. Likewise the importance of the transfer of
political competencies became so great that a growing part of parliamen-
tary work was explicitly induced from above, i.e. from the European level.
This awakened parliamentary elites. The first step consisted of a rudi-
mentary reform of the delegations’ general role to inform parliament on
European matters. In 1990 membership doubled, governmental informa-
tion policy became more systematic and the Ministers for European
Affairs gained an informed parliamentary forum to present governmental
policy via the organisation of periodic hearings (Loi 90–385, 10 May
1990).
But the real breakthrough occurred in the context of constitutional
reform, on which the final ratification/referendum of the Maastricht
Treaty was conditional. The preceding decision of the Constitutional
Council (Conseil Constitutionnel, DC 92–308, 9 April 1992)33 had stated
non-conformity with the Constitution because certain Treaty provisions
such as the formulation of a common visa policy, affected ‘the essential
conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’. This ruling brought
the two chambers of parliament into a veto position which they – above
all the senate – used in a quite proficient way and against the govern-
ment’s initial dispositions. As a result, parliament extended its power to
call into question the constitutional conformity of ratification laws
(Article 54 of the French Constitution) and a revised system of parlia-
mentary screening and controlling European secondary law-making
France 223
2444Ch9  3/12/02  2:04 pm  Page 223
emerged, which is based on a new Article 88(4) of the French
Constitution:
The Government shall lay before the Assembly and the Senate any propos-
als for Community instruments which contain provisions which are matters
for statute as soon as they have been transmitted to the Council of the
Communities.
Whether Parliament is in session or not, resolutions may be passed under
this article in the manner laid down by the standing orders of each assem-
bly.
Article 88(4) gives the parliament for the first time the constitutional
right to be informed, to scrutinise and to intervene – via the tabling of
resolutions – in the conduct of French EC policy.34 These are compara-
tively strong instruments when viewed in the light of the feeble powers of
which the assemblies dispose in most of the ‘internal’ policy-making
domains. Nevertheless, motions of ‘no confidence’ remain the only parlia-
mentary instrument that allows a relatively spontaneous intervention of
parliament into current executive decision-making.35 The subsequent
significant constitutional reforms (Loi organique 95–880) aim to provide
the parliament with opportunities to fulfil its role as a ‘European’ actor by
extending the session period and by loosening the governmental monop-
oly on the parliamentary agenda. Surprisingly the government has paid
much attention to the implementation and effectiveness of the new mech-
anisms. The prime minister pointed out in several ‘circulaires’ to his
ministers that negotiations in Brussels are inconceivable without taking
into consideration the positions of the assemblies.36 These changes mark
a quite fundamental shift in executive–legislative relations in the Vth
Republic.
Parliamentarians have made regular but not excessive use of this new
instrument. Between 1993 and 1997, on 970 European proposals trans-
mitted to the assemblies, 139 parliamentary resolutions were tabled. Most
of them were in the domains of budgetary questions (24 resolutions),
foreign trade (22), energy (13), telecommunications (12) and agriculture
(10). Parliament involves itself very much in domains which are under
exclusive Community competence, above all in foreign trade, where the
European Commission – an international actor in its own right – is
severely scrutinised and supervised by the national parliament. The
National Assembly has made more active use of the new instrument of
government control than the Senate (Table 9.1). 
Problems arise when it comes to disagreements as to which issues
constitute ‘matters for statute’ following Article 88(4) of the French
Constitution. Which legislative proposals must the government transmit
to the assemblies and what are the domains where parliamentary inter-
vention is not allowed? Particularly conflictual issues include the domains
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of the second and third pillars (CFSP and JHA), the interinstitutional
agreements and Commission communications.37 Finally, parliament has
shown a great readiness to step into fields outside the EC framework and
therefore to violate the boundaries of Article 88(4), e.g. when potential
additional EU/EC competencies appear in the Commission’s green or
white papers or when Agenda 2000 was published. It is quite evident that
a limitation of parliamentary control over genuine legislative proposals in
pillar one is not in accordance with the definition of the statutory domain
given by Article 34 of the French Constitution. On the other hand, impor-
tant EC decisions may not touch the legislative domain at all while being
incendiary in political terms, e.g. the decisions on prices and market
organisation in the CAP. An irregular governmental practice of transmit-
ting proposals gave rise to further suspicions surrounding the
government’s strategy. French parliamentarians legitimately call into
question the general exclusion of CAP decisions, when at the same time
the proposals on the reorganisation of wine and fruit markets – where the
French government may have found it difficult to defend a hard-line status
quo policy at the EU level – have exceptionally been submitted to parlia-
mentary scrutiny.38
The new instrument is quite complicated to handle because the organ-
isational challenge of establishing a European ‘superstructure’ within the
constitutionally bounded Vth Republic’s assemblies was a difficult puzzle.
The National Assembly opted for a system which is based on the
European Affairs Delegation as the major pillar. Given the quite consen-
sual working style of delegations, one can easily conclude that the tabling
of resolutions is not a technique exploited by the opposition to undermine
governmental business in Brussels. However, some analysts observe an
ideological–instrumental division of labour between parliament and the
executive, ‘that offered new political levers to both, whether on the
domestic or on the international stage’,39 and provided an opportunity to
contain the forceful right-wing anti-European faction by granting it a
position within the parliamentary arena. The strong increase of govern-
mental general declarations on European policy-making in the First
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Table 9.1 Tabling of parliamentary resolutions, 1993–April 1997 





1997 (April) 6 3
Source: Statistiques Parlementaires, Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale/
Bulletin du Sénat (1993–97).
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Chamber from five (1984–90) to fifteen (1991–97)40 demonstrates the
changing political mentalities and the strengthening of the link between
parliament and the executive. Today, the National Assembly and the
Senate have become full players in their own right in French European
policy-making.
Administrative co-ordination and interest intermediation in European
policy-making
In a context of increasing domestication, the French Constitution’s Article
20 gives the government a more and more manifest role to play in
European policy-making. Almost all ministries have had to further their
institutional adaptation since the beginning of the 1990s, but in contrast
to other Member States, none of them exercises a core function in hori-
zontal co-ordination. Even if the Minister for Foreign Affairs (as well as
the Minister for Finance) has many horizontal insights, it would be quite
exceptional for such a minister to deal with an EC issue from start to
finish. In addition neither minister is responsible for the co-ordination of
Paris-Brussels policy-making. 
The Foreign Affairs ministers are normally elected by the president.
Even during cohabitation periods, the choices of Raimond (1986), Juppé
(1993) and Védrine (1997) had the support of the head of state.41 The
ministry’s organisational set-up is threefold: the General Directorate for
Political and Security Affairs covers mainly CFSP issues, the General
Directorate for European Economic Affairs treats issues such as EU trade
policy and representation in international economic organisations, and the
Directorate for Judicial Affairs represents France in trials at the ECJ.42 The
corresponding tasks of the minister himself lie in his presence within the
General Affairs Council and subsequent executive EU organs, of course the
ministry has privileged access to the French Permanent Representation in
Brussels. However since the introduction of a European Affairs Ministry at
the end of the 1970s, the European Affairs Minister has often acted as a
substitute for the Minister for Foreign Affairs.43 As the former minister is
integrated into the Foreign Affairs Ministry, s/he does not have a specific
portfolio, but prepares and co-ordinates the French presidencies, monitors
public opinion and deals with European campaigning (as did Guigou at
‘Maastricht’) as well as the information of political and economic actors at
the domestic level and in Brussels (e.g. Cresson, Barnier). Since Maastricht,
the Ministers for European Affairs are explicitly charged with establishing
‘a close dialogue with MEPs and delegates at the Committee of Regions in
order that the government’s concerns may be incorporated into the work of
these two institutions’.44 The responsibilities assigned to the Jospin govern-
ment’s European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici comprised the full
range of questions concerning European integration, including institu-
tional questions and the process of defining the CFSP.
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Today almost all departments have established units that deal exclu-
sively with European matters.45 The management of European
programmes such as the ESF and the ERDF is provided by the Ministry of
Labour/Social Affairs and the Home Affairs Ministry, respectively.
Problems mainly arise when these units are set up in a mode that interferes
with the hierarchical patterns of intra-ministerial co-ordination in France.
Indeed, the fact that functional units (in highly Europeanised ministries
such as agriculture there may be several sub-units) dealing with European
issues operate horizontally clearly does interfere with this hierarchical
pattern and can lead to overlapping responsibilities and potential
conflicts. This artificial ‘Europeanisation’ – creating new administrative
strata dealing especially with European Affairs – is expanding and deeply
penetrating the ministerial hierarchies: more than half of the ministries
have created ‘cellules européennes’ even at the ‘bureau’ level.46 Moreover
it is a standard operating procedure that in the case of intersectoral
conflicts, the ministerial ‘cabinet’ serves as a clearing-house. The cabinets
are at the heart of French ministries and are composed of young, brilliant
bureaucrats and personal assistants trusted by their minister. At this top
level of bureaucracy, the organisational differentiation for European
matters is more functional. Today most French ministers appoint within
their cabinets a special counsellor for European Affairs who may shape
and streamline the department’s position in case of internal frictions and
who represents the department’s interests at interministerial meetings
within the SGCI.47 In a top-down perspective the creation of European
sub-units at very low levels of the administrative hierarchy seems to be
advantageous. As ministerial problem-solving ‘à la française’ always
comprises the cabinet’s opportunity to overrule hierarchical steps and to
bypass the department’s directors, special access points for European
matters would seem to make sense. However some observers consider the
expansion of cabinets’ tasks to be one of the great flaws of the French
system. This is not only because such expansion constitutes the driving
force behind the politicisation of the French central administration, but
also because it promotes the diffusion of decision-making points for civil
servants who have to interact not only with their regular superiors but
also with many ministerial collaborators to bring about a decision.48
Given the complexity of interministerial co-ordination tasks, France
opted early on for a strong and centralised system at the domestic level to
guarantee coherent interest representation at the European level. The
linchpin of this politico-administrative co-ordination is the famous
governmental secretariat, SGCI. Its responsibilities comprise the whole
range of EC activities, enlargements and – since 1994 – pillar three poli-
cies, Schengen, the Dublin Convention and any other convention
following Article 31 (ex Article K.3).49 The SGCI’s general secretary regu-
larly fulfils a double function as he or she has often additionally been a
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counsellor within the prime minister’s or president’s cabinets (e.g. de
Silguy for Prime Minister Balladur and Guigou for President Mitterrand).
The structure serves as a link between the ministerial departments and
parliament in Paris and the French Permanent Representation at Brussels.
It works under the sole and therefore uncontested authority of the prime
minister. The failure of its brief inclusion into the Ministry for European
Affairs at the beginning of the 1980s was not only for functional reasons
but may also have been a result of the rivalry and mistrust between the
different ministerial ‘elite corps’ (e.g. Inspection des Finances, Corps des
Mines) in France.50
One cannot underestimate the weight and the power of the SGCI which
seems to dominate all stages of the French European policy-making
process. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty it has not only
fully integrated pillar three politics, but has also increasingly centralised
control over the implementation stage and over co-ordination in the
context of adjudication. Likewise one should not overlook the attention
paid by the SGCI to the French presence within European institutions.
This is not only a power-political concern but reflects equally the recur-
rent French tendency to control national civil servants and their opaque
activities in Brussels.51 SGCI is a lean administrative unit and from the
conclusion of the SEA to the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, its
staff has grown by about one-third. Given the many tasks it must under-
take, this is not at all excessive. The co-ordination duties of SGCI have
steadily increased with the multiplication of actors and policies at the EU
level: furthermore, instead of recognising the difficulties of dealing with
the entire scope of EU policies – except for CFSP – by opting for a diver-
sification after Maastricht, the SGCI has extended and strengthened the
coercive functions which it has always exercised over ministerial depart-
ments. The growing impact of transnational administrative interaction52
is perceived as a threat to the ‘coherence of French positions’. Thus the
SGCI controls and supervises the activities of national actors, e.g. in the
following areas:
• The information which ministries send to French MEPs.
• Any ministerial ‘chargés de mission’ who contacts an MEP is 
obliged to send an exact report stating what has been presented as ‘the 
French position’ to the SGCI.
• Any document transferred by the Home Office – which is responsible
for regional policy and structural funds – to the Committee of Regions
must be dispatched by the SGCI.53
Given this extremely elevated degree of centralised co-ordination, it is
not surprising that the prime minister has tended to play an increasingly
active role in the context of internal European bargains and as an arbiter
between the different ministerial departments. Since the establishment of
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the Vth Republic, the prime minister has intervened only as chairman of
interministerial arbitrage sessions in exceptional circumstances, mainly
because of the technicality of most European matters and the opportunity
to make issues ‘remonter à l’Elysée’.54 But today’s limitation of presiden-
tialism and the revaluation of the prime minister’s role are both part of a
‘normalisation’ process that makes the SGCI a perfect forum for political
action as is any other domain at the domestic level (Table 9.2).
Table 9.2 Personnel and activities of the SGCI, 1958–97
Interministerial Committee’s Number of civil Interministerial
arbitrage sessions, chair: servants at SGCI working sessions
prime minister
1958–75: 4 1971: 88
1976–81: 4 1988: 133 1991: 1090
1982–93: 0 1992: 147 1992: 1136
1994–97: 21 1997: 175 1997: 1700
Source: Sauron (1998), pp. 14 f.
‘Traditional’ interest intermediation in France is characterised by elite
networks and pressure politics among high-ranking economic actors at
the senior levels of the administrative hierarchy.55 Anglo-American
‘lobbying’ techniques that consist of the provision of detailed practical
information to the civil servant dealing with the specific technical matter
are used rather rarely. However, this is the prevailing policy style at the
European level. As Vivien Schmidt puts it: ‘Although French civil servants
might have felt at home with the centralised hierarchical style with which
the Commission President, Jacques Delors, ran the Commission and dealt
with Directorates General, they were not attuned to the overall decision-
making process.’56 Large agencies, which are still quite at least partially in
state ownership, have their own Brussels representations (e.g. Enérgie de
France, Renault) and benefit at the same time – for the reasons of
‘copinage’ described above – from privileged access to French EU actors.
By contrast, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other actors
are doubly disadvantaged; one of their few access points being the French
employers’ representation in Brussels. State actors increasingly perceive
the deficient comprehension of mediation styles as indirectly weakening
France’s position in negotiations.57 Apart from their representation in
corporatist structures such as UNICE, non-governmental actors perform
poorly in day-to-day lobbying at the ‘lower’ levels of the EC administra-
tion. French socio-economic interests may therefore be absent from
important informal networks, where the early stages of decision prepara-
tion take place. As regards the representation of labour interests, the
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picture is even worse. Prior to 1999, France’s second trade union, the
communist Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), with about
650,000 members, was completely absent from the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC). Given the extension of social partners’
competencies through the ‘Social Dialogue’ (Social Protocol of Maastricht
Treaty) and the impact of subsequent EC legislation in France, this is quite
an extraordinary situation. The position of French trade unions looks
even worse when compared to the powerful representation of German
trade unions at the Brussels level.58
This lacuna is now fully recognised and therefore since the beginning
of the 1990s there has been a growing tendency of the French government
to supervise and to ‘coach’ national economic and social actors in
Brussels. French state actors increasingly interpose in business interac-
tions at the EU level and try to smooth the integration of national
economic actors into Brussels decision-making and to make them more
familiar with a pluralistic mode of interest representation.59 The institu-
tion that plays a key role in this context is the Permanent Representation
in Brussels. Apart from the normal working routines of any Member
State’s Permanent Representation, the French Permanent Representation
fulfils further functions. Since Cresson’s invention through a ‘Groupe
d’études et de mobilisation’ (GEM), which was designed to encourage
interactions between the politico-administrative world and economic
actors, the Permanent Representation has played an important role in
training and in the provision of information, e.g. on Structural Funds
and programmes on behalf of SMEs. Today the ‘Cellule Entreprises
et Coopération’ absorbs about 11 per cent of the Permanent
Representation’s personnel.60 Since 1996, economic actors who experi-
ence difficulties when doing business within the SEM, have had the
opportunity to call for support at the Bercy ministry’s ‘Mission Marché
Unique’. This new organ is an administrative structure situated at the
‘Direction des Relations économiques extérieures’ (DREE), that co-oper-
ates with the Permanent Representation, the SGCI, the European
Commission and Bercy’s regional and Europe-wide centres for economic
expansion. An important task of this unit is to take other Member States
before the ECJ, when French SMEs are confronted with problems owing
to non-compliance with EC law (above all in public procurement
matters).61
At the same time, the government tends to set up better access struc-
tures for the French economy and civil society at the national level, mainly
through the intensive governmental promotion of Euro-Info-Centres
(affiliated with the regional chambers of commerce). Following an initia-
tive of Elisabeth Guigou, another structure, ‘Sources d’Europe’, has been
set up in Paris which serves almost the same purpose. It is important to
note that ‘Sources d’Europe’ is a unique construction as it results from a
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common initiative of the European Commission and the French govern-
ment and is financed by the Commission, the EP and the French
government. 
The sub-national level: European re-centralisation of regional politics?
Despite the ‘Deferre laws’ on decentralisation introduced at the beginning
of the Mitterrand era,62 France still counts among the most centralised
systems in the Union. That is why – apart from representation in the CoR
– a role for French regions is still almost non-existent in European deci-
sion-making, their functions being confined to the implementation of EC
programmes addressed specially to them. 
One of the great achievements of the 1982 reforms was the valuation
of autonomous ‘departemental’ executives and administrations, repre-
sented by the Conseils Généraux. This could have been an incentive for
French state actors in regional politics, above all the interministerial unit
attached to the Ministry for Regional Planning and the Prime Minister
(Délégation à l’Aménagement du Terretoire et de l’Action Régionale,
DATAR), to choose the newly empowered ‘departements’ as their major
counterparts for the implementation of EU policy. But the French state
opted, on the contrary, for its own representatives at the sub-national
level by charging regional civil servants with supervising the execution of
EU programmes and managing the distribution of funds. The political
linchpin of this system are the regional ‘préfets’, who co-ordinate the
interaction between regional and departmental actors and the ‘services
déconcentrés’, the central state’s field services (e.g. the regional directions
of the Labour Ministry), controls the assignment of funds and supervises
the implementation of EC programmes. The choice of ‘genuine’ regional
actors to participate in the regional set-up of EC programmes is often
conditional on the existing structures within the framework of the state–
regions contract and the subsequent five-year plans. Those contractual
policies fit very well with the regulative modus operandi of EU regional
schemes.63 Eligibility for funding is assessed through a database, the
‘Document unique de programmation’ (DOCUP), administrated by the
territorial services of the central administration. Officially there is no
opportunity for sub-national units to interact directly with the EU level
without being supervised by central state actors. Demands for funding
must always be sent to regional ‘préfets’ and when it comes to the alloca-
tion of European funds, the recipient must sign a convention with the
French state services that explains ‘the conditions of implementation of
the project’.64 Thus the central administration acts as a ubiquitous inter-
face between the Commission and the regional level and uses this position
as a source of power. The structural funds have been the central factor for
the reorganisation of the ‘services déconcentrés’. DATAR, as the only
access point to the EU level, has enhanced its status after a loss of
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influence at the beginning of the 1980s.65 Today, links to the state field
services are a much more promising strategy for obtaining subventions
than the regular intercourse with autonomous regional administrations.
As Balme and Jouve (1996) put it: ‘Paradoxically, the main effect of the
Europeanisation of local government seems [to be] the regionalization of
the state, not an emerging regionalism.’66 Even if the French regions have
gained some weight as political units, because they are a target for
European policy-making,67 Europeanisation has also led to a re-centrali-
sation of power and not to a systematic mobilisation of sub-national
actors as the European Commission may have intended. This may help to
explain why more and more regions have established their own represen-
tations in Brussels: by 1997 about twenty regions or associations of
regions had done so (e.g. ‘Bureau Alsace’, ‘Bureau de coopération des
régions Centre-Atlantique’).
The national policy-cycle: the central state as a gatekeeper
It is no longer adequate today to speak of separate Brussels and Paris
stages of Community negotiation; rather it is now the case that any aspect
of the policy-cycle can simultaneously involve any of the different levels
of government (Figure 9.1).68
The preparation and making of decisions
Normally a proposal for a directive is communicated by the Commission
to the Permanent Representation, which transmits it by fax to the SGCI.
The Secretariat fulfils the functions of dispatching when it determines and
contacts the relevant ministries demanding written observations. Already
at this stage of the process, the sectoral specialists are invited to compose
a detailed report on the impact on national legislation. The relevant
ministry (‘ministère chef de file’) will usually be equally concerned when
it comes to the presentation of bills at the transposition stage of the
policy-making process. 
Before the proposals are officially forwarded to the assemblies, a kind of
pre-selection has to be accomplished (is the proposal ‘legislative’ in terms
of Article 34 of the French Constitution?). This expertise, which had to be
reorganised in 1993, is provided mainly by the Council of State (Conseil
d’Etat), now an important national actor as it plays a core role in improv-
ing the parliament’s chances of becoming a full player in the EC legislative
process.69 That is why today the reports of the Conseil d’Etat on the legisla-
tive or regulative quality of a proposal have to be published.70 In addition,
following the initiative of Juppé, all ‘legislative’ proposals – even those
from pillars two and three – are transmitted to the assemblies, which, in the
case of non-EC proposals, are allowed only to adopt ‘conclusions’ and not
to table ‘resolutions’ (that give rise to the parliamentary reserve described
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below). The Conseil d’Etat has fifteen days to provide its analysis, while the
relevant ministries draw up lists of legislative texts that may have to be
modified following Community legislation in the affected domain. A
broader ‘étude d’impact juridique’ may be carried out by the ministry ‘chef
de file’ within a period of one month if the legislative consequences of a
European text seem to be particularly important.71 The ministerial analysis
should focus, among other things, on the legitimacy of the proposal regard-
ing the principle of subsidiarity (Table 9.3).
Table 9.3 Statistics concerning the legislative impact of European proposals
following the rulings of the Conseil d’Etat (Article 88(4)), 1993–98
1st (EC) 2nd (CFSP) 3rd (JHA) Total Legislative (according
Year pillar pillar pillar number to Article 34 or
the constitution) 
1993 994 0 0 994 179
1994 1038 0 141 1179 172
1995 1060 2 985 2045 213
1996 1221 77 1445 2743 192
1997 1136 78 1019 2233 214
1998 1144 145 926 2215 277
Source: Sauron (1998, p. 107; 1999, p. 200).
In cases of a probable legislative transposition the SGCI transfers the
ministerial positions to the General Secretary of Government (SGG) and
the Conseil d’Etat submits its report. The SGG co-ordinates general
governmental work in any domain of state activity. If the SGG states a
necessity of legislative involvement, it sends the Community proposal to
the presidents of the two assemblies. The proposals are notified, published
as parliamentary documents and mentioned in the French Official
Journal.
At the administrative level, the negotiating ministerial experts periodi-
cally transfer information on the progress of deliberations to the SGCI, the
Conseil d’Etat and the Ministry for European Affairs. A unique position
can be maintained at all levels of negotiation (expert groups, COREPER
and the Council of Ministers). Consultations are systematically controlled
by the SGCI and by the prime minister’s cabinet as a last recourse. This is
due above all to the practice of involving the same few persons during
all three stages of negotiation.72 Since 1994 the assemblies have explicitly
had to be informed of the current agenda of the Council of Ministers. But
one major lacuna resented by the assemblies is the fact that they are
not informed by the French government of COREPER’s agenda. Therefore
two-thirds of decision-making, the ‘A-points’ decided upon at the
COREPER level and only rubber-stamped by the Council, pass rather
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unnoticed despite – or possibly because of – the conflictual nature of many
of these issues.73 Nevertheless, regular working contacts between ten
sectoral specialists at the National Assembly’s ‘Division des Communauté
et de l’Union européenne’ (sub-unit of the European Affairs Department)
and their counterparts at the Permanent Representation in Brussels, seem
to be the dominant method of parliamentary information gathering.74
Given the large number of legislative proposals, the assemblies have
had to find a way of reducing the risk of a European ‘overload’. A second
modification in the National Assembly’s Standing Orders (RAN) Article
151 in 1994 underlined the eminent function of the parliamentary dele-
gation in this context (of minor importance in the Senate).75 The National
Assembly’s delegation examines all texts that have been transmitted by
the SGG (Table 9.4).
Table 9.4 The National Assembly’s checklist for European legislation
1 Treaty basis of proposal, voting procedures at the Council, involvement of EP
2 Date of transmission at the Council/date of reception at the parliament’s
presidency
3 Reasons for EU activity/subject matter/content
4 National legislation engendered
5 French and other Member States’ positions
6 Agendaa
Note: a See Assemblée Nationale, Le Nouveau Règlement de l’Assemblée Nationale (Paris,
1994), pp. 124f.
One of the most important criteria for parliamentary evaluation of a
proposition in the Senate is the attention paid to the subsidiarity princi-
ple.76 The delegations formulate ‘conclusions’ of which their
chambers/permanent commissions are informed and which may or may
not suggest further implications for the decision-making process. Since
1994 in the National Assembly, the delegation may instantly nominate its
own ‘rapporteur d’information’, who is able to submit an immediate
proposal for a ‘resolution’ (two-thirds of the resolutions tabled at the
National Assembly have this origin). Following this, any proposals must
pass through a permanent commission in order to come into force (time
limit: four weeks, Standing Orders Article 151–2).77 Anyway in most
cases – even if the formal denomination of a rapporteur occurs only at the
permanent commission level – the competent MP is also a member of the
European Affairs delegation. Before autumn 1998 only six resolutions
had emanated autonomously from a permanent commission as the initia-
tory body in the National Assembly.78 Thus in contrast to the Senate, the
National Assembly’s delegation has seemingly acquired perhaps not the
statute but at least the functions of a European affairs committee. Finally,
the relevant commission adopts the resolution directly provided that,
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within eight days, the government and the presidents of the standing
commissions, delegations and political groups have not called for a floor
session (40 per cent of resolutions debated, 1993–97).79 When it comes to
the tabling of a resolution, the SGCI has to be informed at an earlier stage. 
The follow-up at the Brussels-level is twofold:
• If the Council intends to put the subject matter on its agenda in less
than fourteen days, the SGCI instructs the Permanent Representative to
intervene and to assert a ‘parliamentary reserve’ 
• If the Council intends to put the subject matter on its agenda in more
than fourteen days, the SGCI instructs the Permanent Representative to
try to demand a postponement until a ‘prise de position du Parlement
français’.80
One European proposal may give rise to several parliamentary initia-
tives, which are pooled at the level of the relevant commission. However,
there is no special instrument available to parliament with which it may
closely observe further decision-making under the EP’s co-decision proce-
dure. Nevertheless, the SGCI provides a full service for the French MEPs.
It sends a ‘note de cadrage’ detailing the interministerial positions as early
as possible, before the EP becomes fully involved in the legislative process.
Since ‘Maastricht’, every ministry has appointed a ministerial ‘chargé de
mission’ for EP matters (a full-time civil servant at the Ministries for
Agriculture, Transport and Industry) who is charged with transmitting a
memorandum and a ‘tableau indicatif de vote’ on the legislative proposi-
tion in question, to the SGCI’s ‘Parlement’ (PARL) department. These
memoranda are sent to the leaders of the parliamentary groups at the EP
and all eighty-seven French MEPs receive a ‘lettre circulaire’, that indi-
cates the French position. It is curious to note that because of the new role
played by MEPs in EC law-making since ‘Maastricht’, they are ‘better’
informed than national parliamentarians on French governmental prefer-
ences and positions defended at COREPER and the Council of Ministers.
Neither the National Assembly nor the Senate regularly receive ‘explana-
tory memoranda’ that could help them to seize early on the relevant issues
at stake. This may be one of the reasons behind the strong parliamentary
attempt to integrate French MEPs into the work of the ‘Délégations’.81 It
might also explain why the French Senate – following an initiative of its
president Poncelet – has recently inaugurated a Brussels office in order ‘to
be better associated and better informed about law-making in the
European institutions.’82
Decision implementation and monitoring
Until 1986 there was no central co-ordination of the implementation of
EC policies in France. But the shortcomings, especially in the context of
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the SEM programme and the growing number of cases at the ECJ, have
made the need for a reorganisation of the application of EC law rather
urgent.
In 1989 a report from the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) underlined
certain deficiencies which Prime Minister Rocard attempted to reduce. In
a ‘circulaire’ from January 1990, he underlines the sectoral responsibili-
ties for the correct application of EC directives and regulations in
ministerial departments but equally evokes a strengthening of the SGCI’s
functions in monitoring EC law in France. Here again, as in its co-ordi-
nation functions in the preparation and making of decisions, the SGCI
sees its responsibilities reinforced rather than decentralised.
After the adoption of a directive, the SGCI sends the text to the SGG
and the affected ministries. Three months later the administration must
present an agenda for transposition and application. The agenda is set
provided that the SGCI, the SGG and the ministries give their assent (if
not, the prime minister intervenes). As shown for the stages of decision
preparation and decision-making, the (1994) ‘études d’impact juridique’
and the analysis of the Conseil d’Etat may contribute to a consideration
of implementation difficulties even prior to the final deliberations at the
Community level. Any legislative text is followed up by the SGCI from the
Commission initiative through to a trial at the ECJ.83
After notification of the application measures, the SGCI controls imple-
mentation, manages the interministerial agenda and observes the
parliamentary legislative process.84 Parliament is again involved following
the constitutional distinction between legislative and regulative spheres.
Even if since 1995 there has been a formal obligation for government to
enlighten the European legislative source in the French ‘projet de loi’
explicative note, parliament is not systematically informed of the European
impact of proposals. Nevertheless, the greater transparency of the deci-
sion-making process at the EU level leads to greater political pressure on
the government to be more accountable. This is particularly the case on
issues for which ministers cannot prove to have negotiated successfully at
the European level after the tabling of a parliamentary resolution in Paris
(See the example of the voting rights directive). However, genuine parlia-
mentary legislative initiatives (‘proposition de loi’) transposing EC
directives into French law, still remain exceptional.85 Finally, an increasing
number of ‘last-resort’ actions by interest groups can be observed at the
decisive stage of the Franco-European policy-making process. For
example, small producers and other social groupings which are unable
and/or unwilling to act at the European level attempt to obstruct the
correct application of EC law not only in interactions with enforcing
administrations (see the ‘Strawberry War’)86 but also by influencing
the national representation. Indeed, the ‘outcry’ of French huntsmen
against the provisions of the EC directive on the protection of wild birds
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and subsequent national initiatives provides a famous example of such
voter orientation.87 In this perspective the strengthening of parliament’s
role perhaps marks an alteration of French regulative culture, which was
traditionally based on the flexibility of the implementing administrations88
rather than on the integration of concerned groups at an earlier stage of the
decision-making process, such as at the parliamentary level.
Decision adjudication: the politics of preliminary rulings
The French Constitution, in general, is orientated towards treaties which,
together with subsequent legislation, are more or less exempt from consti-
tutional challenge. Whereas the Constitutional Council (Conseil
Constitutionnel) is not competent to examine the conformity of statutes
to the stipulations of a treaty,89 the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) has
achieved a slow but significant accommodation with the inevitable. This
has occurred first, through the establishment in 1989 of the superiority of
the EC Treaty over national lex posterior in the Council of State’s
‘Nicolo’-ruling.90 Later the superiority of regulations in the ‘Boisdet’
ruling and even that of directives in ‘Rothmans International’ was estab-
lished. However, the ‘Costa/Enel’ doctrine of direct effect is still not fully
accepted and, theoretically, European law has to be explicitly incorpo-
rated into the body of national rules to be effective. This approach (the
refusal to give up the ‘gatekeeping’ role) still influences French politics
surrounding the implementation of treaty reforms.91
In the early 1990s France was among the less compliant countries in the
EU: from 1993–95 it occupied first place in respect of presumed treaty
infringements.92 But despite some exceptional cases of non-compliance,
e.g. in the women’s night-work case,93 the situation improved at the end
of the decade. In the case of ECJ actions against France, interministerial
co-ordination is again provided by the SGCI. The Foreign Affairs
Ministry’s lawyers represent French interests at the ECJ. But most of the
ECJ rulings originate not from treaty infringement but from the domain
of preliminary rulings, in co-operation with the national courts.
Since the mid-1990s the French government had a quite proactive
policy on preliminary rulings that culminated in 1997 in a monitoring
arrangement which more or less bound the French courts to governmen-
tal processes. The Minister for Justice’s European department (SAEI) in
co-operation with the SGCI, organises control of the ‘appropriateness’
when courts bring Article 234 ECT matters before the ECJ. The SGCI also
intervenes, organising interministerial meetings to define a common strat-
egy concerning the question raised,94 and – if necessary – to ‘reformulate
the preliminary ruling suggested by the party from which the demand for
a ruling emanates’.95 The independence of French courts to request the
ECJ to give a ruling thereon seems to be of minor importance, e.g. when
French budgetary interests are at stake.
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The underlying principle of such measures, i.e. the notion of a unique
‘French interest’ that is to the common advantage of all citizens, provides
an interesting perspective on the functions of EC law within the Member
States. The abrupt downward trend in French courts’ referrals to the ECJ
from 1995 onwards is surely part of a general trend at that time, but it
undoubtedly marks a policy that has been repeatedly described as being
characterised by a ‘culte de cohérence’.96
Conclusion: changes after Amsterdam? The transformation of govern-
ment in France
The ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam – as with the Treaty of
Maastricht – was conditional on constitutional reform resulting from a
decision of the Constitutional Council.97 The ruling referred to the non-
conformity of the Amsterdam Treaty with the Constitution because
certain treaty provisions, such as the use of QMV on asylum policy,
affected ‘the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’.
The governmental ‘projet de loi’ for the constitutional reforms, adopted a
very low profile compared to the important changes brought up by the
last ‘European’ constitutional revision. Eventually, the assemblies voted
for a quite consensual and un-political revision that produced only small
effects on the making of European policy in France. Article 88(2) of the
Constitution was amended to integrate the transfer of competencies in
asylum policy. Article 88(4) was revised in such a manner that all docu-
ments (EC and EU) containing provisions which were matters for statute
were to be placed before the assemblies as soon as they had been trans-
mitted to the Council of Ministers. This new regulation modified the
day-to-day practice of parliamentary scrutiny as it broadened the oppor-
tunities for tabling resolutions to second and third pillar issues.98 The
ratification law itself took the quite exceptional form of a political state-
ment as it posed in Article 2 ‘des progrès substantiels dans la voie de la
réforme . . . afin de rendre le fonctionnement de l’Union plus efficace et
plus démocratique’ as a precondition for further enlargement.99 It is
important to bear in mind that once again, France did not opt for a consti-
tutional ‘general clause’ that would have made future treaty revisions
easier to implement. In contrast to the German Constitution’s Article 23,
for example, Article 88(2) of the French Constitution still strictly confines
constitutional adaptation to the competencies enumerated in the present
Treaty.
This attitude represents a phenomenon that is typical for governmental
policy on procedures in French European policy-making. In this context,
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty marks a turning point. From a
quantitative perspective, institutional adaptation processes after 1992
seem to be inflationary compared to those of the 1980s. What were the
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major challenges encountered by the French model during this period?
Two general efforts mark the behaviour of governments and political
elites: first, a pro-active policy through an opening up of the decision-
making structures when French bargaining positions may be at stake, and
secondly, a greater centralised control over French actors when the differ-
entiation and multiplication of opportunity structures risks the
dissolution of ‘the coherence of French positions’ into multiple multi-level
interactions. The impelling underlying force seems to be to regain control
over the ‘Europeanisation’ process in France and not to lose oversight of
regulation processes at the European level. 
The opening up of the political game is manifest with regard to a
number of factors including: public opinion; the ‘normalisation’ of
Franco-European policy-making owing to the limitations of presidential
power; the empowerment of parliament; the politicisation by prime minis-
terial intervention in interministerial bargaining on European affairs; the
acceptance of the EP as a full player in EU politics; the establishment of
channels of influence at the administrative level and the desperate
attempts of state actors to teach lobbying techniques that can make
French actors more suited to multi-level networking. On the other hand
there has been a manifest strengthening of governmental coercion of the
two players that have gained new influence through direct access points
provided by the Union: the national courts and the regions. It is not at all
accidental that the central state explicitly interposes itself as a gatekeeper
in the two domains where EU players tend to bypass the national state as
a relevant actor. As a result of this, reform processes that have been
undertaken in a strictly national modernisation perspective – such as in
the case of decentralisation – have been partly undermined. Compared to
these transformations, systemic stability is prevailing above all at the level
of administrations and interministerial co-ordination. The SGCI, as the
central organ in Paris–Brussels interactions, still seeks to absorb and to
centralise most EU policy-making tasks at the stages of policy formulation
and decision-making. Instead of opting for sectorisation to combat imple-
mentation deficits at the lower levels of administration, it has chosen to
centralise policy-making at the implementation stage.
Indeed this interpretation of systemic adaptation parts company from
a top-down analysis that assumes rational governmental behaviour.
However, institutional and political choices have not always produced the
anticipated outcomes and syncretistic changes of institutional and behav-
ioural patterns are emerging at all levels of French politics and society. If
our approach was useful for the comprehension of more or less rational
strategies of government, it similarly uncovers the first ‘unintended conse-
quences’ of the pro-active opening up of the state- and executive-centred
system. In this perspective, the effects of the ‘Maastricht’ conflict that
marked the end of executive-dominated ‘foreign policy’ style in French
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European policy-making and which prevented the government from being
able to shift blame to the European level may serve as one of the best
examples. Another illustration is the changing character of French parlia-
mentarism that today alters executive–legislative relations in an
unforeseen and unintended way and which is alienating the institutional
scheme of the Vth Republic. Regarding the process of ‘Europeanisation’
at the politico-institutional level, today’s France is an example of a quite
successful transformation of governance. But if subsequent societal and
cultural processes operate at the same speed, this may still be open to
debate. 
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Introduction: EU membership as part of the National Project
Membership of the European Union since 1973 represented for Ireland
the achievement of a roof or a shelter for its national project of moderni-
sation. Following a re-assessment of Ireland’s economic policy in 1958,
when a decision was taken to pursue external-led economic growth
financed by multinational investment, membership of the large European
market with its CAP became highly desirable. Economic growth was
necessary to alleviate the political and social consequences of low
incomes, emigration, high unemployment and low productivity. The
highly conscious change marked a reversal of protectionist economic poli-
cies. EU membership was about providing Ireland with the opportunities
to ‘catch-up’ economically with mainstream Europe, to make Ireland
more like urbanised, industrialised Europe and thus less like the kind of
Ireland the original state-builders wanted to construct. EU membership
was also likely to help in relation to the traditional concerns of Irish
nationalism, notably by providing a multilateral context within which to
tame or modify its asymmetrical political and economic relationship with
the United Kingdom. Hence European integration was regarded from the
beginning as a positive-sum game by the Irish state elite and Irish society.
In Europe, Ireland was attempting to consolidate its economic and politi-
cal independence and re-discover its society’s internationalist traditions.
The period since joining the Union largely confirmed the early expec-
tations of membership. In the Union, Irish politicians and policy-makers
adapted with relative ease to the demands of multi-level governance. They
had a keen sense that for a small state the ‘pooling of sovereignty’ actu-
ally enhanced autonomy and freedom of action. There were few
reservations in Ireland about traditional doctrines of sovereignty. Apart
from the question of military alliances, there was an easy fit between
domestic concerns and the Union’s policy regimes, which enabled succes-
sive Irish governments to appear ‘communautaire’, at least when seen
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from the perspective of the preferences of the Danes or the British. This
was confirmed in 1985 at Milan, when Ireland was the only new Member
State to vote with the ‘inner six’ on the question of treaty change. From
the outset, Ireland’s two main political parties – Fianna Fail (FF) and Fine
Gael (FG) – favoured membership of the EU. The Labour party (LAB),
which opposed membership in the 1972 referendum, quickly accepted the
democratic choice of the Irish electorate but remained vigilant on such
issues as neutrality and neo-liberal market integration. It did not take a
formal position on the SEA in the 1987 referendum but supported the
TEU in 1992. The Democratic Left (DL, which dates from 1992 and
formally integrated with the Labour Party in 1999), a party further to the
left of the Labour Party, opposed the TEU but supported the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Of the remaining parties in Parliament, the Green party (G)
and a republican party, Sinn Fein, are the only two parties to continue to
oppose treaty change in the Union. There has thus been a gradual but
reluctant acceptance of EU membership across the political spectrum. EU
membership did not lead to any divisive splits in Ireland’s political parties.
An expert survey carried out in 1992 on party attitudes shows where the
parties lie on closer relationships with the Union; it remains largely accu-
rate apart from the shift in the position of DL (see Table 10.1). 
Table 10.1 Expert survey on Irish party positions
Oppose close relations with the Union Support close relations with the Union
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
SF WP G DL LAB FF PD FG
Source: Laver (1994), p. 164.
At a popular level, the Irish electorate has ratified each EU Treaty by a
comfortable majority since 1972 and has thus given its consent to the
deepening of integration since the mid-1980s. Acceptance of Ireland’s
involvement in European integration appears well rooted in the Irish body
politic and in surveys over many years, well over 80 per cent of respon-
dents believe that membership has been good to Ireland. In
Eurobarometer 48 (autumn 1997), 88 per cent of Irish respondents felt
that Ireland had benefited from membership; this was a far higher propor-
tion than for any other Member State. Support for Ireland’s membership
of the Union is not accompanied by a high level of knowledge about EU
affairs. Ireland ranks just above the Union average in such knowledge,
with 59 per cent of Irish respondents to Eurobarometer surveys display-
ing low or very low knowledge of the EU.1
There is remarkable consistency in the policy domains that were
accorded a high priority by Ireland in the Union. From the outset, empha-
sis was placed on the CAP and the need to develop cohesion policies at EU
Ireland 249
2444Ch10  3/12/02  2:04 pm  Page 249
level to assist Europe’s peripheral areas to catch-up. In addition to these,
priority was given to sectoral policies and EU regulation that were likely
to have an impact on Ireland’s competitive position and on regulatory
frameworks at national level. The Internal Market programme was thus
accorded a high priority because of the weight of EC legislation and the
need to prepare the Irish industry and the service sector for the competi-
tive shock of the 1992 programme. The TEU marked a further deepening
of integration with the inclusion of provisions on a single currency, the
CFSP and pillar three. Rather than dislodging the high-ranking policies of
the past, the TEU simply added additional priorities and concerns. The
Programme for Government (FG, LAB and DL) in 1994 and the 1997 FF
and Progressive Programme for Government highlighted the following
themes: 
• EMU: Commitment to the public debt philosophy and targets set out
in the Maastricht Treaty (Government Programme, 1994)2 and support
for the full observance of the Maastricht criteria across Europe
(Government Programme, 1997).3 Full consultation with the exposed
sectors of the economy about the potential problems faced by them in
the single currency zone.
• Structural Funds: Emphasis on the need to maximise sustainable and
long-term employment as a result of the projects undertaken
(Government Programme, 1994). The need to negotiate the continua-
tion of EU structural funds so as to avoid or mitigate any sudden shock
to the Irish economy (Government Programme, 1997).
• Social policy: Support for the Social Charter and the improvement of
working and living and working conditions (Government Programme,
1994).
• Small states: Need to protect the interests of smaller Member States in
any institutional reform. (Government Programme, 1997).
• The Presidency in 1996: Ireland took over the Presidency in the latter
half of 1996 after a succession of large-state presidencies. It was deter-
mined to show that small-state presidencies could manage the business
of the Union in an effective manner. 
Of the above, adaptation to the single currency and the reform of the
Structural Funds had the highest political and official priority. Domestic
adaptation to the challenge of competition and Ireland’s vulnerability as
a small open economy, was not however, unproblematic. Ireland had,
perhaps, the worst economic performance in Europe during most of the
1980s, as a result of international recession, which was reinforced by a
dramatic domestic adjustment to reduce public finance and balance of
payments deficits and reduce inflation. By the mid-1980s, Ireland’s
economic and social strategy was in ruins and its hope of prospering in the
Union was in considerable doubt. Ireland had to find the institutional and
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cultural capacity to overcome the failure of the 1980s. Without this the
opportunities offered by the internal market and a deepening of integra-
tion would have been lost. Gradually there was a recognition by
government and the key representatives of the two sides of industry that
‘membership of the Community does not reduce the need for clear Irish
policy aims and methods. In particular, membership of the Community
does not diminish the need for a national ability to identify solutions to
national problems – even where these required Community policies or
action.’4 Thus a key concern of this period was to ensure that Ireland’s
domestic policies were congruent with membership of a highly competi-
tive market regime. 
Irish efforts to manage ‘Europeanisation’ and internationalisation
evolved through a form of neo-corporatism known as ‘social partnership’.
This began in 1987 with the Programme for National Recovery (1987–90)
and was followed by three subsequent programmes – the Programme for
Economic and Social Progress (PESP 1990–93), the Programme for
Competitiveness and Work (PCW 1994–96) and Partnership 2000
(1997–2000). The programmes involved agreement between employers,
trade unions, farming interests and the government on wage levels in the
public and private sectors and on a wide range of economic and social
policies. The content of all programmes were negotiated in the context of
EU developments and the need to ensure that Ireland adjusted to the
demands of economic integration. The partnership approach, together
with an expansion of EU spending programmes in Ireland, produced the
much-needed recovery from the disastrous early and mid-1980s. From
1992 onwards, Ireland consistently out-performed its EU partners in
terms of economic growth, employment creation and the growth of
exports. As a result, per capita incomes in Ireland converged rapidly with
the Union. EU finance was critical in helping Ireland create the human and
physical infrastructure which fuelled economic growth and recovery. This
meant that at the end of the 1990s, Ireland had to re-position itself, as it
was no longer the poor peripheral state that joined in 1973. It is now a
successful competitor for growth and employment creation. 
Constitutional changes following the TEU
Article 29.4.3, which was inserted into the Irish Constitution in 1972
after a referendum on the question of EU membership, enabled the state
join the European Community and conferred constitutional immunity on
measures ‘necessitated’ by such membership. It did not, however, enable
the Irish state to take on new constitutional and legal obligations without
recourse to the people in a referendum, if the Union was taking on signif-
icant additional powers. The TEU was judged by the government to
require a referendum in Ireland to amend the Irish Constitution, given the
significance of the single currency project. The TEU referendum was the
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thirteenth referendum to amend the Irish Constitution, and the third on
the Union. The referendum campaign was led by the incumbent govern-
ment, a FF–PD coalition which had been formed in February 1992 under
the leadership of Albert Reynolds, the leader of Fianna Fail. The
Government White Paper on the TEU was launched in April 1992 with an
accompanying guide to the main features of the Treaty. The tone of the
government White Paper was very supportive of the TEU and recom-
mended ratification by the Irish electorate. The main message was that
membership of the Union conferred substantial economic, political and
social benefits on Ireland and that ‘staying out could only be devastat-
ing’.5 The stage was set for another routine EU referendum in Ireland.
This occasion was, however, disturbed by a High Court and Supreme
Court case on abortion and by the Danish ‘no’ vote in June 1992. During
the negotiations on the TEU, the Irish government had insisted on the
inclusion of a protocol to the Treaty which stated that no provision in the
Treaty could override the eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution
which protected the life of the unborn and gave constitutional protection
to a legal prohibition on abortion facilities in Ireland. The protocol
became embroiled in controversy because of a case in the Irish High Court
and Supreme Court (February–March 1992) about the right of a fourteen-
year-old alleged rape victim to travel to the United Kingdom to have an
abortion. The constitutional uncertainty arising from the case meant that
the TEU protocol was the subject of considerable suspicion by both the
pro- and anti-abortion lobbies. The public campaign was dominated by
contention about the impact of the protocol on women’s rights and not
on the substance of the Treaty itself. Following the Danish ‘no’ vote in
June, the government moved quickly to reiterate its commitment to a ‘yes’
vote in Ireland. In Parliament, the Taoiseach argued that:
The reasons for a ‘yes’ vote in our case are clearly in evidence, with the over-
whelming endorsement given by this House and the Seanad recently, as well
as by the full spectrum of economic and commercial interests including
employers, trade unions and farming bodies.6
Do those who advocate a ‘No’ vote here tell us how we would cope with the
sort of pressures which have hit Denmark today? Could we as an even
smaller and less wealthy economy withstand the outflow of investment
funds which would follow?7
I cannot emphasise sufficiently that a resounding ‘Yes’ will be important
here to enhance our standing in Europe and strengthen our position in EC
negotiating fora.8
In the event, the TEU was passed by a sizeable majority (69.1 per cent
‘yes’, 30.9 per cent ‘no’). Ireland was thus in a position to assume the legal
and constitutional obligations of the Treaty and once more the commit-
ment of the Irish people and not just the state elite to Ireland’s
membership of the Union was confirmed. Apart from constitutional
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change, the TEU did not in itself lead to any major institutional or proce-
dural changes in Irish Government (Figure 10.1). 
The national policy-cycle: the EU as a reference guide for internal
reform 
Overall, EU business was grafted onto the pre-existing pattern of public
policy-making in Ireland through a process of what might be called ‘inter-
nalisation’. Because of the political consensus in Ireland on Europe and
the high level of support for membership in the first referendum, Irish civil
servants did not face the challenge of participating in EU policy-making in
a hostile political or parliamentary environment. They did not have to
control, disguise or attempt to contain the impact of EU policy at national
level. Rather successive governments and the senior civil service were
largely free to chart Ireland’s course in the Union. This allowed them to
be open to the multiple streams of ‘Europeanisation’ coming from
Brussels. 
The central actors in the management of Ireland’s EU policies are the
incumbent government and senior civil servants in central administration.
Irish administrative adaptation was based on the primacy of the ‘lead
department’ for each area of EU policy that fell within its responsibility.
The primacy of the ‘lead department’ reflected Irish administrative
culture, which accorded considerable latitude to the sectoral ministries,
notwithstanding the doctrine of collective responsibility and the role of
the cabinet in co-ordinating public policy. Individual departments are
responsible for those areas of EU policy that fall within their functional
competence. Responsibility implies the preparation of Ireland’s negotiat-
ing position, attendance at Commission committees and advisory groups,
negotiations in Council working parties and subsequent implementation
of law or spending programmes. The impact of the Union is thus uneven
across the system with some ministries entrenched in the Union’s policy
processes and others with a periodic and more intermittent interest. As
new areas develop at EU level, national ministries are brought into the
Union’s policy process. A distinction needs to be made between the over-
arching, multi-sectoral and sectoral departments. The Departments of
Foreign Affairs, Finance and the Taoiseach (Prime Minister’s Office) are
the main overarching departments. The Department of Finance had the
longest tradition of involvement in EU business from the early 1960s,
whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs was transformed by member-
ship. The importance of the Finance Ministry has been enhanced by its
management of structural funds and its responsibility for EMU prepara-
tions. The role of the Taoiseach’s Department was accentuated by the
development and growing importance of the European Council. From
the beginning, the Department of Agriculture was the main sectoral
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department affected by membership, but is now one of many embedded in
the Union’s policy process. What is now called the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment has major EU responsibilities across a
range of EU policies; it services four different Council compositions.
Developments in the third pillar enhanced the presence of the Department
of Justice in EU policy-making as it takes the lead in this domain (Table
10.2). 
Table 10.2 Ministerial responsibility for EU matters in the central
administration
Overarching ministries Taoiseach’s (Prime Minister) Department
Department of Finance 
Department of Foreign Affairs
Sectoral ministries with one Department of Agriculture and Food
distinctive policy area Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Department of the Environment and Local
Government
Department of the Marine and Natural Resources
Department of Education
Department of Health and Children
Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the
Islands
Sectoral ministries with Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
multiple EU responsibilities Department of Public Enterprise
Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation
With the exception of the Department of Defence, all departments of
state have been gradually brought within the ambit of the Union’s gover-
nance structures. The intensification of ‘Europeanisation’ is apparent
across the range of public policies. 
The government and cabinet
The cabinet has the primary responsibility for the management of national
and EU policy. The core principle of cabinet government in Ireland is the
doctrine of collective responsibility which ensures that the cabinet as a
whole takes responsibility for its decisions and individual ministers are
expected to support government decisions in public. A pronounced feature
of Irish government formation since 1982 is the dominance of coalition
governments. Responsibility for EU policy does not appear to have been a
major source of tension in government formation, nor are coalition
governments any less cohesive on EU matters. EU policy is dealt with
through the normal procedures established for the cabinet. Individual
ministers bring memoranda to government on EU issues that require
monitoring or agreement by the government. Departmental ministers are
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responsible for those areas of EU policy that fall within the ambit of their
departments. They represent their departments in the EU’s ministerial
Councils and oversee the implementation of EC laws and programmes. The
key ministers are the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture,
Justice and Enterprise, Trade and Employment. In most governments since
the mid-1980s, there has been a practice of having a Minister of State
(junior minister) with a European responsibility attached to the Foreign
Ministry or the Taoiseach’s Department or both. The government elected
in June 1997 is the first government, in over a decade, not to have a minis-
ter with this responsibility. 
The pillar structure introduced by the TEU did not have any discernible
impact on Ireland’s policy style or the management of EU business, other
than to further increase the salience and reach of EU affairs. The most
significant extension in the first pillar was the single currency project
which became the responsibility of the Department of Finance. Its tasks in
relation to EMU included budgetary policy so that Ireland could meet the
convergence criteria, participation in EU committees dealing with the
evolution of single currency rules and policies and domestic preparation
for the advent of the Euro. In 1995, the Single Currency Officers’ Team
(SCOT) was established to prepare for the introduction of the Euro in the
Irish public sector. This was followed by the Euro Changeover Board,
which is responsible for the technical aspects of the changeover and infor-
mation programmes for companies and the wider society. The extension
of pillar one activities to new policy areas such as public health, culture,
education, civil protection, tourism and consumer protection was
absorbed into the workload of existing government departments and state
agencies. 
Responsibility for the second pillar remained with the Political Division
of the Department of Foreign Affairs which had been responsible since
1973 for European Political Co-Operation (EPC). As CFSP dealt essen-
tially with traditional areas of foreign policy, the Political Division had
less involvement, than the Economics Division, with government depart-
ments on the domestic side. CFSP remained largely within a relatively
small and closely-knit policy community in the diplomatic service. The
sensitivity of security policy in an Irish context, however, ensured that
there was considerable public and parliamentary scrutiny of Ireland’s
activities under the CFSP umbrella. As a direct consequence of the TEU,
Ireland assumed observer status at the WEU in 1993 together with
Denmark but remained outside the Partnership for Peace of NATO (PFP).
In January 1999, the government took a decision to join PFP. The
Department of Justice took the lead role on pillar three issues with the
Department of Foreign Affairs playing a subsidiary role. Again this was a
domain that remained largely outside cut and thrust of domestic policy-
making. 
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The national parliament
Following membership of the Union, the Oireachtas lost the ‘sole and
exclusive power of making laws’ bestowed on it by Article 15.2.1 of the
Constitution. Like other parliaments in the Member States, the Oireachtas
sought to qualify its loss of law-making powers by establishing mecha-
nisms to oversee the government’s behaviour. Besides being to some
extent accountable through the traditional mechanisms of parliamentary
questions and debates, the government is also committed to placing a
report on EU developments before the Houses of the Oireachtas twice
yearly. These reports generally arrive too late for parliament to give
serious consideration to the issues they raise. They are however, a useful
overview of developments in the Union for those deputies committed to
tracking EU business. 
In 1973 the Oireachtas established the Joint Committee on the
Secondary Legislation of the European Communities, as a watchdog
committee on EC matters. Since Ireland did not have a strong tradition of
parliamentary committees, this committee was something of a novelty at
the outset. It had twenty-five members (eighteen deputies and seven sena-
tors), with the political parties represented in proportion to their strength
in the Oireachtas. Its terms of reference allowed it to examine and report
to the Oireachtas on Commission policy proposals, legislative proposals,
EC laws, regulations made in Ireland under the European Communities
Act 1972, and all other legal instruments that flow from EC membership.
Between 1988 and 1992, the Committee published twenty-six reports, the
largest number of any parliamentary committee. 
The Joint Committee suffered from a number of constraints that
impede the work of all parliamentary committees. Its terms of reference
were very restricted, so it concentrated most of its energies on secondary
legislation and did not maintain a systematic overview of the flow of EU
policies through the legislative process. Nor could it examine major
changes in the European landscape, notably the collapse of communism
and German unification, that would shape the Community of the 1990s.
In the work that it actually did, it was hampered by a weakness of both
financial and human resources. Neither the members nor the secretariat of
the committee had the legal or technical expertise to examine many of the
complex issues involved in EC law and policies; the many time pressures
on Irish politicians do not allow them to develop the kind of expertise
required for a thorough examination of EU policies.
In response to these difficulties the FF–LAB government established a
new Joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1993.
This subsumed the work of the previous Committee on Secondary
Legislation, and also covered a much broader agenda encompassing the
state’s foreign relations as a whole. The establishment of a Foreign Affairs
Committee brought Irish parliamentary practice into line with other
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parliaments in Western Europe. The terms of reference of the Committee
established in 1993 allowed the Committee to:
• Scrutinise the estimates of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Co-Operation.
• Analyse and report on all aspects of Ireland’s international relations
including its co-operation with developing countries and Ireland’s
membership of the European Communities.
• Receive and debate the Government Annual report presented to both
Houses of the Oireachtas.
• Send for persons, but information need not be provided to the
Committee if a Member of the government certifies in writing that such
information is confidential.
• Engage the services of consultants and specialists.
Irish members of the EP including Northern Ireland may attend the
Committee but not vote.9 The Foreign Affairs Committee meets once
every two weeks and has four sub-committees; it published seven reports
between December 1993 and October 1995. 
A separate Joint Committee on European Affairs was re-established in
March 1995 as part of the 1994 Programme for Government, because the
work of the Foreign Affairs Committee left it with inadequate time for the
scrutiny of European law and wider EU developments. This meant that
the Foreign Affairs Committee no longer carried a European brief
although ambiguity remains concerning the CFSP. Both Committees
ceased to exist in June 1997 when the Parliament was dissolved and were
re-established in autumn 1997 by the new Parliament. The terms of refer-
ence of the European Affairs Committee enable it to:
• Consider such matters arising from Ireland’s membership of the
European Communities.
• Consider programmes and guidelines prepared by the Commission,
acts of the EC Institutions, regulations under the 1972/95 European
Communities Acts and other instruments necessitated by membership
of the Communities.
• Consider matters referred to it by the Houses of the Oireachtas.
• Represent the Irish Parliament at COSAC.10
The European Affairs Committee meets in plenary session once a fort-
night and has one sub-committee which deals with EC secondary
legislation. Ireland’s fifteen MEPs have the right to attend the Committee
and to participate in the discussions. It is difficult to judge the effective-
ness of the Committees as they are of relatively recent origin and have
been established at a time when there is an attempt to professionalise and
enhance the committee structure of the Irish Parliament. Neither
Committee has adequate research and administrative back-up to develop
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independent thinking on foreign and European issues. The Committees
are heavily dependent on briefing papers from the Department of Foreign
Affairs and on external consultants. Attendance at the Committees is
patchy, given the constituency duties of Irish parliamentarians. There is
some overlap and hence tension between the Committees on areas such as
the CFSP. The terms of reference of the Committees allow the Foreign
Affairs Committee to request a joint meeting with the European Affairs
Committee on matters of common activity. The Committees have
contributed to greater openness and accountability on foreign policy
matters, meetings are usually held in public and successive ministers and
officials have attended and given evidence. The Committees have also
provided a focus for the attentive public in this domain. A small coterie of
deputies and senators has become engaged in foreign policy matters. The
Government White Paper concluded that these committees have ‘signifi-
cant powers and are important instruments for maintaining the
democratic accountability of foreign policy in Ireland’.11 The involvement
of the European Affairs Committee in COSAC has also exposed Irish
parliamentarians to practices in other Member States. 
The regions
The Union has had an ambiguous impact on territorial politics in Ireland.
The Commission’s support for partnership as a principle of government
began to loosen the highly centralised nature of Irish public policy-making
and add a territorial and not just sectoral element to the operation of the
Structural Funds. The management of the Structural Funds which was
contained within the narrow confines of central government and the large
state-sponsored bodies has evolved to include diffuse interests including
local authorities, community groups, environmental groups and the social
partners, all in search of a slice of the Brussels pie. EU monies created a
new kind of politics which encouraged people to look both below and
beyond the state. Access to EU monies gave community groups additional
authority and leverage vis-à-vis central government; on the other hand,
the availability of EU largesse reinforced clientelism, a central feature of
the political culture. 
In 1988 seven sub-regional review committees were established to
oversee the operation of the Community Support Framework (CSF) in
each of the eight regions. These were largely an administrative expedient
which added a weak regional layer to the implementation of the CSF and
thereby satisfied the Commission about the operation of the ‘partnership
principle’ in Ireland. These were replaced in 1994 by eight Regional
Authorities with the task of co-ordinating the provision of public services
in each territorial unit. Provision for the authorities was made in the Local
Government Act 1991. Each Regional Authority has an EU Operational
Committee (OP) which operates alongside and partly within the
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Authorities, sharing the same secretariat. The EU Operational
Committees meet once each quarter. Whereas the committees established
in 1989 were cosmetic in nature, they have gradually carved out a pres-
ence for themselves in the policy process. The OPs from the eight regions,
operating together, have established the right to have two seats on the
national Community Support Framework Monitoring Committee and
two seats on each of the nine OP Monitoring Committees. The Regional
Authorities have taken advantage of Community Initiatives to get funding
for forty programmes in their regions. Institutionally, the Regional
Authorities are positioned between the heavily resourced central and local
governments and lack the formal attributes of public power, such as staff
and significant budgets. There are only twenty-nine full-time members of
staff working for the regional Authorities with a total budget of IEP 1.6
million per annum. 
The future of the Regional Authorities depends on what is likely to
happen vis-à-vis structural spending. Given Ireland’s exceptional
economic performance during the 1994–99 period, Ireland as a whole
cannot continue to benefit from Objective One status of the Cohesion
Funds and faces a drop in receipts from the Union’s regional policies
during the next financial period. As a consequence, the government
formally took a decision to pursue an application to EUROSTAT, the
Statistical Services of the Union, for a change in Ireland’s status as a single
region for the purposes of the structural funds. 
The government decided to divide the country into two regions, one
consisting of the current sub-regions of the West, Border, the Midlands
and counties Clare and Kerry and the other consisting of the rest of the
country. The intention was that the Western region would be eligible for
Objective One status and the rest of the country would be in transition
from Objective One. The reclassification of Ireland into two regions was
dependent on a decision by EUROSTAT, which endorsed the division
with some changes to the territorial reach of the regions proposed by the
government. Two new regions have been established with responsibility
for administering the regional dimension of Ireland’s national plan from
2000 to 2006. It remains to be seen just how much autonomy the
Department of Finance in Dublin will allow to the regions over the life of
this plan. 
The local dimension 
The 1994–99 Community Support Framework placed particular empha-
sis on the regeneration of local communities, particularly urban and rural
areas blighted by high levels of unemployment and social exclusion. The
decision to emphasise the local dimension of development stemmed from
an understanding that disadvantage and social exclusion had to be tackled
at a local level within the urban and rural communities. It reflected and
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promoted the explosion of community initiatives and innovation in
Ireland in the 1990s. Local development initiatives followed the ‘partner-
ship model’ promoted by the EU Commission throughout Europe. The
approach was to empower local communities to tackle their problems and
improve the quality of life. New institutional structures – Area-Based
Partnerships and County Enterprise Boards – have been established. EU
money was channeled through three sub-programmes:
• local enterprise;
• integrated development of disadvantaged areas;
• urban and village renewal.
The first sub-programme was implemented through thirty-five County
Enterprise Boards which had a brief to support small and micro-busi-
nesses by financing feasibility studies and start-up grants. The aim was to
engender a spirit of enterprise and entrepreneurship at local level. The
second sub-programme is the responsibility of Area Development
Management (ADM) Ltd. ADM Ltd. channeled financial support to area-
based partnerships and community groups which were attempting to deal
with social exclusion and long-term unemployment. In response to the
initiative, thirty-eight partnerships were established in both urban and
rural Ireland. In addition, thirty-two community groups benefited from
the local development initiative. The Structural Funds were used to assist
those communities making a collective effort to provide training, educa-
tion and work experience for the long-term unemployed. The third
sub-programme was designed to assist urban and village renewal in
Ireland’s cities, towns and villages. The evolving nature of the Union had
an important impact on the willingness of the Irish public service to
engage in experimentation and micro-social interventions. 
Other actors
Given the reach of the Union’s policy remit, interest groups in Ireland
have been drawn into the Brussels arena and are active in trying to influ-
ence government policy in different EU sectors. The employers’, trade
unions and agricultural interest groups have privileged access to govern-
ment through the system of social partnership. The Irish Business and
Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) is very active in EU policy and main-
tains an effective presence in Brussels with its office the Irish Business
Bureau. The farming groups are also very active in Brussels with an office
and easy access to the Irish Agricultural Ministry. The trade unions do not
maintain an office in Brussels because of the cost implications but are
active at national level and in the ETUC. All other interests active in Irish
politics at national level have learnt to play the Brussels game, notably,
the women’s groups, environmentalists and the wider voluntary sector.
The Irish Organisation for the Unemployed has developed a discernible
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presence in Brussels. Irish interests have little difficulty in playing multi-
level politics and are no longer focused only on the national government;
it remains a key player for them, but only one of many. 
Decision-making on the national level
Assessment of how decisions are made in Ireland on EU matters requires
a distinction between routine day-to-day items of EU policy and the non-
routine or ‘high-politics’ issues. With regard to the routine day-to-day
decisions in the Brussels system, the Irish approach is characterised by
considerable sectoral autonomy and delegation to the desk officer. Within
each government department, EU business is delegated to the division
dealing with the substantive area of policy at national level. Hence a
distinction is not drawn between Irish company law and EC company
law. The Company Law division of the Department of Enterprise, Trade
and Employment deals with both. Each division is responsible for prepar-
ing and servicing each Council working party that falls within its domain
and will be called on to provide briefing material for COREPER, other
high-level groups or Ministerial Councils as the need arises. The linkages
are largely internal to each department and their representatives in the
Permanent Representation in Brussels. Cross-cutting issues that transcend
departmental boundaries are led by the key department with ad hoc
committees to manage the interdepartmental dimension of such issues.
The underlying norm of the Irish system is that its officials must ‘sing
from the same hymn sheet’ in Brussels and must consult across the system
before going to Brussels: the Irish system is one of informal effectiveness.
The management of the ‘big dossiers’ differs from that pertaining to the
routine decisions. In the case of the salient dossiers, the Irish system
becomes highly formalised, centralised and hierarchical in that all actors
up to and including the cabinet will be involved. Resources are directed
towards tracking the negotiations at every phase and adapting strategy to
suit the flow of the negotiations. The 1996 presidency, the IGC and the
Agenda 2000 negotiations are all examples of issues that were treated as
‘big dossiers’ and handled in a ‘hands-on’ fashion. Agenda 2000 provides
a useful illustration of how decision are taken in Ireland. In 1997 an inter-
departmental committee, chaired by Foreign Affairs, was established to
co-ordinate the responses of the various departments to the Commission’s
proposals. This group did the ground work for the Group of Senior
Officials (GSO) and the Ministers and Secretaries Group (MSG) during
the latter half of 1997 and 1998. The Department of Foreign Affairs
issued all instructions to Irish negotiators in all working groups and high-
level groups dealing with Agenda 2000 and carefully tracked the domestic
debate in all of the Member States through its embassies. The issues went
to cabinet on numerous occasions during this period; the MSG met six
times in 1997 and a further seven times in 1998. The Taoiseach, as head
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of government, engaged in a series of bilateral visits to explain the Irish
position at the end of 1998 and in the run-up to the Berlin Council. In
December 1998, the Taoiseach established an Expert Technical Group
(ETG) consisting of the key officials in the Departments of Foreign
Affairs, Finance, Enterprise, Trade and Employment, and Agriculture.
This group met seven times in the lead-up to Berlin. The role of the
Department of Foreign Affairs was to ensure consistency and coherence in
the Irish position and to track what was happening in the other Member
States. The Department of Finance took the lead on the Structural Funds
and Agriculture fought to defend the gains of the 1992 MacSharry reform
of the CAP. The Irish managed the negotiations in a sequential manner
and did not attempt to trade off Structural Funds against agriculture.
Rather, it took whatever deal was on offer at any one time and went on
to handle the next phase of the negotiations. Given Ireland’s changing
position in the Union, those involved in the negotiations felt that they had
got a very good deal, especially on agriculture. 
Co-ordination
The operating principle of the ‘lead department’ does not obviate the need
for co-ordination in the Irish system. The autonomy of individual depart-
ments breaks down when an issue has implications for a number of
government departments or has no obvious home in the domestic admin-
istration. For example, environmental taxes clearly involves Environment,
Finance, and Enterprise and Employment, and views are likely to differ
across these departments on the merits of such taxes. Hence processes are
needed to deal with issues that cross-sectoral or interdepartmental bound-
aries. Co-ordination is also necessary to ensure coherence in national
policy in relation to the ‘history-making decisions’ or the ‘big dossiers’, as
discussed above. Co-ordination is achieved at the apex of the Irish system
by the cabinet, which is responsible for the broad thrust of public policy.
The Irish cabinet system is not buttressed by an extensive committee
system. At an administrative level, day-to-day co-ordination is the respon-
sibility of the Economics Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs
which has a watching brief over all EU policies. The division is responsi-
ble for co-ordinating briefs for the General Affairs Council, the main
co-ordinating council in the EU system and ‘A points’ for other Councils.
It also had primary responsibility for the interdepartmental European
Communities Committee which was chaired by the Assistant Secretary
responsible for the Economics Division. This Committee was ultimately
replaced in March 1987 by a successor committee chaired by the Minister
of State for European Affairs, Maire Geoghegan-Quinn attached to the
Taoiseach’s Department. The committee was essentially a committee of
senior civil servants with a political chair, which met monthly and was
responsible for the co-ordination of Ireland’s approach to the strategic
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aspects of Community business at this time. In 1989, this committee
became a planning committee, responsible for organisational and logisti-
cal functions, for the 1990 Irish Presidency. Its policy co-ordination
functions were superseded by a Ministerial Group for the Presidency
established by the then Taoiseach, Mr Charles Haughey. Mr Haughey
also established an MSG to co-ordinate the preparation of the National
Plan for Delors I and to negotiate the CSF. This committee represented an
institutional innovation by bringing together key cabinet ministers and
senior officials. Once the Presidency was over, there was no standing
mechanism for co-ordination at either ministerial or senior official level
other than ad hoc co-ordination groups working on the IGCs and related
dossiers. In 1992, the Taoiseach Albert Reynolds re-established the
Committee, this time under the chairmanship of Minister of State, Tom
Kitt, as the so-called Kitt Committee. This format has since been super-
seded by the MSG which took over responsibility for the preparations of
the Irish Presidency in 1994–95. Notwithstanding changes in the commit-
tee structure in central government, the MSG appears to have become a
permanent feature in the political/administrative landscape. The MSG is
serviced by a GSO who prepare the papers which form the core of its
deliberations. The Committee meets on average once a month but has
no pre-ordained cycle of meetings. There are also a number of inter-
departmental groups on such issues as Agenda 2000 and comitology,
among others. The Irish system of interdepartmental co-ordination differs
from the other Member States in being less institutionalised and less
stable, although the Ministers and Secretaries format appears to have
become institutionalised (Table 10.3).
Table 10.3 Evolution of co-ordination mechanisms in the Irish central
administration, 1973–94
European Communities Committee (1973–87)
Chair and Secretariat: Assistant Secretary DFA/DFA Secretariat
European Communities Committee (1987–90)
Chair and Secretariat: Minister of State for European Affairs/Taoiseach’s
Department
Ministers and Secretaries Group (1988–90)
Chair: Taoiseach Department
European Communities Committee (1992–94)
Chair: Taoiseach’s Department
Ministers and Secretaries Group (since 1994)
Group of Senior Officials (since 1994)
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The Permanent Representation
A central feature of organising for Brussels is the role of the Permanent
Representation Centre. The Representation is the control centre for
Ireland’s formal dealings with the Union’s policy process. The Irish Centre
consists of civil servants drawn from the Department of Foreign Affairs
and all of the home departments dealing with Brussels. As the tentacles of
EU policy spread, so too has the staffing of the Representation which
draws its staff from a wide range of home departments. The Permanent
Representative and his Deputy are career diplomats, who in addition to
managing the internal running of the Representation, are Ireland’s repre-
sentatives on COREPER I and II. Since 1973, Ireland has had five
Permanent Representatives in Brussels and a number of those have served
also as deputies in the Representation. At present Foreign Affairs has
twelve staff in Brussels: Finance (three), Enterprise and Employment
(three), Transport, Energy and Communications (three), Tourism and
Trade (two), Agriculture (two), Revenue Commissioners (two) Health
(one), Social Welfare (one), Environment (one), Marine (one) and Justice
(one). There are thirty-two administrators, in contrast to twenty-two in
1978. Apart from Luxembourg, with seven, Ireland has the smallest
Representation (Table 10.4). 
Although formally the pathway for information and instructions from
Dublin to Brussels should pass through the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the domestic civil servants in Brussels tend to deal directly with
their home departments, while keeping Foreign Affairs informed. Civil
servants at the Representation exercise a Janus-like role between the
Union and the domestic ‘faces’. They are primarily responsible for ensur-
ing that Irish interests and preferences are put forward in the policy
process but they are also a critical source of intelligence on the attitudes
of the other Member States and on the flow of negotiations. They are well
placed to advise Dublin when a deal looks like coming to fruition and
when concessions must be made. The Representation is also the ‘early-
warning’ nucleus of the system. Officials in the Representation Centre
must establish good working relations with the Irish Cabinet,
Commission services, other representations and the Council Secretariat
because such relations are the lifeblood of successful negotiations. The
Permanent Representative returns to Dublin for meetings of the MSG and
their advice would carry considerable weight in the development of
Ireland’s negotiating strategies. 
Relations with the Commission and the EP
As a small state, the Irish have traditionally regarded the Commission as
an ally. It is seen as an institution that has an obligation to take the inter-
ests of all states into account and to balance the demands of the larger and
more powerful states. As a result, the retention of an Irish Commissioner
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is regarded as a core aspect of policy on the institutional development of
the Union. With regard to the services of the Commission, the Irish
Administration has developed very close links with the spending direc-
torates because of their involvement in the national monitoring
committees for the Structural Funds and with DG6 – Agriculture. All
departments with responsibility for EU policy have bilateral dealings with
the Commission and these tend to be relatively free of conflict, although
tensions have arisen in the state aids sector with DG4. Relations with the
EP are far less intensive. Successive Irish Presidencies have accorded
considerable importance to maintaining close links with the EP during the
period of the Presidency but this has not translated into the building of
close links at an official level. There are systems in place to brief Irish
MEPs, but little tracking of the activities of EP committees. 
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Table 10.4 The Irish Permanent Representation, 1967–97
Head of Deputy Permanent First Third
Year mission Representative Counsellor Secretary Secretary
1967 1 3 1
1968 1 3 1
1969 1 3 1
1970 1 3 1
1971 1 3 3
1973 1 7 7
1974 1 7 12 1
1975 1 1 7 14 1
1976 1 1 7 14
1977 1 1 7 12
1978 1 1 7 12
1979 1 1 7 14 1
1980 1 1 7 14
1981 1 1 7 13 2
1982 1 1 8 12 2
1983 1 1 8 12 2
1984 1 1 8 12 2
1985 1 1 8 12 2
1986 1 1 8 10 2
1988 1 1 8 8
1989 1 1
1990 1 1
1991 1 1 9 10 2
1992 1 1 10 11 2
1993/94 1 1 9 10 2
1995/96 1 1 8 15 1
1997 1 1 8 16 2
Source: State Directory, Annual, Government of Ireland.
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Judicial control of EC law
The transposition of EC law into Irish law is usually by means of
Statutory Instrument or secondary legislation. Primary law is used only
for major changes in legislation required by EU membership. Between
membership in 1973 and 1996, 956 statutory instruments were enacted
under the 1972 European Communities Act; 1994 was the year with the
highest number of statutory instruments with a total of eighty-nine (Table
10.5). In 1994 the use of statutory instruments was challenged in the
Supreme Court (Meagher v. Minister for Agriculture) when the plaintiff
challenged the validity of a Statutory Instrument which had appealed an
Irish statute. The Supreme Court found that the sheer number of EC direc-
tives necessitated the use of statutory instruments even when statutes of
the Oireachtas would be repealed. This issue was examined by the Review
Group on the Constitution in its 1996 Report. It considered that the
extensive use of Statutory Instruments contributed to an ‘information
deficit’ and possibly a ‘democratic deficit’. It argued that ‘the use of statu-
tory instruments ensures speedy and effective implementation of EC law
but often at the expense of the publicity and debate which attends the
processing of legislation though the Oireachtas’.12
Table 10.5 The use of Statutory Instruments in
Ireland, 1973–96







Source: Developments in the European
Communities, 1974–1996. 
In the period 1993–97, the ECJ gave judgements in five cases that had
been referred to it for a preliminary ruling. Of these, two cases were sent
by the Supreme Court, two by the High Court and one by the Dublin
District Court. Two cases dealing with the milk super-levy were taken by
individual farmers and the Irish Farmers’ Association. There were two
commercial cases dealing with export refunds and the definition of a
‘maintenance creditor’ and the final case related to the impounding of a
aircraft owned by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia arising from the
sanctions against that state. None of the cases involved major issues of
constitutional law. 
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Conclusions 
The TEU did not represent a dramatic ‘Europeanisation’ of the Irish
political system. Rather it represented an additional layer to the Union’s
constitutional fabric which in turn further enmeshed the national in the
European and the European in the national. It was another step in the
deepening relationship between the young Irish state and the evolving
Union. The expansion in the scope of the Union – EMU, pillar three –
marked a further deepening and widening of the reach of the Union into
national policy-making and politics. There is clear evidence of a linear
progression in the expansion of the policy scope of the Union with the
evolution from market to money in the TEU. The Danish ‘no’ may be
evidence of the ‘pendulum’ in action but it had little impact on the atti-
tude of the Irish Government and senior policy-makers. Their
commitment to membership of EMU in the first wave never wavered
despite the prospect of the United Kingdom remaining outside. The
underlying commitment to membership as the best shelter for the Irish
state and economy is deeply embedded in the attitudes of senior policy-
makers. This is not to say that they wish to be subsumed in a European
federal state. They want to maintain as much autonomy at national level
within the constraints of an integrating market and continue to have a
clear sense of ‘Ireland Inc.’. There is an ongoing concern to ensure that
policy regimes developed at EU level suit Irish needs and the Irish model
of economic development. There is no desire to import the continent’s
high social costs and high levels of corporate taxation. Thus while in the
past the Irish may have argued for ‘more Europe’, this may well change
as Ireland’s re-positions itself in the EU system as a more prosperous
state and society. 
Perspectives for the future
Ireland is at a cross-roads in its relationship with the Union as it moves
from its status as a peripheral state to one with a successful model of
economic development. Ireland benefited greatly from the single market
in two ways. First, as an export-driven economy, a level playing field and
open markets are in Ireland’s interests. Second, Ireland seemed to attract
a disproportionate amount of the flow of US capital into Europe as a
consequence of the ‘1992’ programme. Ireland was able to benefit from
both these developments because it had in place a system of social part-
nership that kept the economy competitive in this phase of integration.
Given the speed and newness of Irish convergence, there is still uncer-
tainty among the state elite about the sustainability of economic growth
and the future prospects of the Irish economy. On the one hand, all of the
indicators point to continuing growth, albeit at a lower level, and unem-
ployment levels at or below 3 per cent. On the other hand, decades of
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relative economic failure are difficult to overcome. Irish politicians and
policy-makers are going through a period of reflection about Ireland’s
future place in the Union and the kind of Union that will suit Ireland.
Although this is a challenging period of Ireland’s relations with the Union,
it is happening in a far more benign environment than the early 1980s
when Ireland was facing failure on all fronts. 
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11 Flaminia Gallo and Birgit Hanny
Italy: progress behind complexity
Introduction: integration as a stabilising factor 
Since the beginning of the European integration process the Italian
membership of the Community seems to have been perceived by masses
and elites as a kind of higher political good – scholars even speak of the
Union as a ‘collective myth’ for Italian society.1 Besides the deficits in the
country’s day-to-day performance in EC policies – e.g. in the implemen-
tation of EC law – Italian society has broadly shared basically positive
attitudes towards the European integration process and its outcomes in
the pre- and post-Maastricht years.2 Questioned by Eurobarometer over
a long time period, large majorities (+ 70 per cent) believed membership
of the Union to be generally beneficial for the country.3 Since 1950,
membership of the Community has been seen as an inalienable stabilising
factor for Italian democracy with its characteristic governmental instabil-
ity and the strong structural differences between north and south.
Furthermore, EC membership has been seen as essential for the develop-
ment of Italian economic welfare and its generous social system.4
Throughout the history of European integration one can observe a
tendency among Italian political actors to justify internal reforms or
unpopular decisions – such as cuts in pension and health systems – with
demands from the European level and as necessary for keeping Italy in the
‘heart of Europe’.5 Furthermore, Italian governments have traditionally
preferred federalist designs for the future of the Community, they have
supported the institutional strengthening of the EP, a far-reaching
‘communitarisation’ of several policy areas, and have been ready to accept
continuous transfers of competencies and tasks from their own political
and constitutional system up to the European level.6
The strange combination of a broad but diffuse support for the
European integration process, shared by masses and elites, with the weak
performance of the Italian political and administrative system in the day to
day policy-cycles of the Community, is often referred to as paradoxical,
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abnormal or even schizophrenic. It has been seen as a major reason for the
loss of credibility among Italian negotiators and the consequent narrowing
of their room for manoeuvre on both the European and the national
levels.7
In the immediate post-Maastricht period public debates in Italy were
not dominated as much by the ratification of the TEU as they were by
other issues, such as the crisis and change in the Italian party system
because of the so called ‘Tangentopoli’ scandals and their judicial prose-
cution, the emergence of new political actors such as Silvio Berlusconi, the
heated battle against organised criminality and the beginning of massive
Albanian immigration. Major attention in the media, newspapers and
public debates was dedicated almost entirely to the so-called ‘Maastricht
criteria’ for the completion of EMU and the possibility of Italian partici-
pation at the beginning of stage three.8 After 1992 all Italian governments
adopted strict financial discipline in order to deal with the precarious situ-
ation of public finances and with the aim of reaching most of the
macroeconomic criteria in time.9 This new stability oriented style in
Italian economic and financial policy was mainly shaped by so-called
‘technocratic’ actors – among them the monetary experts L. Dini and C.A.
Ciampi – who had participated in the negotiations for EMU. Such tech-
nocrats were able to increase their influence by taking advantage of the
elite changes in the party system and the disciplining pressure of the
Maastricht criteria for the country’s economic behaviour.10 A more severe
economic policy – including unpopular reductions in public expenditure
and even a special Euro tax – was justified by the government in terms of
Italy’s need to ‘keep up with Europe’ and was also supported by the
parliamentary opposition, trade unions and employers.11 The first broad
public debate concerning the possible economic and social risks for Italy
in paying too high a price for its participation in EMU took place in 1996.
It shed light upon some rather critical comments and anti-Maastricht
sentiments among the Italian population.12 The decrease in public support
for the European integration process, and for Italian participation within
it, demonstrated by 1997 Eurobarometer data, might have been a conse-
quence of these debates. For the first time in over two decades, fewer than
50 per cent of citizens believed that Italy benefited from its membership
of the Union.
The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and its consequences
On April 1992, the Italian government presented the draft ratification law
on the Maastricht Treaty to the Senate of the Republic. On October 29
1992 a large majority in the Italian Chamber of Deputies – 403 positive
votes of 467 parliamentarians present (compared with 630 members in
total) – fulfilled its part in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
without any debate involving the wider public. Nevertheless, the ratifica-
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tion law, which was finally approved by the Senate on 3 November 1992,
was accompanied by several declarations of government intent. For
example, the government was obliged to work towards the correct appli-
cation of the subsidiarity principle, the elimination of the democratic
deficit in EU decision-making, a coherent method of monitoring the
national finances and the information of the Italian Parliament prior to
European Council meetings. The parliament decided to proceed with the
approval of the ratification law in the short term, because the TEU was
seen both as an important achievement in the European integration
process and as a step which might be endangered by the French and
Danish referendum results.
The TEU extended the competencies of the European Communities by
establishing EMU, for example, and by introducing the concept of
European citizenship. Thus, during the first parliamentary reading of the
draft ratification law, MPs engaged in discussions concerning the EU’s
democratic deficit, its social aims and the co-ordination of fiscal poli-
cies.13 There were also questions raised as to the extent to which Article
11 of the Constitution provided a sufficient legal base for the TEU to
produce its effects on Italian law, national sovereignty and on the organ-
isation of the state. The Italian Parliament decided that the limitation of
sovereignty through the new economic policy could be based on this
Article 11 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it declared that the constitu-
tional provisions for the active and passive electorate should be modified
in order to allow EU citizens to vote legitimately in Italy, as foreseen by
Article 19 (ex Article 8b) ECT. The possibilities of amending the
Constitution, of modifying several of its articles or of introducing a
general provision that would affirm the supremacy of Community law
over national law, were also taken into consideration but have not been
realised so far.14
With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Italian government
declared that it would take the initiative for the constitutional amend-
ments discussed. Since then, the Italian Parliament has promoted two
major attempts at constitutional reform with regard to Italy’s relationship
with the Union. The first was presented during the XI legislature in 1993,
when the Chamber of Deputies’ Committee for Community Policies and
the Senate’s Constitutional Affairs Committee suggested, first, that
parliament be given the power to influence government activities both at
the preparatory stage and within the EU institutions and secondly, that
the regions be allowed to participate in the elaboration of European
regional policies. In addition, parliament proposed the insertion of an
article in the Italian Constitution which would explicitly constitutionalise
the EC treaties. This proposal lapsed because of the anticipated dissolu-
tion of the XI legislature.15 The second proposal, put forward by the
Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Reforms, established in
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1997, included three articles concerning Union–Italian relations. These
provided some declarations of principle codifying constitutional jurispru-
dence and some innovations, such as a procedure to accept further
limitations of sovereignty and definitions of the role of the two chambers
of parliament in Community policies and the role of the regions in shaping
and implementing Community law.16 As the different political parties
were not able to find a compromise on other aspects, such as the modali-
ties to appoint the Head of the State and the autonomy of the judicial
system, the whole reform project failed, including the part concerning
relations with the Union.
Although the TEU was not the only reason behind attempts to adapt
the Italian political system to its European environment, one can never-
theless observe its direct impact in a number of areas. First, the
establishment of the CoR favoured ongoing changes in the relationship
between the Italian regions and the central government in the preparation
and implementation of Community policies, as will be described below.
With regard to EMU, legislation was devised in Italy stating that the
national central bank would carry out its tasks within the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB). The norms that had to be revised were
those concerning the competencies of the Governor of the Bank of Italy,
the role of the state in the issuing of banknotes, the control of the annual
budget of the Central Bank, the fixing of minimum income percentages to
be set aside as reserves and powers for the Treasury to inspect and super-
vise the sessions of the various organs of the Central Bank.17 Generally
speaking, the approach followed was not simply to abrogate the norms
incompatible with EC law, but to reproduce the dispositions of the TEU
and of the ESCB Statute in the national legislation. Another aspect requir-
ing an immediate adaptation of the Italian legal system was the right of
EU citizens to vote in their country of residence, provided by Article 19
(ex Article 8b) ECT. A national decree was therefore approved, establish-
ing that EU citizens living in Italy had to register their intention to vote
eighty days before the elections to the EP.18
The national policy-cycle: the search for full Italian participation in EU
policy-cycles
In 1989 the Italian Minister for European Affairs described the situation
of his country in EC policy-cycles as follows: ‘It is not unusual that prior
to the negotiation . . . the necessary support is not forthcoming from
analysis which might put forward alternatives and predict results.
Consequently, we are sometimes bound to take a particular stance which
goes against our interest but which we first collaborated in defining.’19
Such considerations led, from 1987 onwards, to the adaptation of struc-
tures and procedures for preparing and implementing EC decisions within
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the Italian political system (Figure 11.1). The reforms began with two
laws: the legge Fabbri No. 183/1987 and the legge La Pergola No.
86/1989, both concerning Italian participation in the normative processes
of the European Communities and the co-ordination of the national
actors involved.20 The latter introduced an annual legge comunitaria
(Community law) that is on the one hand a cyclical instrument for the
incorporation of EC decisions and always contains a list of European
regulations, directives or decisions with an indication of the respective
method of incorporation/implementation to use. On the other hand, the
legge comunitaria serves as a vehicle for further improvements to the
structures and procedures of Italian administrative and political units
dealing with European affairs.21 The reforms were intended either to
introduce or to strengthen mechanisms for co-ordination and co-opera-
tion among different actors in the national arena, including ministerial,
regional and local administrations and parliamentary bodies. The aim was
to reduce fragmentation and to establish closer links between those actors
preparing European decisions and those asked to implement them.22 The
incorporation procedures for EC law and the relationship between
government and parliament in this regard were further central aspects of
the reforms.23 During the 1990s the set of regulations and provisions for
the internal preparation and implementation of EC/EU policies was
enriched not only via the annual legge comunitaria, but also through
several – sometimes even contradictory – provisions of other laws or
decrees. Examples of these include the Law No. 400 of 1988 concerning
the organisation of the prime minister’s administrative infrastructure, and
the Decree of the Prime Minister No. 150 of 1990, regulating the struc-
ture and tasks of the department for the co-ordination of European affairs
in the prime minister’s office.24 The two so-called ‘Bassanini Laws’ of
1997 must also be mentioned. They represent another important reform
project in the Italian political system, introducing a kind of administrative
federalisation of the system which, if put fully into practice, would change
profoundly the relationship between the central government and the
regional and local levels in EC/EU affairs. All these reforming laws
pointed at procedures among and competencies of institutional actors and
administrative units at the national and sub-national Italian levels with
regard to EC/EU policies in general; no distinction was drawn between the
different kinds of EC/EU decisions, specific policy fields or EC/EU proce-
dures.
These different legal texts reflected a gradual change in thinking from
the traditional interpretation of EC/EU membership as a domain of
foreign policy and therefore of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, towards a
more issue-related attitude. The call for a more efficient and effective
implementation of EC law in particular, led to a clearer definition of tasks
and competencies of the parliament and the regions, at least in the
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national parts of the European policy-cycle. At the same time, the older
rules for the Foreign Affairs Ministry and other governmental bodies
remained unchanged.25 Consequently, between 1987 and 1997 there was
no coherent adjustment of structures and procedures within the different
administrative units involved in the national preparation and implemen-
tation of EC/EU policies. Rather, a complex patchwork of functions and
competencies, of co-ordinating mechanisms and formalised information
channels was put into practice. 
In the post-Maastricht period, the participation of Italian administra-
tive and political actors in the preparation, writing, implementation and
control of EC legislation and the national implementation of the treaty
itself, has been shaped by the set of regulations described above. But – as
will be shown below – the establishment of actors, structures and new
units dealing with European affairs in the Italian political system in the
early 1990s cannot be seen as direct consequence of the Maastricht
Treaty. From the outside, there have been no observable, formal struc-
tural reactions or systematic adaptations within the Italian political–
administrative system either to the different kinds of decision-making
procedures introduced at the European level by the Maastricht Treaty or
to the changed position of institutional actors such as the EP. Indeed,
Italian administrative and political actors are characterised by a highly
fragmented, pluralistic and sector oriented style of work at the domestic
and European levels. Nevertheless, one could assume that many of these
actors do take into consideration the procedural changes at the European
level during their day-to-day work and are likely to adapt their strategies
when struggling for access and opportunities to advance their particular
interests and needs. 
The central government and the ministerial bureaucracy as key players
In the immediate post-Maastricht period, almost all Italian ministries
introduced special units dealing in some way with policies that were nego-
tiated or regulated in EC policy-cycles.26 The Associazione Nazionale per
l’Informazione e la Documentazione Europea in 1994 counted about 140
directorates general or departments in the central ministerial apparatus
that were involved in the national preparation and/or implementation of
EC decisions.27 Among those units, four in particular officially have major
co-ordinating tasks: first, the Comitato Interministeriale per la
Programmazione Economica (CIPE), the Interministerial Committee for
Economic Prospects, which is considered to be a ‘heavyweight’ among the
Italian interministerial committees; second, the Fondo di Rotazione, a
special unit of the Finance Ministry, which organises and controls finan-
cial transactions related to EC policies such as the national use of
structural funds; third, the Minister for European Affairs and fourth, the
department for the co-ordination of the Community policies in the prime
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minister’s administration. There are also specialised co-ordinating units of
the Foreign Affairs Ministry dealing with EC/EU affairs.28
For the national preparation of EC policies, two scenarios seem to be
typical. The less frequent of the two occurs when an issue negotiated at
the European level is of interest to only one ministry. The latter prepares
the Italian contribution, which afterwards should be channelled via the
specialised units of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Rome to the Italian
Permanent Representation in Brussels.29 In the second scenario, in which
the issue concerned spans the competencies of more than one ministry, the
co-ordinating bodies mentioned above should produce a coherent Italian
contribution. Formally it is the responsibility of the CIPE, in which the
Minister for European Affairs also takes part, and the co-ordination
department of the prime minister’s office to integrate the different posi-
tions in the ministerial administration.30 In reality, the effectiveness of
these mechanisms is considered to be low. This is because the CIPE deals
mainly with the economic and financial implications of different EC poli-
cies, while two of the more recent additions to the administrative system,
the Ministry of European Affairs (which is without portfolio) and the co-
ordinating unit in the prime minister’s office, occupy a rather weak
position with regard to the co-ordination of national preparation of EC
policies.31 The prime minister is not obliged to appoint a separate
Minister of European Affairs – for example this position in the Dini
cabinet of 1995–96 was held by the Finance Minister in office, thereby
weakening the position of the co-ordination department in the ministerial
bureaucracy.32 This department, in theory, has a variety of tasks related
to the Italian performance in EC/EU policy-making. It should take the
initiative for co-ordinating the activities of the Italian government, the
ministerial administration and the regions and provinces in the national
preparation and implementation of EC law. Furthermore it should take
responsibility for all governmental activities related to the Common
Market and be the national interlocutor for the European Commission for
technical and legal aspects of the implementation of EC law.33 Whoever
holds the position of Minister of European Affairs is also responsible for
the regular information of the regions and the parliament on EC/EU
matters in line with the provisions of the laws indicated above.34
The overlapping of old and new co-ordination mechanisms and compe-
tencies in the Italian preparation of EC/EU policies seems to provoke the
resistance of former central actors – such as the units of the Foreign
Affairs Ministry. Such actors, at least during the national preparation
phase, tend to a certain extent, to ignore the competencies of the Minister
of European Affairs or the co-ordination department of the prime minis-
ter.35 The Minister of European Affairs may take part in Italian
delegations when policies related to the Common Market are negotiated,
while the co-ordination department of the prime minister has no formal
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direct access to the European level: the units of the Foreign Affairs
Ministry seem to defend their privileged position in this regard.36 The
members of Italian delegations participating in EC policy-making are
proposed by the different ministries and are officially appointed by the
Foreign Affairs Ministry.37 In the optimal case, these delegation members
meet at the national level or co-ordinate their positions with the help of
communication technologies before participating in meetings at the
European level. However, co-ordination efforts are often made much later
within the Italian Permanent Representation.38 Since 1990 the Foreign
Affairs Ministry has had to open its representation in Brussels to other
ministries, to the Italian central bank and also to regional administrations
and is therefore composed nowadays of officials from several administra-
tive units.39
The reality behind the formal attribution of competencies and co-ordi-
nating tasks still shows a strongly fragmented access for different
ministerial units to the European level. Many such units have direct
contacts with their Brussels counterparts and quite often ignore the formal
competencies of co-ordinating bodies at the national level, thus permitting
sectoral interests to reach the Brussels arena.40 Therefore, tendencies
towards ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘sectoralisation’ of the ministerial admin-
istration during the process of European integration and the typical
administrative pluralism of the Italian political system seem to have
mutually reinforced each other.41 One major problem for the definition of
coherent national positions within the ministerial administration in the
preparation phase of EC policies seems to be a kind of ‘privatisation’ of
information. This means that important details concerning preparation
for European-level decisions and the effects of and difficulties with the
implementation of other similar decisions are always well known some-
where in the administrative apparatus at the national or the regional and
local level in Italy. However, such details are seldom spread among all
interested actors in the system.42 The existing formalised channels of
information do not seem to produce a sufficient flow of documents and
knowledge.
While for the preparation of EC law within the ministerial bureau-
cracy, none of the formal co-ordinating actors is able to ensure the
effective integration of different views, the situation is slightly different
with regard to the incorporation of EC law. There is a kind of division of
labour between on one hand, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and its perma-
nent representation, as actors trying to dominate the preparation phase,
and, on the other, the co-ordination department for Community policies
in the prime minister’s office, which has a more decisive role during the
implementation phase.43 The prime ministerial department for
Community policies organises the drafting of the annual legge comuni-
taria, the main instrument for introducing EC decisions into the national
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legal system. This legge must be presented at the beginning of each year to
the Italian parliament by the respective Minister of European Affairs or
the prime minister him or herself.44 The individual parts of this legge are
initially drafted in the ministry mostly affected by an EC regulation, direc-
tive or decision. They are then brought together into one draft law under
the co-ordination and legal supervision of the department for Community
policies and with the help of phone, faxes and ad hoc interministerial
meetings.45 Officials of the co-ordination department argue that difficul-
ties and delays in the preparation of this draft seem to depend on the
degree of conformity of the EC provision with the specific features of the
Italian legal system. Once the draft of the legge comunitaria has found its
way through the parliamentary incorporation procedure, the implementa-
tion of EC law is no longer dealt with by the co-ordination department for
Community policies or another central unit, but rather it follows the same
logic as ordinary Italian laws do, depending on the performance of differ-
ent ministerial, regional or local bodies.46 Only in the case of requests and
complaints from the European Commission does the department for the
co-ordination of Community policies in the prime minister’s office return
to the scene. It then examines the case from a judicial point of view,
locates the responsible administrative units and insists on the problems
being solved.47 The department in this case has no competence to give
instructions but can react by introducing respective legal provisions in the
draft of the legge comunitaria of the following year or presenting the
problem to the government.48 Furthermore the department under discus-
sion has two specialised offices for the Common Market and Community
programmes. These offices take part in several interministerial committees
dealing with these topics under the supervision of the CIPE as the main
committee for such matters.49 With regard to the organisation of financial
transactions related to EC policies, the Fondo di Rotazione – which is also
supervised by the CIPE – seems to have become a successful instrument of
control, fighting the improper use of funds and ensuring the continuous
collection and publication of all information related to its field of activ-
ity.50 Generally speaking, in the post-Maastricht period, one can observe
a shift of activities and co-ordinating competencies in the national prepa-
ration and implementation of EC policies from the Foreign Affairs
Ministry, which dominated the scene for decades, to the prime minister’s
offices. The effect of this – at least in the short and medium term – has
been an intensification of administrative fragmentation and of the strug-
gle for direct access to the EC policy-cycle at the European level.
The parliament struggling for influence
Since 1965, the Italian government has been obliged only to present an
annual report on European affairs to the parliament. But the formal infor-
mation rights of the two houses of parliament have been significantly
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extended with the reform laws since 1987. Now the parliament has the de
jure possibility to be regularly informed about EC law which is in prepa-
ration or has just been decided upon at the European level. It also has the
right to ask the government or individual ministers for an evaluation of
the conformity of EC law with the national legal system, to hear the
government or individual ministers on concrete policy issues and to be
informed about the general development of the Union and the Italian
system as part of it. Furthermore the parliament has the right to submit
comments on these matters to the government.51 With the annual commu-
nity laws (legge comunitaria) of 1996 and 1998 the Italian parliament
strengthened its information rights during the preparation phase of
Community decisions of all kinds and must now be informed before a
draft is negotiated at the European level. During the first half of the 1990s
these formal rights and channels of information were used only occasion-
ally and seem not to have led the Italian parliament to a more influential
position in the national preparation of EC law. Government reports were
presented sporadically and contained only general remarks that were far
from enabling the members of the houses to discuss details of the differ-
ent aspects of EC policies. Following the legge Fabbri and its improvement
in the Community Law No. 128 of 1998, the parliamentary committees
and the regions should receive regularly, and promptly, all the draft EC
decisions that the Minister of European Affairs receives from the perma-
nent representation via the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Rome. But this
procedure seems to last too long and many of the documents do not even
reach the respective committees of both chambers of the Italian parlia-
ment.52 One reason seems to be the overloading of the office within the
prime minister’s administration which must support the Minister of
European Affairs and the co-ordination department for Community poli-
cies in the transmission of information to the parliament and the
regions.53 Although members of the parliamentary committees on
European affairs are specialists in EC policies and would have a wide-
ranging knowledge in this regard, only a few official opinions have in fact
been presented to the government on occasions when draft EC decisions
have been discussed in the parliamentary committees.54
Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in the course of the
reforms of the preparation and implementation of EC policy at the
national level, have modified their internal structures in order to improve
parliamentary procedures especially with regard to the incorporation of
EC law.55 In 1988, as a consequence of the legge Fabbri, the Senate
amended its rules of procedure, expanding the rights of the committee for
European affairs (Giunta per gli affari delle Communitá Europee) and in
1990 the Chambers of Deputies established a special commission for
European Community affairs (Commissione speciale per le politiche
comunitarie). This latter got the status of a permanent commission in
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1996 and the name was changed into commission for European affairs
(Commissione per le politiche dell’Unione Europea), which did not mean
any change in its competencies and tasks. Both units have internal co-
ordinating tasks in dealing with the annual legge comunitaria which is
usually examined by different parliamentary committees. Furthermore –
together with the commissions for external affairs in both chambers – they
exert parliamentary control over governmental activities and deal with all
kinds of information received by the parliament concerning the policy-
cycles of the Union in general.56
The adaptations of the parliamentary structure and the extension of its
formal rights of access to and information on the national preparation of
EC policies has not yet led to a more active role for parliamentarians in
Italian–European policies. With regard to the incorporation and imple-
mentation of EC law, with the instrument of the legge comunitaria, the
procedures in both houses were improved and the parliament regained
some control over the activities of the ministerial bureaucracy in compar-
ison to the former unsystematic delegation of legislative competencies to
the government for the incorporation of EC decisions.57 Although this
delegation of competencies to the government is still used quite often, the
parliament is now able to gain more control over the process.58 It can do
so by indicating the legal and/or administrative methods to be used as well
as setting deadlines and obligations for the government to report on the
ongoing implementation process for each individual directive, regulation
or decision. The procedure for the legge comunitaria is thus comparable
to that of the annual budget law59 and has led to more structured parlia-
mentary procedures with the effect that the Italian incorporation
performance with regard to EC law has been decisively improved in the
immediate post-Maastricht period.60 So far, the Italian parliament has not
found a similarly structured way to deal with policy field of the Union not
covered by formal legal processes of the ECT – such as CFSP and the JHA
field. Different interested commissions and committees of both chambers
– together with the specialised bodies mentioned above – exert informa-
tion and consultation rights (e.g. by inviting members of the national
government and EP or expressing observations and recommendations as
a reaction to the government addresses in parliament). Since 1993, a joint
parliamentary committee with members of both chambers has the task of
controlling the implementation and the functioning of the Schengen agree-
ment as well as observing related activities within the Union. Though all
these parliamentary bodies have developed a wide range of activities and
produce a remarkable amount of observations and comments, their influ-
ence in the preparation of European decisions in the CFSP and JHA fields
appears to be low. It depends on the importance of the information the
government presents to the parliament in this regard. 
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The regions on the European scene
With regard to EC policies, the relationship between the central political
institutions in Rome and the Italian regions and autonomous provinces has
over a long period been rather conflictual and characterised by centralist
tendencies. It has involved on the one hand the limitation of regional activi-
ties in EC/EU affairs to the national arena, both legally and in practice, and
on the other, demands from the sub-national actors to become more
involved in the preparation of EC law. One reason behind this conflict is
the direct impact of European decisions on sub-national structures and the
legal competencies of these actors.61 With the first reform laws of 1987, the
role of the Italian regions, in comparison to their former very marginal
position in the national preparation and implementation of EC law, began
to change.62 Information rights for the regions and new mechanisms for the
co-operation of national and sub-national administrative units were estab-
lished. The aim here was to ameliorate problems associated with the
incorporation and implementation of EC law and to institutionalise
regional access to the national preparation of such decisions.63 But the util-
isation of these rights and structures seems to have caused some problems.
As with the parliament, the Italian regions and autonomous provinces
should receive all the drafts of EC legislation in preparation from the
government, or to be more precise, from the Foreign Affairs Ministry via
the Minister of European Affairs, on which they may comment afterwards.
But this opportunity was seldom taken by the regions and autonomous
provinces during the first half of the 1990s.64 The regional opinions
expressed are not binding for the central government and might therefore
encounter difficulties in being taken seriously into consideration in a minis-
terial bureaucracy that already has problems with internal co-ordination
when dealing with EC affairs.65 Furthermore the regions seem to receive
draft EC laws only at the point when these drafts have already been pre-
negotiated at the European and national ministerial levels. Therefore any
eventual regional input would most likely be too late to be effective. The
legge comunitaria of 1998 introduced an obligation for the government to
inform the parliament and the regions and autonomous provinces at an
earlier stage, and to indicate the expected date of a decision on a draft law
at the European level.66 In reality, only part of the EC decisions in prepara-
tion ever reached the Italian sub-national level during the first half of the
1990s.67 A major problem for the Italian regions and autonomous
provinces is that quite often EC policies in certain areas – such as agricul-
ture – overlap with some of their original legislative and regulative
competencies,68 which have been increasingly undermined as the number
of EC regulations incorporated into the Italian legal system has risen.69 The
sub-national level usually is asked to implement these kind of decisions as
an extension of the central administrative structures, because it is the latter
that are responsible to the European Community.70
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Since the reforms of 1987, the role of sub-national actors has been
strengthened particularly with regard to the incorporation and implemen-
tation of EC law. The regions and autonomous provinces are now allowed
to incorporate EC decisions of different kinds that affect their exclusive
legislative competencies without waiting for a law or regulation of the
central institutions, and since 1998 they may do the same for matters
falling under their secondary or competitive legislative competence.71 In
practice, the central institutions quite often seem to ignore the possibility
of leaving the incorporation and implementation of EC law and decisions
to the sub-national level. Furthermore – as the central government always
has prerogative rights – it is felt that there is a risk of higher cost when
implementing European decisions autonomously at the sub-national level
and when actors at this level are required to adapt their own provisions in
line with national acts.72
In order to enforce co-operation between the regions and the central
government in the case of communications and decisions of the Council
of Ministers or the European Commission which affect Italian regional or
provincial competencies, the possibility has been introduced, through the
legge La Pergola, of the presidents of the regions or autonomous provinces
taking part as advisors in the respective central government sessions.73 A
permanent conference of the regions and the State (Conferenza perma-
nente tra lo Stato e le regioni) was also introduced in 1988 which should
establish closer relations and a better flow of information between the
centre and the sub-national level, as well as guaranteeing regional access
to the preparation of EC policies within the national arena. This confer-
ence is the only formal structure in the Italian political system in which
national and sub-national governmental actors take part together, but it
seems not to have satisfied the expectations mentioned above.74 It can be
convoked by the prime minister at least twice a year, whenever he or she
thinks it to be necessary, and it should deal with EC policies affecting
regional competencies. In addition, since 1998 the regional presidents and
those of the two autonomous provinces are entitled to call for a session on
European affairs within the state–regions’ conference. The latter’s
comments on EC law in preparation are not binding on the government
and the special sessions on European affairs that should take place at least
twice a year, were held only twice between 1989 and 1994, while during
three general meetings the conference dealt only occasionally with EC-
related matters.75 At least in the short term the state–regions conference
has not become an effective instrument for co-ordinating national and
sub-national positions and needs. Commentators also point to a lack of
political determination at the national level to allow regional and local
actors to become more involved in the preparation of EC policies; a
certain resistance by formerly dominant ministerial units has also been
observed.76
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Nevertheless owing to changes of the rules since 1987, Italian regions
and autonomous provinces are now officially allowed to have their own
regional offices in Brussels and to maintain direct contacts with adminis-
trative units and political actors at the European level, but only with
regard to EC policies affecting regional competencies. Regional officials
belong to the staff of the Italian permanent representation in Brussels and
regions and autonomous provinces may co-operate with other European
regions or local units. The relevant changes concerning regional relations
with EU institutions are laid out in the Decree of the President of the
Republic of 31 March 1994.77 It established that regions may have rela-
tions with offices and directorates of EU institutions without either the
previous agreement of, or prior communication with the Italian govern-
ment. Thus, from a juridical point of view the regions were facilitated not
only in implementing EC law but also in obtaining information directly
from the European level. Nevertheless the realisation of these provisions
for the participation of the regions in European decision-making seems to
have encountered some difficulties. 
The changes to the internal and external roles of sub-national political
and administrative actors – especially the regional or provincial govern-
ments – show a certain trend towards regionalisation of the Italian
participation in EC policy-cycles. This dynamic, in the immediate post-
Maastricht period, might have been reinforced through the development
of a stronger regionalist profile of the Union itself. This might have
occurred as a result of pressures in Italy, from Northern Italian anti-estab-
lishment parties, to introduce a federal system by the so-called Leghe and
through the increasing demands of some Italian regions and autonomous
provinces to be given more chances to participate in the preparation of EC
law at the national and European levels.78
EC law and the national legal system: the long road towards the
acceptance of the supremacy of EC law
Though the European integration process had a deep impact on the
constitutional system of the Member States and although constitutional
modifications were seen as necessary in Italy following the signing of the
Community treaties, such constitutional changes have not actually taken
place. The evolution of the Italian constitutional system as a result of the
progress of European integration is reflected more by the examinations
and sentences of the Italian Constitutional Court than by modification of
Italian law. Likewise, developments which originate in the European
treaties have found their major interpreter in the jurisprudence of the ECJ,
which has been called not only to apply these provisions but also to clear
up discrepancies between European and national laws and to distinguish
between the competencies and roles of the different levels of government.
Since the establishment of the EEC, three phases in the complex
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relationship between the Italian and the Community’s legal system can be
identified. In the first phase of the integration process, the Italian
Constitutional Court used Article 11 of the constitution to affirm the legiti-
macy of the treaties for the national law system. In a second phase, marked
by the customs union, the development of more policies such as the CAP
and the growing powers of EC institutions to adopt regulations, the Italian
Constitutional Court, through its judgement No. 183 of 1973, affirmed the
two fundamental principles of the European legal construction: the direct
applicability and the supremacy of EC regulations over national law.
Before this decision, Italy infringed the provision of Article 249 (ex Article
189) ECT establishing the direct application of EEC regulations.79 The
third phase began with judgement No. 170 of 1984.80 In particular,
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in this period affirmed: 
1 The obligation of Italian judges not to apply national rules which
contradicted directly applicable EC norms
2 The direct implementation not only of regulations and directives but
also of interpretative judgements and declarations of non-fulfilment of
the ECJ
3 The possibility for EC law (and regulations) to derogate from constitu-
tional norms and to replace them in the delimitation of competencies
between state and regions
4 The obligation of the public administration not to apply rules incom-
patible with directly applicable EC law.
The evolution of the Italian Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence was
completed with judgement No. 168 of 18 April 1991.81 After the affir-
mation of the direct applicability of EC regulations and the constitutional
supremacy of EC legal sources over national ones, it accepted the request
of the ECJ to be able to send questions of compatibility with EC norms
that are directly applicable to common Italian judges. Thus, the
Constitutional Court accepted to a loss of control over these matters in
favour of ordinary Italian judges, with the ECJ having established a direct
interface among these actors. In the post-Maastricht period, this attitude
was confirmed in the order No. 536 of the Constitutional Court in
December 1995. The common judges now have to resolve problems of
interpretation and validity of norms by appealing directly to the ECJ.
Conclusion: structural weakness persists
The Maastricht Treaty was one element among others reinforcing an
ongoing adaptation process in the national Italian system to the necessi-
ties of being a member of the developing Union. Therefore, the beginning
of a new reform activism in Italy was marked not by the Maastricht
Treaty but by national laws introduced from 1987 onwards. These laws
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led to a substantial improvement in Italian participation in EC and later
EU policy-cycles and in the internal preparation and implementation of
European decisions.82 In the immediate pre- and post-Maastricht period
several attempts at procedural and administrative adaptations could be
observed, which are linked to the European integration process in general
and not explicitly to the TEU.
The reasons behind this Italian reform activism in EC/EU affairs since
1987 include, on one hand, the rather low incorporation rate of EC deci-
sions into the national legal system that quite often led to infringement
procedures and sentences against Italy under Article 226 (ex Article 169)
ECT. On the other hand, the administrative incapacity – and sometimes
possibly political unwillingness – to implement EC policies effectively was
perceived by scholars and political actors to be closely linked to a weak
Italian performance in the day-to-day preparation of common decisions at
the European level. As a result, these decisions were quite often far from
being national priorities and the peculiarities of the Italian administrative
and legal system might have caused even more difficulties in their imple-
mentation.83 The dynamics of the integration process at the end of the
1980s, with the realisation of the SEA, the completion of the Internal
Market Programme, the consequent demands among Italian economic
elites to improve the implementation of these developments and the
approaching negotiations on EMU made these shortcomings too pressing
for the Italian political and administrative actors even prior to the
approval of the Maastricht Treaty.84
The structural characteristics of the political system were perceived as
major causes of these difficulties and therefore reform, as referred to
above, was clearly necessary. In the preparation of EC decisions at the
national level, the high degree of administrative fragmentation was seen
to lead to rather incoherent, even contradictory, positions among Italian
actors from different ministries when negotiating at the European level,
and to a lack of intra-ministerial co-ordination. It also prevented a fine-
tuning between the preparation of decisions and their implementation at
the national level.85 With regard to the incorporation and effective imple-
mentation of EC decisions, the reforms aimed to ensure co-operation
between governmental bodies and the Italian parliament, and between
government and regions or provinces as well as introducing parliamentary
incorporation procedures, the implementation of which partly coincided
that of the Maastricht Treaty.
From a technical, efficiency oriented perspective on Italian participa-
tion in EC/EU policies, the reforms and the impact of the Maastricht
Treaty have not (yet) led to greater efficiency in the co-ordination of
administrative units at the national level or to more effectiveness in inter-
nal preparation and implementation of European decisions. Italian
participation in the EU policy-cycle as well as in constitutional revision of
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the Union after Maastricht thus still shows two faces. There is political
rhetoric of pro-Europeanism besides an administrative and legal reality
showing a high degree of interadministrative struggle for access to the
European level. In the years shortly before and after the TEU more and
more former ‘outsiders’ such as the regions and the parliament became
involved in the national EC-related decision processes – which does not
automatically mean that these actors really got more influence on deci-
sions taken. The high-regulating, ‘baroque’ legal system still allows
overlapping competencies among interested administrative units and
political institutions, tolerating the lack of transparency of the Italian
political system in general and also in European policy making. 
During the 1996–97 IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, it could be
observed that, in terms of both economic and foreign and security policy,
‘Europe’ had become the main point of reference for Italian foreign policy
interests and actions. The Italian government’s constant attention to the
attitudes and position of its most influential European partners was a
good case in point. Italy’s prime ministers in all aspects of foreign affairs
have come to look to Bonn rather than Washington. In the European envi-
ronment, Italy still finds a point of reference for its domestic reforms
ranging from cuts in public spending to the future of the Italian welfare
system. Secondly Italy was confronted with a process of marginalisation
and exclusion from some European initiatives such as the Bosnia Contact
Group and in policy fields that were thought to be of interest for the
country. One result was Italy’s negative attitude towards the directoires
that in the 1980s tended to exclude it from the circle of more influential
Member States of the Union. Italian political actors in constitutional
negotiations at the European level therefore prefer ‘core groups’ within
the Union’s institutional framework, with precise ‘opting-in’ clauses,
rather than allowing the creation, outside the Union, of new clubs which
lack clear mechanisms of delayed participation. Thirdly, Italian political,
administrative and economic actors at the highest level of government,
parties, ministries and the economy, have acknowledged the importance
of the Union in its role as an external binding factor for domestic reforms. 
If this is true of the reforms in public spending policies tied to the
Maastricht macroeconomic criteria, it might also be useful for the overdue
modernisation of Italy’s institutional set-up. Finally, Italy’s position at the
crossroads of the two major crisis points in the Euro-Mediterranean
region justifies its requirement of a new security and defence policy as a
response to the changes taking place in this environment. The threats
perceived to come from that region cannot be seriously countered through
the creation of merely occasional alliances such as, most recently, the
Southern European countries’ alliance engaged in the Albanian mission:
from the Italian perspective they would instead require a more active role
for the Union. Hence, during the 1996–97 IGC, public statements issued
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by the Foreign Affairs Minister Lamberto Dini and prime minister
Romano Prodi emphasised Italy’s support for a stronger institutional
framework in the political dimension of the Union. In other words, the
focus was on institutional reform of the Community pillar of the Union
(the EP’s powers, majority voting and so on), the creation of more effec-
tive institutions dealing with CFSP and, finally, the adoption of common
policies for immigration and asylum (the so-called third pillar). From the
Italian perspective, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced several relevant
innovations, but important reforms remain on the negotiating table. As a
consequence, at the end of September 1997, Italy, Belgium and France
presented a joint declaration to be enclosed in the protocol on the institu-
tions with the prospect of the enlargement of the Union, affirming that the
reinforcement of the institutions is seen as an indispensable condition for
the conclusion of the first accession negotiations and that they are ‘deter-
mined to give the fullest effect appropriate to the protocol’. Since then, the
Italian position has remained unchanged.86
In view of future intergovernmental conferences and of its day-to-day
policy-cycles, Italian participation and performance will still be marked
on the one hand, by complex internal structures and administrative and
regional struggles for access to those fora where the decisions are taken,
and on the other, by far reaching, pro-European visions for the future
development of the Union and Italy’s part in this process. Within these
margins the Italian actors involved have taken advantage even of their
often quite inefficient and ineffective participation in EC/EU policy-
making for the stabilisation and modernisation of the country’s political
and economic system over recent decades. There is a high probability that
this mechanism will work for the future as well.
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12 Danielle Bossaert
Luxembourg: flexible and pragmatic
adaptation
Participating in European integration to strengthen national autonomy1
With 406,000 inhabitants and a surface area of 2.586 km2, Luxembourg
is by far the smallest Member State of the European Union. The highly
positive attitude of the Luxembourg people towards the Union, expressed,
for example, in the Eurobarometer surveys which are carried out on a
regular basis, can be explained not merely by Luxembourg’s history, but
also by the specific characteristics related to its small size. In this sense,
the European Union as a community of peace contributed substantially to
both strengthening Luxembourg’s oft-challenged national autonomy2 and
to compensating for the disadvantages of the small national market. As
one of the founding states, Luxembourg has gained many advantages
from membership of the Union which have quite significantly contributed
to a strengthening of its own sovereignty. In particular, those elements of
the Union’s ‘architecture’ which are based on the principle of suprana-
tionality, which guarantee rights of participation and co-decision for the
smaller states, have contributed considerably to ensuring that
Luxembourg has an influence disproportionate to its size. Normally, an
isolated state such as Luxembourg – which has no political weight to
speak of, has few natural resources and is more than 95 per cent depend-
ent on imports and exports – would hardly be noticed as a sovereign state
in European and international circles. In this context, the other Member
States now recognise and respect the Grand Duchy as a partner, not least
because of the active presence and willingness to participate of
Luxembourg politicians, diplomats and public servants in the European
Council, the Council of Ministers and its related expert groups. This also
helps Luxembourg to better protect and look after its own vital interests.
Since the beginning of the integration process, political parties and
interest groups consider EU membership an unquestionable necessity for
reasons related to security policy and economy. In this context it is also
interesting to note that in recent years the employees’ organisations have
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become aware of the advantages of better mutual consultation. Thus, in
1996 the two largest trade unions, the socialist OGBL (Onofhëngege
Gewerkschaftsbond Lëtzëbuerg) and the Christian LCGB (Lëtzëbuerger
Chrëschtleche Gewerkschaftsbond), established a joint office in order to
better safeguard Luxembourg’s interests within the ETUC. Both parties in
the government (the Christian Social Party and the Democratic Party) as
well as the main opposition parties (the Socialist Party and the green
parties) openly follow a course in favour of integration. Accordingly, the
deepening of the European integration process is carried by a broad
consensus. For instance, Luxembourg was one of the first states to ratify
the Maastricht Treaty by a large majority, and thus openly demonstrated
its deep commitment to the introduction of a single European currency, a
CFSP and progress in the JHA area.
However, even the smallest Member State is sometimes susceptible to
reservations about the idea of integration. In particular, the concept of
citizenship of the European Union, which was introduced by the
Maastricht Treaty, according to which EU citizens have the right to vote
and to stand as candidates in municipal and European elections through-
out the Union, caused alarm about foreign domination among the
Luxembourg population. It was feared that this might jeopardise the
peaceful co-existence of the Luxembourg and foreign population and that
this right could change the current political balance of power.3 Later,
however, this concern, which was connected with the fear of losing
national identity, proved to be unfounded, especially since only a few EU
citizens exercised this right.
As the smallest Member State, Luxembourg is quite sensitive on
matters that directly affect its extremely vulnerable economic structure
and its most important sectors such as finance, the iron and steel indus-
try, etc. Luxembourg therefore does not support harmonisation efforts at
any price in the field of taxes or the introduction of capital gains tax. Two
other key national interests concern the question of the seats of the
European institutions and the observance of the principle of equal rights
as regards representation in these institutions. Nevertheless, despite these
sensitivities, the strongly pro-European attitude of the Luxembourg popu-
lation is primarily based on the view that its national interests are best
looked after in a supranational community of solidarity and common
values. Indicative of this is the fact that the ratification of the last two EU
treaties (Maastricht in 1992, Amsterdam in 1997) did not encounter any
insurmountable constitutional problems. Since 1956, the transfer of
sovereign rights to a supranational community has been regulated by
Article 49a of the Luxembourg Constitution, which stipulates that compe-
tences reserved for legislative, executive and judiciary powers can be
temporarily transferred by treaty to institutions under international law.
The right of EU citizens to vote and stand for election at municipal and
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European levels, as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, was the only
change requiring Articles 52 and 107 of the Constitution to be amended. 
Luxembourg’s policy priorities in the Union: active deepening and
discrete mediating
Luxembourg’s policy regarding the Union shows an exceptionally high
degree of continuity. Apart from some minor shifts of emphasis, which are
mainly caused by the different personalities of the leading politicians,
there has hardly been any difference between the principal European poli-
cies of the Christian Social governments under Pierre Werner (1959–74;
1979–84), Jacques Santer (1984–95) and Jean-Claude Juncker (since
1995), and those of Gaston Thorn’s Democratic government (1974–79).
With their clearly pro-European attitudes, these governments have
contributed considerably to strengthening and promoting further integra-
tion. For example, in the early 1990s, it was the proposal developed under
the Luxembourg Presidency, which was strongly oriented towards politi-
cal compromise between the United Kingdom and the other Member
States, which prevailed over the far more idealistic Dutch plan and served
as a basis for the formulation of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Prominent Luxembourg politicians such as Joseph Bech, in the early
years, made great contributions to the further development of the
European integration process as active co-developers or discrete media-
tors. In this respect it is worth mentioning the three-stage plan to build
EMU, developed in the 1970s under the leadership of Pierre Werner, as
this played an important role in the field of financial policy. In the late
1990s, the negotiating skills of the Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker
brought about German–French agreement at a time when the stability
pact on budget deficits was being developed, and thus helped to further
EMU. Luxembourg’s European policy focuses primarily on a deepening of
the integration process while safeguarding vital national interests. During
the 1996–97 IGC, the government supported first and foremost the
consolidation of the Internal Market through the introduction of EMU
and the reinforcement of the second and third pillars. However, it vigor-
ously opposed both a Europe à la carte and any weakening of the
European Commission. Jean-Claude Juncker has particularly favoured
monetary union, to which he committed himself with great perseverance
and which is considered in the Grand Duchy as an indispensable prelimi-
nary stage for a CFSP. Of course, with respect to this close co-operation
on monetary policy, we should not overlook the fact that the establish-
ment of the ECB has given Luxembourg a considerably greater say in
matters than it has ever had before, especially when considering that since
its accession to the Belgian–Luxembourg Economic Union4 in 1921 it had
given up part of its monetary sovereignty.5 In the Luxembourg govern-
ment’s declaration on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, former Prime
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Minister Jacques Santer stated that monetary union was significant for
Luxembourg since it would now become a partner with equal rights in a
Union managing a common currency and defining a common monetary
policy.6 In contrast to larger countries such as Germany or France, which
are characterised by extremely complex structures of domestic interests,
the vital interests of a small state such as Luxembourg which, moreover,
is spared from internal disputes as far as Luxembourg’s European policy
is concerned, are less extensive. This of course has the advantage that in
certain areas it may be more ready to compromise and can often act as
mediator between conflicting interests.
Looking to the future, a question that arises in particular for
Luxembourg is that of its position within a European Union which will
one day comprise twenty or more Member States, mostly from Central
and Eastern Europe. In this context the Grand Duchy will of course be
required to defend its position as an active founding member with the
same rights and obligations as the large states. Consequently, during the
1996–97 IGC the government vehemently argued that – both now and in
the future – all the Member States should be represented in all institutions
(Council of Ministers, Commission, EP, ECJ, Court of Auditors,
Presidency, etc.), so that they can actively participate in the decision-
making process. Understandably, this topic is a high priority for the
smallest Member State, all the more so since attempts were made in the
run-up to the institutional reforms to reduce the disproportionately strong
influence of small states. In this respect the Grand Duchy vigorously
resists any attempts to marginalise its position, by unequivocally voicing
its opinion on equal representation in the principal institutions. Hence,
Luxembourg is not prepared to give up ‘its seat’ in the European
Commission or its right to the rotating Presidency of the Council, while
in essential areas such as treaty amendments, citizenship of the Union,
taxes, accession, etc. it remains in favour of maintaining unanimity in the
Council of Ministers. Another key element in Luxembourg’s European
policy since the Juncker government came to power is the aim of achiev-
ing better consultation with both Benelux partners, Belgium and the
Netherlands, and to extend this to various policy areas in coming years.
The national policy-cycle: pragmatic and flexible adaptation to the EU
treaties 
Luxembourg is a unitary central state with only two administrative levels
(national and municipal) (Figure 12.1). Unlike most EU Member States, it
has no regional or intermediate authorities. Without exception, EU policy
is prepared, decided on and implemented centrally. In the consensus
oriented democracy of Luxembourg, great importance is attached not
only to the mostly informal involvement of the parliament in the decision-
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making process, but also to consultation and provision of information to
the relevant interest groups, employees’ organisations, etc. in order where
possible to find consensual solutions. Another important characteristic of
political life in Luxembourg is its small size, which is apparent from the
fact that the total staff of the public administration does not exceed
11,800 civil servants. This structural feature is naturally a determining
factor, which affects the organisational capacities as well as the co-ordi-
nation mechanisms of the Grand Duchy. Some of the most distinctive
characteristics will be discussed below.7
Decision-making processes at national level
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of political life in Luxembourg is
the manageability of relations. In this sense, nearly all decision-makers
who deal with EU policy know each other personally. This almost daily
and direct contact, along with Luxembourg’s democracy which is based
on compromise, is advantageous insofar as the degree of bureaucratisa-
tion in the co-ordination of the various ministries is much lower than in
the larger states and in that the flow of paperwork stays within reasonable
limits. For instance, the result of these simplified channels of communica-
tion is that Luxembourg has relatively few permanent and regularly
meeting co-ordination structures. And where such interministerial bodies
do exist, they are characterised particularly by the fact that they are linked
to a direct interest, as in the case of an IGC, and that they are usually only
of a temporary nature. Another feature is that co-operation between the
various administrations in Luxembourg is characterised by a low degree
of competitive behaviour, which can also be put down not only to the
frequent consultations, but also to the fact that there are so few internal
‘cleavages’. Therefore, political decision-makers usually agree in principle
that it is better for the country’s interests for them to agree on a negotiat-
ing position rather than block a national decision unnecessarily by stirring
up interministerial rivalries.
Dominance of decentralised decision-making processes
Owing to the closeness of the relationships, the hierarchical decision-
making processes in Luxembourg are considerably shorter and more
flexible than in larger states. Usually, the officials who are in charge of a
certain EU dossier have a large degree of independence in their field and,
when working within their ministry, they will generally co-operate with
their minister, with whom they have direct contact in person or by tele-
phone. Of course, this considerable ‘room for manoeuvre’ gives officials
an enormous sense of responsibility and requires considerable expertise in
their own field, all the more so since, owing to the limited staff resources,
they often have to manage several fields at the same time. The result of the
visibly growing number of working groups, expert committees and other
Luxembourg 303
2444Ch12  3/12/02  2:05 pm  Page 303
bodies at EU level is therefore that civil servants participate in various
groups on account of their many different functions. What characterises
ideal Luxembourg officials is not so much their marked expert knowledge
but mainly their broad education and ability to quickly familiarise them-
selves with new fields of work.
Personnel shortages as well as the consensual development of the
democracy have a decisive influence on the working style of the different
administrations. In view of the additional workload associated with the
advancing process of European integration, one of the main challenges for
Luxembourg is to ensure a smooth and satisfactory functioning as regards
the preparation, decision-making and implementation of EU policy,
without, however, having to make unnecessary additions to the staff.8 So
far the government has solved this dilemma mainly by taking a pragmatic
and flexible approach, characterised by a distribution and organisation of
tasks which is targeted primarily at respective requirements and not so
much at strict observance of areas of competence and the exact applica-
tion of rules.9 A good example of this style of adaptation according to
practical needs is the Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers, whose
successful management in Luxembourg is not merely the result of a tightly
structured and well-organised administrative machinery, but also, and
chiefly, of the flexible working methods, the strong motivation and posi-
tive work attitude of officials as well as the availability of young college
graduates or diplomats currently abroad. A consequence of this flexible
approach is that the Luxembourg administration has so far proved to be
extremely resistant to fundamental organisational and procedural restruc-
turing, and that the institutionalisation of co-ordinating bodies is far less
advanced than it is, for example, in federal states which often have
extremely complicated co-ordination mechanisms. 
The government and the administration 
European policy in the consensual democracy of Luxembourg is formu-
lated by coalition governments, which are characterised by extraordinary
stability and continuity. The Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker
(Chrëschtlech-Sozial Vollëkspartei, CSV), can already look back on more
than fifteen years of experience in government, while Pierre Werner (CSV)
was able to make his mark on the country as Prime Minister for a total of
twenty years and Jacques Poos (Lëtzëbuerger Sozialistesch Arbëchter
Partei, LSAP) led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a long period as well.
Besides many years of extensive experience at EU level, another charac-
teristic of Luxembourg’s decision-makers is the fact that they usually
manage several important ministries. A good example of this multi-
functional approach of Luxembourg politicians is again Juncker, who in
the previous legislative period was the Minister of Employment, Minister
of Finance and Prime Minister at the same time, and represented
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Luxembourg in these capacities in several important EU Councils of
Ministers. This strong presence naturally gave him a deep insight into key
decision-making processes. Despite the enormous workload, this combi-
nation of key functions in a single person can be advantageous in that
energy-consuming and decision-blocking rivalries and disputes over
competences between these key ministries can be avoided. 
Nevertheless, Luxembourg has not been completely exempt from the
question of competence in European policy in recent years. For instance,
the coalition partner (LSAP) which held the post of Minister for Foreign
Affairs, particularly criticised the Prime Minister’s overly strong interfer-
ence in EU policy, arguing that he was overstepping his limits as primus
inter pares. However, since the formation of the coalition government
between the Christian Social Party (CSV) and the Democratic Party
(Demokratesch Partei, DP) in June 1999, this question has again been
pushed into the background. As a result of Luxembourg’s specific struc-
tural characteristics, the administration is characterised by a marked
decentralisation and considerable autonomy on the part of the individual
ministries. However, in 1993, with the appointment of a European
Correspondent in all ministries, a first step seems to have been made
towards better more formalised co-ordination in the implementation of
EU law and a more efficient treatment of the European dossiers. Besides
keeping track of major European issues, the responsibilities of European
Correspondents also include monitoring the correct application of EU
law. 
Most of the responsibility for preparing, deciding on and implementing
EU dossiers rests with the competent ministries, while co-ordination lies
within the scope of responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.10
Although this ministry cannot exert control over other ministries, its role
as a ‘go-between’ – scouting Luxembourg’s policy interests between the
Permanent Representation in Brussels and the national administration –
should not be underestimated. Important communications between the
‘technical’ ministries and the EU bodies usually go through the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Commission proposals for EU legislation are sent to
the competent ministry (or ministries) to be worked on. After the latter
have added their comments to the dossier, the content of which now
represents the official negotiating position of Luxembourg, sometimes
including a special report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is passed
on to the Permanent Representation. Where there are varying points of
view between the ‘technical’ ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
can call on an interministerial advisory body of senior civil servants,
which is formed on an ad hoc basis, and which will then try to define a
strategy. If agreement still cannot be reached or if the dossier in question
is of such vital importance that it affects the national interest, the govern-
ment’s Council of Ministers may become involved, which will then decide
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on Luxembourg’s position. Besides the weekly Council of Ministers
meeting, the Union Committee (Comité de l’Union), which meets every
two weeks under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is
the most important co-ordinating body in Luxembourg. At the meetings
of this body, attended by ministers and their colleagues concerned with an
item on the agenda, all topical issues (institutional questions, Agenda
2000, etc.) are discussed. In Luxembourg’s consensual democracy, inter-
est groups affected by a directive on the Union’s rolling agenda are also
consulted in the preparatory and decision-making phases. A new trend in
recent years has been the improved consultation and co-ordination
regarding Luxembourg’s national position as a result of increased infor-
mal consultation with the two Benelux partners. With regard to the 2000
IGC, the three partner states again wanted to lay out their common
proposals in a memorandum concerning the further development of the
Union. Their aim, of course, is not least to be able to better protect the
interests of smaller countries within the institutional structure. 
In the decision-making phase, the national officials dealing with a
dossier usually participate in the relevant working groups at European
level with each official covering about two–three groups. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs sends about thirty-five of its total staff members11 to meet-
ings in Brussels. The implementation of EU directives is a matter for the
ministries in whose area of competence the contents of a directive or any
other EU legal act fall. In accordance with the internal rules on the
management of dossiers requiring implementing measures12 laid down by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the respective ministries are urged to
ensure both that the act in question is correctly implemented and that time
limits laid out in a directive are observed. According to the statistics, the
Grand Duchy, with its implementation rate of 94.4 per cent, is now
twelfth within the Union.13 This small distance behind its partners is
partially due to a shortage of staff in the administrations, which has
become particularly apparent during the Luxembourg Presidencies. Such
a responsible and prestigious task demands so much of the administrative
machinery of a small country that the entire routine legislative process
relating to domestic policy slows down considerably during this time. In
the case of actions for infringement of the EC Treaty,14 Luxembourg was
sixth15 in 1998 with a total of eight cases, while in the period between
1953 and 1998 it was taken to court in eighty-six cases.16
So far, the new Treaties (Maastricht and Amsterdam) have given rise to
some small organisational and institutional adjustments in Luxembourg.
Judging from the coalition agreement of the new CSV–DP government,17
it is to be assumed that some additional adjustments will be made in the
coming years, for example as regards interministerial co-ordination, co-
operation between parliament and government, information and
communications policy, etc. 
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In the context of the establishment of EMU the conversion of the
Luxembourg Monetary Institute (Institut monétaire luxembourgeois) into
a Central Bank with the same competences and the same legal status as
equivalent institutions in the other Member States, has been of paramount
importance. The Monetary Institute in existence up to that point did not
have all the competences of a central bank owing to Luxembourg’s mone-
tary union with Belgium. All decisions concerning EMU fall within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, which also deals with tax policy in
general and EU tax harmonisation in particular. 
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the further development of a
common foreign and security policy through the Treaty of Maastricht led
to a limited expansion in order to cover the twenty-five working groups
of the European Council. A very recent adjustment, which is not due to
the increasing influence of European integration on the national level, but
rather to the dissolution of the Ministry of Defence after the formation of
the new government, concerns the transfer of the competence for defence
policy from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
order to do justice to the increasing importance of the defence policy
dimension within the Union. Another adjustment brought about by the
Maastricht Treaty was the transfer of the asylum and immigration policy
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior. However,
as regards matters covered by pillar three and Schengen, for example, the
Maastricht Treaty did not bring any major changes, and so these
remained within the Ministry of Justice, according to the principle that
the ministries covering a certain field of expertise at national level will be
responsible for the same area at European level.
The Permanent Representation 
The Permanent Representation in Brussels has a key role when it comes to
the formulation of Luxembourg’s European policy. Not only does it hold
a high position within the Luxembourg administration, but the weight
of its opinions also has considerable influence in the development of
Luxembourg’s negotiating positions. With an average length of service of
ten–fifteen years, most of the accredited diplomats in the Belgian capital
have a thorough knowledge and considerable experience in the field of
European affairs. The great value attached to the Permanent
Representation by the Luxembourg government is also clear from its
constant expansion and the considerable investments made in it.18 Since
1997 the Representation has a better infrastructure, as it has a seat in the
House of Luxembourg19 near the EU institutions. Parallel to this devel-
opment in terms of space, its staff has increased from approximately five
diplomats in 1995 to a current total of twelve. All officials come from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the exception of a representative from
the Ministry of Finance, a representative from the Ministry of
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Employment and Social Affairs, who deals exclusively with social affairs
and labour market policy, a representative from the Ministry of Justice,
who is responsible for the third pillar and a representative from the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, whose work area covers all financial and
fiscal affairs. 
During the presidencies, which are extremely labour-intensive for a
small state, the limited number of staff must be supplemented with young
academics and temporarily seconded diplomats. Without these, the
smooth organisation and coordination of around 1,600 meetings at minis-
terial, ambassador and expert level during the last presidency in 1997
could hardly have been achieved. The manageable size of the
Representation also means that in its routine tasks Luxembourg concen-
trates primarily on those areas which are of direct importance to
protecting its interests. For instance, it is more than reasonable to assume
that the small Luxembourg administrative machinery would not have the
same expertise on all technical issues as, for example, a bureaucracy
which is the size of those in France or Germany. In this respect, the short-
age of staff and material resources is linked to a certain selectiveness in
working methods. In its relations with the most important EU institutions
– the Council of Ministers, Commission and Parliament – Luxembourg is
also characterised by this selective approach, in which respect it attaches
special importance to its close contacts with the Council Secretariat and
the Commission. This is, of course, all the more important as
Luxembourg cannot be represented in all working groups and is therefore
dependent on the availability of reliable information. On the other hand,
its relations with the EP are not as close and its contact is less frequent. 
The Chamber of Deputies 
The Chamber of Deputies comprises sixty delegates, most of whom also
have a job in addition to having a seat in parliament. For this position
they receive a compensation as well as, at a later stage, an addition to their
regular pension. Members of Parliament have only a very limited admin-
istrative and scientific staff, which means that whenever there is a great
deal of work it is often difficult for them to familiarise themselves with
each specific field in their subject area. This also applies to technical ques-
tions on EU matters; the result is that systematic consideration of all
proposals from Brussels is not possible.20 Furthermore, the fact that
Luxembourg Members of Parliament are elected at national level has not
always increased their willingness to take initiatives regarding EU affairs. 
The main share of the work of the Luxembourg parliament takes place
in twenty-three committees with eleven members each on average, while
responsibility for European policy lies with the Committee for Foreign
and European Affairs, which consists of thirteen members. So far,
repeated attempts to create a specific advisory body dealing only with
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European affairs have failed. One of these plans was aimed at creating a
consultative committee comprising the six members of the national
parliament and six MEPs. The reason why none of these plans could be
realised is connected, on the one hand, with the fact that the establishment
of another body would have further increased the workload of individual
Members of Parliament and, on the other hand, that it would have been
difficult to demarcate the area of competence between this committee and
the Committee for Foreign and European Affairs.21
The involvement of the Chamber of Deputies in preparing, deciding on
and implementing EU policy has developed only to a limited extent in
Luxembourg and, according to the new coalition agreement between the
CSV and the DP, is likely to expand in the future. The first concrete
proposal for stronger parliamentary involvement in the European legisla-
tive process aims at involving the Committee for Foreign and European
Affairs, which is responsible for European policy, at an earlier stage in the
decision-making process by informing it of the government’s initial offi-
cial position regarding important proposals for a directive. 
Until now, relations between the government and the legislature in the
area of information and consultation have developed without the parlia-
ment having been actively involved in the law-making process. The
progress made mainly concerns the improved provision of information by
the government and the regular briefing of parliament before and after
summit meetings, during the IGC or in the case of important decisions
taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These meetings always end with
a parliamentary debate. Another form of this provision of information is
the sending of all relevant EU documents such as white papers, green
papers, etc., to the Chamber of Deputies. However, with a view to the
increasing extension of EU competences to new fields and with the trans-
fer of national competences to European level, the Chamber of Deputies
has become somewhat more active in relation to Europe since the
Amsterdam Treaty. In order to integrate EU policy more efficiently into
the work of the committees, it was decided that, in European matters, the
individual committees would be given the responsibility for those sectors
for which they are also responsible at national level. As a result, many of
the existing committees set up their own sub-committees which deal
exclusively with EU topics. 
The desire for a stronger and more efficient involvement of the
Chamber of Deputies in EU policy, which has grown more acute particu-
larly in recent years, was not limited only to the parliament. An important
initiative came from the government in 1996 when it put the Luxembourg
MEP Charles Goerens in charge of writing a report on the future role of
national parliaments in the Union. In Goerens’ opinion, a charter should
be incorporated into the Treaty which, on the one hand, ensured that
governments imposed minimum obligations on national parliaments and,
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on the other hand, strengthened the obligations of the EU institutions
towards the EP. Some of his proposals, which also concerned
Luxembourg, aimed to improve co-operation between MEPs and national
Members of Parliament, for example through the participation of MEPs
in thematically relevant meetings of national committees, through the
right of MEPs to ask questions of the competent ministers, and through
the closer involvement of MEPs in the national committee for Foreign and
European Affairs. The fact that, in the future, changes will be made in the
co-ordination between government and parliament in Luxembourg is also
underlined by the new government programme which envisages stronger
participation of the Chamber of Deputies in the EU decision-making
process. 
The regional level
For a small state like Luxembourg, which as regards its size is compara-
ble to the smallest German Bundesland (Saarland), it would be a luxury
and surely also too expensive to have an intermediate or regional level of
government with its own competences and administration. Below the
central state level, the Grand Duchy is composed of three districts and 118
local communities. In each district, a senior civil servant, appointed by the
Grand Duke, supervises the implementation of laws, regulations, etc. as
well as the administrative management of local finance. This centralist,
unitary state structure without powerful regional players naturally facili-
tates the government’s pro-integrationist course towards European
integration which reflects more or less the interests of the whole popula-
tion.
Conclusion: Luxembourg – condemned to a pro-active integration
strategy
In the smallest EU Member State, active and committed co-operation with
the European institutions is considered a necessity which increases
Luxembourg’s visibility and strengthens the protection of its interests in
Europe and in the world. From this viewpoint, the Treaties of Maastricht
and Amsterdam were considered by the public as quite far-reaching,
although the expansion of matters dealt with by the EU has not led to
fundamental feelings of resentment at the further loss of sovereign rights.
The existing consensus among the political elite that national interests can
best be safeguarded in a supranational community has not been shaken.
As regards the Amsterdam Treaty, it was even suggested that the commu-
nitisation of some fields, such as common foreign and security policy and
asylum and immigration policy, would not go far enough to solve current
problems. 
The uncomplicated attitude of the Luxembourg people towards the
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new treaties is also reflected in the pragmatic adaptations of the national
institutions to the extended European agenda. Even after the latest treaty
modifications, the internal co-ordination of EU policy is still characterised
by a small degree of institutionalisation of co-ordination bodies, while the
various ministries and the individual officials in particular have consider-
able decision-making power and autonomy, and interministerial conflicts
are kept within limits. The restructuring of the administration has, up to
now, been rather a flexible adjustment to acute requirements, as for
example in the case of the introduction of the European correspondents.
However, as set out in the new government’s coalition agreement,
some adjustments are expected in the future. Besides more efficient inter-
ministerial co-ordination and improved bilateral relations, the policy on
information and communication between the institutions and between the
state and the citizens should also be improved. These reforms aim in
particular to strengthen the coherence of Luxembourg’s EU policy and to
defend its national interests more effectively in a Europe which is becom-
ing increasingly complex. For instance, in the course of the enlargement
of the Union to the east, the smallest Member State must pay particular
attention to ways of increasing its visibility and its room to manoeuvre
within an enlarged Union by developing contacts with its neighbours and
its traditional allies. 
In this context it is also interesting to note that the employees’ organi-
sations have become aware of the advantages of better mutual
consultation. Thus, in 1996 the two largest trade unions established a
joint office in order to better safeguard Luxembourg’s interests within the
ETUC. 
With the growing importance of the European level an increased need
for co-ordination and co-operation between the national institutions has
also arisen in Luxembourg. However, while on the one hand, this need
has not developed in the same way as in large states, on account of the
small size of the country and the simpler communication channels, on the
other hand the growing complexity and abundance of subjects to be dealt
with also requires certain adjustments to be made, such as, for example,
a better distribution of tasks and a clearer organisational structure.22 This
is, of course, not always so simple for an administration the size of that of
a city, particularly since it will never have access to the same specialised
and technical expertise as an administration the size of Germany or
France. The individual official in Luxembourg often has to deal with a
whole range of special issues which in other states are spread over several
departments. With the further deepening of the Union, the responsibility
and workload of the individual official is likely to increase rather than
decrease, especially since it will not be possible to increase the number of
staff accordingly owing to high costs. 
However, this specific problem of small size is not expected to become
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acute in the near future because Luxembourg has fewer national key inter-
ests than large states and because it can specialise mainly in these key
areas. However, owing to the limited capacity of its small administration
as well as its very small size, it will in the future still have to rely on
competent politicians with a strong personality who will look after both
national interests and Community interests. A great challenge for the
Grand Duchy will therefore continue to be that of compensating for its
small size and the associated structural disadvantages through active and
committed co-operation in the European integration process.
Furthermore, with regard to Luxembourg’s ability domestically to deal
with the deepening of the European integration process, it should be
emphasised that the small size of the country’s administration with its
highly informal communication structures and the predominance of
generalists rather than specialists, has until now had many advantages
(little need for institutionalised co-ordination structures, a pragmatic and
flexible approach towards European integration, etc.). On the other hand,
however, it should be pointed out that owing to the increasing complex-
ity and specialisation of the working areas, it is very difficult to make
prognoses for the future. In this context and without questioning the
strategy of flexible and pragmatic adaptation, we can only conclude in a
very general way that Luxembourg is increasingly becoming aware of the
need for better co-ordination and communication structures,23 as can be
seen, for instance, in the coalition agreement of June 1999. A development
in that direction would therefore be considered as an indication of the
stronger influence of the European level on the national level.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Marc Ungeheuer, Deputy Permanent Representative of
Luxembourg to the European Union and Victor Weitzel, Press Attaché of
Jacques Poos, the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for their valuable
support with regard to this chapter.
2 In the more than 150 years of the state’s existence, its national independence
was challenged several times by Belgian, German and French
‘Annexionsversuche’.
3 This should chiefly be considered against the backdrop of the fact that in
some municipalities the majority of the population consists of foreigners.
4 The economic union with Belgium, established in 1921, also meant a
currency union with a common currency (the Belgian franc), the predomi-
nance of the Belgian National Bank (Banque Nationale de Belgique) and a
common commercial policy.
5 A striking example is the 8.5 per cent devaluation of the Belgian franc in
February 1982 by the Belgian government without prior consultation of the
Luxembourg government.
6 See the declaration by Prime Minister Jacques Santer on the ratification of
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the Maastricht Treaty of 22 April 1992 in the Chamber of Deputies. 
7 See Martine Nies-Berchem, ‘L’administration luxembourgeoise et les débuts
de l’administration européenne’, in: Gilbert Trausch and Edmée Croisé-
Schirtz (eds), Le Luxembourg face à la construction européenne
(Luxembourg: Saint-Paul, 1996), pp. 147–160; Jean-Marc Hoscheit and
Malou Weyrich, Luxembourg, La mise en oeuvre des directives communau-
taires’, in: Heinrich Siedentopf and Jaques Ziller (eds), Making European
Policies Work, Vol. II (Maastricht: EIPA, 1988), pp. 521–569.
8 At present, about one in three employees in Luxembourg works for the state,
while the industrial sector and the services sector increasingly have to rely on
foreigners to meet their staff needs.
9 See Simone Merten-Beissel, ‘Administration luxembourgeoise et l’intégration
européenne’, in: Charles Debbasch (ed.), Administrations nationales et l’in-
tégration européenne. Proceedings of the colloquium in Aix in October 1986
(Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1987); Editions du Centre national de la Recherche
Scientifique, p. 49 et seq. 
10 See Marc Bichler, ‘The case of Luxembourg’, in: Spyros A. Pappas (ed.),
National Administrative Procedures for the Preparation and Implementation
of Community Decisions (Maastricht: EIPA, 1994), pp. 371–386.
11 More than one-third of total staff (120) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
12 See Bichler, 1994, op. cit., p. 382.
13 See Implementation Report, May 1998. In this context, it should be pointed
out that the differences between the first position and the twelfth position are
small.
14 The following statistics concern Articles 169, 170, 171, 225 of the ECT,
Articles 141, 142, 143 of the EAEC Treaty and Article 88 of the ECSC
Treaty.
15 Belgium and France were last with twenty-two cases, while Denmark,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom were the ‘model pupils’ with only
one case.
16 Belgium, on the other hand, had the most cases: a total of 225.
17 See Déclaration gouvernementale, declaration by Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker, of 12 August 1999 in the Chamber of Deputies, pp. 4–5,
8–9.
18 These investments are the most significant the state of Luxembourg has ever
made abroad.
19 The ‘House of Luxembourg’ also accommodates the Luxembourg Embassy
in Belgium, the Consulate and the Representation to the WEU.
20 See Gaston Stronck, ‘Luxembourg’, in: Roger Morgan and Clare Tame (eds),
Parliaments and Parties (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 171.
21 See ibid, p. 169.
22 In the context of administrative reform, improvements in the organisational
structure are planned, as well as a more specific distribution of tasks in
general.
23 See Déclaration gouvernementale, declaration by Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker, of 12 August 1999 in the Chamber of Deputies, p. 9.
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13 Ben J.S. Hoetjes
The Netherlands: a former founding
father in search of control
Introduction: a mature member’s second thoughts
The involvement of the Dutch in European integration dates back to the
1950s, and so do the Dutch attitudes towards it. Over the years, they have
changed, but there is also a long-standing support for the overall process
of European integration. A clear distinction, however, should be drawn
between the elite and the general public. For the general public, European
integration in the 1950s was a good cause, to be left to the experts and to
the elite. Until the mid-1960s, when the system of pillarisation1 was still
in force, the general public was quite willing to leave politics to its
pillarised elites (Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal-Conservative).
Within the political elite, there was hardly any disagreement about
European integration, and the general public played its role as a ‘captive
audience’.
In the mid-1960s, relations between the voters and the elite, and within
the elite, became less predictable. New parties emerged, and ‘floating
voters’ became more important in the elections.2 In the 1970s, public
opinion and political discussion were radicalised. Remarkably, however,
this change did not affect the Union. European integration remained a
highly technical, specialised and politically uninteresting field. Notions
about integration were rather vague. There was, at least, an implicit
assumption that Dutch identity and Dutch political institutions would
remain in place, and that the integration process would deliver consider-
able benefits, especially in economic terms.3 With the decline of ideology
and political participation in the 1980s, European integration became a
matter of ‘positive indifference’. After the end of the Cold War, ideologi-
cal controversies subsided, or virtually disappeared. The public at large
lost interest in politics altogether. Only very down-to-earth and close-to-
home issues such as safety in the streets, the stock exchange, career
openings, private business, etc. could draw the public’s attention. 
Against this ‘post-modern’ background, the mid-1990s showed more
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and more signs of Euroscepticism and Eurocynicism. Gradually, European
integration came to be criticised as ‘too costly’, ‘wasteful’, ‘un-demo-
cratic’, etc. Business people remained quite positive about the Union, but
in other circles, positive indifference was replaced by controversy, or by
negative indifference. 
The Dutch state and the integration process: the constitution and
national politics
The ratification of the EU treaties (Maastricht and Amsterdam) created no
constitutional problems. Although international treaties require the assent
of parliament, the Dutch Constitution permits the granting of legislative
and/or executive powers to international bodies created to carry out
international treaties (Article 92). Therefore, neither Maastricht nor
Amsterdam required a constitutional amendment. Both treaty ratifica-
tions as such, did not generate a serious discussion in parliament. Because
of this smooth and silent approval, it took some time before Dutch poli-
tics and administration became aware of the consequences of the
Maastricht Treaty. Specifics will be presented later, but in general there
was a rather hurried and haphazard reaction to the Union as the new
supranational level of government. Meanwhile, some important political
changes took place in the 1990s. One was the decline in ideological iden-
tity, especially among the left. Another, related to the first, was the
emergence of new coalitions. The 1994 parliamentary elections brought
losses for the social democrats and the Christian Democrats, and gains for
the liberal conservatives and the leftist liberals. The new ‘purple’ coalition
government led by the social democrat Kok left the Christian Democrats
in opposition – an event unprecedented since the First World War. After
the 1998 elections, a second ‘purple’ government was formed. 
The policy programme of the new government did not represent a
radical break with the previous government (Christian Democrat/social
democrat coalition), but there were some interesting changes from an EU
perspective. For one thing, the Christian Democrats no longer represented
the Netherlands in Brussels. Personalities such as Lubbers disappeared,
and the long-standing Christian Democratic commitment to Europe was
replaced by social democratic and liberal commitments. Personalised
animosities, e.g. Lubbers’ failure to become President of the Commission,
could be put aside. Something else was also obvious: new, and more crit-
ical attitudes towards the Union would soon present themselves.
In terms of personnel, the trio of Lubbers–van den Broek–Dankert
(Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Secretary for European
Affairs) was replaced by Kok–van Mierlo–Patijn. Patijn (liberal conserva-
tive) took a low profile, and concentrated on the organisational and
diplomatic side of EU work. Van Mierlo (left liberal) took a higher public
profile, preferring broad ‘philosophical’ views on world affairs, and –
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interestingly – stressing closer relations between the Netherlands and
France. Kok, however, took the actual lead in Dutch EU affairs. Being on
close personal terms with Helmut Kohl – in spite of party differences – he
managed to improve Dutch–German relations, both bilaterally and within
the Union. In the background, the Queen and especially her husband
Prince Claus von Amsberg, contributed further to the Dutch commitment
to the Union and to close relations with Germany. 
The second ‘purple’ coalition in 1998 involved the same parties, but
some new personalities. The Kok–van Mierlo–Patijn group was succeeded
by the trio of Kok–van Aartsen–Benschop. Kok and Benschop belonged to
the social democratic party while van Aartsen was a liberal conservative.
Although this implied a stronger social democratic weight in EU affairs, it
should be taken into account that Benschop did not have any EU experi-
ence – he was the election campaign manager for the social democrats.
Van Aartsen, on the other hand, was Agriculture Minister in the former
‘purple’ coalition. As such, he acquired considerable EU experience. He
has a reputation for down-to-earth political skill and as a ‘general
manager’ more than a ‘career diplomat’. Furthermore, he has close links
with the (liberal conservative) Minister of Finance, Zalm, who strongly
asserted himself in EU affairs after 1994 – he was also the Finance
Minister in the previous government. Next to the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs (assisted by the State Secretary for European
Affairs), the Ministry of Finance plays a strategic role, both in domestic
politics (co-ordinating all public finance) and in EU affairs.
Dutch policy priorities in the Union: a rethinking of governments and
political parties
For the Dutch government, the Maastricht Treaty and the new European
Commission in 1994 were two ‘dramatic moments ‘ of rude awakening to
the political realities of Europe in the 1990s. In the negotiations for
Maastricht, the Dutch presidency took a strongly pro-federal position
which proved untenable and had to be discarded in a rather embarrassing
way. The TEU’s three-pillar structure was a Luxembourg–French design,4
forced upon an unwilling and disgraced Dutch presidency. For the Dutch,
Maastricht is remembered vividly as ‘Black Monday’5 – a major diplo-
matic failure, and a trauma, especially for the Foreign Ministry. The
Dutch, therefore, have tended to overlook the enormous progress of
European integration brought about by the TEU.
In the negotiations for the new Commission in 1993–94, Prime
Minister Lubbers campaigned rather openly for the Commission
Presidency. When this failed – the post went, rather humiliatingly, to the
Luxembourg Santer – he campaigned for the position of NATO Secretary-
General, and also failed. These two experiences, on the one hand, created
ill-feelings especially among the Christian Democrats – the bitterness of ‘a
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founding-father of the EU, who is no longer listened to’. This may well
have contributed to the electoral discredit of the Christian Democrats in
1994 and 1998. On the other hand, they also forced the Netherlands to
re-think its approach and priorities in the Union. This re-thinking process
has not yet come to an end, but since 1994 some overall changes have
emerged. First, there is now an explicit commitment to the national inte-
rest. Before 1994, the Netherlands always declared their full and explicit
commitment to the cause of European integration – implicitly assuming
that this was the best way to serve the national interest. After 1994, the
government publicly stated its desire to promote its national interest in
Europe, including Dutch business interests.
Secondly, a higher priority is given to financial issues in the Union. The
presidency of the ECB was won by the Dutch social democratic banker
Duisenberg, after a sustained and extensive campaign. In the discussions
about EU finance, the Netherlands sided with Germany in favour of redu-
cing national contributions. Owing to the CAP reforms, the Netherlands
had become a net-payer rather than a net-receiver, and Finance Minister
Zalm decided to take a hard ‘I want my money back’ line. Compared to
the 1980s, this was a remarkable reversal of both the position and the
tone of the Dutch in the Union.
Thirdly, there is a stronger emphasis on coalition-building inside the
Union – something to which the Dutch government was not accustomed.
Instead of simply just balancing-off the major Member States, or assum-
ing the moral authority of the Netherlands, the government has to look
for groupings within the Union. Depending on policy areas, these group-
ings may vary – e.g. in environmental affairs the Scandinavian countries
are potential partners whereas in monetary matters, Germany is a possi-
ble ally. Currently, the Foreign Ministry is developing a more systematic
approach to coalition-building in Europe.
Aside from these general changes, one can also see a pattern in the
specific Dutch policy priorities.6 The traditional commitment to pillar one
integration continues: full support is given to economic and monetary
integration (Single Market, EMU, convergence criteria and the stability
pact), to a more efficient and reformed CAP, and also to a stronger EU
environmental policy. However, in social affairs the Dutch take a more
low-key approach. Whenever the harmonisation of social security legisla-
tion in the Union might threaten the Dutch competitive position in terms
of productivity or production costs, the Dutch government is reluctant.
The Dutch also supported the Barber Protocol, aimed at the restriction of
EU-wide equal rights provisions, mainly for financial reasons.
Furthermore, Dutch support for EU employment programmes and poli-
cies is rather ambivalent. For ideological reasons, the social democrats
proclaim their commitment, but since unemployment in the Netherlands
is much lower than elsewhere in the Union, there is little interest in strong
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financial support for EU employment programmes. The reduction of
public expenditure, and the creation of jobs are among the major Dutch
domestic policy goals. Only if EU policies are supportive of these will they
be embraced. 
In the second pillar (CFSP) the Dutch have shown a strong support for
peace-keeping activities under the Petersberg missions and for various
forms of aid to conflict-ridden countries, e.g. the former Yugoslavia. The
fight against poverty by means of international aid should prevent, or
reduce the influx of refugees and immigrants into the Union. The Dutch
government also supports the expansion of the Commission’s powers in
the second pillar.
Only since 1997 has the third pillar received explicit attention, e.g. in
government declarations in parliament, budget debates etc. with the
Ministry of Justice taking the lead. Pillar three has been a late developer
but has recently grown in importance. This is clearly related to the
increased political salience of crime and safety in the Netherlands.
Immigration has also become a major political issue – again, bringing in
the Ministry of Justice and the third pillar.
On the political party scene, one can observe a major change in policies
towards the Union especially in the liberal-conservative  Volkspartej voor
Vrijheld en Democratie (VVD).7 Its former unquestioning commitment to
European integration, especially from a business perspective, was chal-
lenged, within the party, by a new nationalism promoted by party leader
Bolkestein. In the socialist Partei van de Arbeid (PvdA) there is some leftist
intellectual flirting with ‘post-modern nationalism’, but there is a clear
commitment to European integration with increasing attention paid to
social security and unemployment. Leftist liberals, as well as Christian
Democrats, remain clearly committed to the integration process, includ-
ing a federal Union. Only among the small parties on the far left – not the
Green Party, but especially the Socialist Party (former Marxist) – and on
the far right – orthodox Calvinist parties – can one find a clear rejection
of the Union.
The subsidiarity principle, as it appeared in official EU policies, did not
create a great stir in Dutch political thinking. Although in origin it is a
Christian Democratic concept – with its roots in Catholic political philos-
ophy – it was unknown in Dutch ideological discussion. In fact, however,
it fits quite well with current administrative thinking in the Netherlands.
The Dutch state is a ‘decentralised unitary system’ with historical roots in
a confederal republic. Local and provincial autonomy have historically
been very strong, and the continuous budget cuts over recent decades have
only encouraged central government to shift powers – and burdens – to
lower levels. In Dutch policy discussions, therefore, the preference for the
downward-shifting of powers sounded quite familiar. By itself, this pref-
erence is part of the older tradition of consociational democracy in the
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Netherlands. The tradition of ‘pillarisation’ has, since the 1960s, been
secularised and is now called the Dutch ‘polder model’, but the basic idea
of leaving as much power as possible in the hands of smaller, constituent
units, has remained.8 Thus, subsidiarity may have sounded unfamiliar,
but substantially it belonged to the ‘automatic reflexes’ of Dutch admin-
istrative and political culture. 
In the Dutch policy-cycle, the interministerial Review Committee on
Commissions Proposals – the Beoordelingscommissie Nieuwe
Commissievoorstellen (BNC) – was established to review proposals from
the European Commission from the viewpoint of subsidiarity.
The national policy-cycle: adapting to trauma, and catching up 
Since the Netherlands has a decentralised unitary system9 with a relatively
weak intermediary, provincial level of government, we can distinguish
between the national level on the one hand, and the ‘lower levels’ on the
other (Figure 13.1). We then deal with political parties and interest groups
and, finally, we look for patterns of change since Maastricht. When
analysing national involvement in EU policies, one can distinguish
between government and parliament. For both, there is the question of
involvement in the preparation of EU policies, the actual making of deci-
sions, their implementation and, finally, the control of implementation. In
this last phase, an important role is also played by the judiciary.
Government: politicians and civil servants 
In practice, it is very difficult to pinpoint the exact beginnings of EU
policy preparation.10 The Commission’s advisory committees, Council of
Ministers working groups, EP committees (since Amsterdam), or informal
discussions, seminars or conferences provide the breeding ground for
policy ideas or initiatives. For a national government it is very important
to have well-organised links with these ‘breeding grounds’. Moreover,
these links are needed for the formal policy preparation process, i.e.
‘feeding’ the national representatives with the necessary expertise and
instructions for Council decision-making. 
Within each ministry in the Netherlands, there is a unit in charge of
international and/or EU affairs.11 In some cases, it has a strong position
as a directorate, e.g. Agriculture, Economic Affairs, Environmental
Affairs, Finance; sometimes it has the status of a bureau or a division
(afdeling) (e.g. Justice, Transport and Water), and sometimes it is placed
in a co-ordinating position close to the secretary-general (e.g. Interior). 
The position of these units has changed over the years. In general, this
has been consolidated (e.g. Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Finance), or
strengthened considerably (e.g. Justice, Interior). In the ministries with a
long-standing EU involvement, EU affairs have become an established
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specialisation for a specific unit. In the more recently ‘Europeanised’
ministries the EU units are small and are charged with increasing aware-
ness of the Union throughout their organisation.
The views of the ministries on EU policies are presented in the
(frequent) meetings of interministerial bodies: the Co-Ordination
Committee (CoCo), the Review Committee on new Commission
Proposals, and the Co-Ordination Committee at High Civil-Service Level
(CoCoHAN).12 All ministries are represented in these committees and
they are chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate for
Integration in Europe (in charge of EU as well as other multilateral
European organisations). 
The CoCo was established in the early 1960s, after an interministerial
struggle over the leadership in EEC affairs. Economic Affairs, which had
been involved in European integration since the late 1940s (Marshall
Program, OECD, ECSC), lost out to Foreign Affairs, which won the
leading position in Dutch EEC policy. For specific aspects of the EEC,
especially trade and agriculture, a privileged/autonomous status was,
however, given to the ministries of Economic Affairs and Agriculture.13 In
Dutch coalition politics, it is impossible for a single ministry to impose its
will on a policy area where other ministries are involved.
The BNC was created more recently, in order to carry out ‘subsidiarity
testing’ on Commission proposals, i.e. to give a preliminary judgement as
to whether a proposal deserved to be developed by the Commission at all,
or whether it should be handed over to the national government.14
CoCoHAN was created after the trauma of Maastricht in 1992. It was felt
that the involvement of the very top-level civil servants would prevent
future policy failures. Whereas CoCo consists of the heads of ministerial
EU units, the EU Director from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and a repre-
sentative of the Dutch Permanent Representation, CoCoHAN involves the
secretary-generals of all the ministries, plus the Permanent Representation
director himself and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. CoCo and
CoCoHAN provide the Dutch Permanent Representation with instruc-
tions for meetings of the EU Council of Ministers. However, since there is
also a strong political dimension to the Union, the Dutch position is also
prepared at the political level, i.e. in a committee of the Council of
Ministers: the Council on International and European Affairs – Sub-
division on Europe (REIA-E). REIA-E is chaired by the Prime Minister,
and consists of all cabinet ministers. Some sub-groups, e.g. Foreign
Affairs–Union, Agriculture, Economic Affairs and the Prime Minister,
have their own preparatory meetings for REIA-E at the political level.
Policy preparation in the bureaucracy is thus paralleled by political prepa-
ration – with the Secretary of State-Foreign Affairs–Union as the
linch-pin.
Moving from policy preparation to decision-making, one has to
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acknowledge the strategic role of the Dutch Permanent Representation in
Brussels. Between 1986 (SEA) and 1992, the Permanent Representation
expanded rapidly, so that all ministries now have at least one representa-
tive. Before the TEU’s three-pillar structure was in place, all ministries had
joined in the ‘race for Brussels’. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
formally in charge of the Permanent Representation; its head is a career
diplomat, and all views/instructions from individual ministries have to be
channelled through it.15 However, Agriculture and ECOFIN are exempted
from this rule and can make their own policies in the Council – under the
pillar one procedures. In the third pillar, the K4 committee has carved out
its own competence in preparing Council meetings.
These exceptions indicate the serious problems of co-ordination and
control in the Permanent Representation.16 They are not unique to the
Netherlands, but they are aggravated by Dutch coalition politics, which
offers much autonomy to individual ministries. The Dutch prime minister is
always a ‘primus inter pares’, unable to impose his views on others, and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs is usually more interested in international poli-
tics and diplomacy than in the technical specifics of EU policy proposals. 
The Dutch Permanent Representative, therefore, has a very difficult
task. Not only does a great deal of policy preparation escape his view –
there are many contacts between ministries of Member States which by-
pass the head of the Permanent Representation – but also his control – as
some important ministries have succeeded in creating a reserved ‘policy
space’. For them, the Permanent Representation serves mainly as a tech-
nical facility in Brussels. 
Only a strong Minister of Foreign Affairs, or – even better – a coalition
between a strong Foreign Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister, can
reduce the Dutch problems of co-ordination and control in EU policy-
making. The present government, where the Prime Minister has strong
European ambitions, the Secretary of State has close links with the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has an interest in weakening
the autonomy of Agriculture, for example, demonstrates some interesting
illustrations of this struggle for control. Policy failures in the past, and the
increasing need for some success in the Union, should stimulate the Dutch
not only to find coalition partners among the other Member States, but
also to settle their internal differences and to speak with one voice in the
national interest.
Concerning the implementation of EU policies and the control of
implementation, the record of the Netherlands is rather mixed – quite
unlike what one might expect from this founding father of European inte-
gration. Table 13.1 shows the number of EU directives implemented, the
number of delays, infringement procedures and verdicts of the ECJ
against the Netherlands concerning non-implementation, for the years
1990–97.17
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Table 13.1 (Non-)implementation of EU directives by the Netherlands,
1990–97
Implemented Court case
Year (started by Commission) Delayed Infringement + verdict
1990 66 70 31 4
1991 90 71 41 10
1992 149 73 45 6
1993 141 79 41 5
1994 123 35 18 2
1995 82 31 18 0
1996 73 32 6 0
1997 89 33 19 0
Compared to earlier data,18 Table 13.1 shows that the ‘race for 1992’
to implement the White Paper was ultimately successful in the
Netherlands. The Dutch government has considerably increased the
number of directives implemented since 1990, and kept up a high
implementation record after the 1992 obligations had been fulfilled, i.e.
until 1994. In the process, the balance between directives implemented
and directives delayed (deadline passed) also shifted in favour of imple-
mentation: the number of deadlines passed remained below the number of
implemented directives, and this ‘positive gap’ increased. 
Nevertheless, the number of Commission notifications of delay
remained quite high until 1993, as did the number of infringement proce-
dures started by the Commission. Only after 1994 did implementation
problems decrease, at least in statistical terms. Overall, however, in 1997
the Dutch record of implementation, including infringements and ECJ
cases, was much better than in 1990. Even so, there were several serious
cases of implementation failure, or even blunders. One of them was the
EU nitrate directive of 1991, where the Dutch government tried, in vain,
to obtain an exemption for its cattle farmers (cows and pigs). As a result,
Dutch farmers found themselves in flagrant violation of EU nitrate norms,
sometimes 400 per cent above the permitted levels, and the government
was unable to enforce the rules. After a rather dramatic episode of far-
mers’ protests (1996) followed by widespread swine fever (1997), the
Commission officially and publicly notified the Dutch government of
violation (1998).
Another case was the so-called ‘Securitel-list’, i.e. the non-implementa-
tion of the ECJ verdict in 1996, which stated the obligation of national
governments to notify the European Commission of national rules
concerning technical product specifications. In 1997, it turned out that
more than 350 rules of this type had not been duly notified, and could
therefore be declared invalid. The Ministries of Economic Affairs and
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Justice, after some panic, and a parliamentary debate, took emergency
measures to correct this lapse. Thus, problems of implementation have
remained, and they are caused by several factors. One is the technical
complexity of many matters, which are accessible only to very few
specialised civil servants – if one of them falls ill, implementation can be
delayed considerably. Another factor is the translation into Dutch which
is sometimes rather weak, owing to staffing problems in the Commission.
Sometimes, also, there is disagreement and stalemate as to which ministry
has jurisdiction over a particular EU directive. Also, there is the Dutch
desire for consensus, consultation and legal perfectionism – related to
consociational democracy and Calvinism – which makes for cumbersome
time-consuming procedures. Finally, the implementation of EU rules does
not have a high priority in Dutch government. Since the administration is
increasingly under stress (budget cuts, staff reductions), the implementa-
tion of EU rules, which is politically unattractive, soon lags behind. The
impact of the ‘1992 campaign’ was clear, but the TEU with its new policy
fields did not affect implementation directly. Implementation and control
belong to the pillar one policy-cycle – all, then, depends on the legislative
productivity of the EU in the first pillar. 
The second and third pillars do not produce EU legislation, but, at
most, they lead to international treaties. The implementation and control
of such treaties is, on the one hand, a phenomenon with a long tradition
– much longer than the implementation of EU legislation. On the other
hand, it uses different mechanisms of control. There may be good reason
to take a new look at this, because the third pillar in particular, produces
many conventions, but this falls beyond the scope of this chapter. For the
Netherlands, it seems at first sight that the second and third pillars do not
present serious problems of implementation.
Another form of control over EU policy implementation is the requests
by national Courts of Justice for advice from the ECJ concerning applica-
bility of EC law: the ‘preliminary rulings’. The Dutch courts have always
been quite active in this field, compared to other Member States. From
1988 to 1997, the number of Dutch preliminary rulings increased from
19 to 54 (annual figures: 19, 28, 16, 21, 21, 43, 38, 30, 18, 54). There is
a considerable time-lag between an EC law’s entry into force, the starting
of a national court case, and a preliminary ruling.19 Furthermore, when
analysing the topics of the Dutch preliminary rulings, one finds no clear
link with the Maastricht Treaty. Indirectly, as argued above, the increas-
ing productivity of EU pillar one legislation is bound to bring an increase
in preliminary rulings in the medium and long term. A final remark
concerning control: the Dutch Court of Accounts in 1998 complained
about the difficulties of controlling the spending of EC Structural Funds
in the Netherlands, and called for a closer collaboration with the
European Court of Auditors (ECA). The problem behind this is that the
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competence of the Dutch Court of Auditors is restricted to the implemen-
tation of Dutch legislation, and therefore it does not have full control over
EC spending (based directly on EC law) in the Netherlands. In the
management supervision of spending there is an adequate involvement of
all actors (local, regional, national, EC), but in the field of accounting,
control and reporting, some ‘border problems’ have not yet been solved,
and delays or gaps can occur, in spite of the good working relations
between the Dutch Court of Auditors and the ECA.
Parliament: parties, committees and MEPs20
The involvement of the Dutch parliament in the EU policy-cycle is very
weak: it takes place, if at all, in the very last phase of implementation and
control. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports every three months to
parliament (second chamber) about the implementation of EU legislation,
and parliamentary debate about the Union is mostly triggered by imple-
mentation problems – protests against Dutch legislation based on EC law,
or against Dutch legislation which violates EC law. These debates follow
the familiar lines of opposition versus government without, however,
going into the substantive reasons for EC policies, or into the Dutch posi-
tion in the Union. Aside from some grumblings or disbelief, parliament
concludes by agreeing that EC rules have to be complied with. The vast
majority of EC rules are overlooked by parliament altogether, in spite of
the fact that more than half of Dutch legislation (and, in agriculture or
environment, for example, almost all legislation) is of EC origin. EC poli-
cies, therefore, are given ‘much too little attention, and much too late’.
Parliamentary interest in and frustration with the Union is neverthe-
less weak and recent. Only in the mid-1980s were steps taken to increase
parliamentary interest by creating a Standing Committee for European
Affairs (1986). Quarterly reporting on EU implementation started in
1989, at parliamentary request, and since 1991 the ‘fiches’ dealing with
EU decisions and issues have been made available to the Dutch parlia-
ment.
The interest of the Dutch parliament in the role and the work of the EP,
was and is mostly of an informal nature – i.e. following party lines. Every
political party wants to maintain a certain control over its representatives
in the EP and to be informed about ‘what goes on in Brussels’. After all,
recruitment of EP candidates is in the hands of the national parties, who
want to keep an eye on their performance, if only to decide about their
future value for the party. Numerous informal contacts therefore exist
between MEPs and their colleagues in the Dutch parliament – not only
before 1979 when the dual mandate and the indirect election of the EP
existed, but also since then. Within some parties, contacts were somewhat
institutionalised (e.g. the agenda of the Labour MEPs was/is sent to the
Labour representatives in the Dutch parliament), but on the whole,
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contacts remain intensive but informal. The performance of MEPs,
however, is judged not only along party lines, but also along national
lines: an MEP’s ability to serve the national interest is highly appreciated
in the Dutch parliament.
During the 1980s the Dutch parliament drifted further away from the
EP, mainly because the dual mandate disappeared. EP membership
became a separate, full-time job – on paper. In practice, it became a
nomadic existence, well-paid but formally distant from national politics.
The Standing Committee on EU Affairs, for example, consisted of
members of the Dutch parliament only; the meetings of COSAC therefore
involved a different ‘circuit’ than that of the Dutch MEPs. More and
more, contacts between the Dutch parliament and the EP came to depend
on the personal, informal initiative of the MEPs.
The increasing powers of the EP since the SEA provoked some efforts
to increase Dutch parliamentary interest in EU policy-making and the
Maastricht Treaty strengthened these efforts. In 1994 the Standing
Committee on EU Affairs became a General Committee on EU Affairs
with a mission to increase awareness of EU matters among all MPs.
Furthermore, the First Chamber of the Dutch parliament also established
a Standing Committee on EU Affairs. Dutch MEPs are asked for advice
more frequently, and in 1996 the Dutch parliament (Second Chamber)
created a special ‘question time’ for EU matters. In 1996–97, a weekly
Euro-consultation was started, involving Standing Committees of parlia-
ment (not only the EU committees), ministers and Dutch MEPs. All major
parties have institutionalised their contacts with their MEPs through co-
ordination meetings, steering groups, committees for foreign affairs
(Labour, Christian Democrats), the systematic presence of MEPs at Dutch
parliamentary meetings (conservative liberal) or ‘fraction’ meetings (leftist
liberals). Plans to formalise these contacts at the parliament level, by
creating ‘mixed committees’ of the EP and Dutch Parliament, are
supported by the major parties, but have not yet materialised. On the
whole, then, the Maastricht Treaty and the Dutch Presidency during the
conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty had a stimulating impact on parlia-
mentary interest in the Union.
The provinces and municipalities 
The Dutch ‘decentralised unitary state’ is sub-divided into twelve
provinces and 548 municipalities.21 Their governmental structure consists
of an executive (Queen’s Commissioner or a Mayor) and an elected
assembly (council). This is also the case for the sixty-six water boards,
another important lower level of government in the Netherlands. The
involvement of these lower levels in EU affairs is, in practice, restricted to
their administrations. The elected assemblies are not involved in the
Union, apart from ‘recreational activities’ such as excursions to the EP,
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etc. At the municipal level, there are numerous ‘twinning’ arrangements –
in the past mostly with Third World counterparts, but increasingly within
Europe, especially Eastern Europe – but this is outside the direct scope of
the Union.
The Maastricht Treaty had a substantial impact on provincial and local
involvement in EU policies. Before the TEU, provinces or municipalities
made an occasional effort to benefit from EU programmes and/or from
the Structural–Regional Funds. Rotterdam, for example, obtained
support from the Renaval programme in the 1980s, and the province of
Friesland benefited from agriculture-related Structural Funds. Official as
well as informal contacts with the Commission (e.g. Friesland with DG
VI) and/or with MEPs, were the main channel to promote their interests
in Brussels. This competitive struggle for financial benefit increased, if
only because of the continuing domestic budget cuts. As the Union
expanded its activities, it became more and more interesting for individ-
ual Dutch provinces, municipalities and water boards. On top of this, the
creation of CoR, and of the JHA pillar, offered municipalities and
provinces official entry to the EU policy-making scene – as a group, at an
earlier stage, and in a modest way. 
The SEA, the Schengen Agreement and the ensuing creation of the third
pillar were the reasons behind the expansion of the Dutch Permanent
Representation. A representation of the Ministry of the Interior was
added in 1990 (at first one, later two officers, plus a third pillar specialist
from the Foreign Ministry). Its task was to participate in the negotiations
on behalf of the Interior Ministry, mainly in police and internal security
co-operation, but also to represent the interests of local and provincial
administrations, and especially to inform them about the requirements of
the ‘Europe 1992’ programme. Because of ‘Europe 1992’, some of the
larger cities established organisational units for EU affairs, and a
Common Information Point for municipalities and provinces was estab-
lished by the Ministry of Interior, the Dutch Association of Municipalities
(VNG), and the Inter Provincial Consultative Agency (IPO).
The CoR22 was created mainly at German and Belgian insistence. When
it became operational in 1993 there was a slight panic among Dutch
provinces and municipalities who were hardly prepared, and had very
little EU expertise. The Ministry of the Interior wanted the Dutch CoR
delegation (twelve members) to represent only the administrative
units/levels with a democratically accountable executive. In practice, this
boiled down to the provinces and municipalities – the water boards, for
unknown reasons, were left out. Also, it was decided that the seats were
to be divided between municipalities and provinces. Thus, one finds six
representatives of the Dutch municipalities (most of whom are mayors,
the others are elected aldermen) and six representatives of the provinces
(most of whom are elected deputies, the others are Commissioners of the
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Queen – one of them is the chairman of the delegation). In geographical
terms, the CoR offers a strong representation of the periphery of the
country, i.e. the southern, eastern and northern provinces. The IPO acts
as the secretariat for the Dutch CoR delegation while, the VNG acts as the
most influential interest group.
In terms of policy input, however, the Dutch CoR delegation was
confronted with very difficult circumstances. The CoR had great difficulty
putting itself on the EU map – competing with both ECOSOC and the EP.
Also, the prospect of a diminishing Dutch share of the Structural Funds
proved a severe handicap for an organised and effective input in EU struc-
tural policy-making. Successes were very hard to achieve, and therefore
the CoR delegation also turned to lobbying at the implementation stage.
As mentioned above, there were some benefits for Dutch municipalities
and provinces in the 1980s. In the early 1990s, the province of Flevoland
obtained Objective One status, qualifying for substantial support until
1999, albeit at a very high political cost in the public’s eyes. Support for
this wealthy region seriously undermined the credibility of EU Structural
Funds. 
For the immediate future, Dutch municipalities and provinces are
looking for EU support in the fields of urban problems, crime and safety,
immigrant minorities and social integration. Commission initiatives and
programmes – URBAN, INTERREG, RESTRUCT, LEADER – are
increasingly addressing Dutch concerns. Transport and infrastructure also
figure highly on the municipal and provincial list, and there is also an
increased awareness of the EU’s importance for environmental regulation,
which belongs to the local/provincial competence. 
Lobbying by Dutch municipalities and provinces to a large extent takes
place in a competitive and rather haphazard fashion. Rotterdam,
Amsterdam and the Hague have sizeable units for international affairs,
and a common office in Brussels, which is also used by the three western
provinces. Recently, this office has become available for all the provinces,
which used to have their own separate, individual offices.
The most active provinces, surprisingly, are not the three western ones,
but the two larger ‘peripheral’ ones: Gelderland in the east and Noord-
Brabant in the south. The municipalities, aside from the ‘big three’, are
mostly represented by the VNG, which has a sizeable international divi-
sion. However, there is also a great deal of individual activity: the
enthusiasm and commitment of a mayor or alderman is often crucial for
success in Brussels. MEPs rooted in specific regions are also mobilised for
provincial or municipal lobbying. As the importance of the EP in EU
policy-making increases, their role becomes more important. In this
respect, the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties have substantially
changed the life of a Dutch MEP.
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Parties and interest groups
After the ‘Europe 1992’ campaign and the Maastricht Treaty, there was a
considerable, but mostly temporary, increase in activity from different
interest groups towards the EU institutions, especially the EP.23 The
increase in powers of the EP in the policy-making process, however, was
overestimated – access to the Commission, and to the Council, which
basically means, to the national capitals, has remained the most important
way to influence policy-making and/or implementation. 
Patterns of behaviour among Dutch political parties and interest
groups have apparently not changed much.24 The major parties have
maintained their policy on the Union except for the ‘nationalist’ challenge
among the conservative liberals. A newcomer among the anti-EU parties
was the Socialist Party. The emergence of a strong European platform, e.g.
for the EP elections, remains a temporary affair. Among the interest
groups, the trade unions since Maastricht are giving more attention to the
Union, for example, the Barber Protocol, the Social Protocol, and major-
ity voting/co-decision in the first pillar have made them aware of the
importance of involvement at the earliest stages of decision-making.
Larger companies, especially multinationals, are highly aware of the
strategic importance of EU rules concerning competition, health, safety,
or the environment, and of EU programmes and initiatives concerning
R&D. Dutch agriculture has changed its organisational structure –
becoming less corporatist – but has maintained its presence in the CAP,
and in COPA.
In terms of interest representation, some of the Dutch MEPs have close
links with Third World groups (socialists), trade unions (socialists), trans-
port and trade (orthodox Calvinists) or agriculture (Christian Democrats,
liberal conservatives). However, more and more lobbying activity is
contracted out to consultancy offices, lawyers, accounting firms, etc. in
Brussels, for reasons of cost effectiveness and flexibility. These profes-
sional brokers have one interest in common, to restrict direct access to the
EU policy-making cycle. Their ‘vested interest in complexity’ is hardly
compatible with the desire for more transparency and democratic
accountability in EU policy, and controversy about their role is likely to
emerge.
Changing patterns after Maastricht and Amsterdam?
By way of overview, it can be stated that a major change in Dutch involve-
ment in the Union since Maastricht has been the increased attention given
to the Union in the administration, especially at the national level. The
Dutch Presidencies of Maastricht and Amsterdam were triggers creating a
dramatic, but temporary, increase in political attention and administrative
input. For most ministries, the Dutch Presidencies brought a 50 per cent
increase in EU personnel input – followed, of course, by a clear dip.
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However, for the Dutch administration, the Maastricht episode provided
a lesson which had been learned by the time of the Amsterdam Presidency.
After the ‘failure’ of Maastricht, preparations for ‘Amsterdam 1997’ were
made in a very thorough way. Elaborate and careful views on the Union
were developed, after taking into account the views of the other Member
States. Ambitions for ‘Amsterdam’ were presented as low key so that
‘success was guaranteed’. This approach required more, and sustained,
attention from the administration, especially the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. However, in other ministries, too, the post-Maastricht era
brought a further organisational adaptation, enabling stronger involve-
ment in EU policies. Afterwards, the policy problems related to the Union
– especially Securitel, concerning the non-implementation of the ECJ
verdict in 1996 – sent a strong message to the Dutch administration – that
the neglect of EU policies can create serious problems of non-compliance
for a (national) government. EU policies are not only an important
resource for solving problems – e.g. EU assistance was essential in the
1997 swine fever crisis – but they also provide a regulatory framework
which has to be taken into account at all times.25 In reality, the Union has
become ‘the new roof on the Dutch house of government’. The introduc-
tion of the Euro will further stimulate this awareness.
Next to the administrative adaptation, there was also a change in
public opinion and party politics. A more explicit promotion of the
national interest, and a focusing on financial issues was added to the
traditional Dutch commitment to European integration. This change is
clearly related, with some time lag, to the change of the Netherlands’
status from a net receiver to a net payer in the Union. Public opinion and
party views have come to recognise the new realities of the 1990s. The
change is also related to a general shift in the public mood towards
domestic ‘close-to-home’ issues such as crime, safety, and – even in the
open society of the Netherlands – the control of immigration. The outside
world is no longer regarded only in positive, idealistic terms. This new line
of thinking has demonstrated itself both in the debate about institutional
reform of the Union, and in the reform of EU finances. The Dutch have
declared an unwillingness to reduce their representation in the institutions
(EP, Commission, Council of Ministers). Without aiming for the next
Commission Presidency explicitly, they are not willing to do without
‘their’ one commissioner – in the portfolio distribution there is some flex-
ibility for negotiation. 
In EU finances, the reduction of the Dutch contribution has a high
priority. In the national budget, accepted by parliament, the Dutch finan-
cial input into the Union has already been reduced dramatically. It
constitutes an unprecedentedly tough starting position in the negotiations.
In the discussions concerning CAP reform, the re-structuring of the EU
Structural Funds and other Agenda 2000 items, a considerable compen-
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sation will be demanded in exchange for Dutch agreement. The close rela-
tionship with Germany, however, imposes certain limits on Dutch
obstinacy. 
Conclusion: the Netherlands – less willing but more able within the EU?
How ‘Europeanised’ is the Dutch administration? 
After Maastricht, all Dutch ministries adapted their internal organisation
and created, at least on paper, close links with the Union. The actual
‘Europeanisation’ of organisational culture, often lagged behind, but since
1990 there has been an organisational upgrading of EU units, as well as
an increase in the attention paid by management to international and EU
affairs. In the Dutch administrative culture of the 1990s, the Union was
central. An interesting case was the Ministry of the Interior, the latecomer
in EU affairs. In organisational terms, it made the necessary adaptations
even before Maastricht, but within the ministry, EU awareness is spread
rather thinly and unevenly – it is strong in the Police and Internal Security
directorates but weak in the Provincial/Municipal Supervising and
Funding directorates. After several ‘policy accidents’ related to the Union,
measures were taken to prevent such events from occurring again. A
reorganisation within the ministry upgraded the EU division in the hier-
archy, but considerable effort is still needed to integrate awareness of the
EU into the ministry’s ‘domestic’ culture. Another interesting indication
of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Dutch administration is the number of
secondments from the ministries to the Commission.26 This number is
modest, i.e. between thirty-three and fifty-nine per year between 1993 and
1998 from the thirteen ministries. Most secondments (five–fifteen per
year) are from the Ministries of Agriculture, Economic Affairs and
Foreign Affairs. Traffic and Water, Housing and Environment, and
Finance send around five persons per year, while the other ministries send
fewer than this. These figures reached a high point in 1993, fell between
1993 and 1995, but rose again after 1996. The 1993 level (fifty-nine),
however, had not yet been reached by 1998 (fifty-one). There is no clear
relationship between the number of secondments to the Commission and
the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.
How ‘fit’ are the Netherlands for the post-Maastricht Union?
Are the Netherlands ‘willing and able’ to play a role in the new phase of
EU development, and to face its challenges? This question can be
answered quite positively – with some specifications and provisos. The
specific role of the Netherlands will depend on the rethinking of its
foreign policy, which is currently in process. The Netherlands will look
for new partnerships and coalitions within the Union. While it takes
the national interest as an explicit starting-point, in order to create new
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coalitions it will nevertheless have to make some sacrifices and compro-
mises. The Netherlands’ close relationship with Germany is likely to
become a cornerstone of Dutch foreign policy – and this will offer both
possibilities and restrictions for the Dutch position. In terms of EU enthu-
siasm, the Dutch no longer want to play the moral leading role among the
Member States. In the discussion about institutional reform and the acces-
sion of new members, therefore, they are likely to take a cautious
approach, preferring consolidation and ‘cleaning up’ rather than expan-
sion and new dynamism. The vulnerable spot in the Dutch position is
popular legitimacy of the Union. Turnout at EP elections decreased in the
1990s, and the Union is increasingly seen as a financial institution which
is not able to handle its finances in a proper manner. It has the ‘political
sex appeal’ of a bank-cum-lawyers’ office, i.e. virtually zero. For the
Dutch role in EU affairs, this implies that for most of the time, the public
will not pay much attention and will give implicit room for manoeuvring.
But when the public does pay attention, this will be negative, unless a
great effort is taken to explain the value of the Union for the solution of
the country’s social, political, economic, environmental and other prob-
lems.
Future perspectives: debates surrounding the Union
Political discussion about the Union in the Netherlands follows the
general shift in public opinion: politics is considered relatively uninterest-
ing, e.g. compared to sports, or ‘high society’, and is therefore a matter for
the opinion of a small elite of students, public servants, politicians, etc.
Within politics, attention focuses on personalities and money, and less on
social problems or ideals. In EU matters, much public attention was given
to the ‘race for the European Central Bank presidency’ (the Duisenberg
lobby), the introduction of the Euro, the Dutch contribution to EC
finances, the ‘fraud, corruption and mismanagement’ of EC funds and the
financial ‘extravagance’ of the EP. In the run-up to the 1999 EP elections,
the political parties developed their platforms, with especially the leftist
liberals, the social democrats and the Christian Democrats stressing the
need to transcend national thinking. The conservative liberals took a more
national approach: ‘don’t throw away good Dutch money’. Aside from
this, the EU has been called upon, more often than in the past, to assist in
solving the major problems of Dutch politics: crime and safety, immigra-
tion, maintaining the health care system, and traffic congestion and the
transportation system, including airports, highways and railways. There
is an opportunity, therefore, for the Union to prove its ‘added value’.
Furthermore, the Union is, and in future will be, called upon more
frequently in matters of market policy and competition policy, such as
mergers and market access for such things as public transportation,
telecommunications, banking and insurance. 
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For the Dutch economy, the Dutch state is far too small: transnational
thinking and action have been strong in Dutch business for centuries, and
will be only strengthened by the development of the Union. The intro-
duction of the Euro in particular, will stimulate further, international
transactions, in both the private and the public sector. Monetary issues,
therefore, will loom large in Dutch discussions about the Union. The ECB
presidency has been won, the introduction of the Euro is in full swing, but
there is concern about the solidity of the Euro in the future, i.e. the ECB’s
policies. A stronger Dutch input into the ECB’s actions – present and
future – might well be worth a concession in some other EU field for the
Dutch government. 
In short, the Dutch foreign policy mix of peace, profits and principles27
is likely to shift in favour of profits, with a rather puritanical approach
towards thriftiness, cleanliness and solid finance – or even a certain
‘miserliness’ (the Dutch expression is krenterigheid). The moral chord has
certainly not disappeared, but for the time being, it produces a different
music.
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14 Otmar Höll, Johannes Pollack and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann
Austria: domestic change through
European integration
Introduction: ambivalence as ‘Leitmotiv’ 
Austria’s attitude towards the (West) European integration process after
1945 has been ambivalent at best.1 The Second Republic was designed as
a democratic system, based on political pluralism and party competition.
However, its political culture and its real character (Realverfassung),
because of its strong corporatist elements, developed into the typical
features of the specific ‘Austrian model’. The first steps towards post-war
recovery and re-integration into the international community were largely
shaped by participation in the European Recovery Programme. The
amazing economic success of the first decades after the occupation by the
four Allies (until 1955) helped to create a stable socio-political environ-
ment. In contrast to the harsh conflicts of the interwar period the
emergence of a consensus oriented society was a major task resulting in a
pact between parties, chambers, employers and trade unions called the
‘social partnership’.2
In its international orientation membership in the UN (1955) and in the
Council of Europe (1956) was achieved shortly after the State Treaty in
May 1955 was signed and the Constitutional Law on permanent neutral-
ity as the condition for regaining independence was adopted. Together
with the socio-economic success story these factors formed the basis of a
so far unknown strong popular identification with the ‘Austrian Nation’.3
While it maintained a rigid attitude on military aspects of permanent
neutrality, Austrian politicians showed a more flexible stance in inter-
preting neutrality with regard to economic and ideological dimensions.
Austria not only signed a customs and price agreement with the ECSC in
1956 in the framework of GATT, but also entered into negotiations with
the EEC in order to establish independent agreements on tariff reductions,
dispute resolution committees and economic policy harmonisation in
1960.4 As for the rest of the European neutrals (Switzerland, Sweden and
Finland) at that time membership in the EEC was viewed as incompatible
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with permanent neutrality. These countries co-operated in setting up the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of the so-called ‘Outer Seven’.5
Since NATO membership of Great Britain and Norway did not bother the
neutrals in the EFTA framework, EEC membership may have been seen as
economically too far-reaching for them. 
Against a completely changing political and economic background full
EC membership was first demanded by the Federation of Austrian
Industrialists in May 1987.6 The Austrian People’s Party, Österreichische
Volkspartei (ÖVP), the smaller of the two coalition parties, followed suit.
After all provincial governors, as well as the four institutions of the system
of social partnership, had come out in favour of EC membership in March
1989, the Social Democratic Party – Sozialdemokratische Partei Österre-
ichs (SPÖ) – finally decided to vote for the application which was
subsequently lodged in July 1989.7 This development was only logical for
the ÖVP under Foreign Minister Alois Mock, who was an early and
enthusiastic advocate of European integration, whereas the SPÖ under-
went a certain change in its stand on Europe. It was Chancellor Franz
Vranitzky who convinced the party of the gains of EC membership.
The Austrian government’s re-orientation was motivated primarily by
economic considerations. It accepted the consequences of membership for
the national decision-making processes, and for various policy fields,
especially in the realm of the economy, social security, environment and
democratic policy. Foreign and military security arguments, by compari-
son, began to feature more prominently only with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the beginning of the war in former Yugoslavia.8 Austria
forged ahead on the question of membership at a time when the govern-
ments of Switzerland, Sweden and Finland still perceived neutrality and
EC membership as incompatible.9 For many analysts, especially those
who were acquainted with the traditional Austrian foreign policy profile
of ‘active neutrality policy’, this came as a surprise. In retrospect, it is
worth mentioning that Austria applied for membership at a time when the
European Community was pushing heavily towards integration in many
fields, including defence cooperation, especially since the TEU. In June
1992, the Austrian government declared its ‘preparedness to participate in
the CFSP and in its dynamic development actively and in a spirit of soli-
darity’.10
Membership of the Union required far-reaching constitutional changes
for Austria, a two-thirds majority in the ‘Nationalrat’ (the Austrian
Parliament), but also approval by the ‘Bundesrat’ (second chamber of the
Austrian Parliament), and finally a popular referendum.11 Considering
that there was quite strong popular opposition (between 38 per cent in
spring 1989 and more than 40 per cent in 1991 and 1992 against
membership), and two opposition parties strongly arguing against acces-
sion, the task for the government to convince the population was not
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small.12 Moreover, membership in the EEA, which was achieved on 1
January 1994, was not regarded as a suitable substitute for full member-
ship of the Union – it was merely taken as a tiresome but necessary
prerequisite, also providing the government with arguments in favour of
accession. Taking over two-thirds of the acquis communautaire without
participation in the decision-making institutions of the Union was seen as
foolish. 
Austria’s membership negotiations began on 1 February 1993 and were
concluded on 1 March 1994. The areas of greatest domestic political
concern to the government were agriculture, transit traffic and regulations
restricting the sale of property in Alpine regions.13 Reflecting the internal
politics of the grand coalition, the Austrian negotiating team was offi-
cially led by the Foreign Minister Alois Mock (ÖVP) and the State
Secretary in the Chancellor’s Office, Brigitte Ederer (SPÖ). The Austrian
negotiation positions had mainly been a matter of co-ordination between
the government, the social partners and the provinces, while the parlia-
ment, despite participation and having information rights, remained
outside.
A referendum on membership was obligatory under the Constitution
and was called by the government for 12 June 1994, well in advance of
the Scandinavian countries. The referendum debate was characterised by
a marked and stable elite consensus on the desirability of EU membership.
Main opponents were the right-wing and populist Austrian Freedom
Party, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ),14 the Green Party as well
as the weak Austrian Communist Party. The FPÖ under Jörg Haider tried
to stir up and exploit popular sentiments. Sections of the trade unions and
farmers, extra-parliamentary initiatives (Anti-Transit Movement) and
some other grass roots organisations formed by more or less prominent
individuals, also opposed EU membership. Yet, because of the large
heterogeneity of interests a common position among these groups was not
achieved. Compared with the Scandinavian countries, opinion polls in
Austria since application indicated a relatively clear, albeit volatile,
majority in favour of membership that dwindled temporarily during the
critical phases of the entry negotiations in the winter of 1994. Yet the
extent of the need for domestic adjustments was deliberately played down
by the elites, in fear of risking a minority result in the referendum. The
Austrian objectives remained the same: guaranteeing sustainable
economic growth and securing political manoeuvrability and influence of
the country. On voting day turnout was 82.4 per cent, 66.6 per cent
voting in favour of EU membership and only 33.4 per cent against.15 After
the parliamentary ratification process was concluded, Austria joined the
Union on 1 January 1995.16 The most important legal consequences of
accession were the adaption of parts of the EU acquis which had not
already been integrated with EEA membership. What was clear from the
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beginning was that the balance between government, parliament and the
social partners would shift in the direction of the former. The parliament
was expected to lose its legislative monopoly,17 and the public service
would come under mounting pressure. The ‘social partnership’, the
system which had served Austria so well in the 1960s and 1970s but
which has become a burden to modernisation, would change substantially
as well. 
The national policy-cycle: from consociational to competitive
democracy?
With EU membership the perception of the Austrian society as being
composed of quite stable relationships of relatively equal interest groups
was suddenly superimposed by the reality of antagonisms between the
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the integration process (Figure 14.1). The idea of
being an ‘island of the blessed’ began to be replaced by a more intense
power struggle, with the coalition parties SPÖ and the ÖVP trying to
maintain their political influence on society.18 The addition of a new
(European) tier in policy-making saw the opposition parties FPÖ, LIF
(Liberal Party) and the Green Party demand a voice as well. The opposi-
tion was able to underpin its demands with the results of the 1994 federal
elections; the two government parties combined lost more than 12 per
cent and, consequently, their previous two-thirds majority in Parliament.
This enabled the opposition to press for strong controlling rights for the
Austrian parliament in EU issues. Post-war consociational patterns of
governance came under strain, driving the system towards greater compe-
tition and confrontation.19 Some parts of the governing Austrian political
elites expected EU membership to be a catalyst for structural reform. In
order to increase their influence within the complex EU system, a more
anticipatory policy-making style and swifter decision-making procedures
had to be developed. The traditional, sometimes sluggish consultations
among the ‘social partnership’ institutions – the Federal Chamber of
Labour, the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, the Presidential
Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, the Austrian Chamber of
Business, and interest groups – were seen not to enable the Austrian polit-
ical system to deal efficiently with the complex multi-level system of the
Union.
In order to adapt the domestic decision-making structures to EU
membership, three major problems had to be tackled: how to co-ordinate
the governmental policy-making process; how to involve the regions in it;
and how to secure parliamentary scrutiny of government policy within the
Union. However great the aims to modernise the Austrian corporatist
system, the results have still to be seen as its continuity. The two coalition
parties (SPÖ/ÖVP) decided on a system of formal equality. Today EU
340 Member States and the European Union
2444Ch14  3/12/02  2:05 pm  Page 340





































policy is co-ordinated by the Federal Chancellery and the Foreign
Ministry, the former being dominated by the SPÖ, the latter by the ÖVP.
From a legal point of view, co-ordination within the Austrian government
is necessary only to the extent that a European issue compels several
ministerial areas to take action in a particular question. This is mainly due
to the differences in the distribution of competencies on the European
level and in the Austrian bureaucracy. The political agreement to share
the responsibilities and merits to a far greater extent than in the past was
politically formalised in the coalition agreement of 1994 and a separate
statute from 1996.20
The federal government 
Once a week the government discusses the Austrian position for the next
meetings of the Council of the European Union. Under a special item on
the agenda the respective member of the government reports ‘about the
subjects which for implementation need a governmental decision by law
in the form of an oral or written cabinet address before the meeting of the
Council of the European Union where the decision is taken at the latest’.21
The purpose of the cabinet address is the description of the subject as well
as a justification of the Austrian position. The coalition agreement also
demands a permanent information exchange between the ministries;
owing to the potential role of the so-called Main Committee of the
Parliament granted by constitutional law, the heads and directors of the
parliamentary groups of the government parties were granted the right of
participation and speech in the Austrian cabinet meetings. 
The position of the permanent representative in COREPER I and II is
co-ordinated in a weekly jour fixe where all ministries, the Austrian
National Bank, the Austrian Statistical Office, the League of cities and
municipalities, the Standing Committee of the Austrian Länder and the
‘social partners’ take part. As a general rule for common working groups
a system of periodic change in the chair was fixed between the parties. 
The federal government in agreement with the Main Committee of the
Parliament nominates the candidates for the European Commission, the
ECJ, the Court of First Instance, the EIB and the ECA. This procedure
constitutes a constitutional novelty because for the first time the parlia-
ment (in form of the Main Committee) takes part in personnel decisions
of the government. On the other hand the Austrian President was granted
an information right only.
The presidential element of the Austrian constitution has – contrary
to some expectations before accession – not been strengthened. After a
short disagreement between the Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky
and the Austrian President Thomas Klestil on the occasion of the Corfu
Summit in June 1994, regarding who should be appointed as the main
representative at European Council meetings, the latter was limited to
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his constitutional role – i.e. without specific competences in European
politics.22
The parliament
In comparison with other national parliaments the Austrian parliament is
provided with strong constitutionally embodied participation rights in the
field of EU policy.23 Articles 23e and 23f were introduced in a constitu-
tional amendment in December 1994 regulating the rights of information
and opinion. Thus, Morass (1996) talks about a ‘special constitutional
democratic legitimation’ by the parliament.24 Today this assessment
appears to require some revision. The government is obliged to inform the
parliament (i.e. its Main Committee) about ‘any initiatives’ within the
Union.25 Parliamentary scrutiny not only includes legislative initiatives
but also political ones and encompasses all three pillars. Positions by the
Main Committee bind the government. An escape clause can be invoked
by the government if there are ‘compelling reasons of integration policy’
(Article 23e §2B-VG). EU decisions which require constitutional changes
necessarily require an advance agreement with the parliament. Whereas
the Main Committee is supposed to deal with questions of a supranational
nature (i.e. first pillar subjects), the Foreign Policy Committee of the
Austrian Parliament is responsible for intergovernmental questions, such
as the CFSP and possible changes in the Community Treaties. There is no
direct co-ordination between the two committees but coherence can be
reached through personal union or in the so-called Preparatory
Committee, which tries to stem the information avalanches coming from
the bureaucracy. These parties and the Klubreferenten (secretaries of the
parliamentary groups) meet usually the day before the Main Committee
comes together and pre-select the incoming information and draw up an
agenda for the Main Committee which consists of representatives of all
parties. 
What in theory looks like a remedy for the lamented democratic deficit
in EU-related domestic policy-making turns out to be of limited use in
practice. Setting a tight scope for negotiations would impede the manoeu-
vrability of the acting minister and contradict the widespread practice of
package deals in the European Union. On the other hand the parliament
simply cannot cope with the enormous amount of information – which
may serve a certain strategy of the bureaucracy to neutralise it.26 In addi-
tion, the parliament depends on the reports of the participating agents and
has no possibility of getting first-hand information owing to the complex,
multi-level system of the Union. In 1995, the parliament was informed of
17,317 European projects. Though this number looks quite large, one
must not forget that it comprises proposals of legislative acts, reports,
opinions, invitations for meetings, agendas, requests for preliminary
rulings, to name only a few. Around 70 per cent of the documents derive
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from the Council of the EU, 20 per cent from the European Commission,
7 per cent from the Permanent Representation of Austria in Brussels, 1 per
cent from the ECJ, 1 per cent from the EP and 1 per cent from the ECA.
Around one hundred became the subject of deliberation in the Main
Committee, which finally issued eighteen opinions. Between 1996 and
1997, 37,624 projects were conveyed to the Main Committee. Of these,
106 were dealt with and eleven statements were made. Considering that
the Main Committee comprises twenty-nine members, even a very selec-
tive approach can handle only a fraction of the important issues. 
The Länder
From the outset the nine Austrian Länder realised their changing political
role with regard to prospective EU membership. To secure their influence
on the federal level they pressed for a structural reform of the federal
system. The Landeshauptleute (state governors) made their approval for
accession dependent on a successful reform of the federal system.27 On 8
October 1992 a ‘Political Agreement on the Reform of the Federal State’
was signed between the Länder and the federal government which
included a general commitment to a redistribution of competences in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, a reform of the financial
transfer system and the establishment of the Bundesrat as the representa-
tion of the Länder, similar to the German model. A joint commission was
to develop concrete proposals, but no agreement has been reached thus
far. The Landeshauptleute removed the linkage after the overwhelming
result of the referendum on EU membership, in order to deflect responsi-
bility had the referendum failed.
Concerning the Länder, the federal government has been constitution-
ally bound to inform them about all EU questions ‘which affect their
independent sphere of action or may otherwise be of interest to them’.28
The Länder can issue a simple or qualified opinion from which the
government can still deviate for important integration reasons, but it has
to justify its decision within eight weeks. Additionally the federal govern-
ment can transfer its participation in the EU Council of Ministers to a
representative nominated by the Länder (Article 23d §3). Foreseeing their
shrinking influence without close co-operation, the Länder founded the
‘Integration Conference of the Länder,’ comprising the Landeshauptleute
and the Standing Committee of the Länder. In practice, the Standing
Committee plays only a marginal role since it is not provided with suffi-
cient resources to cope with the enormous information overflow.
Reflecting the strategy of the EU Commission to bypass the federal
governments, some of the Austrian Länder have opened Representation
Offices in Brussels in order to improve their opportunities for lobbying.
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The social partners and administrative agencies
To compensate the ‘social partners’ for their loss of influence in Austrian
EU policy-making, the government parties in 1994 agreed on the so-called
‘Europaabkommen’ (Agreement on Europe) which guaranteed them
participation in ‘important’ and ‘relevant technical questions’. At first the
federal government tried to secure their official involvement in the various
working groups of the Council of Ministers. However, the equal partici-
pation in these groups failed because it would have been an infringement
of EC law (Article 203 TEC) which states that only representatives of the
government have the right of vote and speak. 
The challenge for the Austrian administration has been twofold. The
first concerns the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the
Austrian legal system after accession to the EEA in 1994, and intensify-
ing with full-scale membership in the Union. Siedentopf and Ziller
(1988) pointed to the importance of early preparation for the successful
implementation of EC law in the national legal systems. Since 1987 the
Austrian federal government has taken care of adapting the domestic
legal system to conform to EC law: a guideline was issued which
demands a check of all government bills regarding this conformity. With
the Austrian accession to the EEA, around 1,600 EU regulations were
taken over. However, the 1996 report of the Commission on the imple-
mentation of EC law shows a total of 819 complaints against Austria
which is an improvement of about 14 per cent compared with 1995
(1,145 cases).29 Unfortunately, in the same period the Austrian share of
non-implemented or poorly implemented directives rose by 15 per cent.
Concerning the implementation of Internal Market directives, Austria
occupied last position in 1996 and 1997. The reasons for this delay are
manifold: the federal distribution of competences; the strict constitu-
tional principle of legality, which demands a legal determination for any
state actions; and the still strong tradition of ‘social partnership’.
Furthermore, the implementation of the acquis demanded far-reaching
changes in Austrian economic administrative law. This occurred at the
same time as a staff reduction in public administration was under way
for budgetary reasons. In November 1997, 10 per cent of the directives
were notified as not implemented. However, in May 1998, a big leap
took Austria to the seventh position, and only 5 per cent remained
unsettled.30
Concerning Austria’s applications for preliminary rulings of the ECJ, a
significant growth can be observed. In the first year of membership
Austria requested two preliminary rulings. In 1996, this increased to six.
In comparison to Sweden and Finland this is quite a standard develop-
ment (Sweden: 1995, 6, 1996, 4; Finland: 1995, 0, 1996, 3).31 However,
in 1997, the Austrian cases rose to thirty-five whereas Sweden asked for
four and Finland for six.32 One possible explanation might be that the
Austria 345
2444Ch14  3/12/02  2:05 pm  Page 345
awareness of the Austrian judges concerning Community law is to some
degree higher than that of the other new Member State judges.
The second challenge for the administration involves participation in
the policy-making process at the European level. The highlight in terms of
workload and publicity was the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the
European Union in the second half of 1998, following the United
Kingdom and preceding Germany. Since presidencies have significantly
grown in importance in terms of co-ordinating European politics as well
enhancing the visibility of the Union, the Austrian presidency was well
prepared by the government administration. In order to cope with the
everyday business of the presidency, the administration created co-opera-
tion structures between all ministries, installing a regular meeting of all
high officials (Sektionsleiterkonferenz). The management of the presi-
dency was, in short, a success story. The same appears to be true of the
public spectacle during the various formal and informal summits. The
‘Europeanisation’ of the public administration during the Austrian
Presidency of the Council was an invaluable asset.33 However, as to the
political achievements of the Presidency, a more sceptical judgement is
appropriate. The two main goals could be summarised by the slogans
proposed by the government: Austria aims at the role of an ‘honest
broker’ in the policy process and it wants to achieve greater ‘fitness’ of the
Union, particularly in view of the coming enlargement.
The list of projects ranging from the creation of jobs to the protection
of the environment contained such a variety of important themes that one
could hardly qualify them all as priorities for a six-month Presidency.
Furthermore these topics represented quite an unequal choice, the intro-
duction of the Euro being at that stage largely a technical issue, while the
negotiations on the Agenda 2000 and the enlargement were objects of
political controversy. During the opening ceremony, though, the Austrian
Chancellor Viktor Klima and the Vice-Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel
placed the accent mainly on enlargement, while the Minister of finance
Rudolf Edlinger pointed to tax harmonisation as being his priority.34
On a first assessment of the Austrian EU Presidency we may draw some
initial conclusions. To begin with, many of the points listed in the above
programme did not result in concrete policies or action owing to the under-
lying problems involved. The political and economic preconditions of some
goals also made the success of some projects impossible – for instance,
Agenda 2000, or the compromise of the Berlin Summit, which did not
permit serious reform of the financial system to adapt to EU enlargement. 
Disappointingly, the Austrian initiatives in the process of EU enlarge-
ment towards Central and Eastern Europe, as well towards Cyprus, did
not lead to agreements about concrete time schedules. Beyond the
Commission’s screening the applicants’ strategies for implementing the
acquis communautaire and what has been achieved, enlargement policy
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appears to lack a strong political will by key players among the Member
States. This is partly due to the self-imposed budget constraints as a result
of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability Pact, and partly to the
urgent, yet unanswered, need for institutional reforms. At the same time,
the postponement of negotiations on Agenda 2000 to the German
Presidency was closely linked to the question of enlargement.
Interestingly, the Austrian ‘Programme of the EU Presidency’ vaguely
touched upon this highly delicate issue when it referred to the Conclusions
of the Summit in Cardiff (June 1998). It made a point that part of the
problem was addressing equal distribution of financial contributions by
Member States. However, the Austrian programme did not provide any
solutions to this problem. Although any expectations of finding such indi-
cations in an official paper might be too high, one could speculate about
the links between this omission and the lack of results at the Vienna
Summit in December 1998. Whether this lack of concrete results corre-
sponds with the traditional Austrian corporatist system of avoiding
conflict remains an open question. 
Conclusions: the persistence of ambivalence?
To assess the changes in the Austrian policy-making process induced by
European integration is somewhat difficult owing to the relatively short
period of EU membership. Like all institutional change, the adaptation
of national institutions, rules, norms and forms of behaviour to the
European reality occurs at a rather slow pace, and such changes are far
from easy to measure. Assessments which might hold true for some insti-
tutions cannot be simply applied to others; in order to corroborate any
judgements on the changes occurring in the Austrian institutional arrange-
ments, more in-depth studies on different dimensions of the
transformation process are needed. 
The easiest part of the task of describing the changes Austria has under-
gone since the beginning of EU membership in 1995 concerns
constitutional amendments. Owing to the specific power constellation
after the national election of 1994, in which the governing parties lost
their two-thirds majority, the opposition parties won the game in the
negotiations on the role of the parliament in the EU policy-making
process. However, what appeared to be a victory of the legislature over
the executive quite quickly turned sour for two reasons. First, the Main
Committee of the Parliament was overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of
EU proposals it had to deal with. Secondly, the ‘power of tradition’ saw
members of the ruling parties in parliament uphold government positions.
Thus, for the time being the Austrian situation reflects the developments
that have occurred in most of the Member States: European policy-
making is the privilege of the executive. 
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Regarding more general changes in the decision-making process,
including the whole set of intermediary powers, assessment necessarily
remains more speculative. As has been stated above, the system of ‘social
partnership’ that has been the main pillar of Austrian consociational
democracy has been put under considerable pressure. It is, however,
important to note that owing to international competition, at least part of
this strain had already surfaced in the mid-1980s. Changes in the Austrian
political and economic elites vis-à-vis EU membership may also be inter-
preted as a strategy to cope with more general developments on global
markets. Moreover, the shifts in economic ideology within the SPÖ
towards greater liberalism as well as the change in leadership from Bruno
Kreisky to Franz Vranitzky in 1986,35 who downplayed the international
role of neutral Austria, have to be considered. However, changes in the
‘social partnership’ require some distinctions. While it is safe to assess that
the system of consensus-building between capital and labour has lost
much of its attraction, EU membership has provoked interesting shifts of
power within the institutional arrangement of the ‘social partners’. Those
representing large industries, which had emerged through privatisation,
grew in importance at the expense of those lobbying for SMEs. With
regard to those representing labour interests, it can be said that the tradi-
tionally powerful Austrian union (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund)
has been stripped of power, in particular when negotiating the 1996 and
1997–98 budgets, in order to satisfy the convergence criteria of the
Maastricht Treaty. For the first time in the history of the Second Republic,
labour representation was not involved from the outset, but only after
they had expressed considerable protest against the new procedures. Yet
extrapolating from this experience, a more general assumption about the
end of Austrian corporatism might turn out to be an exaggeration.
The most impressive change in Austrian institutions appears to relate
to the party system. Yet, here again a cautionary tale has to be told in that
the erosion of the two-party system owing to the growth of a strong third
force (the FPÖ) and to the emergence of two smaller ones (the Greens and
LIF), is only partly linked to the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Austrian policy-
making process. The persistent growth of the ‘New’ Radical Right, the
FPÖ, in the 1990s, must be assessed in terms of its anti-European stance.
During this period, it increased its percentage of votes, from 5–6 per cent
to approximately 25 per cent at the federal level, and to a sensational 42
per cent in a provincial election in 1999. The success story of the FPÖ is
also owing to the fact that the enthusiasm professed by Austrian citizens
in the referendum on EU membership in 1994 rather quickly declined in
the wake of the restrictive budget policy compelled by the construction of
EMU. The main parties ruling the state in a ‘grand coalition’ failed to
control their electorate by neglecting the need for a truly public European
discourse. As a matter of fact, after they had won the referendum,
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‘Europe’ disappeared from their communications with the public and
returned only during their EU Presidency in the second half of 1998. In
terms of public debate, the Presidency was dominated by superficial
elements rather than communicating the actual nature of the suprana-
tional polity to the public. 
However, the Presidency produced important results with regard to the
‘Europeanisation’ of the Austrian administration. The Presidency was
professionally organised and involved significantly larger parts of the
bureaucracy than had previously been the case. As one high official of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained in a conference in March 1999 on
the outcomes, in that six-month period, the Austrian actors did not ‘make
the Union fitter for the future’ – as was stated by a poster slogan of the
government – but the intensive involvement in European affairs made the
Austrian bureaucracy ‘fit for the Union’.36 The proficiency of the admin-
istration was nonetheless achieved at the expense of clear political
strategies with regard to the important questions challenging the Union at
the time, such as Agenda 2000 or institutional reform. 
Moreover, the Austrian EU Presidency was marked by an ambivalent
attitude towards EU enlargement in that a special commitment was
pronounced in public and seemingly countervailed in action. The ambiva-
lence is also the result of the growing Radical Right in Austria which
fiercely opposes EU enlargement. Less visible, though not less important,
are the changes in the Austrian judiciary in implementing a European legal
order superseding the national order. The studies available in this field
show that some of the greatest implementation difficulties may pertain to
any legal reform. However, other difficulties appear to be specific to the
‘Europeanisation’ of judicial activity. In particular, resistance to or neglect
of European laws is repeatedly argued on the basis that these laws contra-
dict the principle of legality dominating the Austrian system. Thus,
experts in EC law warn against the increasing lack of legal certainty. Here
again, further in-depth studies are needed in order to assess the quantity
and quality of non-compliance. 
With regard to the changes Austria has undergone since the beginning
of its EU membership, one final remark must be made about the EP elec-
tions in June 1999. The results underlined Austrian ambivalence toward
the Union. Turnout was perilously low (49 per cent) when compared to
national elections, despite corresponding to the EU average. Interestingly,
the very visible and controversial election campaign did not lead to a
greater interest of the public in EU institutions: in a survey, 20 per cent of
non-voters mentioned the insignificance of the EP. However, most of the
competing parties considered the election as a rehearsal for the national
election in October 1999, and failed to define their themes in ‘European’
terms. In view of the war in Yugoslavia, neutrality largely dominated the
campaign, both positively as well as negatively. While the SPÖ and the
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Greens argued in favour of neutrality, the People’s Party, the FPÖ and the
Liberals denied the importance of the subject in a European election.
However, one significant change occurred in this debate, at least in terms
of rhetoric. The discourse on NATO membership, pursued by the three
latter parties, shifted to a call for an independent European security
system without NATO. Interestingly, EU enlargement did not play a great
role, not even in the positions of the Radical Right, which in fact lost 4
per cent compared to the previous European election of 1996. 
By way of conclusion, a clear-cut judgement on the form and degree of
the transformation of the Austrian political and economic system as a
result of European integration is far from possible. As to the question of
whether the political system has been transformed from a consociational
to competitive democracy, two answers may be proposed: the first point-
ing to the fact that at least part of this transformation occurred before EU
membership; the rise of the FPÖ can also be interpreted as a reverberation
of a more general European development of the Radical Right. The
second answer is driven by a more sceptical view of the sustainability of
this change. The same holds true for the attitude towards European inte-
gration: while on a macro-level the commitment to the European Union is
still impressive, the micro-level adaptation to the new order is difficult to
measure. The ‘power of tradition’ continues to influence the mentality and
behaviour not only of ordinary people but also of the elites in politics,
economy, the judiciary and the scientific community. It may well take
another five years in order to tell whether the elites have been able to
become the gravitational centre of a sustainable process of transforma-
tion.
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15 Maria João Seabra
Portugal: one way to Europeanisation 
Introduction: from enthusiasm via Euro-pessimism towards active
support
Portugal joined the European Communities in 1986, following a process
of negotiations that had lasted eight years. The request for membership
was made in March 1977, at a time when the country was still deeply
engaged in the process of democratic transition. Internally, the European
option was considered to be decisive to the consolidation of democracy.
Shortly after the 25 April 1977 coup d’état, the democratic parties, and
especially the socialist party (Partido Socialista, PS), began to use the
slogan ‘Europe is with us’, which played a major role in the consolidation
of Portuguese democracy. 
This political option was clearly supported by the Portuguese people.
Although pro-European parties had always won, there was also strong
support in opinion polls at both the national and the European level. Until
1992, it can be said that the Portuguese were much more ‘European’ than
the government. From 1986 to 1992, the Portuguese government chose a
low-profile European policy. Deeply concerned with the economic impact
of integration and with the negotiations of the Structural Funds (Delors
Packages I and II), the government had a very cautious position towards
the development of political union. This is clearly demonstrated by the
positions adopted at the 1991 IGC. While favouring the single currency
and economic and social cohesion, the Portuguese government opposed
the inclusion of any kind of federal commitment and was not very
supportive to the establishment of a CFSP, especially its security and
defence dimensions. At that time, however, opinion polls showed that the
Portuguese were ready to support these developments.
Until 1992, all three major political parties were strongly pro-
European, and the Communist Party was the only one to support
anti-European positions. This situation changed with a new leadership in
the small Christian-Democratic party (Centro Democrático Social and the
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Partido Popular, CDS–PP) In the general elections of 1991, it was the
fourth party with 4.4 per cent of the vote.1 From a traditionally federalist
approach, the party moved to an anti-European position. During the
debate on the ratification of the TEU, the CDS–PP advocated a referen-
dum2 and developed a nationalistic rhetoric on the loss of Portuguese
sovereignty. This new position created the conditions for a wider debate
on European affairs in Portugal but has also contributed, together with
the 1992–93 economic crisis, to a certain decrease of public support for
the European integration process. This bout of ‘Euro-pessimism’ is now in
the past, largely owing to the economic and social development the
country has experienced since, and participation in the single currency.
The majority of the Portuguese interest groups support the European inte-
gration process. Although concerned with the impact of the single market
and of common trade policy on Portuguese economy, which has led to
demands of increased transitional periods and derogations, the major
agriculture and industry organisations did not develop an anti-European
attitude. Trade union associations have adopted different positions. The
Workers General Union (União Geral de Trabalhadores, UGT) has tradi-
tionally been more supportive of the European Union than the Portuguese
Workers’ Confederation (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores,
CGTP). 
Constitutional changes
The participation in European integration has forced several changes in
the Portuguese Constitution.3 Drafted in the aftermath of the revolution,
the 1976 text was the result of the political and economic upheavals that
characterised the Portuguese transition and that were incompatible with
full membership of the European Communities. The first revision took
place in 1982 and settled the role of the armed forces in the political
system: the Council of Revolution, a military-run institution that moni-
tored the constitutionality of laws, was abolished and replaced by the
Constitutional Court. Although this is not directly connected with the
perspective of EC accession, full membership would obviously not have
been possible without the constitutional regulation of political–military
relations. At the same time, the first revision paved the way for the future
accession to the Union. Although a general clause providing for the possi-
bility of transferring sovereign rights was not included, the amended
constitutional text did provide a framework in which Community regula-
tions could be adopted with no further change.
The second revision was concluded in 1989 and concentrated mainly in
the economic aspects of the constitution. The 1976 text stated that the
process of nationalisation was irreversible which was incompatible with
the participation in the European process.4 The 1992 reform was a direct
consequence of the TEU. In spite of the general framework agreed in
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1982, the major pro-European parties came to the conclusion that the
constitutional text should be revised prior to ratification of the TEU, and
the Portuguese Parliament therefore decided to amend the constitution.
Four major amendments were made: the inclusion of a new norm allow-
ing the joint exercise of powers within the Union;5 the right of citizens of
EU member countries to vote and to be elected to the EP; the re-definition
of the role of the Portuguese Central Bank; and the reinforcement of the
role of the parliament in reviewing Portugal’s participation in European
integration. The third revision was clearly an up-date of the Portuguese
Constitution according to the developments at the European level. The
amendments, however, did not create any kind of automatic mechanism
to transfer powers to the Union. 
The latest revision of the Constitution, which took place in 1997, was
related to strictly internal questions. As far as the Union is concerned, an
amendment was made on the role of the Central Bank, in order to allow
for participation in the single currency.6 Another amendment concerns the
referendum. Following the signature of the TEU, the question was raised
of whether a referendum, upon ratification, should be called. Prominent
in the public debate in Portugal,7 this issue re-emerged as a part of the
political agenda of the 1995 general elections. Both the Partido Socialista
and the social democratic party (Partido Social-Democrata, PSD) prom-
ised to hold a referendum on the ratification of the new treaty that would
emerge from the 1996 IGC. With the agreement between these two
parties, the Constitution was changed again in 1997. The articles on the
referendum state that issues of relevant national interest, which must be
the subject of international agreement, can be subject to a referendum.
Although strictly speaking this is not a change wrought by participation
in the Union, it is a consequence of the uneasiness that followed the
debate on Maastricht and of the subsequent adaptation of the Portuguese
political system. It reflects the need to overcome the ‘permissive consen-
sus’ and to establish mechanisms to increase the perceived legitimacy of
Portugal’s participation in the Union. The process to hold a referendum
on the Amsterdam Treaty took place in 1998 but the Constitutional Court
ruled that the question was unconstitutional, and so the referendum actu-
ally did not take place. The Amsterdam Treaty was ratified by parliament
in January 1999. 
The evolution of Portuguese political priorities
Since 1986, the Portuguese political priorities with regard to EU policy-
making has somewhat evolved owing to both domestic and European
reasons. Since accession, the Portuguese government concentrated its
efforts on regional development policies and the management of
Structural Funds. Fisheries policy also received a high level of attention,
since this sector was one of the most affected by integration. Externally,
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the Portuguese priorities were directed towards Africa and Latin
America.8 The new policies introduced by the TEU forced the government
to adjust its own priorities: EMU and the participation in the single
currency turned into one of the top Portuguese priorities. 
The domestic political changes also affected the ranking of priorities.
The socialist party won the 1995 general elections.9 Despite the fact that
both the socialists and the social democrats have always shared the same
views on the Portuguese participation in the European process, the new
socialist government introduced some changes to Portugal’s European
policy. The commitment to participating in the single currency from the
outset was maintained by the new government, as well as the emphasis on
social and economic cohesion. The main change occurred in the political
dimension of the Union. The programme of the PS government empha-
sised the need to reinforce this. The socialist government’s positions
during the 1996–97 IGC,10 on the CFSP and on integrating the WEU into
the Union, differs from the previous government. Another difference is the
importance attached to the EP, namely through support to the extension
of the co-decision procedure. Co-operation on JHA is another priority of
the present government, especially on such issues as drug trafficking,
organised crime, terrorism and illegal migrants. 
In 1999, the negotiations on the financial framework were at the top of
the government’s priorities and economic and social cohesion continued
to be a key element of its European policy. Another delicate issue is
the institutional reform of the Union. Although open to reform, the
Portuguese government is unwilling to accept drastic changes in the
present pattern of power-sharing. The current debate on voting weight,
double majority, the composition of the Commission, the number of the
MEPs and the rotation of the presidencies is seen as posing a direct threat
to one of the basic principles of the European process: equality among
states. The socialist government abandoned the traditional Portuguese
attitude in the Union. From a very reactive and passive presence, the new
government adopted a more active and constructive participation, trying
to be present in the discussions of all the dossiers, which enlarged the
scope of the Portuguese political action in the Union. 
The national policy-cycle: centralisation and Europeanisation 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has a major role in dealing with EU
issues (Figure 15.1). Within the ministry, the Secretariat of State for
European Affairs (SSEA), which until 1994 was named Secretariat of State
for Community Affairs, deals with all EC/EU matters with the exception
of the CFSP. Bilateral relations with European countries, including fellow
EU Member States, also fall outside the scope of the SSEA. The change in
name reflects the changing nature of the issues being dealt with at the
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European level. The Secretary of State is responsible for the Directorate-
General for Community Affairs, the Interministerial Commission for
Community Affairs and for the National Co-Ordinator for Free
Movement of People in the European Space. 
The Directorate-General for Community Affairs co-ordinates the
actions on Community matters.11 It includes ten units (direcção de
serviços). The unit on Community institutions supports the participation
of the members of the government in the European Council, General
Affairs Council and other ministerial-level meetings, overviews the activ-
ity of the EP and of the ECOC and follows the issues related to the
Union’s decision-making process. The juridical unit monitors the legisla-
tive adaptation and co-ordinates the cases in the ECJ. The economic and
financial unit is responsible for the follow-up of the application of all poli-
cies related to social and economic cohesion. The unit of agriculture and
fisheries deals with the CAP and the fisheries policy. The unit on the
Internal Market, deals with the issues of the free movement of people,
goods, services and capital. The unit on foreign relations deals with the
relations between the Union and third countries and organisations. The
unit on intra-European relations is responsible for the relations of
the Community with European non-Member States, including the EEA.
The unit on bilateral relations is responsible for co-ordinating relations
with Member States on Community issues. The other two units deal with
scientific, technological and industrial issues and with documentation,
information and training, including the adaptation of the Portuguese
administration to the requirements of the European Communities.
The co-ordination between all the ministries is made by the Inter-
ministerial Commission for Community Affairs, which also includes
representatives from the two autonomous regions, Azores and Madeira,
and from the Prime Minister’s office. The post of National Co-ordinator
for Free Movement of People in the European Space was created in 1996
and is a direct consequence of the TEU and the Schengen Agreement. Until
1996, K4 committee affairs and co-ordination on Schengen were handled
by two separate entities. To guarantee coherence and efficiency, the
government decided to set up this institutional body, which functions in
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in co-ordination with the corresponding
departments of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministries. The creation of
the CFSP also produced some changes in the structure of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.12 The 1994 administrative reform of the ministry created
the unit of Common Foreign and Security Policy which ‘inherited’ the
European Correspondent Service. According to their own competencies,
all the other ministries are involved in EC/EU matters. Apart from the
Ministry of Finance, that deals with all the ECOFIN issues and is one of
the most directly involved in European affairs, another important ministry
is the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration. This ministry
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is responsible for planning and carrying out actions related to EU
Structural Funds and initiatives. The Directorate-General for Regional
Development shares the Commission of Management of the Structural
Funds and is the interlocutor of the Cohesion Fund and the ERDF. The
Ministry of Labour and Solidarity handles the ESF and all Community
initiatives related to job creation and training in co-operation with the
Ministry for Education. 
With the TEU, the Ministries of Justice and the Ministry of Home
Affairs were forced to adjust to the third pillar. Even if third pillar and
Schengen affairs are mostly dealt with by the national co-ordinator for
free movement, the services functioning under these ministries, including
the police, the courts and the migration and border control services
(Serviço de estrangeiros e fronteiras) are now much more involved in the
preparation and implementation of EU legislation. The development of
JHA co-operation also generated a need to have counsellors at the
Portuguese Permanent Representation in Brussels. 
To co-ordinate the action of all the ministries and establish the priori-
ties of Portuguese European policy, the government created special
cabinet meetings known as the Council of Ministers for European Union
Affairs. The council meets once a month, and is attended by all cabinet
ministers, the Secretary of State for European Affairs and the representa-
tives of the central government (Ministro da República) in Madeira and
the Azores. This is the highest co-ordinating body of the Portuguese
system, and it concentrates mainly on the definition of the strategic goals
of the Portuguese government. 
The relations between Portugal and the European institutions
Since accession, the Portuguese authorities have chosen the Commission
as the most important ally in the Union. A small, peripheral country,
much less developed than most of the other Member States, Portugal has
always tried to gain Commission support. As far as the EP is concerned,
there are no special relations. Furthermore, at the time of the 1991 IGC,
Portugal still opposed increasing the EP’s powers. Only in 1996 did that
position change, with the support of the extension of the co-decision
procedure. The attention paid to the EP, however, is likely to grow. This
is owing to its increasing powers after the coming into force of the
Amsterdam Treaty, but also because of the election of Mário Soares, the
former Portuguese President, the leading candidate of the socialist party
in the June 1999 European elections. The choice of Soares to lead the
socialist team reflected the will to upgrade the political importance of
the EP.
At this point, the Portuguese political parties attach much more impor-
tance to the European parties than the government does to the EP. One
interesting example is the change in the Portuguese social democratic
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party’s political group. Originally, it had joined the Liberal Group but it
moved to the European People’s Party in 1996.13 This choice was justified
by the affinity in European policy and also by the fact that the European
People’s Party (EPP) is much stronger than the ELDR (European Liberal,
Democrat and Reform Party).
Parliamentary control
The TEU includes a declaration on the improvement of the participation
of national parliaments in EU activities. In order to keep with that decla-
ration, the 1992 constitutional revision included a new paragraph stating
that parliament has the competence to monitor and to evaluate the
participation of Portugal in the process of European integration.14
Concomitantly, the government is required to submit to the Assembly of
the Republic, at appropriate times, information concerning the integra-
tion process. Finally, in 1997 a new article was added according to which
parliament is required to give its opinion, as provided by law, on matters
that are pending decision within the organs of the Union that have a
bearing on their exclusive legislative powers.15
Law No. 20/94 states that parliament will review and evaluate
Portugal’s participation in the process of construction of the Union,
through a regular process of exchange of information and consultation
between parliament and government. Each year, the government will
present a report to parliament, which will enable it to review Portuguese
participation in the process of the construction of the Union. That report
must provide information concerning the resolutions adopted in the previ-
ous year by European institutions having an impact on Portugal and the
measures put into practice by the government as a result of those resolu-
tions. A parliamentary debate with the government occurs during each
six-month presidency of the European Council. 
The Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs is mandated to
review and globally evaluate EU matters. The committee evaluates all the
subjects of interest to Portugal within the framework of the European
institutions. It encourages greater participation by parliament in the activ-
ities undertaken by the European institutions, and stimulates exchanges
between the national Parliament and the EP. The committee proposes
reciprocity, as appropriate, and regular meetings with interested members
of the EP, in particular those elected in Portugal. The committee also
appoints the Portuguese representatives to COSAC from the national
Parliament, and assesses COSAC’s activities and findings.
Within this new legal framework, the Parliamentary Committee for
European Affairs has increased its activities. Two sub-committees, one on
EMU and another on Economic and Social Cohesion, have been created,
and the dialogue with the government has been improved. The Foreign
Minister meets with the committee after each European Council, and the
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Secretary of State for European Affairs holds a similar meeting with the
committee after each General Affairs Council. The finance minister and
the minister for planning also hold frequent discussions with the commit-
tee, especially to discuss budgetary issues and the management of
structural funds. These meetings are not a legal requirement, and the
reason behind them is twofold. First, there is an awareness of the need to
involve the parliament more deeply, and secondly, the government
requires the support of the other parliamentary caucuses; it must there-
fore, increase work with the Parliament. This situation was particularly
important for the approval of the budget, in order to comply with the
convergence programme and fulfil the criteria for participating in the
single currency.
Despite these improvements, the Portuguese Parliament still lags
behind in terms of having an effective control over EU issues. The effec-
tiveness of its role is still too dependent on the willingness of the
government to co-operate. It has the power to sanction government action
within the Union, but not to keep the government from taking political
decisions or, conversely, to recommend particular action to be taken.
Furthermore, even if it is duly informed on the Union’s legislative propos-
als it does not have the power to oblige the government to follow
parliamentary positions.
The role of other actors
The Portuguese political system does not leave much room for effective
participation in EC/EU affairs of institutions other than the central
government. The government and the central administration are clearly
the main actors. The action of political parties is felt mainly through
Parliament. It has become the practice that the prime minister receives the
leaders of the parliamentary political parties before each European
Council. The two autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores have
their own political and administrative statutes and their own institutions
of self-government. These regions have the ability to programme and
manage the Structural Funds, which in the mainland is an exclusive
competence of the central government. This is the reason why their repre-
sentatives attend the meetings of the Interministerial Commission for
Community Affairs. Contrary to what happens with regions of other EU
Member States, neither the Azores nor Madeira has set up offices in
Brussels. 
The administrative structure of mainland Portugal is highly centralised.
The government tried to pass legislation to create administrative regions
in the country, which could have some political powers and certainly
influence in the policy-cycle. A referendum was held in October 1998 and
the majority voted against this regionalisation process.16 The Union was
an argument used during the campaign of the referendum; the political
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parties and citizens’ movements opposing the creation of regions argued
frequently that the division of the country would diminish Portuguese
bargaining power in the Union. Behind this position was a conception of
competitive lobbying by the regions in Brussels. The opponents of region-
alisation were apprehensive about a possible fragmentation of the
Portuguese bargaining power, given that Portugal is such a small
country.17
Although lacking effective autonomous powers, there are regional
branches of central government that play a role in the policy-cycle, espe-
cially in the administration of the structural funds. Mainland Portugal is
divided in five regional co-ordination commissions – North, Centre,
Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo and Algarve. They are responsible for
the preparation and co-ordination of the regional development
programmes and for monitoring the programmes of social and economic
development within each of the regions. These entities, however, are
branches of central government and if they have a role in the preparation
of policies, the final word belongs to Lisbon. 
As far as the civil society is concerned, Portugal’s accession to the
Union is a parallel process to the development of civil society. The number
of NGOs and professional associations is growing, as well as the impor-
tance these organisations attach to the European process. Especially
important is the participation in European-wide networks. These organi-
sations – some of them, such as business associations, which have
established offices in Brussels – try to influence the EC/EU legislative
process, both in Portugal and in Brussels. At the same time, the govern-
ment also tries to get the support of these organisations for its policies.
The prime minister receives the major interest groups and trade unions
associations before each European Council.
Conclusions: progressive ‘Europeanisation’ of the civil societies
The adaptation of the Portuguese administration to the new political and
economic internal circumstances was parallel to the process of integration
in the Union. It is difficult to say, in same cases, whether the changes were
internally or externally induced. Right after the request for membership,
the changes introduced in the Portuguese administration tried to cope
with the demands of integration. The correlation between internal
changes and European integration has increased with the TEU. In fact, the
TEU led to a substantial reform in the Portuguese constitution and it has
changed the role of the Parliament in the control of the EC legislation. At
the same time, almost all the ministries had to create or adapt their serv-
ices and institutions even those traditionally less ‘Europeanised’, such as
the police forces and the judicial authorities. Even if the Foreign Ministry
continues to be the major player on European issues, the other ministries
364 Member States and the European Union
2444Ch15  3/12/02  2:06 pm  Page 364
are progressively becoming more involved. The co-ordination structure,
however, did not change drastically. It is the same since the accession and
it has been evolving without major upheavals. The same applies for the
preparation of decisions and policies, still mainly concentrated in the
ministers and secretaries of states and not so much in the administration. 
The coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty is likely to produce
some changes, but not to the same extent as the Maastricht Treaty. The
same is true for the single currency, which will probably cause the
Ministries of Finance and of Economy to reform their structure to some
extent. So far, the Portuguese membership of the Union has been a success
story. Politically, administratively and socially, Portugal is evolving and
adapting to the evolution of the Union itself. But the Union is also enlarg-
ing its scope and it will probably become increasingly demanding. On the
one hand, the greater involvement of more ministries can produce rival-
ries, requiring a greater co-ordination effort. On the other hand, the
concentration of the preparation of decisions almost exclusively at the
political level could not be enough to cope with Union requirements. 
The Portuguese case also shows that domestic political change is still
influential in the definition of European policies. The new government has
changed the attitude vis-à-vis EC/EU dossiers and has contributed to a
broader range of internal actors involved in the process, although in a
very informal way. It is also interesting to note the different profiles of
Portuguese prime ministers. While Aníbal Cavaco Silva – Prime Minister
from 1985 to 1995 – had a low profile in the European scene, António
Guterres has a much higher profile, and this obviously has a bearing in
enhancing the role of Portugal. Portuguese civil society is also learning
how to deal with European integration. Following democratic transition,
Portuguese civil society became more active and organised; civil society
organisations now tend to act not only in Portugal but also in the
European institutions. In the near future, civil society, through its organ-
ised representatives, is likely to play an increasing role in Portugal’s
European policies. 
Perspective for the future
The Portuguese position on the 1996–97 IGC concentrated mainly on
three basic issues: institutional reform, social Europe and JHA. At the
institutional level, the main concern was the preservation of the country’s
relative power: the voting weight at the Council, the composition of the
Commission, the rotation of the Presidency. Another concern was the
interpretation of subsidiarity and the introduction of the flexibility clause.
Portugal also stood for the simplification of decision-making mechanisms
and the extension of the co-decision procedure with the EP. Another
priority was social Europe and co-ordination of employment policies.
Portugal supported the partial communitarisation of the third pillar, and
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concentrated on issues such as drug-trafficking, organised crime, terror-
ism and illegal flows of immigrants. The Portuguese government also paid
special attention to the promotion of human rights and the fight against
discrimination. The protection of the peripheral regions and the recogni-
tion of their specificity, which has a direct impact on the Azores and
Madeira, were also of particular concern. 
The Amsterdam Treaty did not generate any special divergences
amongst the political parties. Following the rather peculiar incident of the
referendum, the Treaty was ratified in January 1999. Afterwards,
Portugal was deeply involved in what was probably the most difficult
negotiation since the accession: the Agenda 2000 and the financial frame-
work for 2000–06. Portugal tried to maintain the present level of financial
flows and opposed attempts to link the cohesion fund to the participation
in the single currency. Prime Minister António Guterres has constantly
stressed that the Union was facing dangerous times with the emergence of
strong selfish, national attitudes. The Portuguese position is especially
difficult because the country is overwhelmingly dependent on the struc-
tural funds. While other cohesion countries can obtain significant
resources from the CAP, Portugal on the contrary is a net contributor in
terms of agricultural policy. Another important topic is the phasing out
of the Lisbon region. Until recently, the whole of the country qualified
for Objective One, but the Lisbon region is now over the 75 per cent
threshold. 
The internal political debate on Agenda 2000 was very strong, with
opposition parties urging the government to veto proposals that could be
detrimental to Portugal. The government, nevertheless, chose to be very
cautious with the threat of vetoing. The outcome of the negotiations was
rather positive to Portugal, which managed to keep the same amount of
funds as in the second CSF. 
It was the government’s position to de-link budgetary negotiations with
the enlargement process. The Portuguese government fully supports acces-
sion of the CEE countries; since the Community supported the Portuguese
democratic consolidation process and economic development it should
therefore play the same role in Central and Eastern Europe. It is quite
clear that the negotiations on the financial framework are not, in
Portugal’s view, about a competition for funds between present and future
members but rather about a concern for perceived gaps between north
and south, and richer and poorer Member States in the EU. 
Notes
1 The change in the European policy of CDS–PP granted the party much better
electoral results: in the 1994 European elections it reached 12.5 per cent of
the vote and 9.1 per cent in the 1995 general elections. 
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2 At that time, the Portuguese Constitution barred any referendum on interna-
tional treaties. 
3 For a complete overview of the constitutional reforms, see José Magalhães,
Dicionário da Revisão Constitucional (Lisbon: Europa-America, 1989) and
José Magalhães, Dicionário da Revisão Constitucional (Lisbon: Europa-
America, 1999). 
4 Following the attempted coup of 11 March 1975, the banking and insurance
sectors were nationalised as well as the major industrial companies.
5 Article 7 §6. Provided that there is reciprocity, Portugal may enter into agree-
ments for the joint exercise of the powers necessary to establish the Union, in
ways that have due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and the objective
of economic and social cohesion.
6 Article 102: ‘The Bank of Portugal, in its capacity as a central bank, shall
carry out its functions in accordance with the law and with the international
rules to which the Portuguese State is bound.’ The reference to the omission
of currency was eliminated. 
7 The demand to hold a referendum on the ratification of the TEU was largely
made by its opponents, but not exclusively. The then President of the
Republic, Mário Soares, also argued that the Maastricht ratification would
be a good occasion to consult the Portuguese on the participation of Portugal
in the Union. The two major parties, the socialists and the social democrats,
however, refused to change the constitution in order to allow the referendum.
8 The importance that Portugal and Spain gave to Latin America, and their
willingness to bolster the importance attached by the Union to that region
was clearly expressed in the Treaty of Accession, which included a ‘common
statement of intent in relation to the furthering of relations with the countries
of Latin America’.
9 It was the first time since the Portuguese accession that the government had
changed (the PSD had won the 1985, 1987 and 1991 general elections). 
10 Portuguese document to the Inter-governmental Conference www.minnes-
trangeiros.pt/politica/europeia/engindex.html
11 The Directorate General for Community Affairs was created in 1985, under
the designation Directorate-General of the European Communities. The
change of name took place in the framework of global restructuring of the
Foreign Ministry, in 1994. 
12 See Pedro Sanchez da Costa Pereira, ‘Portugal. Public Administration and
EPC/CFSP – A Fruitful Adaptation Process’ in: Franco Algieri and Elfriede
Regelsberger (eds), Synergy at Work, Spain and Portugal in European
Foreign Policy (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1996), pp. 207–229. 
13 CDS–PP was a member of the EP but it was expelled after becoming an anti-
European party. 
14 Added to Article 166; now in Article 163, following the 1997 revision.
15 See Article 161.
16 The referendum was held 8 October 1998. The ‘no’ vote won, with 63.5 per
cent of the votes.
17 Another argument used was the fear that some of the Portuguese regions
could fall into a sphere of influence of the border Spanish regions. 
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16 Karl Magnus Johansson
Sweden: another awkward partner? 
Introduction: reluctant yet faithful 
Scholars of the European Union must lift the lid off the ‘black box’ of
domestic politics to understand the behaviour of Member States in the
integration processes. In this chapter, we will move inside the Swedish
polity by analysing domestic constraints and institutional characteristics.
The overarching aim is to capture the fundamentals of Sweden as an EU
member, thereby identifying the primary actors involved in the policy-
cycle. Joining late, Sweden has faced strong pressures of adaptation both
at the state and societal levels. As the Union has advanced and become an
increasingly complex organisation, countries seeking membership and
new Member States are faced with a more difficult and steeper learning
curve than the founding members. At the same time, latecomers are in a
position to learn from the experiences of others. 
Sweden joined the Union in January 1995. The decision to seek
membership can be seen as a logical consequence of the interdependence
between the strongly export-reliant Swedish economy and the West
European economies.1 Although officially neutral, Sweden has since long
been strongly associated with West Europe, both economically and polit-
ically.2 Swedish economic forces actually joined the Common Market
before membership was formally and politically approved. Just like in
Britain and Denmark, membership has been justified primarily by the
political elites on economic grounds, which provided the rationale for
requesting membership in the first place and provoked unrealistic expec-
tations of economic benefits and thereby continued to haunt the elites,
broadly in favour of membership. It is also important to emphasise that
Sweden entered the Union at a time of economic recession.
At the same time, however, there clearly were political determinants
behind the decision to apply for membership. The argument of increasing
political influence was often employed by political leaders when arguing
the case of joining the Union.3 Leading social democrats pointed out that
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the nation state is no longer enough and that meant cross-national borders
had to be found.4 In other words, those leaders were willing to ‘trad[e] off
some of their de jure sovereignties for a guaranteed say in effective policy-
making’.5
The matter of full EC membership rose to the top of the Swedish polit-
ical agenda in a short period of time. The governing social democrats took
a decisive step in this direction in October 1990, in the context of the
management of an acute economic crisis. Later that year, the parliament
(Riksdagen) voted in favour of applying for EC membership by 289 votes
to 28, with the reservation that it must be in a form compatible ‘with the
retention of neutrality’.6 The membership application was handed to the
Dutch EC presidency in the Hague on 1 July 1991.
The negotiations for Sweden’s accession to the Union were formally
opened on 1 February 1993 and outstanding issues were resolved in
March 1994. Overall, the deal reached in 1994 was not a bad one for
Sweden. As Miles (1998) has argued, ‘the Swedish negotiators, for the
most part, gained a generous agreement from the Community and this
was primarily due to the concerns of both sides at the size of domestic
opposition to the country becoming a full member’.7 It seems, therefore,
that the Eurosceptical public may be more of an asset than a liability for
Swedish negotiators and decision-makers, playing two-level or even multi-
level games in multiple arenas.8 That public opinion provides a safety
valve was also shown in connection to the social democratic government’s
justification for not joining EMU in the first wave. During the accession
negotiations and since, Sweden has highlighted particularly Swedish
issues and has been allowed to leave a distinct Swedish imprint on the
common EU agenda. The importance to strike a good deal with the Union
has been considered especially urgent to compensate for the weak support
for European unity in Swedish public opinion. 
In fact, Eurobarometer data has confirmed that the Swedes are the
most Eurosceptic of all citizens in the Union. This situation results in
restricted room for manoeuvre for Swedish decision-makers and will
continue to do so given the persistence of anti-EU sentiments among the
Swedes. It appears that European integration has become a new cleavage
in Swedish politics.9 The pattern of party support and opposition to EU
membership still reflects the position of the referendum in November
1994. Accordingly, the Left Party and the Green Party are against, at least
nominally, whereas the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the
Moderate Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Centre Party
remain principally in favour. At the same time, however, there is opposi-
tion to supranational integration within all the Swedish political parties.
Although there has been a consensual style to Swedish EU policy, espe-
cially when supposedly ‘national interests’ are at stake, the political
priorities are very much those of the social democrats. From the outset, a
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priority was to turn away the debate from institutional issues in particu-
lar. As a non-member at the time, Sweden was not in a formal position to
influence the contents of the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, leading
social democrats were critical of the focus on institutional reform and
monetary union. They wanted to put other issues on the EU agenda,
notably employment. At the same time, politicians across the political
spectrum seemed happy about the insertion in the treaty of the subsidiar-
ity principle, conveniently defining it in terms of ‘nearness’.10
The social democrats have invested enormously in committing the
Union to a Swedish-style active labour market policy. Accordingly,
employment had top priority in the 1996–97 IGC, resulting in a separate
title on employment in the Amsterdam Treaty.11 Predictably, this was
considered a victory by the Swedish social democrats.
In the IGC, Sweden emphasised issues presumed to be of concern, such
as equal opportunities between men and women, consumer protection,
the environment, and openness, or transparency, in addition to employ-
ment.12 Sweden reluctantly accepted the flexibility clause, which implies
that those Member States that want to could go on with co-operation and
integration without having all partners on board.13 For Sweden, as one of
the smaller EU members, the notion of flexibility was seen as favourable
for the larger Member States, eventually forming a hard core, but it was
stressed that flexibility would be of limited use given the right of veto and
also for reasons of solidarity among Member States. The Swedish govern-
ment was also opposed to changes in the rules for QMV in the Council
and to changes in the composition of the Commission. 
One can detect a growing awareness on the part of the Swedish govern-
ment that supranationalism in the sense of strong EU institutions and
decision-making procedures could be advantageous for the relatively
smaller Member States, fearing the emergence of a directoire among larger
states. However, this is difficult to communicate in a country where the
influence of Sweden in the Union is widely measured in terms of the
number of votes, presently four, in the Council. Accordingly, the Swedish
government has been reluctant to discuss deepening – that is, institutional
reforms necessary or desirable in order to extend the number of EU
members. Sweden has been an enthusiastic and unequivocal supporter of
EU enlargement, performing the role of an advocate for the Baltic states.
For the foreseeable future, the Swedish policy of non-participation in
military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for the country to
remain neutral in the event of a war in its vicinity, is likely to remain
unchanged. However, the social democratic government has adopted a
more pragmatic attitude towards existing alliances and joint operations,
while rejecting proposals for a common defence in the Union along the
lines of collective security.
Unlike Britain and Denmark, Sweden has no formal ‘opt-out’ from the
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third stage of EMU. Whether or not Sweden will join will also depend on
the positions of the other Member States which decided not to join in the
first wave, notably the decision by the British government. The reticent
government position on EMU reflects the divisions in the social demo-
cratic party and also an overall anti-federalist attitude. 
There is a basic anti-federalist sentiment in Sweden, a unitary state, and
in the political parties. In this regard, there is a deep-rooted ‘nation state
logic’ behind Swedish membership of the Union.14 The broad support in
favour of the welfare state and feelings of uniqueness, some say ‘welfare
chauvinism’, imply that the instincts of most Swedes are that they would
lose from closer integration in a federalist direction. Accordingly, the
Union has been seen by the public largely as a threat rather than as an
opportunity:
To many voters, the immediate and very visible costs associated with the
Europeanisation of Sweden far outweigh the potential but diffused benefits
of membership, as professed by various establishment figures. The people of
Sweden were inspired by their political authorities to turn their backs on the
Continent of Europe some fifty years ago. In spite of the best efforts by the
new generation of leaders to draw public attention back to this traditional
focus of interest, most Swedes (across party lines, but more so the young and
women than the middle-aged and men) tend to remain sceptical.15
Sweden stayed out of the two world wars and many of the ideas under-
pinning the EU project, such as the subsidiarity connected with Catholic
social teachings, are unknown to most Swedes, few of whom identify with
this project. In short, neither crucial parts of general European history nor
basic ideas are shared between Sweden and the continental countries
which originally launched the project of European integration. 
Against this background, it might be argued that Sweden is and will
remain another ‘awkward partner’ in the Union, or a ‘reluctant
European’.16 Paradoxically, however, Swedish compliance with EC legis-
lation is among the highest of all the Member States and Swedish
representatives seemingly do their best to behave well in the Union, both
administratively and politically.17 As a Member State, Sweden must,
however, be considered aloof from the ‘heart of Europe’ not only
geographically but also ideologically. 
The national policy-cycle: identifying the primary actors
The primary concern of this section is to discuss the institutional charac-
teristics and changes following from the Swedish EU membership and the
adjustments to the EU policy-cycle. The most important actors involved
in the policy-making process will be identified. Formally, the obvious
actors are the government and the public administration as well as the
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parliament. In addition, there are non-governmental actors such as inter-
est groups, political parties and the media.
Although there is an old tradition of local government, and renewed
regionalisation, the Swedish unitary polity must be considered as rela-
tively centralised compared to several of the other EU Member States,
especially the federal or semi-federal states. In the making of Swedish
policies towards the Union, the degree of centralisation is striking.
However, there is a certain fragmentation at the central level insofar as
there is an interministerial rivalry and, perhaps inevitably, problems of co-
ordination. The institutions dealing with the Union in one way or the
other are continuously adjusting to the EU policy-making process, and
this appears to be the situation for the institutional set-up in general.
The central government and administrative agencies
In an age of globalisation, few if any issues are completely domestic. And
in the light of Europeanisation an increasing number of policy areas must
similarly be handled by government sections other than foreign ministries
which thereby lose some of their control of exchanges across borders.
This situation may reflect a general waning of influence and prestige for
foreign ministries. In Sweden, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has tradi-
tionally had a somewhat superior position compared to other ministries.
The Ministry had the privilege of defining neutrality and non-alignment.
However, this privilege has no longer the same meaning and importance
as it used to have. And the involvement in the EU policy-making process
has added to the rivalry in the direction of Sweden’s external relations in
general. 
The search for smooth horizontal interministerial co-ordination must
be seen in the light of the relationship between the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs and other ministries. Given the rivalry noted above, in reality as
well as potentially, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was naturally keen
on having the co-ordinating function. Accordingly, the main co-ordina-
tive unit, the EU secretariat, was placed there. Officially, however, this
was considered a cross-ministerial body, with the staff seconded from
other ministries as well. On a cross-ministerial basis, there is also a
group for EU affairs among state secretaries, the most high-ranking civil
servants in the ministries. When a new social democratic government
was formed in March 1996, the widespread impression was that the new
Prime Minister and his office (Statsrådsberedningen) would take a firmer
grip on the co-ordination of EU affairs.18 An indication of this was that
the position of Minister for European Affairs, placed in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, was abolished. At the same time, however, one of the
state secretaries in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was to specialise on
the Union, thereby reducing the burdens on the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. On balance and in terms of influence, the winner from these
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changes seems to have been the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
However, one of the reorganisations of the government office in
connection with the formation of the social democratic cabinet after the
September 1998 general election concerned co-ordination of EU affairs.
Although the EU secretariat would be retained in the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, a co-ordinative unit would at last be established in the Prime
Minister’s Office and a state secretary appointed. The then Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, the longest-serving of the present
ministers, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, with overall co-ordina-
tion responsibilities. These changes, also made in view of the Swedish
Presidency of the Union during the first half of 2001, must be interpreted
as a recognition of the organisational deficiencies concerning the co-
ordination of EU affairs so far. It remains to be seen to what extent the
new arrangements will run smoothly, ensuring effective co-ordination.
There is still a potential for co-ordination problems: following the
October 1998 cabinet formation, there are three ministers in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, all of whom deal with the Union in one way or the
other. The head of the ministry, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, repre-
sents Sweden in the General Affairs Council. There is still a Minister for
Foreign Aid, and the Minister for Trade, previously in a separate ministry,
co-ordinates Sweden’s Baltic Sea policies, which are of high priority for
the cabinet but through this division of work seemingly, and perhaps
unfortunately, separated from EU affairs.
The relative influence between different bodies cannot be explained
only with reference to structural conditions, however. Another factor is
the degree of personal commitment to the Union. That some key persons
in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs have turned out to be very committed
and capable with regard to EU affairs and bargaining, contributes to their
influential position. And it is obvious to any observer that the Prime
Minister since March 1996, Göran Persson, has not shown a great inter-
est in EU affairs, at least not during the years of his first cabinet and
before that as Minister for Finance.19
Thus, the Swedish involvement in the EU policy-cycle has revealed a
democratic and constitutional problem in regard to the relationship
between politicians and civil servants to the extent that Swedish policy-
making vis-à-vis the Union has been driven by unelected bureaucrats
rather than politicians. That several politicians at the ministerial level
apparently are not interested in EU affairs results, in turn, in a lack of
political backing. This could be frustrating for officials speaking on behalf
of the Swedish government in various working groups, committees and
pre-Council meetings. The ambiguity that has characterised the Swedish
position-taking in the Union, notably in the Council, is to the detriment
of Sweden’s overall influence and has, therefore, a political cost. Such
ambiguity makes a Member State an unpredictable ally. For successful
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negotiation outcomes, civil servants negotiating on behalf of the Swedish
government have called for clarity and political backing.
It goes without saying that the Swedish Permanent Representation to
the Union underwent an expansion of staff owing to membership.
According to a report in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, only the Greek
representation was larger than the Swedish in June 1998. Then, ninety-
one people worked at the Swedish Representation in Brussels. Out of
fifty-two civil servants altogether, twenty-four were from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs and twenty-eight from other ministries. Again, there is a
divide between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other ministries in
that the Brussels-based civil servants either are career diplomats or more
or less specialised officials from ministries such as the ministries for
finance, agriculture or environment. Specialised experts, on a temporary
basis, are also seconded from central administrative agencies. In addition
to the horizontal co-ordination at the ministerial level, there is the verti-
cal co-ordination between ministries and central administrative agencies.
The linkages between them have become more dense because of EU
membership. Since Swedish ministries are relatively small, as measured by
the number of staff, they have to rely on assistance and expertise from the
specialised administrative agencies and, generally speaking, increasingly
so the more technical the issues are. The closer contacts and interlinkage
between Swedish ministries and central administrative agencies have
constitutional implications given the latter’s formally independent
status.20 This status has a long tradition in Sweden and is likely to be
maintained for the foreseeable future, just like the principle of collegial
decision-making in the cabinet and the system of common deliberations
(Gemensam beredning) between two or more ministries in general and in
budgetary matters in particular.
Swedish government structures – in regard to communication, steering
and co-ordination both horizontally and vertically – have thus been
deeply affected by the necessary adjustments to the EU policy-cycle.
Furthermore, EU membership has given rise to a new kind of relationship
between the government and the parliament.
The parliament
Law-making and scrutiny are two of the functions of any parliament, and
these functions are both directed towards the government. EU member-
ship has diminished the overall legislative influence of parliaments,
including the Swedish Riksdag. However, an awareness of this diminished
role has acted as an incentive for new ideas in regard to governmental
relations. Looking at other models, mainly the Danish, of how to scruti-
nise the government’s handling of EU affairs, the Swedish parliament
set up the Advisory Committee on EU Affairs (or the EU Advisory
Committee).21 It follows from its name that the committee is a forum for
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consultation with the government, which has to inform the Riksdag about
all matters which are to be dealt with by the Council and has to confer
about Sweden’s positions on important matters more generally.22
Formally, the powers of the committee are limited since it is advisory
unlike the Danish model, cannot bind a minister in regard to the Council
negotiations. Nor can the committee submit issues under deliberation to
the chamber for plenary debates. 
Nevertheless, the committee exercises a real influence, which is impos-
sible to measure, insofar as the committee’s recommendations are taken
into consideration. If a minister does not follow the advice given by the
committee, the matter could actually be scrutinised by the Committee on
the Constitution and a ‘no confidence’ vote could be taken in the
chamber.23 It is also interesting to note, given that IGCs are formally
between governments, that the government regularly consulted with the
committee during the 1996–97 IGC.24
The committee, which regularly convenes on Fridays and behind closed
doors, is attended by the relevant minister, and his or her advisers, or
exceptionally by state secretaries and under-secretaries of state if ministers
are unable to attend. Who the relevant minister is depends, of course, on
the nature of the issue to be dealt with in the Council the following week. 
That government representatives come before the committee so late in
the policy-cycle is one of the major deficiencies in the ways in which
government–parliament relations over EU matters have been organised so
far. A related problem is that the issue-specific information primarily is
provided by the government, mainly through the EU secretariat and
before then from the Swedish Representation in Brussels. However, the
committee has direct communication with different units in the entire
government office. That the background information to the committee is
provided by the government implies that it could be filtered when it
arrives in parliament. The question arises to what extent the information
is reliable and sufficient. Even though relations are said to be good, the
committee does not completely rely on the government which seems to be
a healthy scepticism from a body with scrutiny of government as one of
its key functions.25 For this reason, the committee, through its secretariat,
has established alternative sources of information.
One source is the cabinet of the Swedish Commissioner. Other sources
are various data bases and documentation from other parliamentary units
dealing with EU affairs, notably those of the other Nordic Member States
with which the Swedish committee exchanges information and occasion-
ally holds joint meetings both among staff and committee members.
Information is also provided by the twenty-two Swedish MEPs.26 The fact
that the government tends to focus on the Council and to ignore what
goes on in the EP implies that the information from the government rarely
includes briefs about proceedings in the EP and its agenda.
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However, the relationship between Swedish MEPs and the Riksdag,
notably the EU Advisory Committee, has been somewhat tense in that
some of the MEPs wanted access to the committee, on a more formal
basis, but were denied it. Also the proposal, serious or not, that Swedish
MEPs could be invited to attend debates on EU matters in the chamber
was turned down. Instead, the channels of communication between the
Swedish parliament and the Swedes in the EP are primarily upheld by the
political parties and the party groups in the Riksdag. 
The direct channels of communication between the party groups in the
Swedish Riksdag and the Swedish MEPs enable committee members to get
first-hand information from party colleagues at the European level of
politics. Thereby, one can identify a strategy seeking to bypass the central
government. Such a bypassing strategy is also employed by sub-national
governments and by a host of non-governmental actors.
Sub-national governments
The sub-national levels of the Swedish body politic, mainly the regional
level, are undergoing a transformation. Although some changes were initi-
ated before Swedish membership of the Union, some of the most apparent
signs of Europeanisation of the Swedish polity are related to regionalisa-
tion and the new dynamics of regional self-government. Such processes
refer to networks of transaction, communication and organisation across
state borders. Maps have been redrawn and there are experiments with
new regional authorities in some parts of the country, including Scania,
West Sweden, the County of Kalmar and the island of Gotland. It is
beyond doubt that these changes have been reinforced by processes of
‘Europeanisation’ in general and EU membership in particular. Not least,
the principle of subsidiarity provided an opportunity for further decen-
tralisation and regionalisation, and the Structural Funds and the
establishment of the CoR have also contributed to this development.
To an increasing extent, units at the sub-national level of government
and public administration become transborder, or transnational, actors.
Specifically, there are the trans-regional exchanges across the Öresund
between Denmark and Sweden.27 There are also the wider exchanges
across the Baltic Sea. Both the Öresund area and the Baltic Sea area have
gained EU financial assistance, specifically through the INTERREG
programmes. A small secretariat of Interreg II C is located in the town of
Karlskrona, and a larger secretariat of that programme is located in
Rostock, Germany. Another illustration is provided by the regional lobby-
ing vis-à-vis EU institutions.28 One example of representation centres in
Brussels of different Swedish regions and associations of local authorities,
or communes, is the South Sweden European Office. Swedish sub-national
governments are also represented, with altogether twelve members, in the
CoR. These members are formally appointed by the Swedish central
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government, but they are nominated by the Federation of County
Councils (Landstingsförbundet) and the Association of Local Authorities
(Kommunförbundet).
The outward-looking regional and local authorities have brought a
new kind of relationship between public authorities and societal actors,
for example through chambers of commerce. In other words, processes of
regionalisation and Europeanisation at large may give rise to strengthened
partnerships between the private and the public.
Where the Swedish central government has been reactive in its dealings
with the Union, sub-national governments have in many cases appeared
to be pro-active. Thereby, one can identify patterns of ‘paradiplomacy’,
‘microdiplomacy’ and ‘multi-level governance’. Just like parliamentarians
and political parties, as mentioned above, sub-national governments
employ influence strategies, often through networking, bypassing the
central level of government and its hierarchical structures. The same situ-
ation applies to the multiplicity of non-governmental actors which appear
in EU policy-making in one way or another.
Non-governmental actors and interest groups
Non-governmental actors are involved in patterns of informal European
integration. They thus exercise transnational strategies of influence and
play an agenda-setting role. Such actors could go through central govern-
ment and public administration or bypass these by targeting EU
institutions and policy-makers directly. These strategies could also be
combined and their effectiveness varies between the phases of the EU
policy-making process. Given the corporatist tradition of Sweden, strong
and centralised interest organisations have been part of the policy-making
process. The central organisation for blue-collar workers is the Swedish
Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen) and for white-collar
workers the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees
(Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) and the Swedish Confederation of
Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation).
These organisations have a joint office in Brussels. The central organisa-
tion for employers is the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (Svenska
Arbetsgivareföreningen), which has a joint representation centre in
Brussels together with the Swedish Trade Council (Industriförbundet). It
is important to emphasise that both of these Brussels offices were in place
several years before Sweden became an EU member. However, since
Sweden joined the Union the organisations mentioned above could
become full members of the ETUC and UNICE, respectively. And the
Federation of Swedish Farmers (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund), which also
has an office in Brussels, became a full, and active, member of COPA. 
Swedish interest organisations, primarily those mentioned above, are
indirectly represented in the EU’s Social Dialogue and directly in
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ECOSOC, with altogether twelve seats. And even though Swedish interest
groups were active in the European arena before Sweden became an EU
member, their overall lobbying in Brussels and Strasbourg has increased
considerably since 1995. The same situation applies for ‘new’ social
movements such as the environmental groups, some of which have linked-
up with umbrella organisations, or Euro-lobbies, notably the European
Environmental Bureau (EEB).
Political parties
Correspondingly, Swedish political parties have linked-up with Euro-
parties and co-operate actively with like-minded parties on a
transnational basis.29 By ‘Euro-parties’, I mean the European parties
called for in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 138a). At another organisa-
tional level, there are the EP party groups. Again, it is stressed that these
informal integration processes on the part of Swedish non-governmental
actors were set in motion before Sweden formally became an EU member. 
In fact, the Swedish Social Democratic Party became a founding
member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in 1992. For their part,
the Moderates and the Christian Democrats became full members of the
European People’s Party (EPP) in 1995, they had previously been affili-
ated with this Euro-party. A similar situation applies for the Liberal Party,
which is a member of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party
(ELDR). While there is no Euro-party for the leftists, formerly
Communists, they sit in the leftist group in the EP. The Greens, however,
are members both of the Green Group in the EP and the European
Federation of Green Parties (EFGP), which like the ELDR was founded in
1993. The Centre Party is represented with one seat in the ELDR group in
the EP, but is not a member of the ELDR party. For a governing party like
the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the involvement in a Euro-party like
the PES provides channels for access to other governing parties.
Specifically, there are the PES pre-meetings to European Council summits
and the group of Sherpas – that is, of personal representatives of party
leaders sitting in government. These representatives seek to co-ordinate
policies more broadly. Such concerted efforts have, for example, been
made in the issue area of employment.30 The Swedish Deputy Prime
Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, is a vice-president of the PES, and her pred-
ecessor as Swedish Foreign Minister, Margaretha af Ugglas, is a
vice-president of the EPP.
Issues related to the Union have, more or less, disrupted the cohesion
within the political parties represented in the Riksdag. Intra-party faction-
alism and conflicts are sometimes difficult to control for party managers.
One strategy, most notably employed by the social democrats but also by
other parties, is to contain intra-party divisions by avoiding clear-cut posi-
tions on different issues, such as EMU, and avoiding debate altogether.
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This strategy of party management, which can be interpreted as a lack of
leadership, slows down, if not actually hinders, Europeanisation.31 Party
attitudes are also formed in relation to the stance of the interest groups
with which the parties are related, such as trade unions in the case of the
social democrats, employers for the Moderates and agriculture for the
Centrists. Arguably, the vacillating position of the latter party reflects a
cost-benefit analysis for the agricultural sector as a whole, with many
small-scale farmers suffering from the increased competition. However,
the Federation of Swedish Farmers came out in favour of EU membership.
Their connection to industry may explain the strongly pro-EMU position
of the Moderate Party, historically a conservative party. However, there is
a growing dissent within the party over the single currency. The Christian
Democrats and the Centrists are divided over the issue, whereas the Liberal
Party is almost at one in its favourable position. Both the leftists and the
greens insist that Sweden should stay out of the third stage of EMU and
that the matter should be decided by a referendum, the sooner the better. 
The media
The impact of the media on Swedish policies towards the Union is also
impossible to measure. However, the media shapes public opinion, and
very much so in a Eurosceptic direction given the focus on detailed EU
standardisation and legislation reportedly affecting Sweden negatively.
The media, thereby, impacts indirectly on the government’s policies and
provides a further domestic constraint. 
The quality of media reporting with regard to the Union varies enor-
mously. The two leading daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter and
especially Svenska Dagbladet, generally contain highly qualitative reports
and commentaries. They are widely read by the political elites. Both of
these newspapers are non-socialist, as are most of the Swedish newspa-
pers. Accordingly, the leading articles tend to be critical towards the
approaches to the Union on the part of the Swedish government. This may
have contributed to the government’s more active approach, at least
rhetorically, since the formation of a new cabinet in October 1998.
Reports in the foreign media may also have had the same effect, especially
when they have compared Swedish behaviour in the Union to the allegedly
more effective and active Finland.32 In effect, also the media, through
opinion formation across borders, appears as a non-governmental and
transnational actor. Such actors exert informal power. 
Conclusions: an adaptive but largely reactive and defensive member 
Looking into the future, we should recall the Statement of Government
Policy presented by the Prime Minister in October 1998, which put an
heavy emphasis on the role of Sweden in the Union and Europe at large.
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‘Sweden will actively contribute to the shaping of Europe’s future.
Membership of the European Union makes it possible for Sweden to work
for a continent characterized by democracy, solidarity and openness. The
presidency of the EU in 2001 will be a new milestone in our work in the
EU.’33 This might be interpreted as a recognition that Sweden, during the
early years in the Union, has been insufficiently active and therefore may
have missed opportunities that could have been seized. The new message
might also be interpreted as an effort to try to convince the public of some
of the advantages of being an EU member.
The cabinet still suffers fundamental constraints from a lukewarm
public opinion, however. And having done badly in the September 1998
general election, the social democrats entered into negotiations and built
a kind of informal coalition with the the two most Eurosceptic parties in
parliament. At least in their rhetoric, those two parties want Sweden to
leave the Union. The partnership with them became increasingly strained
in connection with the campaign for the June 1999 European elections. 
Although there have been, and still are, apparent problems of adjust-
ments and co-ordination, both administrative and political agencies have
proved capable of learning and on the whole are fit for the task of repre-
senting Sweden in the Union. At the same time, it is fair to say that the
Swedish learning process has been slower than the Finnish. At least to
some extent, this can be explained by organisational factors.
Organisationally, there have namely been weaknesses in the Swedish
government office in terms of a machinery for co-ordination and an antic-
ipatory capacity for strategic thinking. There clearly is a myopia and
preoccupation with day-to-day politics. 
How ‘fit’ is Sweden? A learning curve 
Sweden’s approaches to EU affairs during the first years of membership
can be characterised as largely reactive rather than pro-active and antici-
patory; a defensive attitude to European integration has prevailed. This
situation has had negative effects for co-ordination, both horizontally
among ministries and vertically between ministries and central adminis-
trative agencies. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Sweden has
been an unpredictable partner in the Union. There have probably been
many missed opportunities for effective coalition-building, which is very
much the name of the game. This situation has also diminished Sweden’s
overall EU influence. 
The ‘nation state logic’ underpinning Swedish membership has resulted
in a method of organisation that is basically intergovernmental rather
than supranational. In the light of the metaphor of the ‘inside’ and the
‘outside’, the EU is primarily seen as something ‘outside’, that is, beyond
national borders and spatially separated from the national territory. In a
deeper sense, therefore, ‘the Swedish nation has not adapted to the
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requirements of EU membership or even to the wider movement toward a
transnationally defined human existence’.34
That the intergovernmental rather than the supranational image has
prevailed in Swedish thinking towards the Union is indicated by the
prominent, although diminishing, role of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
and traditional diplomacy with regard to EU affairs. The Swedish govern-
ment has similarly tended to focus on the basically intergovernmental
Council rather than the supranational institutions of the Commission and
the EP. In many ways, Sweden has been affected by processes of
‘Europeanisation’. This is illustrated by the membership of political
parties in Euro-parties and of interest groups in Euro-lobbies, as well as
by the European activities of regional and local authorities and by the
increasing number of personnel dealing with EU affairs at different levels
of government. One can identify an ‘institutional fusion’ in that there is a
close ‘intermesh’ between institutions at the European level and at the
national and sub-national levels of politics.35 However, the Swedish
central government fundamentally maintains the control of deliberations
on EU affairs. It is the central government that provides background
information to parliament and sets the rules, overall, for local and
regional self-government. And despite the inherent spillover dynamics of
being an EU member, no transfer of national sovereignty can occur
without the accord of Member States’ governments. 
Nevertheless, the Swedish central government is a victim of conflictual
pressures emanating from the supranational and the sub-national levels of
government. There are, in fact, parallel processes of ‘Europeanisation’ and
nationalisation, in the case of Sweden, in so far as membership of the
Union provides policy-makers with the task of formulating national posi-
tions and vital interests. This double-edged challenge constitutes a
paradox of being a Member State in the Union and is often overlooked by
scholars in the field of ‘Europeanisation’. In short, European integration
brings about counter-reactions and countervailing forces.
Given the ‘nation state logic’ underpinning EU membership, Sweden is
and will remain, regardless of the colour of the government, an obstacle
to those forces that want the Union to develop in a federalist direction.
This implies that Sweden’s membership even makes it more likely that the
Union will develop further into a ‘multi-speed’ or ‘hard-core’, and
perhaps fragmented, entity. EU Member States should not be dealt with
as unitary entities, or monoliths. In addition to the external constraints, a
government like that of Sweden suffers internal, domestic constraints and
these have to be identified if we are to understand the behaviour of
Sweden as a Member State. Given the nature of the domestic constraints,
Sweden will add to the cyclical ups and downs of European governance
and is likely to remain, by and large, an ‘awkward partner’, at least in the
eyes of committed European federalists.
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17 Kenneth A. Armstrong and Simon Bulmer
The United Kingdom:
between political controversy and
administrative efficiency
Introduction: once a latecomer always a latecomer?
European integration has represented one of the most fundamental chal-
lenges for politics in the United Kingdom since 1945. Integration has
highlighted the problems of, and possibilities for, the re-orientation of
foreign policy as part of the United Kingdom’s post-war descent from world
power status. The ‘Monnet method’ of supranational integration raised
constitutional concerns for a state which had elevated territorial integrity
and parliamentary sovereignty to key normative principles of its institu-
tional order.1 Integration has at different times divided the main political
parties internally as well as being a source of division between them, from
the ratification of accession right through to the present. Levels of public
support for integration have been among the lowest of all Member States.
And yet the business of preparing, making and implementing European
policy has been characterised by considerable efficiency at the official level. 
For the United Kingdom as for the other Member States the result has
been a pattern of ‘fusion’: ‘trends of merging public resources at several
state levels, leading to increasing complexity, a lack of transparency and
difficulties in reversing the development’.2 However, this fusion has not
led to a homogenisation of patterns of European policy-making within the
Member States. The British approach remains distinctive. Its political and
legal institutions are outside the continental mainstream, and its European
policy discourse remains distinctive. But that is not to say that there has
been no impact of EU membership. The UK constitution is in the process
of undergoing major reform as part of the Blair government’s political
agenda of modernisation. European integration is among the stimuli for
this change.
Political context
The United Kingdom was not a founder member of the European
Communities. Neither of the two main political parties was prepared to
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engage with European organisations that went beyond intergovernmental
forms of co-operation. Under the Conservative Macmillan government a
policy change took place, resulting in the decision to apply in 1961 for
membership of the Communities. This decision was contested within the
government and opposed by many in the Labour Party. Following the
1963 rejection of the British application by President de Gaulle, the
Wilson Labour government made a renewed application in 1967 which
met the same fate. Following de Gaulle’s retirement in 1969 the interna-
tional climate for UK accession improved and it was the incoming Heath
Conservative government which was able to agree terms of entry. Once
terms had been finalised, the Heath government faced the task of securing
the passage of the accession agreement (the European Communities Bill)
in Parliament. The government had to contend with a significant group of
dissenting MPs within its own party; out of a highly contested situation
the internal party factionalism on integration developed that has persisted
in various forms to the present.
Based on a lack of political consensus, EU membership has been
dogged by two other factors. First, no real vision has been presented by
successive British governments of what form European integration should
take, there has been much greater clarity on what was not wanted from
integration.3 In consequence, a persistent feature of the United Kingdom’s
relationship has been one of ‘backing into integration’ out of fear of isola-
tion, with other states taking the initiative. UK (prime) ministers have
been seriously lacking in ‘the vision thing’ where European policy has
been concerned – Mrs Thatcher’s support in the early 1980s for the Single
Market Programme was a notable exception.4 Beyond that – and prior to
the 1997 Blair government – proposals for strengthening integration have
been of a pragmatic nature. Second, successive UK governments have had
to contend with an acquis communautaire that did not reflect British
interests most notably the principles of the CAP and the EC budgetary
arrangements. These substantive policy issues could rally parliamentary
opposition to the Union in the same way as miscellaneous threats to sover-
eignty. European integration has been a ‘poisoned chalice’ for all
governments, from Heath to Major. Whether the Blair government is able
to avoid the same fate will depend on how it handles the policy of British
participation in the single currency.
If we examine governmental priorities and attitudes towards the last
three exercises in treaty reform we are able to capture the first of the two
problems. In 1985 the SEM White Paper was adopted at Milan and the
IGC was set up that led to the SEA. The position of Mrs Thatcher’s
Conservative government was one of support for the SEM: a policy which
she could regard as market liberalisation of the kind she advanced domes-
tically. Her government was much more reserved about the SEA,
especially the institutional reforms. 
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The strategy in the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty was
not radically different, although much more complex owing to greater
intrusion of domestic political divisions. Mrs Thatcher was deeply
concerned by German unification but did not draw the conclusion that it
should act as a spur to deeper integration. She made clear her opposition
to monetary union in 1990, a position which was fully in line with her
more sceptical policy on the Union in the late 1980s, as outlined in Bruges
in 1988. Her negative position on EMU was one of the factors which led
to a leadership challenge against her in the Conservative Party and culmi-
nated in her replacement in December 1990 by John Major. The new
prime minister’s effort to put ‘Britain at the heart of Europe’ was compro-
mised by the presence of key figures in his Cabinet who were opposed to
deeper integration. Two key integrationist advances in the Maastricht
Treaty – EMU and the Social Chapter – were subject to British opt-outs.
Concerned about the loss of national sovereignty, the Major government
was one of the key advocates of subsidiarity being introduced as a guiding
principle in the Maastricht Treaty. A notable exception to this position
was the British initiative to strengthen the powers of the ECJ so that it
could fine states which flouted EC law. Increased powers for the EP and
greater use of QMV were not among the government’s wishes but were
regarded as a necessary part of the Maastricht ‘deal’. The subsequent rati-
fication of the Treaty brought the government, re-elected in April 1992
with a much reduced majority, to the brink of defeat.
With Major still in power, and a vocal group of rebellious Eurosceptic
backbenchers, the British government played a rather obstructionist role
in the IGC preparing what became the Amsterdam Treaty. The break-
down of relations with EU partners over the handling of the outbreak of
‘mad cow’ disease (CJD) entrenched positions further. The government’s
policy was largely defensive, for instance in blocking increased use of
QMV and further powers for the EP. In those areas where it made initia-
tives, they were largely to limit, or roll back, supranational powers, for
example in its proposals to limit the powers of the ECJ. The IGC
effectively ground to a halt as partner states hoped for a change of govern-
ment at the May 1997 British general election. The incoming Labour
government of Tony Blair proved more flexible: accepting, inter alia,
more QMV, increased powers for the EP and signing up to the Social
Chapter.5
As can be seen from the above episodes the United Kingdom has been
a somewhat reluctant participant in these three exercises in EU constitu-
tional revision. The Blair government’s wish to play a much more positive
role in integration has been borne out to some degree, as in proposals for
a European defence identity. However, non-participation in the single
currency places the United Kingdom on the sidelines of the EU’s key inte-
grationist programme.
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What are the key European policy priorities of the Blair government?
The two specific manifesto commitments were:
• To hold a referendum on participation in the single currency
• To lead reform of the Union.6
The latter of these refers to a range of proposals, including: rapid comple-
tion of the single market; a high priority for enlargement of the Union to
CEE countries and Cyprus, with accompanying institutional reforms;
reform of the CAP and of the Common Fisheries Policy; greater openness
and democracy in EU institutions and support for a proportional voting
system in national elections to the EP; retention of the veto on matters of
national interest but extension of QMV in a limited number of areas; and
signing up to the Social Chapter.7
Having proved more flexible in the IGC than its predecessor,
Chancellor Gordon Brown in late 1997 set out the conditions under
which the government would recommend joining the single currency. It
then made progress towards putting its other commitments into action
during the Presidency. The overall position of the Labour government
remains one of commitment to a Union composed of sovereign states but
it is more prepared to see the Union as an ‘opportunity structure’ than
Major’s government. 
Constitutional context
The principal characteristics of the British political system are as follows:
• Until summer 1999 it was a unitary state; it is now an asymmetrically
devolved one (i.e. there is limited devolved power in England, and the
powers devolved to Scotland and Wales differ from one another).
• It is a constitutional monarchy, with the formal seat of power residing
in the Queen in parliament (parliamentary sovereignty).
• Parliamentary sovereignty embodies the principle that the government-
in-parliament has the ultimate power to make or unmake any law (i.e.
no law can bind a successor parliament).
• There is no formal, written constitution and no British Constitutional
Court vetting parliamentary legislation or acting as a check on govern-
ment.
• The English legal tradition (common law) differs from that of conti-
nental Europe.
• The rules of the Westminster electoral system tend to ensure single-
party majoritarian government.
• The institutional structure of the state encourages the conduct of adver-
sarial politics in Westminster between government and opposition
parties.
• The Prime Minister has considerable potential power resources, and
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can call upon the centralised machinery of Whitehall, co-ordinated
through the Cabinet Office, to reinforce leadership.
• The direct involvement of the state in economic governance is relatively
limited by comparative European standards.
• The civil service is well qualified, under pressure to be efficient, and
theoretically neutral (i.e. subservient to the objectives of whatever
party is in power).
• State power has traditionally been concentrated on central government,
with local government having a weak position.
• The United Kingdom nevertheless comprises different national identi-
ties (Scots, Welsh, etc.) as well as the complex situation in Northern
Ireland.
• Finally, the constitutional order – of England in particular – has
evolved peacefully over many centuries, with no breach of territorial or
constitutional integrity.
This constitutional order has been stable for much of the post-war period.
However, the Labour government embarked on several major reform
exercises, which we discuss at the end of the chapter.
The national policy-cycle: a Rolls Royce machinery with erratic
politicians at the wheel? 
The conduct of the United Kingdom’s European policy is dependent on
the politicians at the head of government being able to put the machinery
of government to effective use (Figure 17.1). The latter has sometimes
been regarded as a very smooth, ‘Rolls Royce’ operation. At times,
however, this Rolls Royce has been described as having a lunatic at the
wheel, as dogmatic political positions have been adopted on the substance
of European policy. The latter situation has been most likely to occur
when ‘parliamentary arithmetic’ makes the House of Commons a key veto
point in the formulation of European policy. Thus, we have argued that
two broad patterns of European policy conduct can be identified in the
United Kingdom.8 Under circumstances of a small parliamentary major-
ity, we argued that continued British sensitivity to issues of sovereignty
could result in issues of European policy being handled in a highly
symbolic, rhetoricised manner and following the logic of adversarial
parliamentary politics. However, we also argued that much European
policy did not trigger these sovereignty concerns and was consequently
conducted at a more technical level. 
We do not wish to depart from that analysis, which we feel offers a valid
explanation for the bulk of the period of UK membership since 1973. But
we do need to point out the very special circumstances enjoyed by the Blair
government. It was elected in 1997 with a majority of 179 seats.
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Furthermore, generational turnover among Labour MPs reduced the
number of Eurosceptics in the party. Hence the government had a
commanding majority and it is unlikely that parliamentary veto points will
play a major part in the formulation of European policy. This situation is a
big departure from the circumstances prevailing for the Major government,
revealed most dramatically in his difficulties in securing the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty but evident also in a range of other issues, including
the domestic handling of relations with the Union over CJD.9
What is the contemporary machinery for the making and controlling of
European policy?10 The principal institutional link between national poli-
tics and the Union is through the national governments, which are often
seen as occupying the role of ‘gatekeepers’. This designation derives from
their central institutional role at the intersection of national and European
decision-making. British central government comprises different levels, of
course, and it is important to be alert to these in what follows. Thus, the
growth of the European Council since 1975 has brought with it a major
involvement on the part of heads of government. The ministerial level is
extremely active in the various formations of the Council of Ministers.
The civil service is active in the preparation and implementation of policy.
It is also involved at the European decision-making stage by supporting
the appropriate national minister or through participation in COREPER
and related committees and working groups. The involvement of civil
servants in EU negotiations may occur in the form of the Whitehall-based
officials. Equally, the role of the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels
(UKREP) must be considered. Finally, civil servants and ministers have an
involvement in transposing Community law into national law where this
is necessary. Implementation and application of EC law is a separate task
which falls to central government; central government agencies;11 local
authorities (and, post-devolution, to devolved authorities in Scotland,
Wales); and – depending on the peace process – in Northern Ireland.
There are two apparently contradictory patterns evident in the manage-
ment of British European policy. One is a pattern of centralisation. Its
centripetal features find expression in: 
• the co-ordination of European policy by the Cabinet Office European
Secretariat (COES, whose origins date back to the 1960s);12
• co-ordination at political level by a ministerial sub-committee on
Europe, whose origins date back to the original application for
membership;
• the growth of prime ministerial involvement, especially following the
creation of the European Council in 1975; 
• a strong information-sharing value within the British civil service.
The other trend is more centrifugal, and can be seen in other features,
such as:
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• the problems of co-ordinating the sheer volume of business that
emanates from the Union;
• the emergence of ‘mini-hubs’ for co-ordination: in the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) for the CFSP, in the Home Office for
JHA, and in the Treasury for EMU; 
• the tensions which may develop between devolved executives and
central government in London.
Hitherto – and certainly when compared with other Member States –
the centripetal dynamics have prevailed. However, much business does
not necessitate government-wide co-ordination, and this work is carried
out in a more decentralised way.
The role of the Prime Minister
The Prime Minister has many policy areas beyond the Union to attend to.
However, important tasks include dealing with the Union in the run-up to
regular European Council sessions, regular EU items on the agenda of
Cabinet meetings, and frequent bilateral summits with EU counterparts.
In comparative terms the Prime Minister has considerable power
resources. They may be used in connection with European policy under
two particular sets of circumstance: where European policy is contested
within Parliament and perhaps also in the Cabinet; and where a European
policy initiative is pursued. The former situation led John Major
(1990–97) to expend much effort on European policy, e.g. in finding a
negotiating line on Maastricht or in trying subsequently to agree a policy
(of keeping options open) on UK participation in EMU. Given the parlia-
mentary salience of European policy for most of the period since 1973, the
Prime Minister must have good antennae for picking up signals from the
political environment. The latter situation was more typical of Heath
(1970–73), who made accession a government priority. It is also worth
noting that prime ministers have considerable scope for limiting the
discussion of policy in areas that they wish to keep as a domaine réservé.
Participants in her cabinets have noted that this practice was used by Mrs
Thatcher to restrict discussion of European policy.13 The Prime Minister’s
staff in 10 Downing Street will provide support for this European policy
business but the principal adviser on European policy is the head of the
COES. 
The role of departmental ministers
By comparison with the Prime Minister, the involvement of several
departmental ministers is more continuous, since it is neither dependent
on the relatively infrequent meetings of the European Council nor on the
fluctuating political salience of European policy issues. The Foreign
Secretary, the Minister of Agriculture and the Chancellor of the
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Exchequer are particularly affected in this way, with annual meetings of
‘their’ Council of Ministers formation into double figures. The key minis-
ters are those in the ministerial sub-committee, known as (E(DOP)) under
the Blair government and as (OPD(E)) under Major. The formal reporting
structure of this sub-committee is via the Foreign Secretary, as Chair, to
the full Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP)
but, more usually, direct to the Cabinet itself, where there is a regular EU
agenda item.
The European dimension of ministerial work has not been an ‘easy
ride’ for several of the incumbents. Among the casualties of senior office
on European policy-related grounds have been: Michael Heseltine/Leon
Brittan (1986), Nigel Lawson (1989), Nicholas Ridley (1990) and Sir
Geoffrey Howe (1990) under Mrs Thatcher and Norman Lamont under
Major. These upheavals normally arose from contested views on
European policy on the part of individual politicians.
Civil service departments
The lions’ share of European policy is conducted at the specialist level
within the individual ministries. Moreover, all departments now have EU
business, from the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF,
since 2001 DEFRA) – arguably the most ‘Europeanised’ ministry – to the
more peripheral Ministry of Defence and the Department of Culture,
Media and Sport. The key players, however, are the FCO, the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI), MAFF and the Treasury. Our attention is
focused initially on the policy- and decision-making stages, that is to say,
on the period up to formal decision-making in the EU institutions.
The decision to integrate EC affairs into the existing organisational
structure of the ministries was taken in summer 1971 when, following a
review of other countries’ systems, Prime Minister Heath decided that
there would be no Ministry for Europe but, rather, all ministries should
‘think and act European’.14 Co-ordination was entrusted to the Cabinet
Office’s European Secretariat, which was considered to be a more neutral
agency than the FCO for bringing together the wide spectrum of ministe-
rial views, since the latter’s expertise lay in diplomatic matters. The COES
is staffed by some nine senior staff who are seconded from those
ministries which are most affected by EC matters but the head is always
from a home department – counter-balancing the FCO appointment of the
Permanent Representative in Brussels. It acts ‘as a clearing house for the
dossiers that go to ministers as well as providing guidance for depart-
ments on others’.15 Its co-ordinating role comes to the fore when
Whitehall-wide negotiations are under way, such as for IGC negotiations
or enlargement. In co-ordination there is a strong norm that policy should
be agreed early and thereafter the whole of Whitehall should ‘sing from
the same hymn-sheet’. The secretariat’s tasks also include the preparation
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of negotiating tactics: a task facilitated by a Friday meeting of relevant
ministries, attended by the Permanent Representative. The head of the
European Secretariat is particularly influential in co-ordinating govern-
mental policy and, in addition, briefs the prime minister prior to sessions
of the European Council. Staff from the COES chair official level commit-
tees: EQO, comprising senior officials (formerly known as EQS), and
EQO at middle-ranking level. The former meets infrequently but the latter
often, although the meetings are often ad hoc. The members of these
committees are part of an EQ network, among whom key papers on
European policy are distributed. Special sub-committees may be set up
separately from these two, for example to co-ordinate on IGCs or enlarge-
ment. It is also worth noting that there is a separate lawyers’ network
within central government, chaired by the Cabinet Office Legal Adviser,
who is located in the Treasury Solicitor’s Department. It has its own
committee, known as EQO(L) and meets frequently, chiefly to co-ordi-
nate on legal advice or on EU litigation.
For the purposes of cross-national comparison, it should be pointed out
that the Cabinet Office is the part of the government responsible for
putting into practice the principle of collective cabinet responsibility. It
functions in an anticipatory mode; it does not have to contend with intra-
coalition negotiations; nor does it expect to devote large parts of its time
to solving crises which have already reached the Cabinet, since its role is
to pre-empt them. These characteristics set it apart from most of its coun-
terparts elsewhere in the Union.
The FCO plays a more technical kind of co-ordinating role. It shadows
most policy areas and leads on institutional developments and CFSP in its
EU Departments. It is formally responsible for UKREP in Brussels. It also
assumes a greater role in policy co-ordination when the United Kingdom
holds the Presidency, and will set up a special Department for about eight-
een months. In 1999 it absorbed bilateral relations with European
partners into its EU command structure.
Other ministries have had to accommodate the European dimension in a
significant manner. MAFF/DEFRA is a prime example because of the
extent to which national agricultural policy is integrated into the CAP.
Already in 1982 it was estimated that some 200 MAFF officials travelled to
Brussels each month.16 The DTI’s responsibilities within the Union are
extensive and include the majority of the Single Market Programme, trade,
regional policy and research and technology policy. Under the Blair
government a Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe was
appointed – Lord Simon, formerly Chief Executive of BP. His responsibili-
ties include the DTI’s European Directorate as well as responsibility for the
Euro Preparations Unit, which is located in the Treasury. The Treasury
itself is a key ministry, including responsibility for budgetary policy and
monetary union. Its strict budgetary rules have an impact on all Whitehall
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departments which have responsibility for programmes spending resources
for the EC budget.17 The Home Office has become a more significant
player in European policy with the growth of JHA co-operation. 
The Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices also warrant
comment, for they have often been neglected in studies of European
policy-making in the government. Prior to devolution in summer 1999, at
which point their roles changed, they had a twofold responsibility. On the
one hand, they represented their particular territorial interests at the
policy-making stage, whether at ministerial or administrative level. On the
other hand, they supervised policy implementation in their own territo-
ries. For instance, the existence of the separate Scottish legal system often
necessitates different implementing legislation from the rest of the
country. In Scotland and Wales devolved executives took on these func-
tions from July 1999. At the time of writing the peace process in Northern
Ireland had not made sufficient progress for a similar planned develop-
ment to take effect there.
Other agencies
All these departments and ministers are engaged in the preparation of
policy. There will be consultation of other agencies outside the depart-
mental structure of government as the need arises. The Bank of England
is an obvious case in point in respect of EMU. It was granted autonomy
by Chancellor Gordon Brown in 1997; however, this decision was
presented much more as a decision designed to facilitate a sound mone-
tary policy. The move does, of course, have implications for joining the
single currency. UK competition agencies are consulted on European
competition policy, for instance; the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
on EU legislation in that domain; the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) on
air transport liberalisation policy; and so on. Customs and Excise and the
Inland Revenue, two agencies responsible to Treasury ministries, have a
significant involvement in European policy.
The role of UKREP
UKREP is a key component of European policy-making. It acts as an intel-
ligence-gathering body, keeping ministries briefed on developments in the
supranational institutions. But its involvement becomes more critical in
the decision-making stage, where the Ambassador, the Deputy Permanent
Representative and other officials undertake key preparatory work with
their counterparts in the Council hierarchy, pending formal ministerial
approval. UKREP has generally had a staffing level of some fifty senior
officials: one of the larger Permanent Representations in Brussels and
drawn from ministries across Whitehall. As already noted, the Permanent
Representative returns to Whitehall on Fridays to discuss the tactics and
strategy of British policy at a Cabinet Office meeting with interested
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ministries. This regular participation in Whitehall’s European policy-
making is indicative of the latter’s centralised nature. The involvement of
the UK government in negotiations has been summarised well by Peter
Pooley, formerly the senior MAFF official in UKREP: ‘[T]he British are
more predictable. They are very well briefed, they are very articulate, it’s
very easy to get hold of and understand their point of view. It’s relatively
more difficult to change it.’18 This last comment highlights the fact that a
highly co-ordinated European policy such as the United Kingdom’s may
bring inflexibility in negotiations within the Union. This situation – a
product of the institutional characteristics of EU policy-making within the
United Kingdom – may be compounded by the adversarial norms which
British politicians bring with them to the Council and the European
Council that do not emphasise the more consensus-building dynamics in
the EU intergovernmental institutions.
Developments post-Maastricht
Maastricht-related developments in EU policy-making have been of much
less significance than for certain other states, such as Germany. There has
been no fundamental re-arrangement of the government machinery. The
principal change has been the reinforcement of three subsidiary co-ordi-
nation hubs under the umbrella of the COES machinery.
On EMU, both in the IGC negotiations leading to Maastricht and
thereafter, the Treasury has served as a co-ordinating ‘mini-hub’. Under
the Conservatives contacts were with the Bank of England at a technical
level and between the Chancellor and the Prime Minister at the political
level (owing to the sensitivity of the issue within the government). Under
Labour the DTI was brought in rather more, with the need for British
industry and commerce to prepare for the Euro even without UK partici-
pation. The creation of an EMU Preparations Unit within the Treasury
has been the main institutional change. On JHA co-operation the Home
Office has taken on the role of ‘mini-hub’, reflecting the fact that the UK
representative on the K4 Committee is from that Department. Other
ministries and agencies involved include the Lord Chancellor’s
Department (i.e. the law officers) and Customs and Excise. The staffing
compliment of the Home Office has grown considerably in order to deal
with JHA business. On CFSP the existing ‘mini-hub’ around the FCO has
been reinforced somewhat, with the Ministry of Defence becoming more
involved with the advent of negotiations on security and defence policy.
Beyond these developments there has been no fundamental change,
although there has been some adjustment to parliamentary procedures.
Regions and other sub-national actors
The involvement of central government administration in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland pre-devolution has been outlined above. In England
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central government has the so-called ‘government offices’ in the regions,
such as the English North-West, and their creation was partly stimulated
by the Union, notably the growth of the Structural Funds. Prior to
summer 1999 there have been no directly elected assemblies above the
level of local authorities, but regional governance is becoming an increas-
ingly significant development across the United Kingdom.
Parliament and policy-making
The role of parliament in shaping British European policy has three
aspects. First, the House of Commons is recognised as a ‘talk’ parliament
rather than as a ‘work’ parliament. It is not especially attuned to the influ-
ential scrutiny of proposals emanating from the Commission. Secondly,
the government’s institutional origins lie in its majority in the House.
Ministers thus need to be conscious of those EU developments which
might encounter serious criticism within the House. As already indicated,
this anticipatory function becomes even more critical when the govern-
ment-in-office holds only a small majority. The third aspect is the work of
the House of Lords, where business tends to be oriented towards detailed
scrutiny. The focal point of the work of the House of Commons lies in
oral reports, debates and questions relating to the Union. In the first cate-
gory fall, for example, the reports made by the Prime Minister following
a meeting of the European Council. Parliamentary questions may be asked
of ministers or the prime minister on European matters, although it would
be difficult to attribute any significance to these upon the ultimate pattern
of negotiations in the Council of Ministers. The European Scrutiny
Committee monitors proposals from Brussels and decides whether fuller
debate is necessary, normally in one of three European Standing
Committees established for the debate of different domains of EC legisla-
tion. However, such standing committees rarely capture public attention
and party discipline generally ensures a fairly smooth passage.
Commission documents have to be deposited with the committees within
forty-eight hours of their formal receipt by the government and the lead
department is expected to submit an Explanatory Memorandum as the
government’s evidence to Parliament within ten days. Amongst the weak-
nesses of the scrutiny system are pressure on timing, and problems
discussing proposals before they are formalised. JHA and CFSP business
was excluded until reform in November 1998.
A further means of control is an agreement with the government that
no minister should agree to legislation in the Council if the scrutiny
committee has not been consulted: the so-called ‘scrutiny reserve’ power,
from which JHA and CFSP business were also excluded until November
1998. The 1998 reforms were part of the Labour government’s parlia-
mentary modernisation programme, pursued by the House’s
Modernisation Committee.
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The work of the House of Lords is conducted in the Select Committee
on the European Communities. This (1998–99 session) comprised six sub-
committees according to policy area. The Committee’s reports are
thorough and highly regarded in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the
Union. Parliamentary control over EC legislation was for many years far
from perfect; indeed, it was not until 1989 that the House of Commons
Scrutiny Committee was permitted (i.e. by government) to look at
anything other than formal EC proposals. Thus the SEA could not be
considered prior to ratification, nor could the work of the IGC in which
it had been negotiated. The Maastricht Treaty has certainly contributed to
the pressure for reform of parliamentary procedures on EU business but it
was as part of Labour’s manifesto commitment to reform that momentum
gathered pace in 1998.
Policy implementation
It has become the convention to describe the United Kingdom as a
combative negotiator in the Council of Ministers but a good performer in
terms of the subsequent implementation of EC law. One explanation for
the latter has been civil service centralisation and efficiency. Moreover,
there are in the United Kingdom no institutional features discriminating
against EC legislation; as it has been pointed out, administrators may not
even be aware of the origins of the legislation.19 Indeed, the importance of
the administrative context may be developed further; the centralised
nature of the UK administration may contribute to the positive perform-
ance. By contrast, a federal state may create longer chains of command.
But arguably as important is the culture embedded in the British public
administration. Although the British administrative machinery is not
populated by staff with a legal training, there is nevertheless a strong
assumption that laws are made to be put into practice.
Transposition and compliance
In the previous section we suggested that the United Kingdom’s adminis-
trative structures tend to ensure the positive implementation of EC
obligations. Of course, the transposition of Community legislation is but
one form of compliance. Breaches of Community law may occur through
transgressions of directly effective Treaty provisions, such as the rules on
free movement. Or Community rules can be implemented, but incorrectly
applied by the relevant national agencies. In this way, there are no
straightforward indicators of how well the United Kingdom complies with
its obligations. That said, we can point to some indicators:
• In terms of direct actions brought before the ECJ for failure to fulfil
obligations, forty-one cases were brought against the United Kingdom
between 1973 and 1998. This compares with 225 cases against
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Belgium, 122 against Germany, 185 against France and a massive 355
against Italy.
• Few cases make it all the way to the ECJ. The majority of cases are
resolved after the Commission has sent a Member State a letter of
formal notice (the first stage in bringing infringement proceedings
under Article 226 (ex Article 169) ECT. Between March 1998 and
March 1999, twenty-one letters of formal notice were sent to the
United Kingdom (compared with thirty to Belgium, thirty-one to
Germany, fifty-two to France and forty-three to Italy) for alleged
breaches of SEM rules.
• As regards implementation of SEM directives (in terms of the
Commission’s Single Market Scoreboard), the United Kingdom has a
higher implementation rate than Belgium, France and Italy, but a
poorer performance compared with Germany.
Approached with appropriate caution, it is evident from the above that
the United Kingdom appears to have a good compliance record. However,
it is important to stress that much of the life of EC law can be found in
the use made of EC law arguments by litigants before their national
courts. The statistics above give no indication of the qualitative signifi-
cance of EC law within the national legal orders.
EC law in the UK courts
It is evident from previous sections that UK membership has resulted in
institutional adaptation and evolution within the domestic administrative
order. Adaptation and evolution within the national legal order is a more
complex question. In its early jurisprudence, the ECJ itself made clear that
national legal orders were to provide the structures, processes and reme-
dies for the enforcement of Community law rights. It has, however,
moved from such a position of complete procedural autonomy to recog-
nise that features of the national legal orders may create barriers to the
effective protection of Community law rights. In this way, while there has
been no harmonisation of legal orders in institutional and procedural
terms, national impediments to the effective protection of EC rights have
been removed. Two UK cases are significant in this respect. In Marshall
II, a national limitation on the amount of compensation to be paid for a
breach of the Equal Treatment Directive was found by the ECJ to prevent
the effective protection of EC rights.20 In Factortame I, the House of
Lords, following a preliminary ruling from the ECJ,21 set aside a national
constitutional rule preventing the granting of interim relief against the
Crown. Perhaps the most important intrusion into the national legal
orders has been the ECJ’s creation of the doctrine of state liability for
breaches of Community obligations. In the United Kingdom, the possibil-
ity for obtaining damages against the Crown for public wrongs has
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historically been very limited. But as a result of the ECJ’s Brasserie du
Pêcheur/Factortame ruling,22 the English courts have awarded compensa-
tion to Spanish fishermen who suffered loss as a consequence of the
United Kingdom’s discriminatory system for the registration of fishing
vessels.
Developments in the availability of remedies are a visible manifestation
of the impact of EC law in the United Kingdom. Less visible is the more
routine use of EC law arguments in the UK courts. It is clear that litigants
may seek to use arguments derived from EC law to supplant or even
replace domestic legal discourse. The use of EC law in the national courts
has been enhanced in the public law sphere by a distinct legal evolution in
the form of the ‘application for judicial review’. The accompanying liber-
alisation of the rules of locus standi together with an enhanced ability to
seek the remedy of a ‘declaration’ have been harnessed by individual liti-
gants and pressure groups to seek declarations that public bodies have
acted contrary to Community law. The impact of EC law upon the United
Kingdom cannot, therefore, be traced back to simple moments of Treaty
revision like the Maastricht or Amsterdam treaties. Rather, the dynamics
of change are driven by a mixture of developments within the broader
Community legal order; changes within the domestic legal arena; and the
unpredictable flow of litigation in national courts.
Closing the door to the ECJ?
One means by which we might test the willingness of UK courts to engage
with and accept EC law is to consider the use of the preliminary ruling
procedure under Article 234 (ex Article 177) ECT. Although eagerness in
seeking rulings from the ECJ may be considered to be indicative of a will-
ingness to accept EC law, the converse is not necessarily true. Indeed as
integration proceeds, national courts should feel themselves able to
correctly apply EC law without the need for a ruling. Comparison
between different Member States is difficult not least because of the differ-
ences in date of accession. By 1998, courts or tribunals in the United
Kingdom had sought 269 preliminary rulings. Of these, twenty-three were
sought by the highest civil court (the House of Lords) and ten by the
English Court of Appeal.23 The remaining 236 rulings were sought by
lower courts or tribunals. By comparison, French courts have sought 594
rulings, Italian courts 581 rulings, while the German courts have sought
1,113 rulings. Even taking accession dates into account it is evident that
the UK courts do not make as much use of the Article 234 ECT procedure
as their EU partners. It has been suggested that lower courts use references
to the ECJ as part of a strategy of judicial empowerment, while the higher
courts may seek to restrict the use of references. It is true that the English
Court of Appeal attempted to establish a restrictive approach to the use
of references in the 1970s, but there is evidence that these guidelines have
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not been followed subsequently. Indeed, the English courts seem well
aware of the advantages in seeking a ruling at an early stage if this is
appropriate.
EC law and the UK constitution
At first sight it may seem paradoxical that a state like the United
Kingdom, whose constitutional order is premised upon a dualist approach
to international law coupled with a strong principle of parliamentary
sovereignty, does not evidence strong conflicts between national and EC
law. This paradox may seem more acute when one thinks of the difficul-
ties encountered in France and Germany. That is not to say that reception
of Community law is unproblematic – rather that the courts have gener-
ally sought to avoid conflicts.24 As Craig has noted, UK courts have
accepted their obligations under Community law using a number of tech-
niques:
• By reasoning from national constitutional law itself, fulfilment of EC
obligations can be viewed as an expression of the will of Parliament as
expressed in the European Communities Act which gives effect to UK
membership.
• Interpretative techniques can be used to avoid conflicts – although
some judges have cautioned against distorting the language of UK
statutes.
• In Factortame I, the House of Lords accepted the functional logic of the
ECJ in the sense that the UK court set aside a national rule which
prevented the effective protection of Community law rights.
That the English courts have accepted the functional rationale of the
ECJ – i.e. the effectiveness justification for giving effect to Community
law – does not necessarily imply that the courts accept the more norma-
tive rationale of the ECJ. Another way in which the constitution shapes
UK membership concerns the whole process of negotiating and giving
effect to international treaties in the first place. The United Kingdom,
unlike its EU partners, does not possess a codified Constitution but rather
a set of constitutional practices and constitutional norms deriving from a
variety of sources. The power to negotiate and ratify treaties is an exer-
cise of the royal prerogative; a power which is vested in the Executive and
carried out in practice by government ministers. Parliament has no formal
role in the ratification of treaties leading to the paradox that while
Parliament has sought to increase its supervision of the Executive in the
day-to-day decision making process of the Union, it has little power to
supervise the Executive as regards the ratification of treaties. As a matter
of constitutional practice under the so-called ‘Ponsonby Rule’, the texts of
treaties are laid before Parliament for at least twenty-one days prior to
ratification, and this will normally prompt a debate on the treaty.
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Nonetheless, Parliament has only the possibility of expressing disapproval
of the treaty (with no direct consequences) or more significantly of using
a debate to force a motion of no confidence in the government (with the
hope of precipitating a change in government). While the Executive may
be responsible for the negotiation and ratification of treaties, any changes
in the national legal position as a consequence of such treaties can be
brought about only through an Act of Parliament. There is, therefore,
potential for the Executive to ratify a treaty but for parliament to fail to
enact laws to provide for the obligations contained in a treaty. This would
itself amount to a violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Therefore, it is normal practice for the required legislation to
pass through parliament in advance of treaty ratification by the Executive. 
The United Kingdom’s relationship with the Union is regulated through
the European Communities Act 1972, and with each treaty revision,
amendment has been made to the Act. However, the Bill to give effect to
the Maastricht Treaty created an opportunity for political battles both
within and between the main UK political parties.25 In short, the Bill to
amend the 1972 Act became the subject of wrecking amendments
proposed by Eurosceptic Conservative MPs and by the then Labour
Opposition seeking to inflict damage on an increasingly beleaguered
Conservative Administration. After the then Conservative government
made approval of its Maastricht negotiations a matter of confidence in the
government, the necessary resolution was passed, and the Bill was ulti-
mately enacted as law.
Once the Act came into force, attempts to block the Maastricht Treaty
continued through resort to the courts. It follows from the principle of the
sovereignty of Parliament that the UK courts cannot call into question the
validity of an Act of Parliament. Thus, challenge was brought by Lord
Rees-Mogg to the executive act of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,26
rather than to the validity of the European Communities (Amendment)
Act itself. This challenge, however, failed. The legal action met the same
fate as the 1971 challenge to the United Kingdom’s decision to accede to
the European Communities in the first place,27 namely a reassertion of the
distinct constitutional roles played by the Executive and the Judiciary. In
short, the English courts do not have the ability to seek to enforce national
democratic approval of the foreign policy acts of the Executive. In the
absence of strong parliamentary controls over the Executive in this field,
the result is a relatively poor set of constitutional controls when compared
to the United Kingdom’s European partners.
Legal fusion?
To talk of ‘legal fusion’ in the EU context is to court controversy. It is
undoubtedly true that UK membership of the Union has had consequences
for national legal orders in terms both of the acceptance of the doctrinal
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jurisprudence of the ECJ and the incorporation of the material law of the
Treaties and secondary legislation. But this is not the same as legal conver-
gence or legal fusion. National laws and institutions may remain tightly
coupled to social processes within the nation state.28 While national insti-
tutions can adapt to accept rather than repel Community law, this is not
the same as assuming the convergence of legal orders. In any event, we live
in a world of greater complexity than the simple interaction of
Community and national law. Globalisation forces can create new diver-
gences. Thus, while the legal order of the United Kingdom may be fused
to that of the Union, this relationship is one of mutual influence, adapta-
tion and evolution.
Conclusion: moving towards the continental mainstream?
The argument thus far has been that the United Kingdom has an efficient
machinery at official level, but one which has been at times subject to
doctrinaire political positions, especially when parliamentary veto points
have been in play. The Labour government elected in 1997 and re-elected
in 2001, however, has called into question this interpretation. It has done
so in two respects. It has adopted a more pro-European policy, exempli-
fied by Blair’s constructive European policy and engagement with fellow
Centre-Left governments in the Union, a situation already clear at the EU
level with agreement on the Amsterdam Treaty. Domestically, the absence
of parliamentary veto points was clear with the smooth ratification of the
treaty. It is chiefly the government’s equivocation on joining the single
currency that harks back to the United Kingdom’s ambiguous stance of
earlier periods. However, at the same time domestic constitutional
reforms may call into question the existing efficient machinery. To
examine this aspect we need to focus on the constitutional agenda of the
government and its interaction with EU policy-making.
Perspectives for the future
The Labour government came to power in 1997 with an extensive
commitment to constitutional reform.29 Many of the proposed reforms
have a European policy dimension, although the stimuli for them were
principally domestic. Once fully operationalised, the making and imple-
mentation of European policy will have undergone fundamental change as
part of reform UK politics. The proposals (status in brackets) include:
• Scottish and Welsh devolution (legislation enacted, elections to the new
bodies in May 1999; powers transferred to assemblies/executives on 1
July 1999).
• The creation of a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland as part
of the peace process (legislation enacted and assembly elected but
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executive’s creation is contingent on the political situation including
decommissioning of paramilitaries’ weapons).
• A directly elected London mayor to head a new Greater London
Authority (GLA) and the creation of regional development agencies
and (indirectly elected) regional assemblies in England (in progress).
• Introduction of proportional representation election systems for the
devolved assemblies and the EP (all used in 1999) and a referendum
on whether to reform the electoral system for Westminster (not yet
scheduled).
• Incorporation of the Convention of Human Rights (enacted). 
• Independence for the Bank of England (enacted).
• Modernisation of the House of Commons (in progress – proposals and
White Paper, with reforms on European business mentioned above).30
• Reform of the House of Lords (legislation on first stage in session
1998–99).
• The promise of a freedom of information bill (draft bill introduced for
consultation in spring 1999).
These are major changes. They will have a transformative impact on
the UK political system generally and the making of European policy
specifically. Their full ramifications cannot be judged at the time of
writing. What is clear on a general level, however, is that the United
Kingdom’s constitutional order is moving much closer to the continental
mainstream. Coalition government, such as in Scotland, will become less
unusual in the United Kingdom. Multi-level governance is now a political
feature, and the Union may come to be seen as one level of government
among several. EU and foreign policy are retained powers of the UK
government but policies such as agriculture, the environment and regional
development are devolved, so relations between the devolved executives
and London may become politicised over European policy. The presence
of a minority Labour administration in Wales and a Labour–Liberal
Democrat coalition in Scotland reduces the scope for political clashes with
London of the kind more likely had the Scottish National Party (SNP)
taken power in Edinburgh. Nevertheless, there will be domestic tensions
over European policy where policy issues have a territorial dimension, and
the smooth administrative machinery may even be weakened, as devolved
executives serve different political masters. The United Kingdom’s good
record on implementation may be challenged now that some legislation is
to be implemented by devolved authorities rather than purely in
Westminster.
It is difficult to judge exactly where all these developments will lead:
the politics and public administration of European policy in the United
Kingdom are both ‘in play’ as the country enters the new millennium.
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18 Jürgen Mittag and Wolfgang Wessels
The ‘One’ and the ‘Fifteen’? The
Member States between procedural
adaptation and structural revolution
Does the EU matter? Fundamentals before and after Maastricht
The growth and differentiation of the institutional and procedural system
of the European Union has created considerable challenges for all
Member States.1 The very nature of the process of European integration
is a continuing pooling of sovereignty, and a transfer of responsibilities
and authorities, which has enlarged the range of policy areas dealt with
by the Union through para-constitutional communitarisation. This
process has led to institutional and procedural differentiation and a subse-
quent widening of the functional scope of integration in the form of
sectoral differentiation. Moreover, this enlargement of the EU’s policy-
making scope has brought into play a growing number of governmental
and non-governmental bodies dealing with public policy. We can also
observe an increasing actor differentiation. 
Within the individual Member States there is an ongoing reaction to
these challenges of the developing EU system. A general survey of the
fifteen national systems does not however, paint a clear and unequivocal
picture. With regard to the results of earlier analysis2 the impression
which can be sketched from the empirical material is vague and sometimes
even confusing, including both divergent and convergent patterns of
national adaptation. 
For a systematic overview we use a typology (see Figure 18.1) differen-
tiating between ‘strong’ and ‘weak adapters’ at both the national and at
the ‘Brussels’ level. Do we witness on the one hand strong national
performers (horizontal axis, type 3) shaping clearly defined interests and
preferences in their own capital with regard to European policies and the
making of political decisions without much access to Brussels? Who are
these strong protagonists in the interplay between various intra-state
actors in one Member State? On the other hand, are there ‘strong’ players
at the supranational level (vertical axis, type 2) making efficient use of the
opportunities for access and influence in the Brussels arena without an
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equivalent say in the national capitals?3 Finally, do we observe ‘strong
multi-level’ players (type 1) which are able to strengthen their access and
influence on both levels and to make use of their position on each of these
levels for strengthening their say on the other? 
One finding is valid for all Member States: national institutions have
made substantial efforts in order to cope with the requirements of the
Union. As to the fundamental view on the European polity, all relevant
actors in EU Member States are aware of the increasing importance of the
Union and of the need to take strategic decisions on vital issues. Focusing
on this observation, the central question is to what extent the trend
towards ‘Europeanisation’ has had an effect on the Member States. How
relevant are the EC/EU oriented procedures as well as the institutional and
administrative set-ups for the Member States and for their constituencies?
Have these procedures and set-ups led Member States to move towards
becoming ‘strong multi-level’ players (type 1)? To what extent are
national institutions involved in the policy-cycle of the European Union?
Has there been a ‘Europeanisation’ of national institutions or a fusion of
national and European institutions creating a persistent trend towards
field 1? Do we observe a convergence between the various national
models leading to stability in the EU system4 or will our findings indicate
a plurality of adaptation patterns such that a comparative view of Figure
18.1 would show many variations? 
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Historical paths to integration: national motivations and identities 
Since 1951, when the six founding states signed the treaty establishing the
ECSC, substantial changes have occurred in the process of European inte-
gration. Every new treaty and the ensuing treaty amendments has brought
new competencies on the basis of negotiations and compromises among
the Member States. There have been changes not only in rights and obli-
gations but also in the scope and salience of the Community’s policy
areas. The European Union as it appears following the coming into force
of the TEU in 1993 is an amalgam of several national interests and a
multitude of historical developments. The success of this construction has
perpetuated the effect of the EC/EU process, leading to a kind of magnetic
attraction for outside countries. 
The fundamental reasons for individual countries wishing to join the
integration process have varied from case to case. Stepping back and
considering the basic premises we can identify several approaches in the
Member States from the very beginning of their respective memberships.
While politicians in the three smaller founding members (B, LUX, NL)5
have drawn their conclusions from the failure of their neutrality policies,
the engagement of Germany was accompanied by the struggle for more
acceptance and the need to regain sovereignty after the disastrous effects
of the Second World War. A traditionally strong tendency towards multi-
lateralism and the desire to overcome its social fragmentation have been
the main reasons for the engagement of Italy in the integration process.
French motives for participation were based to a certain degree on the
belief that national interests – such as the political and economic control
of Germany – could be realised most efficiently within a European set-up.
Moreover, actors in France and the United Kingdom still subscribe to the
belief that they should hold a position of political leadership that can be
achieved to a certain degree through a European ‘alliance’. The Danes
were attracted to apply for Community membership primarily for
economic reasons but were also motivated by a fear of isolation.
Additionally, in Ireland the intention to achieve more independence from
the United Kingdom should be stressed. On the other hand, Greece as well
as Spain and Portugal, have linked their accession to the European project
with the expectation of promoting the process of democratic consolida-
tion after the demise of their authoritarian systems. The three latest
newcomers were particularly motivated by economic reasons. However,
in the case of Finland, geopolitical security interests have also played
an important role ‘because the decision to join the Western unity . . . had
been beyond Finland’s reach during the five long decades of the Cold
War’.6 The European Union has also been seen as an instrument for
domestic modernisation. In several cases the challenges of the European
level are highly welcome by the single Member States. Some of them
consider the integration process as a gateway for their national projects of
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modernisation (A, GR, IR, NL), economic liberalisation (SF, S) or as
providing the necessary guidance for overcoming particular regional
problems such as the bi-national system of Belgium or the strong north–
south cleavages in Italy. For a remarkable number of nations, ‘opening the
state’ to the Union seems to provide the groundwork for necessary inter-
nal reforms.
Although the finalité politique of the integration process remains vague
and ambiguous, the discourse on Europe in most Member States still
embodies the expectation that the EU polity in general offers a better and
safer future. The construction of these images and views continued in the
1990s and has even been somewhat reinforced by the new applicants. The
Eurosceptic or minimalist states have continued to view their European
engagement in terms of their own historical role and perception of a
national future. The difficulties of adapting to a moving target are clearly
visible and they remain high on the national agenda of an increasing
number of states. 
Despite this diversity of national motives a common groundwork for
all Member States can be found. The idea of European integration has
been promoted by a set of similar and common goals and aspirations such
as the striving ‘for the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms’7 – but especially the search for
economic benefits and the pursuit of national goals linked to a nation’s
identities and role in the world. 
Priorities of the Member States: promoting ‘national interests’ 
The vast majority of Member States have declared their agreement with
the fundamentals of the European construction, implicitly assuming that
this was the best way to serve their own national interests. However, with
another upswing of Eurosceptic attitudes, governments in the 1990s
reinforced arguments in favour of defending and pursuing vital national
interests. The Maastricht process increased this trend in a considerable
number of states, especially in such founding members as Germany,
France and particularly the Netherlands, where the Maastricht Treaty was
regarded as a ‘dramatic moment’ causing a ‘rude awakening to the polit-
ical realities of Europe in the 1990s’.8 But ‘even the smallest Member
State’, as is stated with regard to Luxembourg, ‘is sometimes susceptible
to reservations about the idea of integration’.9 This emergence of more
robust national attitudes can be seen as a direct or indirect consequence
of the implementation of Maastricht, even in Member States considered
as traditional supporters of the integration process. 
Analysis of the fifteen Member States suggests that there are very
heterogeneous interests in the policy domains of the European Union.
These interests are linked closely to the peculiar structure and the
geographical or organisational context of each Member State. Therefore,
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policy fields such as agriculture and fishery continue to be the highest-
ranking domains in Ireland or Spain while other states are particularly
interested in strong manufacturing bases or high export rates. Finland and
Sweden, for instance, are engaged in an initiative on a ‘Northern
Dimension’ of the Union while southern states such as Greece, Spain or
Portugal are primarily interested in a continuation of the Structural and
Cohesion Funds. These interests are difficult to categorise. National prior-
ities are the product of particular intra-state structures and developments.
Domestic issues are the prevailing issues. Thus, if we are looking at the
‘real’ actions of national governments, ‘(re)-nationalisation’ of policies
appears quite often to be more of a public relations affair than an actual
change in policies pursued. Therefore, the same or similar policies are
adopted and are promoted as ‘good’ European policy – or, as in more
recent times, are described in terms of their national benefits. In the
1990s, most Member States gave a high priority to budgetary and mone-
tary issues. Besides the demand for a reduction in national contributions
to EU finances (D, NL, S, UK), the creation of EMU attracted particular
attention in all countries. As far as security and defence are concerned,
there are considerable differences between the positions of the founding
Member States (B, D, F, I, LUX, NL) and the north-European countries
(DK, S, SF, UK), which are either reluctant to participate in any military
co-operation owing to the high priority given to national sovereignty and
national defence, or because of a traditional policy of neutrality. The secu-
rity initiatives of the Blair government since 1997 and the Helsinki
decision on closer military co-operation therefore represent a fundamen-
tal change and might induce more adaptations of non-aligned countries. 
Public opinion: from permissive consensus to reluctant acceptance
At first sight, we find in all Member States – with the exception of the
United Kingdom and to a certain degree, Denmark and Sweden – a long-
standing affective and, to a lesser extent, utilitarian support for the
European enterprise. The integration process has been regarded for much
of its history as a positive-sum game for many Member States. However,
since the end of the 1980s and especially towards the mid-1990s this
overall trend changed. Attitudes within Member States to the European
integration process became more multi-faceted.10 In several countries,
more and more signs of Euroscepticism surfaced, causing heated debates
concerning the benefits and costs of membership (A, D, DK, S, UK). The
new and more sensitive issues of the Maastricht Treaty evoked more scep-
tical views and serious concerns among the general public about the
democratic deficits of the European Union.11 A commonly held view of
the European enterprise was that its political aspects had their short-
comings while the economic side had been undoubtedly a success. The
highest rates of support could be detected at the end of the 1990s in
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some of the original Member States (I, LUX, NL), on the Iberian penin-
sula (E, P) and particularly in Ireland. On the other hand, the lowest rates
of support for EU membership are expressed in public opinion polls in
some northern states (S, UK) and in Austria.12 In nearly all Member States
but especially in Germany and the northern states of the Union – and
particularly with regard to EMU – there was a considerable gap between
the attitude of elites and the rest of population. While political and
economic elites are principally in favour of membership – as they see the
benefits to be gained from the Community – the general public is less posi-
tive. Hence, in these Member States ‘two worlds’ can be observed: the
general public discourse evolves according to its own mainly national
logic on the one side as do the dynamics of the multi-level EU system on
the other.
Whatever public opinion polls tell us specifically in each Member State,
one major finding across the ‘EU-fifteen’ is that the increasing controversy
concerning the development of European integration has not put the EU
system itself into question. In view of the considerable changes in the
international and European system since 1989 it is even more revealing
that fluctuations in public opinion have basically not changed: pre-exist-
ing trends have thus not been reversed but have even been reinforced.
Looking at the national end of the EU policy-cycle, the Brussels level of
the EU polity seems to have become an essential day-to-day part of
national political systems. 
Such an observation offers a contribution to the issue of legitimacy.13
That is, the surprising overall stability of the EU system might be due to
the broad and intensive participation of national elites. Nevertheless,
towards the end of the 1990s this tendency lost its dramatic impact.
Though support for EU membership had not grown significantly, neither
were there serious concerns about the European integration process as
such. Instead, a ‘positive indifference’14 or a tendency towards ‘accom-
modation of the inevitable’15 has become the essential background for
policy-making. The low voter turnout at the EP elections in June 1999
seemed to confirm this trend. Thus we might conclude that the public
mood has changed from permissive consensus to ‘reluctant acceptance’16
or ‘issue-related voice’17 – with considerable variations within this broad
trend. 
Political parties: growing relevance of a ‘European cleavage’? 
As major national actors, parties are also slow and reluctant adapters. A
vast majority of national parties support unconditionally, or to a large
degree, the European integration process in general. The European poli-
cies of political parties in government are usually based on a broadly
pro-integration attitude. Changes in government tend to have only limited
impacts on the basic perceptions of European policies of the Member
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States and on the methods of running the EU machinery. Strangely
enough, this statement is also valid for eurosceptic, ‘awkward’18 or mini-
malist states. A higher degree of public distrust has only limited impact on
governmental and administrative machinery. In no case has the forming
of a new government led to a complete re-formulation of the national
strategy on European integration.19 Frequently, a consensus pervades in
which both governmental and opposition parties approve of the integra-
tion process. Nevertheless, there is a small number of parties opposing
further integration and, more importantly, in some cases an increasing
internal party factionalism concerning the strategy towards European
integration.
Since Maastricht, the debates on European policy in some Member
States have brought about another cleavage in national party systems. The
salience of both pro- and anti-European arguments have led to an addi-
tional dividing line between or within parties. Though attitudes towards
European integration have become more differentiated, European matters
play an increasing role in certain national party systems. A strict distinc-
tion between left or right oriented parties may be of limited use.20 There
are parties of the far right and left, ecological, regional or religious parties
as well as conservative parties favouring re-nationalisation of particular
policy fields. Recent election campaigns and the formation of anti-
Europe-election platforms in some Member States (DK, F, UK) show this
trend clearly. Negative feelings have been used by some parties, such as
the Austrian FPÖ or the Swedish and orthodox Greek communists, to
reinforce their anti-establishment strategies.21 Moreover, pro-integration
parties fear losses at the polls if their campaigns are too pro-European,
especially if smaller parties stir up the national EU debate (DK, P, UK). As
was seen in Finland in 1995, ruling parties have indeed paid heavily for
their pro-European attitudes with considerable losses in the elections. 
More important than the impact on party systems are the effects on
individual parties. Differing attitudes towards Europe have led to
increased tension within parties such as the French Gaullists, the British
Conservatives and especially the parties in Sweden. Here, we observe
‘opposition to supranational integration within all the Swedish political
parties’.22 Even (some) party splits can be attributed to the impact of
European policy issues. The debate on Europe is thus often characterised
more by intra-party rather than inter-party division. However, despite
these cases the main trend is different: European integration, including
major steps such as renouncing one’s own currency, has not yet led to a
new permanent cleavage in the party system or in political life in general.
No persistent patterns can be identified EU-wide. Opposition parties with
a critical view of the Union often discover, when coming into power, the
utility of the EU system. An anti-European stance might be of importance
for parties in some countries, but there is no united anti-EU front in the
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making. No ‘anti-system party’23 against the European Union has gained
major relevance. 
Except for some crises attracting media attention, most European poli-
cies and politics belong to the normalcy of everyday political life. The
major dispute concerns the direction and the speed of this construction.
Disputes about concrete issues often arise without leading to any kind of
fundamental opposition. 
Interest group politics: attraction by the European magnet 
As has been revealed by the debate about pluralistic and corporatist inter-
ests, institutions and administrations in western political systems are
closely linked to intermediary groups of different kinds.24
The participation of interest groups such as labour unions, employers’
or farmers’ associations or other NGOs represents an expression of
specific societal interests. In some Member States these voluntary unions
and corporate actors have developed considerable influence by using the
informal channels of representative democracies in order to urge govern-
ments to act on matters of concern. For many, but not all interest groups,
the expectation of access and more influence in Brussels has become a
powerful magnet.25 Taking the increased competencies of the European
Union and its institutions into account, for several Member States
‘Brussels’ has gained more importance for the representation of organised
interests while the significance of national political institutions and the
domestic level has not decreased to the same degree.
Though there are many interest groups in each Member State, the most
developed systems of such groups can be found in those Member States
with (neo-) corporatist traditions, such as Austria, the Netherlands,
Ireland, Germany and the northern states of the Community.26 A growth
in the formation and activities of interest groups – owing to the new chal-
lenges posed by the Union – is especially notable in Spain, France and
apparently in Greece, where ‘both industry and the unions have been
increasingly using Europe not only as a lobbying field but also as a source
for ideology formation’.27
The position of interest groups towards the European integration
process is – very generally – positive. Nevertheless, there are some devia-
tions depending very much on ideological and policy preferences – and
also particularly on the sector. Thus, in the Finnish case, membership of
the Union was opposed by farmers and the rural population owing to
serious concerns about European competitors while industrial lobbyists
were hoping for better access to the European market.28
Since the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, interest groups have paid
more attention to the European sphere because the EU institutions have
made them aware of the importance of early-stage information and
contacts. Larger companies, especially multinationals, are aware of the
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strategic importance of EU rules concerning competition, health, safety
and environment, and of EU programmes and initiatives concerning
R&D. Thus, the number of offices run in Brussels by the various interest
groups continues to rise. Large corporations have their own delegations
which in some cases include more staff than the offices of Europe-wide
federations.29
Interest groups are still directing their attention primarily towards the
European Commission. However, with the coming into force of the
Maastricht treaty and the co-decision procedure, the EP has increasingly
become a second point of contact in Brussels while the Council – which is
less accessible – plays only a minor role for interest groups as they may
turn instead to their governments in the national capitals. All in all, we
can see that many have become active multi-level players in the semi-offi-
cial, and even more in the informal and non-hierarchical networks.30
Constitutional provisions: smooth and limited adaptations
Looking at one major indicator for institutional change – the legal consti-
tutions of Member States – the findings show again a modest rate of
EC/EU-related revisions. The constitutions of the Member States are
expressions of long traditions and historical identities of the respective
nation. Participation in European integration and the adaptation of the
relevant and valid community law, the ‘acquis communautaire’, has
forced the Member States again and again to make incremental amend-
ments to their constitutions. However, an overview of the constitutional
changes in the fifteen national systems reveals that the rate and the
salience of changes at the European level has not been matched by analo-
gous structural revolutions in the Member States. One major conclusion
is thus: political and administrative strategies have in all states been
geared to use existing constitutional and institutional opportunity struc-
tures and to improve forms of intra-state co-ordination. 
Constitutional changes have occurred only in some countries and are
limited in scope and even more limited in their impact on the national
policy-cycle. Changes are not linked specifically to the implementation of
the Maastricht Treaty; rather, as in the Spanish case, they are related ‘to
the natural evolution and adaptation of the . . . public administration to
the requirements of the EC/EU decision-making process’.31 Though
European integration is among the incentives for constitutional change
(A, D, F), there have also been adaptations or substantial changes as in the
Netherlands (1983), Belgium (1993) or the United Kingdom (1998–99),
which are not rooted in the challenges of the European treaties but in the
deficiencies or shortcomings of national systems. In case of the United
Kingdom they are explained as ‘part of the Blair government’s political
agenda of modernisation’.32
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The impact of Maastricht: a turning point for national fundamentals? 
If we come back to the initial question concerning the impact of
Maastricht, the latter has to be seen in the light of European history. Five
steps and four subsequent periods which are defined by historical deci-
sions to create, amend or revise the treaty can be identified: the ECSC, the
Rome Treaty, the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and – currently – the effects
of the Amsterdam Treaty. The overall trend is clear and persistent: over
fifty years, national actors have increasingly dedicated their attention to
playing the EC/EU multi-level game both at home as well as in the
European arena. The Maastricht Treaty has reinforced this trend. The
TEU was the result of one year of negotiations between the different
governments of the Member States. It had an immediate impact on the
various actors and societies in the national systems. Though there are
some Member States in which the impact of Maastricht was less substan-
tial, in most states the TEU process attracted much attention. While the
quasi-constitutional changes and reforms of the Maastricht Treaty have
not been a turning point for the national systems, the changes brought
about by Maastricht have reinforced pre-existing patterns. Furthermore
new Member States have rapidly mobilised the necessary resources to
compete successfully in all policy fields and in all stages of the policy-
cycle.
Has Maastricht led to more convergence in the fundamentals? Our
overview suggests several areas of convergence, especially concerning the
basic reasons behind application for membership but also with regard to
public opinion. Nevertheless a vast number of specific national character-
istics remain. All in all, this survey adds to the conventional picture and
reaffirms that some traditional insights are still relevant in the 1990s. In
spite of substantial changes within the Community and the Union, and
even after the major upheaval of the international and European political
system in 1989, the historic legacy remains strong. In other words, the
Member States or at least the political elites, define the raison d’être of the
Union and its process of deepening and widening in terms of their own
historical, geopolitical constellations and identities. Many Member States
refer to their own history, such as in Ireland where it has been noted
that ‘in Europe, Ireland was attempting to consolidate its economic
and political independence and re-discover its society’s internationalist
traditions’.33
In terms of reasoning about the fundamentals and the input dimension
of a political system, there is a divided view concerning the extent to
which the fifteen have become one: the debate about the finalité politique
is still mainly influenced by national heritages. However, discussions
concerning the future of Europe, which are often vague in nature, are
nevertheless part of the debate on the general objectives of the Member
States. The Member States’ histories may differ but the future is broadly
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seen as a common endeavour. More specific visions of the Union are
however, strongly influenced by national experiences. Thus, the European
Union is supposed to become a Member State’s own positive dream for
the best of all worlds.
Do national institutions matter? The Member States in the EU
policy-cycle
In comparison to the vast variety of political systems in the world, the
European Union’s Member States constitute a rather homogeneous group
made up of what might broadly be described as ‘liberal democratic
systems’. Concerning their governmental structures, the fifteen Member
States of the European Union generally fit into the category of parliamen-
tary systems but with a wide range of variations. After the constitutional
changes in Finland and Portugal only the French system could still be
characterised as semi-presidential. Although there is a general trend
towards convergence, there are still many divergences in the governmen-
tal structures of European states. They differ both between more
consensual and more majoritarian patterns of policy-making as well as in
terms of varying patterns of relations between central and regional
levels.34 Consensual traditions as in Austria, the Scandinavian states or
the Netherlands, or federal structures as in Germany or Belgium, consid-
erably influence the methods of policy-making adopted in the Member
States. Such a typology allows for a comprehensive analysis of the fifteen
national political systems and of the role, function and weight of their
institutions.35 However, rather than employing an extensive approach,
our examination of the Member States’ political systems focuses on the
institutional framework and the relevant institutions with regard to the
EU policy-making process without considering the particulars of each
national system.36
Governments: national gatekeepers in European affairs?
Among governmental actors we observe a uniform instinct to seek out
access and influence in EU policy-cycles and, at the same time, several
processes of adaptation such as a shift in the intra-governmental balance. 
In all Member States of the European Union, prime ministers or chan-
cellors, as the heads of government, have become key actors in EU affairs.
Particularly through their role as members of the European Council they
are able to steer internal procedures and thus to lead the national deci-
sion-making process. The European Council and bilateral summits have
even reinforced the role of those heads of government that were less
powerful in the national arena. Given the need to act assertively and
coherently in making key decisions, which are increasingly taken through
the European Council, prime ministers have gained power vis-à-vis their
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colleagues. A shift in power towards heads of government can be observed
in several Member States (DK, F, GR, SF), and even in such countries as
the Netherlands where the formal status was traditionally that of a primus
inter pares. As is the case in Italy, one can observe in many cases in the
post-Maastricht period ‘a shift of activities and co-ordinating competen-
cies in the national implementation of EC policies from the Foreign
Affairs Ministry, which dominated the scene for decades, to the prime
minister’s offices’.37 Thus, the EC/EU process has changed the balance
inside governments. In France this process has had a particular impact:
‘The changing patterns of executive European policy-making are not
solely a result of the actual president’s weaknesses, rather they elucidate
the long-term consequences of the Maastricht integration boost, and a
decline of presidential power in general.’38 Overall, the members of the
European Council have become strong multi-level players.
Beyond a uniform basic instinct of governmental actors to attempt to
gain access to the European ‘policy-making process’ we can identify
certain directions. The European level is matched by the national govern-
mental level particularly in the centralised countries of the Community
(DK, F, GR, IR, LUX, P, S, SF, UK) where politicians of national govern-
ments have a powerful grip on EU affairs and where the EU-related
bureaucracy is directly linked to the government in developing effective
means for participating in the EU decision-making process (DK, F, UK).
The more decentralised (E, I, NL) or federal countries (A, B, D) are char-
acterised by a stronger involvement of the regional level, with the effect
that in Belgium and Germany, regional ministers can participate in the
Council of Minister’s decision-making. Depending on the policy field and
the issue at stake in the Council of Ministers, each national ministry and
many departments therein are more or less intensively involved in the
EC/EU decision-making process following traditional intra-state logics. In
the Finnish case, for example, the ‘key position of ministries and their
officials mirrors the concrete exertion of powers and influence in the
domestic EU process’.39 Very roughly, we can differentiate between on the
one hand, pioneer ministries such as those dealing with foreign affairs,
finance, economics or agriculture, and on the other, newcomers such as
ministries of environment, education, etc. Within those ministries which
have a long-standing involvement in EU affairs, special units have been set
up and consolidated, and have acquired a substantial role. Those
ministries which have developed such units more recently, still have prob-
lems in establishing their position inside the national co-ordination
machinery. Interestingly however, in all Member States we find within
nearly every national ministry, a unit responsible for EU affairs. From the
early days of European integration, departments of agriculture were the
main ministries affected by membership, but nowadays they are only one
of many embedded in the EU’s policy process.
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With the exception of defence, government ministries and, in many
cases, administrative units within departments, have established their own
EU resources and networks. Yet with the new plans for ‘military crisis
management’40 even defence departments are becoming involved. The
General Affairs Council of 15 November 1999 brought together for the
first time in the history of the Union, the ministers of foreign affairs and
defence. Sectoral differentiation – that is, the increasing number of policy
fields dealt with by the EU – has therefore had remarkable effects. This
fragmentation is also evinced by the increase in the number of committees
operating on the same level as COREPER.41
With this decentralisation process within national governments, the
need for hierarchical or co-operative co-ordination across policy sectors
has grown.42 Without exception all Member States substantially increased
their internal co-ordination efforts in the 1990s. Foreign ministries remain
formally the lead department in most (B, DK, E, F, GR, I, IR, LUX, P, S,
UK) but not all Member States. Since the coming into force of the TEU,
foreign ministers in several countries have lost some of their influence.
Rivalries, particularly those between foreign ministries and economic/
financial ministries concerning responsibility for the different EU pillars,
have led to a more branched structure. Owing to the growing importance
of EMU this shift has been accompanied by a greater role for finance
ministers. 
The number of policy fields at the EU level has thus promoted more
sophisticated co-ordination between ministries. As ministries have been
increasingly affected by European policies and as their desire to partici-
pate has grown, it has become necessary for governments to establish an
effective system of interministerial and intra-ministerial co-ordination and
co-operation in order to reach common viewpoints and to develop a
coherent negotiation strategy. The way the Member States have dealt with
this challenge reveals quite different patterns. A number of Member States
adopt the practice of establishing special informal or ad hoc cabinet
committees (E, F, I, NE, UK) while in others the cabinet as a whole takes
on the task of formal co-ordination and decision-making (A, B, DK, IR,
S, SF). A separate European ministry with far-reaching co-ordination
competencies has not been established in any Member State. Though in
some states (F, GR, I, SF, UK) sub-ministries with a moderate capacity for
co-ordination have been created, in most Member States European policy
is organised in a decentralised manner by the relevant specialised ministry. 
While in Ireland we can detect a ‘relatively light co-ordination’,43 such
Member States as Denmark – which have developed ‘elaborate co-ordi-
nation mechanisms’44 – are known for their streamlined co-ordination
machine (DK, F, P, SF). Developments after the coming into force of the
TEU show that the mostly hierarchical methods of co-ordination are
decreasingly able to cope with all issues, actors and information in the
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European sphere. They have not prevented the ‘subtle trend towards more
independent approaches to the EC/EU affairs on the part of certain
ministries’,45 that is, a tendency towards sectorisation and decentralisa-
tion. In Spain the existence of a central co-ordination body, the Secretariat
of State for Foreign Policy and the European Union linked to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, has not prevented interministerial conflicts and diffi-
culties in defining positions in COREPER and the Council of Ministers.
This tendency is still relevant after the internal reform of the ‘Secretariat’
in 1998. 
Other countries such as Germany or Belgium are characterised by frag-
mented policy-making and have developed more complicated internal
co-ordination mechanisms, with the result that their positions in Brussels
are not always free of contradictions. In the Belgian case the federal
authority, the regions and the communities concluded in March 1994 an
agreement ‘to organise a general co-ordination mechanism ensuring unity
in the views expressed by Belgium’. According to this agreement, co-ordi-
nation ‘must take place before each session of the Council of Ministers,
whatever the field may be’.46
For a systematic approach to the differing models of co-ordination we
propose the following set of categories. We take Figure 18.2 as point of
departure. Can we observe with regard to European policies and the
making of political decisions, a high or a low level of horizontal co-
ordination, or do we find a small or large amount of horizontal functional
decentralisation?
Without proper co-ordination, decentralised pluralist national posi-
tions are fragmented (Figure 18.2, type (3)). Often the German case is
cited as an example of this type. In Germany, there exists ‘no single
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decision-making centre but different levels interact in the decision-making
process and compete for access and participation’.47 Small governments
might stay with unified positions. Given the functional scope and the
political salience of the Union it is understandable that a ‘one-hand’
approach becomes less representative. In the case of a unified Member
State (type 1), this exercise – so often tried in France – is not successful.
The most interesting case is another one: the strategy of co-ordinating
units, each of which have their own channels to Brussels. Two sub-types
can be identified: a strong vertical hierarchy based on a central agency
which is permanently supported by the political leadership (type 2), and
horizontal co-ordination among equals based on consensus (type 4). The
French and the United Kingdom’s set-ups are normally cited as examples
of the first case while the Dutch and Danish systems serve as examples of
the second. 
In the light of developments during the 1990s the differences among the
Member States, though clearly still existent, might be less prominent than
often stated: horizontal co-ordination seems to be overshadowed by an
increasingly involved political hierarchy as in all Member States prime
ministers have discovered the political importance of becoming involved.
They have attempted to reduce fragmentation by introducing strong
centralisation. Of course, this indirect effect works only when there is a
sufficiently clear and stable political leadership. But nevertheless, a strong
vertical hierarchy needs broad inputs from the specialised ministries and
units. 
Administrations: opening up to new challenges?
In general, bureaucratic structures are difficult to break up.48 They form
the basic patterns of a political system, which cannot be changed easily by
governmental acts. However, with regard to the Union’s institutional
system, we cannot neglect the fact that national administrations are no
longer restricted to their national spheres.49 In all phases of the EU policy-
cycle, i.e. decision preparation, decision-making, implementation and
control, national administrations participate intensively.50 Depending on
the policy field and the issue at stake in the European Commission and
Council of Ministers, ministries and departments are more or less inten-
sively involved in the EC/EU decision-making process. They are, to an
increasing extent, oriented towards Brussels and have considerable incen-
tives to participate. 
Interaction between European and national administrations has inten-
sified and broadened since the early days of the Community. In several
national systems, however, the process of negotiating the Maastricht
Treaty was given special attention within national bureaucracies. In the
Netherlands or Austria, the presidencies were ‘the highlight in terms of
workload and publicity’51 and the starting point for a greater awareness
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among national administrations of the EU level. The realisation that care-
lessness with EU policies could cause serious problems became
widespread and caused a change in national administrative cultures. 
With regard to the policy-cycle it is difficult to identify precisely the
starting point of EU policy preparation. For national administrations it is
therefore important to have well-organised and permanent connections to
institutions in Brussels, such as the advisory groups of the Commission,
the working groups of the Council, the comitology committees and, more
recently, the EP committees.
The connections of national administrations to Brussels are particularly
necessary for the informal policy preparation process in the Commission
and the formal process in the Council of Ministers and EP. In all Member
States civil servants are therefore engaged in this very first stage of the
policy-cycle. Administrative experts and sectoral specialists are involved
in various types of preparatory committees (groupe d’experts). The
contacts between the Commission and the national administrations are
deliberate, either in permanent or in temporary groups. These contacts are
activated by the Commission if and when the need arises. The delegation
of national experts is part of the daily business of the national ministries
and the responsible specified units. In some countries, such as Germany,
the responsible units of the ministries co-ordinating the respective pre-
reconciliation of the expert groups are not co-ordinated by any central
institution. A characteristic feature of these administrations is the direct
involvement of the responsible administrative unit in Brussels. This trend
of decentralisation is favoured by the customary praxis of Community
institutions to pay travel expenses for a limited number of national partic-
ipants.
With regard to the decision-making phase of the policy-cycle, national
administrators serve on various bodies of the Council of Ministers. Most
important is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).
The main preparatory work of the Council is, however, carried out by
specific working groups, which are established according to political
sectors. In the immediate preparation of decision-making and preparatory
drafting of EC legislation, national civil servants are involved in about
350 committees and working groups of the Council of Ministers.52
Usually the participants are administrators from specialised ministries
and, in some cases – according to the internal structure of the Member
State – are accompanied by a civil servant from a regional administration.
With regard to the channels of access and influence in the Brussels
arena, Permanent Representations play an important role in all Member
States. They are key actors in the interplay between both administrations
and governments on the one hand, and between the national and the
Brussels level on the other. Civil servants within Representations often
exercise – as in the Irish case – ‘a Janus-like role between the EU and the
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domestic’.53 Yet, Permanent Representations operate not only through a
single government delegation but also liaise between different branches
and levels of government, thus between the Council of Ministers and the
Member State governments. In this context they influence the formulation
of national points of view and negotiating positions. Between 1986 (SEA)
and 1992, the Permanent Representations of the EU Member States
expanded rapidly. The largest are those of Greece and Sweden, the latter
being made up of ninety-one people.54 At present, nearly all ministries of
each Member State – with the exception of defence – have at least one civil
servant attached to their national permanent representation in Brussels.55
Foreign affairs ministries are formally in charge of the Permanent
Representations which are headed generally by a professional diplomat.
In some Member States this position is regarded as the most important
status in a diplomatic career. All opinions and instructions from individ-
ual national ministries are supposed to be channelled through their
Permanent Representations. However, there are manifold linkages
between the ministries of Member States which evade the head of the
Permanent Representation and also his control, as the example of the
Netherlands shows. Here, ‘some important ministries have succeeded in
creating a reserved “policy space”. For them, the permanent representa-
tion serves mainly as a technical facility in Brussels’.56
The third phase of the policy-cycle, the implementation of Community
legislation at the European level, is carried out by the administrative units
of the European Commission and by roughly 420 committees57 which are
in most cases established by the relevant legislative act for which they are
responsible. There are various forms of these so-called ‘comitology
committees’ in which the degree of formalised power of the national civil
servants differs. Owing to the nature of the implementation committees,
participating civil servants from the national administrations are in
almost all cases working in the various ministries and specialised depart-
ments of ministries responsible for the policy field in question. 
Altogether the administrative infrastructure in Brussels includes at least
around 1,500 bodies of different characteristics. Assuming that each
Member State sends an average of at least two civil servants or experts –
in some cases even more as the example of Germany shows – there are
about 40,000 national officials involved in many meetings per year. 
The last phase of the policy-cycle – the monitoring of transposition and
the control of binding decisions, also has a direct impact on national
administrations. Legal considerations are becoming more and more rele-
vant. Therefore, in Germany approximately twenty higher civil servants
were exclusively specialised in European legal affairs in the mid-1990s.
The Member States’ Administrations are mostly concerned with EC direc-
tives which need to be incorporated at the national level within a certain
time period. If time limits have not been adhered to, the European
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Commission may take legal action against this non-compliance in order to
enforce Community law. The Commission can deliver a reasoned opinion
on the matter after giving the relevant Member State the opportunity to
submit its observations. The various supervision and control mechanisms
of the Commission laid down in the treaties thus lead to extensive consul-
tation and co-operation procedures between the Commission
administration and national – but also regional and local – administra-
tions. Until the mid-1990s, the number of suits for non-compliance
against Member States grew rapidly. Since then, the total sum has
decreased, which can be explained by a learning process among national
governments and administrations. Yet, in 1998 the Commission asked
Member States to report on possible non-implementation in 1,101 cases
on the basis of Article 226 (ex Article 177) ECT. In the same year, it deliv-
ered a reasoned opinion in 675 cases. If the Member States do not comply
with the opinion of the Commission, the matter may be brought before
the ECJ. In 1998, this occurred in 123 cases. The desire for a good compli-
ance record and the implications of a negative judgement of the ECJ have
forced specialised national administrators to push their national
colleagues into conforming with the obligations of legal acts from the
Community. 
Summing up the governmental and administrative level, two parallel
developments can be identified in nearly all Member States: more and more
ministries and administrative units are becoming directly involved in the
Brussels arena. They have often established their own links rather than
being channelled through a national gatekeeping organisation. This decen-
tralised move is matched – to different degrees among the Member States –
by a co-ordination and centralisation strategy with other departments and
ministries. These trends in Member States are evolutionary. We have found
neither a radical revolutionary change in the governmental and administra-
tive set-up of any country nor the construction of a new superstructure. But
internal equilibria have been affected. We are witnessing increasing
changes in the internal power balance. The influx of new actors and the
stronger participation of old ones has led to new balances and coalitions
both in the relations between states and within individual states, thereby
reducing the relevance of foreign ministries but strengthening economic
and financial departments and the role of prime ministers.58
It can be concluded that national actors, heads of government, minis-
ters and administrations have overall proved to be active multi-level
players and thus may be categorised as ‘strong adapters’. All these actors
have established their own channels of access and exercise their influence
in all phases of the policy-cycle. Maastricht did not reverse but rather
reinforced this trend. But what about national parliaments? Of specific
interest is the question of how national parliaments have developed their
position in the EU’s multi-level game. 
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Parliaments: reactions to the warning lights of the TEU 
In a large number of EU Member States (B, D, E, IR, LUX, NE, P) prior
to the Maastricht Treaty, national parliaments were regarded as the
victims of the integration process.59 Owing to the growing supremacy of
national governments in the European decision making process on the one
hand, and because of governments’ ability to use the knowledge and
powers of their administrations on the other, national parliaments were
either left outside the EU policy-cycle or were only marginally involved.
Neither their financial nor their human resources could cope in any way
with the increasing amount of EU legal acts – though in all national
systems, formal legislative competencies are traditionally in the hands of
parliaments. The role of national parliaments is particularly limited with
regard to EC directives. Though such directives allow the Member States
some room for manoeuvre in national transposition – in contrast to the
directly applicable regulations – governments are very often not capable
or willing to adapt the content of the respective act. In addition, some
national parliaments have shown little interest in EU affairs, which can be
explained to a certain extent by the complex internal structure of the some
legislatures (D, F, NL). As the German case study illustrates, between
1980 and 1986 about 65 per cent of the EC documents considered by the
Bundestag were already in force when they were debated for the first
time.60
Since the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, perceptions have
changed significantly.61 National parliaments have recognised not only
that the Union has acquired new policy fields and competencies, but also
that they themselves are losing their traditional access and influence, espe-
cially in view of their scrutiny functions vis-à-vis governments. Aiming to
move beyond the conventional instruments of parliamentary questions
and debates, parliaments in all Member States have called for more influ-
ence over their governments. With regard to the EC/EU decision-making
process, parliaments have asked to be informed earlier and more compre-
hensively about legislative proposals debated in the Council of Ministers.
As became evident in the overview of national systems, a major step in
improving the performance of national parliaments concerns their access
to information. 
The forms and implications of parliaments’ attempts to increase their
role differ across Member States. Nevertheless, some common features
can be emphasised concerning constitutional changes, specific laws, decla-
rations and reports. In some countries the new rights of national
parliaments were based on constitutional revisions and amendments.
Basic constitutional reforms due to the Maastricht Treaty have taken
place in France and Germany. The amended Article 88(4) of the French
constitution or Article 23 of the German Basic Law, which calls ‘the
Federal Government [to] inform the Bundestag and the Bundesrat
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comprehensively and as quickly as possible’, are expressions of the parlia-
ments’ demands for more efficient participation. In Germany the new
Committee on European Union Affairs can even be authorised by the
Bundestag to take decisions for the Bundestag as a whole.
In the Belgian Chambre des Représentants, the Spanish Congreso de los
Diputatados, the Irish Dáil Éireann, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the
Portuguese Assembleia da República, special laws and agreements between
governments and parliaments were adopted in order to strengthen parlia-
mentary scrutiny rights in European affairs. In the Netherlands the former
Standing Committee for European Affairs became a General Committee on
European Union Affairs with a mission to increase EU awareness among all
MPs. In some countries the improvements to parliaments’ role in European
policy-making resulted frequently from their own declarations or reports
which bound governments and improved the participation rights of the
national parliaments (DK, E, I, NL, UK). 
Moreover, parliaments have attempted to play a more effective part by
strengthening the role of specialised committees. Though the establish-
ment of committees on European affairs in all Member States had
increased at the end of the 1990s, the impact of the newly established
committees is still not as yet clear. One cannot overlook the possibility
that rival parliamentary committees will be reluctant to allow the
European dimension of their work to slip away into the hands of the new
specifically EU-related committees. National parliaments, such as the
Finnish for example, are following in the footsteps of Denmark where the
Folketing is regarded as a policy-making assembly which has retained its
position after entering the Community. The Danish parliament has exer-
cised vast control over European policy. The Danish European Affairs
Committee (the former Market Relations Committee) mandates its minis-
ters in the Council. In Austria, the Constitution guarantees participation
in cabinet meetings for the influential Main Committee of the Parliament
and the heads of the parliamentary groups of the government parties.
It can be concluded that in nearly all Member States, national parlia-
ments have strengthened their formal role in the EU decision-making
process. Though decision-making continues to be primarily in the hands
of governments, their room for manoeuvre in Brussels negotiations will be
restricted to an increasing extent by national parliaments and particularly
by their specialised committees. Some legislatures (DK, F, I, S, SF, UK)
have even created their own points of contact in the EP’s Léopold Building
in Brussels. It seems that parliaments no longer simply follow their
governments in European policy but try instead to prescribe their govern-
ment’s actions in EU policy-making. Some expect that the further
development of the Union might not take place without a more active role
for national parliaments, especially in the phases of preparation and
control of EU decisions. 
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In this context increasing levels of interparliamentary co-operation can
be seen. Since the end of the 1980s there have been regular meetings of the
presidents and speakers of the national parliaments. Since 1989 national
parliaments’ specialised EU committees have met every six months in the
framework of the so-called COSAC. The Amsterdam Treaty protocol on
the role of national parliaments may alter COSAC’s informal profile; it is
remarkable that both the EP and the Council of Ministers have amended
their rules of procedure in order to recognise national parliaments and
COSAC as consultative bodies within the EU policy-making framework.62
National parliaments have learned and tried to cope with European
challenges by adapting some of their procedures. Nevertheless, the relative
weakness of national parliamentary institutions at the EU level cannot be
overlooked. The patterns of national governments and administrations in
preparing EU matters have been affected to only a limited degree.
Continuous deficits in parliaments’ ability to play the multi-level game
reduce the influence of national deputies. The involvement of parliaments
in the EU policy-cycle remains weak and largely reactive. 
The overall trend of reinforcing the role of national parliaments in the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty might also be explained as a conse-
quence of popular discontent. However, parliaments have not become an
opposition force putting forward the critical views of the public. The logic
of parliamentary government with the basic cleavage between the execu-
tive and the parliamentary majority on one side, and the parliamentary
minority on the other, has not been replaced by a return to the classical
division of power between executive and legislature. Indeed the incentives
of the European arena have strengthened governmental actors and further
reduced the influence of parliaments. The increased activities of some of
the latter have not fundamentally shifted the institutional (dis-)equilib-
rium. Thus, at the end it is not an issue of resources but national
parliaments have not been able to gain a decisive voice. Despite some
constitutional changes most national parliaments have remained ‘weak
adapters’ with regard to the European policy-cycle. Some have kept or
gained a performance as national performers. Their influence is mostly
notable – if at all – in the final phase of implementation and control. 
Regions: new players in the multi-level game 
As the range of policies dealt with by the Union has become wider, so the
rights and competencies of regional as well as local bodies have been
affected to an increasing extent.63 While regions have specific – sometimes
even autonomous – rights and tasks and are responsible for implementing
legal acts, the growing number of acts and legislative activities of the
Community in such fields as education, culture, research, health, envi-
ronment, agriculture and fisheries has led to demands from regions in
many countries (B, D, DK, E, F, I, NL, UK) for the right to participate
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more actively and efficiently in the EU policy-cycle. However, there are
clear differences and even increasing divergences with regard to the exten-
sion of involvement of regional bodies in the respective national and EC
contexts. 
There has been much concern among the regions of Belgium, Germany,
Austria and to some extent, Spain, owing to the federal structures of these
countries. Amendments and revisions within the Union have induced the
development of formalised rules and structures to assure participation
rights for regions. Moreover, new instruments have been established with
regard to the way EU policy is dealt with. In Germany nearly every
regional ministry has its own desk officer for European affairs. After
Maastricht, the German Länder and Belgian regions even succeeded in
participating in the Council of Ministers and its working groups and
committees of the Commission. Using the regulations of the new Article
203 of the TEU and the new Article 23 of the German Basic Law, German
regions are able to appoint a delegate who represents the Federal Republic
in the Council in such cases where sovereign, exclusive competencies of
the Länder are concerned. In this process, the role of the German
Bundesrat has also been reinforced, obtaining in certain constellations a
veto position. 
In Belgium the Comité de concentration with six national ministers and
six representatives from the regional entities has become an important co-
ordination body. In Spain the ongoing transfer of competencies to the
Autonomous Communities has to be taken into account. Each of the
seventeen Autonomous Communities has inaugurated a department
exclusively dealing with EU affairs. In some autonomous regions of Spain
the regional parliaments are even more active than the national parlia-
ment in seeking direct influence in Madrid and Brussels. 
Elsewhere in countries which have a highly centralised structure, there
are no regional bodies between the often well-equipped national and local
governments. Replacing the seven former sub-regional committees in
Ireland, eight regional authorities were established in 1994 to co-ordinate
the provisions of public services in each territorial unit. After a very
controversial debate on regionalisation – initiated by the struggle for
further participation in the EU’s structural funds in the period 2000–06 –
Ireland has established a model dividing the country into two larger
regions. 
In some Member States where there are regional units with their own
rights and competencies, such regions have had difficulties in articulating
their views against national governments and have therefore only slightly
improved their position with regard to EU affairs (F, I, NL). In Portugal –
where there has been only a minor trend towards regionalisation as a
result of EU membership – management of the Structural Funds lies in the
hands of central government. Consequently, other channels of influence
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have been employed by the regions.64 In Sweden and Finland several
experiments with new regional authorities have been undertaken. It is
interesting, however, that in Finland the regions earmarked for EU
purposes are not identical with the formal state districts. Here, the
‘regional councils function as promoters of regional interests with respect
to the EU and are responsible for the implementation of its regional
programmes’.65
Since the Maastricht Treaty – following the initiative of the German
Länder and the Belgian government – CoR has given the regions a new
forum to articulate their interests. Though there are considerable varia-
tions in the extent to which this body is used by the regions and
municipalities, one cannot overlook the fact that owing to the limited
institutional power of the CoR, some regions, particularly the German
Länder, have employed other channels of access and influence.
In addition, more than eighty regions from within the Union maintain
offices in Brussels, and many major cities have their own representatives
there. Local bodies have been increasingly active in the European deci-
sion-making process and have partly established their own representatives
in Brussels.66 Since Maastricht, together with the regions, they have put
pressure on governments, with some success, in order to extend their own
competencies, especially concerning the Structural Funds.
The Union has thus become an important point of reference for regions
and municipalities and has, to a certain extent, brought about a process
of regionalisation in the Member States. Regional and local authorities
have adapted their structures to the EU policy-making process. In partic-
ular, they have requested from central governments more competencies
and greater participation in EU affairs. The changes in the more federally
organised countries have mainly involved the participation of regional
bodies via their national capital’s channels of influence and co-operation
rather than directly with the EU institutions. 
Although in many Member States there have been no constitutional
changes reinforcing the influence of regional governments, the effects of
European integration have led to a partial institutional adaptation and
some kind of an institutional learning. Thus traditional patterns or at least
conventional views of national policy-making are being eroded, but to a
limited degree as far as regions are concerned. Where regions do however
have resources at their disposal – the German Länder or the Belgian
regions might serve as examples – they have become effective players on
both levels. Others have, however, remained confined to the national level
– in many cases we observe ‘weak adaptations’. 
National courts: relevant actors in the policy-cycle
National courts can be qualified as political institutions since they are
involved in institutional interaction within the EU system at the end of the
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policy-cycle, during the phase of implementing and controlling
Community law. Courts become active when a case is brought before
them and they pronounce their judgement on the basis of the national law,
the EC treaties, previous judgements or established legal rules and princi-
ples. Thus also in an anticipatory view, they have an important indirect
influence on the shaping of Community law and the institutional system
as such, provided they do not ‘stay away from politics’ owing to the
supremacy of national parliaments, as in the Danish case.67
In some Member States the courts were ‘rather straightforward in
accepting the mainstream principles of Community law’ – ‘even before
accession’, as has been the situation in Greece.68 The most radical impact
on the sovereignty of the Member States results from the gradual estab-
lishment of the supremacy of Community law. The ECJ has extended step
by step its interpretation of the treaties, declaring that by creating a
Community of unlimited duration and having its own institutions, the
Member States have limited their sovereign rights. 
Though many courts have expressed doubts – most famously in
connection with the Irish ratification of the SEA and the judgement of the
German Constitutional Court on the TEU – or stressed their right of
review (A, B, D, E, I, S), the supremacy of Community law has generally
been accepted.69 It can be concluded – as in the case of the French Conseil
d’Etat which examines the conformity of statutes to the provisions of a
treaty – that the courts have ‘achieved a slow but significant accommoda-
tion with the inevitable’.70 In some states (DK, GR, P) either the
relationship between Community and national law has not proved to be
a major issue of legal dispute among national high courts or there have at
least been no attempts to interpret the character of the Union in order to
analyse the compatibility of national and European law. National courts
have apparently accepted without any serious resistance the primacy of
EC law and when needing to interpret the latter, they have referred to the
ECJ. One highly important set of procedures which particularly concerns
national institutions are the preliminary rulings made according to Article
234 (ex Article 177) ECT. These refer to decisions on the interpretation
and application of the Community law in cases of uncertainty before the
courts in Member States and which are referred to the ECJ by those
courts: ‘Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision
on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.’71 Such preliminary rulings are
binding on national courts and form an important link between the ECJ
and the Member States’ courts. The use of such preliminary rulings varies
considerably. By comparison, in 1998, British courts sought 269 rulings;
Italian courts 581 rulings; French courts 594 rulings; and German courts
sought as many as 1,113 rulings.
436 Conclusion
2444Ch18  3/12/02  2:07 pm  Page 436
An indicator of the continuing differences between the Member States
is the record of incorporation of EC legislation into national law. With
regard to the frequency of legal proceedings against Member States, the
trends of the 1980s continued. Those Member States with the then highest
rates of infringement proceedings (B, DK, GR, F, I) had at the end of the
1990s – with the exception of Denmark – still the highest number of
infringement cases. What is remarkable however, is that Denmark and the
United Kingdom, with their broadly sceptical views of European integra-
tion, nevertheless have better records than such pro-integration Member
States as Italy or Luxembourg. It would seem that this trend can be attrib-
uted only to a limited extent to political obstacles and a lack of efficiency
– especially in the case of Luxembourg. 
Regarding the total amount of infringements, the situation improved
between 1991 and 1995 in nearly all Member States with, most impor-
tantly, a minimum of forty-four cases referred to the Court in 1994. Yet,
until the end of the 1990s the total number again constantly grew, to 123
cases in 1998. 
Though EC law ‘remains a domain of specialists and a certain “elite”’72
the growing amount of EC legislation and the number of cases involving
Community law has increased the requirement in all Member States for
national judges and lawyers, as well as national administrators, to be
familiar with EC law (Table 18.1). In countries such as Ireland or
Portugal special efforts have been undertaken to train the responsible
staff. In the United Kingdom the impact on the national legal system has
been stressed. The unspectacular but persistent involvement of national
courts in the EC system is one of these basic trends which, to an increas-
ing degree, links the national and the EU systems.73 Thus – with all
reservations in view of the specific character of national variations’ – the
court system might be characterised as belonging to the group of active
multi-level players. 
Do the European Union’s Member States matter? Major findings on the
‘Europeanisation’ of Member States and the ‘domestication’ of the
Union 
The chapters on the ‘One’ and the ‘Fifteen’ tell a story full of complexities
but also of some common and recurrent patterns. The evolution of the EU
system as a whole has been considerable. There are ongoing changes and
adaptations within both the European and the national systems. From
analysing the institutional and procedural evolution of the European
Union we have learned that the demands and challenges faced by national
actors have grown considerably through several forms of differentiation.
National governments, administrations, parliaments, regions and courts
have had to face the processes and potential effects of para-constitutional
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Table 18.1 Proceedings against Member States, by category, in comparative perspective, 1991–98
Letters of Formal Notice Reasoned Opinions Cases referred to the Court
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
B 71 110 98 77 80 72 93 88 46 22 26 41 19 62 33 78 8 6 7 10 6 20 18 20
DK 52 45 66 57 42 22 64 40 3 4 3 14 1 0 1 10 1 0 – 0 0 0 0 1
D 60 97 119 90 92 62 116 88 13 18 35 66 25 37 35 46 1 5 4 5 10 8 19 5
GR 88 112 125 96 113 58 109 95 48 30 41 85 26 51 23 51 9 4 4 17 12 17 10 16
E 79 127 107 86 81 59 104 78 30 39 28 53 15 30 23 36 2 5 5 9 6 9 7 6
F 54 111 106 90 97 88 157 121 15 10 39 49 17 46 49 94 4 1 2 8 6 11 15 23
IR 59 88 91 70 67 43 86 63 27 13 25 47 3 36 14 46 3 9 – 12 6 4 6 10
I 115 137 108 102 114 75 123 110 76 40 49 60 36 71 36 91 24 11 6 12 17 9 20 16
LUX 64 97 91 64 71 39 74 62 35 21 29 36 9 28 14 39 4 14 11 6 3 4 8 11
NL 62 73 75 73 59 32 65 28 23 16 22 20 4 9 11 23 7 5 5 4 0 2 3 3
P 86 116 125 96 115 54 116 80 84 22 40 54 22 49 35 57 2 1 – 5 4 6 14 5
UK 63 97 98 73 77 47 92 66 11 13 15 21 15 14 8 35 0 3 – 1 2 1 1 1
SF – – – – 2 290 78 52 – – – – – 0 8 16 – – – – – 0 0 1
A – – – – 4 132 109 76 – – – – – 2 38 38 – – – – – 1 0 4
S – – – – 2 69 75 54 – – – – – 0 6 15 – – – – – 0 0 1
Total 853 1210 1209 974 1016 1142 1461 1101 411 248 352 546 192 435 334 675 65 64 44 89 72 92 121 123
Note: In reading the columns it must be recalled that Greece joined the Community in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and Finland, Austria and
Sweden in 1995.
Source: Table compiled by the authors on the basis of the Annual Reports of the Commission to the European Parliament on Monitoring the





































communitarisation as well as sectoral, procedural, institutional and actor
differentiation.74
As a common reaction we can observe some persistent trends among
the fifteen Member States. National systems in their overall set-up have
moved into the European arena. Thus the institutional system of the
Union – the ‘One’ – can be characterised neither as an isolated nor as a
closed system. The European Union at the beginning of the new century
is open to or has been opened by national institutions and actors, who are
not restricted to their national sphere but rather, to an increasing extent,
are oriented towards Brussels. Conversely actors from EU bodies have
extended their reach of activities deeply in ever-wider fields previously the
domain of sovereign nation states. This phenomenon of interaction and
mutual influence between European and national institutions has become
wider and more intense since the beginning of the integration process, and
is continuing. The gains might be larger for some actors than for others,
but winners and losers are broadly spread and the struggle for influence
still continues in all member countries. 
Vertical asymmetries: unbalanced co-evolution among levels
The ‘Europeanisation’ of national polities and the process of Member
States becoming part of the EU polity is clearly documented by the regular
patterns of interaction. But looking at the evolution of both levels we
observe a vertical asymmetry. The rate of change in the Brussels arena has
been faster than that at the national level. The overall impact of constitu-
tional amendments and revisions leading to institutional and procedural
adaptations has been limited and the strategies adopted by all national
players in national political systems have not led to a major structural
reorientation.
Experience so far shows that except for some actors – the German
Länder or perhaps the French parliament – new constitutional frame-
works and opportunities in the Member States have been used to only
a limited extent. No elaborate adaptation strategy, which would be
unknown or detrimental to the cornerstones of national systems, has yet
been developed. We witness considerable intra-systematic adaptations
owing to the differentiation challenges of the EU system, but no ‘revo-
lutions’ in the set-up of national polities. Thus, we note that national
reactions to the EU system have reached a certain prominence but they
do not constitute a dramatic turn-around from traditional patterns of
policy-making. Typically, we observe a mobilisation of established
actors within the existing constitutional and institutional framework.
This finding does, however, not exclude the apparently considerable
changes in major policies of all Member States, which were directly
influenced or at least reinforced by the evolution of the European Union.
Active involvement in the Union has led to a considerable evolution of
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political cultures and policies, which were however outside the remit of
this research. 
There are two possible explanations of this asymmetry between levels.
Either there is a considerable time lag, which would indicate a retarded
adaptation by the fifteen Member States, or it might be that Member
States are able to deal with these challenges by adapting their existing
machinery and structures incrementally. This finding might therefore also
explain a certain degree of satisfaction within Member States with their
respective degree of adaptation to the complex EU system.
Winners and losers: towards mega-administrations? 
In addition to the vertical asymmetries discussed above we also find
differences in terms of adaptation to EU policy-making on the horizontal
spectrum. Some groups of actors, particularly administrations and several
regions, have been more successful adapters than others. Thus, they have
been more successful in gaining access and influence – particularly than
parliaments and most regions. The intensity of use varies considerably
within and between Member States. Gains and losses depend not least on
the way national actors have established their own channels to the EU
level.
In the older Member States, parliaments and regions have reacted to
the Maastricht Treaty and adapted their way of working through two
parallel and mixed strategies: they seek formalised access and de jure
influence over national governments both at the beginning and end of the
EU policy-cycle. But to varying degrees these actors also step outside their
national arena and establish their own access to the EU bodies and
become part of network governance. Besides administrations, only inter-
est groups have turned into active and efficient multi-level players. 
Examples of strong national performers might include the governments
of Greece and Portugal or some parliaments such as the Danish and,
increasingly, the French. In these cases, constitutional and political
resources could be better employed at the national level, but not in the
Brussels arena. Strong EU performers without adequate national access
are more rare. The Spanish comunidades might be examples of this model.
The ‘weak adapters’are unable or unwilling to play a stronger game at the
national or the European level. The Italian regions and most parliaments
might exemplify this type. Strong multi-level players are able to increase
their access and influence at both levels and to use their position on one
level for strengthening their say on the other. German and Belgian regions
might develop into these kinds of actors. We can trace a persistent trend
during the 1990s, particularly in terms of adaptations and reactions to
Maastricht, towards stronger national performers. 
Given this rise in salience it is surprising that some fundamental
patterns of adaptation have not changed. Administrations have used
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existing set-ups to mobilise their resources for access and influence over
an increasing scope of vital policy areas and over all phases of the policy-
cycle. The masters of the treaty have installed and even reinforced an
institutional set-up which has maintained and strengthened the strategic
position of governments – especially prime ministers – and of administra-
tions. Even in those states where European parliamentarians are
participating on a permanent basis in EU committees of national parlia-
ments, one cannot observe any kind of permanent, formalised interaction
with the EU level. Parliamentarians of whatever level are not able to use
their access and influence at one level for enhancing their role at the other.
National bureaucracies have become the multi-level experts vis-à-vis their
amateurish parliamentary masters. Parliaments are underprofessionalised
– often they engage themselves too late and too little. Also, the CoR is no
match for the influence that central governments can have over the game.
But even chancelleries and foreign offices are not gross winners, they
are still the masters of amendment and revision of treaties – and with that
the constitutional and institutional set-up. However, they are no longer
masters of the normal use of these institutional incentives and constraints,
they are no longer the exclusive ‘chief negotiators’75 or gatekeepers for the
links between national and EU policy-cycles. The competition from
administrators and lobbyists has reduced the margin of the executive’s
prerogative in extra-national policy-making.
We have seen a persistent extension in the participation of administra-
tions and in the development of their role as active and strong multi-level
players. Empirical trends towards a ‘mega-administration’76 are clearly
visible, in and by which Community and national administrations link
their channels of influence and merge their respective sources to create
networks. In this process several variations can be discerned. A ‘mega-
technocracy’77 or an ‘expertocracy’78 would serve as a benevolent
‘epistemic community’79 for a common good. This view would fit into
functionalist thinking: the experts socialise and pre-decide what is ‘good’
for Europe. In more negative terms, national and European functionaries
would form a ‘mega-bureaucracy’ in which they would follow their
bureaucratic goals of maximising own resources. No more servants or
agents of their governments, they monopolise the central channels of
access and influence. As both levels are intrinsically interwoven, no
control mechanism exists and the institutional equilibrium is shifted to
these actors. 
However, several features of the EU policy-cycle could put the validity
of this argument in question. One is the rivalry among national adminis-
trations. Sectoral networks, with civil servants managing units, are
competitors for access and power in areas of scarce resources. The staffing
of Permanent Representations and the role of COREPER vis-à-vis other
high-level bodies such as ECOFIN – formerly the monetary committee –
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or the Political Committee of the CFSP structure are telling examples of
administrative competition. 
From asymmetries to differing degrees of adaptation: no imitation from
divergent responses
Comparing adaptation processes, the rate of importing apparently
successful components of other national systems is surprisingly limited. A
screening of best practices is not pursued on a systematic level – and
perhaps rightly so. The pictures sketched of particular Member States
make clear that any simple imitation would be subject to the law of unin-
tended consequences.
Several lines of thought have been presented in the ‘goodness of fit’
debate. Conventional wisdom stresses that administratively centralised
and politically hierarchical machineries – such as those of the United
Kingdom and France, for example – are clearly more successful than
systems such as that of the FRG which is characterised as pluralist, frag-
mented, decentralised and non-hierarchical.80 A later line of reasoning
however, stresses structural congruencies between the EU system and the
national systems. Puzzled by the apparently obvious successes of the FRG
– that of ‘failing successfully’81 – the competitiveness of national positions
was explained less by streamlined machinery but by broad and intensive
participation. Given that major features of the FRG seem to be more
congruent with some of the central characteristics of EU politics, the
former is considered to be more competitive, at least in the long term.
Pluralist and decentralised systems fit better into the pluralist system of
the Union (Figure 18.3). 
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After surveying the real variations on both levels, only cautious conclu-
sions can be drawn. Both at the national and at the European level a
simple answer is problematic. In view of national characteristics it is
extremely difficult to make any serious and valid statements on who is
more or less successful. Any blueprint for an optimal model is academi-
cally and politically risky. Best practices should be compared but carefully
evaluated in terms of the relevant constitutional, institutional and politi-
cal features, and the characteristics of the policy field concerned.
One issue is already linked to indicators of success. If we take the rate
of implementation as a sign of the successful adaptation of national
systems to the Union’s legal output, we get a different rating than if we
were to look at similarities of constitutional features or – another area of
competition among actors – at the contents passed on specific policies. In
certain areas the European Council and in others the Commission plays
the role of a strong collective hierarchy. These policy areas therefore
require different strategies among national actors when compared with
those policy fields characterised by non-hierarchical networks. At the
national level, systems which might look rather fragmented could turn out
to be quite strong on certain issues where leadership can be mobilised on
the basis of a large national or sectoral consensus. Certainly, the avail-
ability of different power resources might be of importance for a more
successful policy, but this does not imply that smaller states are not
competitive. 
One more argument in the debate about dominating systems should be
mentioned: perceived by some as being successful in constitutional deci-
sions on the Union, German strategies might have created exactly the
kind of EU set-up which fits best the German system. German models –
autonomy of central banks, involvement of regions, ministerial autonomy
in the sectoral councils, the judicial powers of the ECJ and the
Richtlinienkompetenz of the European Council – can be seen as closer to
those of consensus systems of a federal kind than those which exist in
centralised systems of a majoritarian type. These latter systems are then
forced by competition within the Union to evolve against long-established
traditions towards pluralist or federalist lines. Thus, in the long term these
dynamics would reinforce converging trends towards a multi-level
consensus democracy. We could expect at least a more narrow band of
variations.
Similarities among constitutional systems are open to debate. Perhaps
the Union’s institutional checks and balances might appear more similar
to those of the French Fifth Republic in times of cohabitation than the
German models presented above. A simple dichotomy between
centralised/fragmented or consensus/majoritarian models thus lacks suffi-
cient explanatory power, but might just serve as a starting point for
further research. 
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It is therefore against all probabilities that an institutional and proce-
dural device which has worked efficiently in one Member State will have
the same effects in a different institutional and political environment.
The fact that imports will not work in the manner anticipated leads to
the conclusion that operative lessons for applicant countries need to be
drawn very carefully. The range of experiences gained by national actors
in the present Union of fifteen is broad and offers many types of adapta-
tion. However, as a precondition for any advice we need an in-depth
analysis of the traditional structures and patterns of the country in ques-
tion. 
No convergence towards one hegemonic and dominating model 
The finding of rather uniform reaction patterns with regard to the shift of
awareness, attention and mobilisation of similar groups of actors should
not hide another surprising pattern. The constitutional, institutional and
administrative systems and their relative use have not converged into one
model for all the Member States. Given that they have faced the same kind
of challenges, the degree of convergence among the Union’s constitutive
units is rather small. Traditional national patterns are apparently flexible
enough to cope with the European challenges and to be sufficiently
complacent about the own performance inside the Union. Imports of
apparently more competitive set-ups or procedures are rare. Competitive
pressures have apparently only led to de facto harmonised mobilisation by
the political market.
Each Member State pursues its own way into the Brussels ‘space’. The
Union remains as ‘One’ plus ‘Fifteen’ quite different component units –
indeed in some cases the observations point to the reconfirmation and
restoration of well-known national patterns in the adaptation process.
Traditional key actors have used the challenges of Brussels to strengthen
some of their familiar intra-state positions. This picture of strengthened
conventional patterns is not however, without ambiguities. Some actors
such as the German Länder and the French Assemblée have acquired roles
which differ from those they played prior to the 1990s. The real effects are
difficult to identify as yet. Sceptically it could be argued that the efforts of
these actors have simply increased the complexity of national procedures
without seriously affecting the national space and even without any rele-
vance for the Brussels arena. Alternatively, it could be argued that there
has been a long-term trend towards new institutional equilibria both at
the national and at the European level. 
This debate points to the basic problem of the ‘no-convergence’ thesis:
the time span of our research might be too short. The autonomy of
national central banks as a consequence of EMU, the upgrading of yet to
establish regions due to Commission demands for structural funds and the
Committee of Regions, the changing role of national parliaments in their
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relationships with governments owing to the need to reduce democratic
deficits – all these elements might appear to be formal steps of minor
importance to the established patterns of national polities which have
simply been adapted but not overhauled as a consequence of the Union.
However, we might also identify some initial dynamics towards an adap-
tation process in the long term which would converge into one specific
type of Member State for the Union. The spilldown process from EU
developments might be more persistent and relevant than we realise at the
moment. The range of variations in the Member States’ structures might
become narrower in the future. This process would not lead to the devel-
opment of a uniform type of Member State, but nevertheless the historical
differences would lose their enduring strength and the major characteris-
tics of the EU polity would then increasingly affect national structures and
habits. 
Another feature, which could be studied in depth, might be of long-
term relevance for Member States. The broad involvement of many actors
and a constitutionally driven – and needed – search for consensus could
pave the way to a political and institutional culture quite different from
an ‘adversarial’ culture.82 Patterns of a consensual democracy would thus
be dominant not only at the EU level, but might also spill down into
national systems. The Community as a system of concordance might
create or at least reinforce a dominant culture. If such a convergence was
to make the ‘life of the EU system easier’ it would require additional
research.
With these considerations in mind, our findings might also contribute
to a dynamic theory on the evolution of (West-)European states.83 In a
long-term perspective, nation states have neither been ‘rescued’84 – though
we observe strategies for restoring conventional role models – nor substi-
tuted by supranational institutions, as some federalists have suggested.85
Even if we identify certain trends towards convergence there are difficul-
ties in discerning in which direction this multi-level system is moving. No
existing model – e.g. of conventional federations – offers a useful point of
reference. The evolution of the national and the European levels does not
follow any clear path towards a discernible finalité politique. We are thus
observing the creation of a new kind of polity – not as a substitute for
Member States but as some kind of a new stage in the evolution of West
European states. If the fifteen evolve into one, this new system will have
to be defined in a new way. 
Theories revisited: a step towards fusion? 
Our observations on the national systems as dependent variables raise the
issue of explanations, i.e. of the validity of the four theoretical expecta-
tions following the (neo)realist, the (neo)federal/functional, the
governance and the fusion assumptions. Although all four models are to
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some extent heuristic and ideal archetypes which describe reality in a
schematic way, they are nevertheless helpful for classifying the evolution
of the European integration process. Each model offers assistance, some
insights, gains subsistence with regard to special matters and presents a
positive theory explaining why and how this construction has evolved as
it has, from the late 1940s up to the Amsterdam or Nice Treaty. 
Yet, we come to the conclusion that, overall, the fusion theory is the
most suitable for describing observations such as those we defined as
‘Europeanisation’, the ever-increasing institutional interaction and the
limited systemic convergence. The development towards a federal system
seems unlikely because national institutions aim to retain their influence.
They will participate as long as it seems useful for the fulfilment of their
tasks and their own survival. The constitutional dynamics of the
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, of which (neo)functionalists and
(neo)federalists would approve, have not worked. We could not identify
enough indications of a clear shift towards strengthening a supranational
regime. With regard to the Amsterdam Treaty and in view of the increase
of parliamentary powers we have seen neither a development back to a
(neo)realist model, limiting the institutions to the domestic level, nor a
trend towards the governance model in which we would expect an erosion
of the traditional politico-administrative systems of nation states.
Governance analyses would need to bring the role of national parliaments
and the EP into the research focus. 
The intensive ‘Europeanisation’ can be seen as crucial ingredient in the
fusion model in which national actors – voluntarily or involuntarily –
create an irreversible process of pooling and merging policy instruments.
The fusion process stresses the checks and balances between national and
EU institutions in preparing, making, implementing and controlling
binding decisions. It focuses on the mixing of national and EU competen-
cies and the shared responsibility of institutions for the combined use of
state instruments. According to this approach, a precise division of
competencies and responsibilities is improbable and might even be seen as
unnecessary. Instead, the fusion model emphasises the multitude of insti-
tutional interactions and co-operation. 
The role of national governments and administrations in this process
might help to explain the evolution of the system. The Union is the
rational product of fundamental choices by member governments.
Constituent steps in this process are the package deals through which
Member States agree to invest competencies and resources into the polit-
ical system. The Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties have been two among
many fundamental agreements made by the Member States to use the
Union for their own purposes. However, an emphasis on the role of
national governments and administrations does not imply a submissive
role for EU institutions. Indeed the latter are not only significant as agents
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for efficient and effective policy-making but have also developed their
own institutional ambitions. According to neo-institutionalist
approaches, EU institutions do matter in shaping the perceptions of
national actors and in changing the context of the rational pursuit of
national interests. States can remain the ‘masters of the treaties’ but they
are transforming themselves in the very process. Indeed, they have become
actors in their own right and with their own weight. The political space in
Brussels is not only created by but also filled with national politicians and
civil servants.
Yet, this fusion process has been asymmetrical. Change has been
restricted to the governmental machinery, interest groups and to some
degree courts among the fifteen. The fusion process has extended to some
regions. But national parliaments have not become as deeply involved in
the Brussels arena. The trend towards deparliamentarisation and bureau-
cratisation continues – though the dramatic impact of this development
has decreased. 
As to the future: an ever-continuing evolution without an optimum 
The 1990s showed that the development of EU polity had not reached a
final stage or even a ‘local optimum’. The revisions and amendments of
the Amsterdam Treaty as well as the working of EMU would lead us to
expect a reinforced continuation of the basic trends. The Union in the first
decade of the 3rd millennium will provide further challenges for national
actors. With new Member States the number of important co-actors as
veto players will increase. Given the Union’s broader policy-making
scope, national demands for influence will grow with key words such as
‘transparency’, ‘democratic deficit’ and ‘legitimacy’ being employed as a
pretext for a higher degree of participation. 
Following both national and European strategies for gaining access and
influence, national actors will create additional structures and procedures.
Actors on both levels have already demonstrated a large degree of inge-
nuity in developing incremental devices without creating new procedures
or set-ups at the national level. We have not discovered any significant
change in this conservative attitude among the major actors. If we extrap-
olate the major trends of the first decades – also in view of the new
challenges – the EU polity will become even more complex. Thus the
demands made of national actors will grow even further. A vicious circle
between the claim for participation and the increase of complexity has set
in and there are few signs that the present plans for improving efficiency
and legitimacy will be more successful in moving the stronger multi-level
players out of their positions. Neither a one-way-street towards re-nation-
alisation nor a continuous process of replacing national actors seems to be
plausible.
The way in which the challenges of the political agenda up to the year
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2000 are being dealt with both in the Union and the Member States would
lead us to expect that the trends leading to and from Maastricht,
Amsterdam and Nice will continue. Thus, there will be a continuation of
the dilemma of creating an optimal balance between the perceived need
for bold constitutional reforms to maintain efficiency and effectiveness,
and the desire among Member States to participate and maintain control. 
In the near future there might even be inexperienced incentives and
more ‘noise’ in the system. With more partners, especially those applicant
countries with a completely different historical tradition and with institu-
tional patterns which have not been tested in multi-level arenas, the
evolution of the Union and its Member States might take a different track
in the future. The enlargement from fifteen to twenty-seven might oblige
us to review the usefulness of the approach and to re-characterise the
nature and the evolution of the ‘beast’.
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Latvia 110
LCGB see Lëtzëbuerger Chrëschtleche
Gewerkschaftsbond
League of cities and municipalities (AU) 342
Left Party (S) 370
Left Wing Alliance (SF) 162
legal constitution 15, 30, 421




Lëtzëbuerger Sozialistesch Arbëchter Partei
(Lux) 304, 305
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LIF see Liberal Party (AU)
Lithuania 110
living constitution 29, 30, 31, 39
lobbying see interest groups 
LSAP see Lëtzëbuerger Sozialistesch
Arbëchter Partei 
Luxembourg Monetary Institute (Lux) 307
Maastricht criteria see convergence criteria
Maastricht Treaty xiii, 4, 5, 11, 17, 29, 30,
31, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 54,
55, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 92, 93, 95, 99,
101, 106, 107, 110, 111, 122, 124,
129, 130, 132, 138, 167, 168, 172,
179, 186, 187, 201, 202, 217, 222,
223, 228, 239, 250, 272, 273, 277,
286, 287, 299, 300, 306, 307, 310,
316, 317, 320, 322, 327, 328, 329,
330, 331, 332, 346, 348, 357, 365,
370, 380, 390, 394, 390, 399, 401,
404, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421, 422,
424, 427, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435,
440, 448
MAE (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores)
see Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MAFF see Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (see also DEFRA)






masters of the treaties xiv, 5, 8, 11, 14, 30,
33
Mediterranean countries 186
MEH (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda)
see Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ministerial Committee of Defence and
Overseas Policies (GB) 396
Ministers and Secretaries Group (Irl) 262,
264, 265





Netherlands 317, 320, 322, 323, 332
Spain 201
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Spain 190






Ministry for Development Aid (DK) 98
Ministry for/of Economic Affairs
Belgium 75, 76
Netherlands 320, 322, 332
Ministry for EC/EU affairs (GR) 169
Ministry for/of Economy
Denmark 98
Germany 120, 122, 124, 125, 126
Luxembourg 308
Portugal 365




(Science and Culture) Spain 190
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs
(Lux) 304, 308





Ministry for Environment and Energy (DK)
98
Ministry for European Affairs
France 226, 228, 280







Netherlands 317, 320, 332
Portugal 360, 363, 365
Ministry for/of Foreign Affairs
Austria 342, 349
Belgium 75, 77, 78, 80
Denmark 96, 99, 102
Finland 155
France 226, 238
Germany 122, 124, 126
Greece 169, 171, 177, 178
Ireland 256
Italy 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283,
289
Luxembourg 305, 306 307, 309
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Netherlands 317, 318, 322, 323, 326,
331, 332
Portugal 358, 360, 362, 364
Spain 188, 194, 195, 197, 201, 202
Sweden 374, 375, 376, 383
Ministry for Health (DK) 98




(and Judicial Affairs) Spain 191
Ministry for Industry (GR) 179
Ministry for Industry and Energy (E) 190
















(and Social Affairs) France 227, 231
Germany 122
(and Social Services) Greece 169
(and Solidarity) Portugal 361
Ministry for National Economy (GR) 169,
178
Ministry for Planning and Territorial
Administration (P) 360, 363
Ministry for Public Works, Urbanism and
the Environment (GR) 178
Ministry for Regional Planning (F) 231
Ministry for Trade and Competitiveness
(GB) 397
Ministry for Transport and Water (NL)
320, 332
Ministry of Public Order (GR) 171, 178
Ministry of Public Works (E) 190, 201
Moderate Party (S) 370












players xvi, 6, 12, 13, 14
system xiii, xvi, 4, 138, 340, 343
National Assembly (F) 219, 223, 225, 226,
235, 236
National Co-ordinator for Free Movement
of People in the European Space (P)
360, 361
Nationalrat (AU) 338
NATO see North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation
(neo-)corporatism 251
(neo-)federal/functional theory xvi, 9–11,
15, 54, 445, 446
neo-institutionalist theory xiii, 15, 32, 447








North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 69,
166, 167, 256, 337, 350
Northern Ireland 258, 392, 398, 399
Northern Ireland Office (UK) 398




Oireachtas (Irl) 257, 258, 267
Onofhëngege Gewerkschaftsbond
Lëtzëbuerg (Lux) 299
OP see EU Operational Committee
Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development 322
organised crime 358, 366
see also Justice and Home Affairs
Orthodox Calvinist Parties (NL) 319, 330
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (AU)
348
Österreichische Volkspartei (AU) 338, 339,
340, 342, 350
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ÖVP see Österreichische Volkspartei
Paris Summit 70
Paris Treaty 30
parliamentarisation (of the EU/EC) 51, 55
Parliamentary Committee for
Constitutional Reforms (I) 273
Parliamentary Committee for European
Affairs (P) 362
parliamentary committees 41
Parliamentary Committee on European
Affairs (GR) 171




Partido Social-Democrata (P) 357, 358,
362
Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) (P) 355,
357, 358, 361
Parti Socialiste (F) 218, 220
Partnership 2000 251
Partnership for Peace 256
Party of European Socialists 380
party system: 16 Path dependency
approach 32
People’s Europe 46
People’s Movement against the EC Union
(DK) 93, 94
Permanent Representation 
of the Member States 51, 74, 75–76, 77,
88–89 (B); 124, 126, 127, 133 (D);
155, 158 (SF); 171, 178, 376, 429
(GR); 187, 191, 194, 196, 200, 202,
394, 396, 397 (E); 226, 228, 230, 232,
235 (F); 262, 265, 266 (Irl); 278, 279,
285 (I); 305 , 307 (Lux); 322, 323,
328, 429 (NL); 376, 377, 429 (S); 344
(AU); 361 (P)
role in policy-cycle 428–429, 435








decision-preparation 30, 396, 274
EU xv, 3, 7–8, 17, 29, 39, 40, 49, 51
phases of the 40–43, 45, 48, 119, 123,
125, 136
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 41
political system 
of the EU xiii, 9, 19, 31, 48
federal 11, 42, 70, 167, 176
semi-presidential 217
Portuguese Central Bank 357
PP see Partido Popular
preliminary ruling 267, 322, 325, 403, 436
Presidential Conference of Chambers of
Agriculture (AU) 340
prime ministerial department for
Community policies (I) 279
Programme for
Competitiveness and Work (Irl) 251
Economic and Social Progress (Irl) 251
National Recovery (Irl) 251
Progress Party (DK) 93, 94, 101
PS see Partido Socialista (P); Parti Socialiste
(F)
PSD see Partido Social-Democrata
public opinion 15–16, 33, 72, 82 (B), 110
(DK); 167, 168, 175, 177 (GR); 203
(E); 217, 218, 220 (F)
PvdA see Partei van de Arbeid
Radical Right (AU) 350
Rassemblement pour la République (F) 219
realism see (neo-)realist theory
Red–Green Alliance (DK) 93, 94
Regeringens Udenrigspolitiske Udvalg
(Foreign Policy Committee) (DK)
96–98
regional and structural policy 7
regional development policy 186, 187
REIA-E see Council on International and
European Affairs
Research Framework Programmes 45
research policy 50, 51
Ressortprinzip (D) 119
Richtlinienkompetenz (guidance
competence) (D) 120, 127
Right of establishment 46
Riksdagen (S) 370, 376, 377, 378
Romania 176
Rome Treaty 30, 31, 79, 104, 122, 132,
422
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Schengen (agreement/acquis) 95, 103, 110,
120, 131, 191, 227, 282, 307, 328,
360, 361
science policy 46
Scotland 398, 399, 407
Scottish National Party (UK) 407
Scottish Office (UK) 398
SEA see Single European Act 
Second World War 69, 415
Secretaría de Estado de Política Exterior y
de la Unión Europea (Secretariat of
State for Foreign Policy and the
European Union) (E) 187, 192, 193,
194, 195, 196, 197, 200, 202
Secreteriat for EU affairs (SF) 158
Secréteriat Général du Gouvernement (F)
222, 234, 235, 237
Secréteriat Général du Comité
Interministériel (F) 18, 222, 227,
228–229, 230, 232, 234, 236, 237,
238, 240
Secretariat-General for European Affairs
(GR) 169
Secretariat of State (E) 188, 426
Secretariat of State for European Affairs (P)
358, 360, 361, 362
security policy 151, 256
Select Committee on the European
Communities (UK) 401
SEM see Single European Market 
Senate
Belgium 80, 81
France 226, 235, 236
Italy 272, 273, 281
SEPEUE see Secretaría de Estado de
Política Exterior y de la Unión
Europea 
Serbia 167
Serviço de estrangeiros e fronteiras (P) 361
SGCI see Secréteriat Général du Comité
Interministériel
SGG see Secréteriat Général du
Gouvernement
single currency 250, 251, 256, 355, 356,
357, 358, 363, 366, 380, 390, 391,
398
Single Currency Officer’s Team (Irl) 256
Single European Act xiv, 4, 5, 30, 39, 45,
49, 92, 104, 122, 124, 132, 133, 167,
228, 249, 287, 323, 327, 328, 389,
389, 401, 420, 422, 429, 436
single institutional framework 33
Single (European) Market 45, 185, 217,
223, 230, 237, 356, 389, 401
single market programme 268, 318, 389,
391, 397
Sinn Fein (Irl) 249
small and medium-sized enterprises 229,
230, 348
SNP see Scottish National Party
Social Chapter 390, 391
Social-Christian (Party) (B) 72, 82
Social Democratic Party
Denmark 93, 94, 95, 101
Finland 152
Germany 116
Netherlands 316, 317, 318, 333
Sweden 370, 371, 380






Socialist/PASOK Party (GR) 166, 167, 173,
177
Socialist People’s Party (DK) 93, 94, 101,
102
Social Liberal Party (DK) 93, 94, 95, 101
social partnership 251, 337, 338, 339, 340,
345, 348
social policy 30, 46, 85, 106, 116, 152,
250
Social Protocol of Maastricht Treaty 230
Soviet Union 338
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
(AU) 338, 339, 340, 342, 348, 349
Special Act on Institutional Reforms (B) 80,
81
Special Committee (DK) 106, 105–106,
108, 109, 110, 106 
Special Supreme Court (GR) 174
spillover see (neo-) federal/functional theory
spillover processes 54
SPÖ see Sozialdemokratische Partei
Österreichs
SSEA see Secretariat of State for European
Affairs 
Stability Pact 219, 220, 318, 347
Standing Committee for European Affairs
Greece 172
Netherlands 326
Standing Committee of the Austrian Länder
(AU) 342, 344
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State Secretary for European Affairs (NL)
317
Statsrådsberedningen 374
structural funds 177, 185, 186, 190, 193,
194, 197, 200, 202, 204, 205, 230,
250, 253, 261, 263, 266, 328, 329,
355, 357, 361, 363, 364, 366, 377,
400, 417, 434, 435
Subdirección general de Política Exterior y
de Seguridad Común (Under-
Directorate General for CFSP) (E) 191
subsidiarity 73, 94, 138, 139, 186, 202,








Supreme Administrative Court 
Finland 160
Greece 174, 175
Supreme Civil Court (GR) 175
Supreme Court (Irl) 252, 267
Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (Swedish
Employers’ Confederation (S) 379
Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation
(Swedish Confederation of Professional
Associations) (S) 379
Switzerland 338
Taoiseach (Irl) 252, 262, 263, 264
taxation policy 46
terrorism 186, 202, 358, 366
see also Justice and Home Affairs




trade policy 42, 44, 54
transport policy 46
Treasury (UK) 396, 397, 398, 399
Treaty establishing the European
Communities 45, 54, 72, 84, 133, 138. 
‘treatyisation’ 38
Treaty of Rome see Rome Treaty
Treaty on the European Union xiv, 4, 11,
12, 13, 17, 29, 70, 130, 185, 186,
187, 193, 201, 202, 203, 249, 250,
251, 252, 256, 338, 356, 357, 358,
360, 361, 362, 364
TREVI network 37
Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional
Court) (E) 187, 194, 197
Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia
(Competition Defence Body) (E) 199
Tribunal Económico–Administrativo
Central (Central Economic–
Administrative Court) (E) 199
Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (High
Courts of the Autonomous
Communities) (E) 199
Turkey 168, 176, 177
Tweede Kamer (NL) 432
Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske
embedsmandsudvalg (Foreign and
Security Political Committee) (DK) 98,
104
Udenrigspolitisk Udvalg (Foreign Policy
Committee) (DK) 104, 105
UGT see União Geral de Trabalhadores
UK Permanent Representation 394, 397,
398–399
UN see United Nations
União Geral de Trabalhadores (P) 356
UNICE see Union of Industrialists of the
European Community
Unidad Administrativa del Fondo Social
Europeo (European Social Fund
Administration Unit) (E) 190
Unidad de Coordinación y Cooperación
Internacional (Unit for International
Co-ordination and Co-operation) (E)
191
Union Committee (Comité de l’Union)
(Lux) 306
Union of Industrialists of the European
Community 158, 229, 379
United Nations 69, 337
United States of Europe 116
Unity List (DK) 93, 102
Vienna Summit 347
Vlaams Blok (B) 72
VNG see Dutch Association of
Municipalities 
Volkspartej voor Vrijheld en Democratie
319
Volksunie (B) 72
VVD see Volkspartej voor Vrijheld en
Democratie 
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Wales 398, 399, 407
Welsh Office (UK) 398
Western European Union 92, 116, 204,
256, 358
WEU see Western European Union
working groups (of the Council) 42, 53,
135, 262, 265, 394, 425, 428, 434,
441
World Trade Organisation 103
Yugoslavia 178, 319, 338, 349
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